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Abstract
This thesis aims to reconstruct the bases of the doctrine of the sufficiency of Scripture,
bringing its orthodox Protestant formulation into discussion with some related topics in
contemporary theology, hermeneutics, literary theory and the philosophy of language.
Material for the reconstruction is found especially in speech-act theory, as developed by J.L.
Austin, John Searle and Nicholas Wolterstorff, and as it has been applied to the Bible
initially by Wolterstorff, Anthony Thiselton and Kevin Vanhoozer. The content of the
thesis addresses both those who confess the doctrine too unreflectively and those who
dismiss it too hastily.
An introductory chapter outlines the academic contexts in which the content of the thesis is
located: the interpretation of the historical doctrine of Scripture; the influence of linguistic
and literary theory on contemporary theology and biblical studies; Jacques Derrida's
concept of the inevitable 'supplementation' of written texts; the question of authority in
theology and how God is to be 'named'; the broad question of how Christian theology may
think of God's action in light of modernity and post-modernity.
The body of the thesis begins with an analytical overview of the history of the doctrine's
development and decline, focusing on its full articulation in the Protestant Reformation and
in post-Reformation Protestant scholasticism, (chapter 2). Theologians of the latter type,
particularly Francis Turretin, are defended against the charge that they departed
significantly from the Reformation understanding of Scripture. This analysis describes
three elements of the sufficiency of Scripture, each of which is reconstructed in turn in the
three subsequent chapters.
Chapter 3 deals with the theological claim that God speaks, and that Scripture is a medium
of his speech. A notion of what it is to speak based on speech-act theory and especially on
Wolterstorff s application of it to divine speech is adopted, and used to inform a reading of
Karl Barth's conception of God as speaker, in order to assess his rejection of fundamental
aspects of the classical Protestant doctrine of Scripture. The identification of Scripture with
the Word ofGod, acknowledging Barth's concerns, is defended.
Chapter 4 takes up the material aspect of the sufficiency of Scripture: that Scripture
contains everything necessary to be known for salvation. Various construals of textual
ontology are discussed: the hermeneutical models of 'textual self-sufficiency' offered in
literary theory by New Criticism and in theology by Hans Frei; the opposing construals of
authorship developed by E.D. Hirsch and deconstruction, especially as the latter is
exemplified in the work of the NT scholar Stephen Moore; the reader-oriented
hermeneutics of Stanley Fish and Stanley Hauerwas. A conception of Scripture as
'sufficient', in relation to an ethical construal of authorship and a description of the action of
the Holy Spirit, is developed.
Chapter 5 takes up the formal aspect of sufficiency: that Scripture is sufficient for its own
interpretation. The theories of intertextuality of Julia Kristeva and Roland Barthes are
examined, and philosophical resources are found in the work of Mikhail Bakhtin on
language and Paul Ricoeur on Scripture, exemplified in the NT exegesis ofRichard Hays, to
outline a conception of 'biblical polyphony'. The canonical hermeneutics of B.S. Childs is
examined, and supplemented hermeneutically via a recent suggestion of E.D. Hirsch on
authorial intentionality, and theologically with a defence of the orthodox Protestant doctrine
of biblical inspiration, as articulated by B.B. Warfield. A conception of the canon of
Scripture as 'sufficient' is offered.
A concluding chapter suggests how this reconstruction of the sufficiency of Scripture may
inform questions of hermeneutics, biblical authority and Christian talk about God.
[I]f the texts that interest us mean something, it is the
engagement and the appurtenance that encompass existence
and writing in the same tissue, the same text. The same
here is called supplement.
Jacques Derrida, OfGrammatology
[T]he fulfilment and the end of the Law, and of all Holy
Scripture, is the love of an object which is to be enjoyed
[God], and the love of an object which can enjoy that other
in fellowship with ourselves [our neighbour], ... The whole
temporal dispensation for our salvation, therefore, was
framed by the providence of God that we might know this
truth and be able to act upon it; and we ought to use that
dispensation, not with such love and delight as if it were a
good to rest in, but with a transient feeling rather, such as
we have towards the road, or carriages, or other things that
are merely means. Perhaps some other comparison can be
found that will more suitably express the idea that we are to
love the things by which we are borne only for the sake of
that towards which we are borne.
Augustine, On Christian Doctrine
Later on, the word fills with meaning.
It remains gravid and it fills up with lives.
Everything had to do with births and sounds -
affirmation, clarity, strength,
negation, destruction, death -
the verb took over all the power
and blended existence with essence
in the electricity of its beauty.
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1. Introduction
'It is not easy ... to confess the sufficiency of Scripture: it is not a self-evident, handy
chapter in systematic theology, but it is the dominating tone for the entire chorus of the
church.'1 G.C. Berkouwer's statement implicitly warns of two over-arching problems
which may attend a discussion of the sufficiency of Scripture. It can be confessed cheaply,
with too little acknowledgment that it is a confession which, where it is made, must be
argued for carefully; it must be shown in its relation to the fundamental christological,
pneumatological and trinitarian themes of Christian theology. Those who reject it are not
self-evidently wrong, for it is not self-evident that they thereby either misrepresent the Bible
or distort the rest of Christian theology. It can also be denied hastily, with too little
acknowledgement that it is a confession which, in various forms, has been widely made and
cherished throughout the history of the Christian church, for most of that period by the
majority of Christians, as vital to what Christians want to tell themselves and others about
the Christian faith.
The present work aims to examine the sufficiency of Scripture, heeding both
Berkouwer's implicit warnings. We will address those Christian communities who do wish
to assert belief in the sufficiency of Scripture, investigating how the doctrine may best be
constructed and articulated at the end of the twentieth century. It will be argued that our
proposed construction is coherent, defensible, and not at odds with other central themes in
Christian theology. Our construction will be a reconstruction, both in that it is intended to
be in continuity with the classical doctrine of Scripture,2 and in that elements for it have
been sought in recent developments in hermeneutical theory and, especially, the philosophy
of language, which were not available to previous proponents of the doctrine.
Characteristic of the intellectual and cultural life of the present century has been a
focusing of interests on language, evidenced especially, for our concerns, by the so-called
'linguistic turn' of philosophy, and by the increasing notice taken by other disciplines of
academic studies of literature. Both biblical studies and Christian theology have been
affected by these developments in many complex ways. Significant branches of biblical
scholarship have become interested in the Bible as a linguistic and literary entity, as the
expanding number of different 'literary' interpretive approaches at the disposal of the
1 G.C. Berkouwer, Studies in Dogmatics. Holy Scripture trans. & ed. Jack B. Rogers (Grand Rapids,
Michigan: Eerdmans, 1975), 305.
2 By 'classical doctrine of Scripture' is meant that which came to prominence in the work of the
Protestant Reformers, and was developed by subsequent orthodox Protestant writers. That, despite
the differences between writers of this period, a relatively consistent core of beliefs about the Bible
can be identified, will be defended in chapter 2. The doctrine's formulation in the seventeenth
century, confessionally in the Westminster Confession of Faith and theologically in the work of
Francis Turretin, will be prominent throughout the thesis.
biblical scholar bears witness. Among theologians who have been influenced by this shift,
new linguistic and literary conceptualities are often taken to confirm and deepen, rather than
to challenge, the disrepute into which doctrines of Scripture have fallen.3 In contemporary
theology, notes John Webster, Christian doctrine 'has receded into the background in
describing the church's reading of the Bible'; he locates the cause in 'the steady expansion
of general hermeneutics' and its rise 'to become a fundamental, transcendental
anthropology.'4 In general the decision made programmatically in the nineteenth century
that a particular focus on a doctrine of Scripture is unnecessary or unhealthy to Christian
theology, detracting from what should be its primary concern, is not regularly questioned.5
Of course, a relative lack of interest in the doctrine of Scripture itself does not mean
that the issues which earlier formulations of the doctrine were intended to address - the
mode of God's continuing presence in the church and the world, the hierarchical
relationship between different claimed sources of human knowledge of God, the
frameworks through which revelation is to be interpreted - have ceased to be of central
importance for the enterprise of theology. Nor does it mean that theologians have had no
interest in reworking their views of Scripture along the way, relocating Scripture in the
wider theological task. It may be, in fact, that the increasing plurality of Christian
theologies and practices raises questions about the Bible, paradoxically, to even greater
prominence: 'Now that almost the only thing held in common by all those who call
themselves Christian is this canon of sacred books, the Bible is quite simply indispensable.'6
Scriptura returns as (almost) sola, now at a minimal pragmatic level. How should
Christians think about these texts which they still all share in common?
Recently, a small number of theologians have found the resources to develop a renewed
conception of Scripture, which remains largely in line with views of Scripture articulated
especially in the Protestant Reformation, in one particular recent development in the
3 As regards linguistic influences on theology, this is true whether the interest in language is
motivated by wider trends in philosophy or is more consciously theological; see, respectively, the
Derridean post-modern theology exemplified by Mark C. Taylor, (e.g., Mark C. Taylor, Erring. A
Postmodern A/theology [Chicago & London: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1984]), and the 'radical
orthodoxy' recently developed by John Milbank, Catherine Pickstock and others, (e.g., John Milbank,
The Word Made Strange. Theology, Language, Culture [Oxford: Blackwell, 1997]; Catherine
Pickstock, After Writing. On the Liturgical Consummation ofPhilosophy [Oxford: Blackwell, 1998]).
4 John Webster, 'Hermeneutics in Modern Theology: Some Doctrinal Reflections' Scottish Journal of
Theology 51 (1998), 307-41 (311-12). This is evident in theologians influenced by literary categories:
e.g., Hans Frei's narrative theology, (which will be discussed in chapter 4), while focused on the
Bible, is not interested in doctrines of Scripture.
5 The concern is, of course, an ancient one. Augustine describes the danger of becoming obsessed
with the signpost not the reality, with the carriage rather than the destination, (Augustine, On
Christian Doctrine, 1.35, 39, in Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers 2 ed. Philip Schaff [Grand Rapids:
Eerdmans, 1956]). The danger is something like that of becoming a Christian 'train-spotter'.
6 Frances Young, The Art of Performance. Towards a Theology ofHoly Scripture (London: Darton,
Longman & Todd, 1990), 62.
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philosophy of language: speech-act theory. Anthony Thiselton began his work on this topic
by noting how ordinary language philosophy in general, and speech-act theory in particular,
arguing as it does that the conveying of propositions is a condition of the fundamentally
performative function of language, could correct both of the opposing views that the
language of the Bible is performative but conveys no semantic content,7 or that the primary
function of all language is to refer.8 He has gone on to apply this insight to the Bible as a
whole, in the context of a sophisticated analysis of contemporary hermeneutics, stressing
especially the 'self-involving' character of biblical language.9 Kevin Vanhoozer has
focused specifically on the different analytical concepts provided by speech-act theory,
using them to inform a description of how biblical literary genres function in relation to
truth and authority,10 to outline a doctrine of Scripture," and most fully to articulate a
trinitarian hermeneutic, in dialogue with contemporary theology, hermeneutics and literary
theory.12 Nicholas Wolterstorff has appropriated speech-act theory quite inventively in his
philosophical defence of the claim that 'God speaks', and to relate that speaking activity to
the Bible.13 The work of these three, particularly Vanhoozer and Wolterstorff, will be
significant in the present work - the former because he has focused on the issue of the
doctrine of Scripture as a whole, and the latter because of the particular development of
speech-act theory he provides, which, we will argue, is particularly insightful.
7 A.C. Thiselton, 'The Parables as Language-Event: Some Comments on Fuchs's Hermeneutics in the
Light of Linguistic Philosophy' Scottish Journal of Theology 23 (1970) 437-68. Thiselton suggests in
this article that light be shed on different forms of biblical literature through the adoption of the
resources of 'linguistic philosophy'. This has been taken up by Dietmar Neufeld, Reconceiving Texts
as Speech Acts. An Analysis of 1 John (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1994); Andreas Wagner, Sprechakte unci
Sprechaktanalyse im Alten Testament. Untersuchungen im biblischen Hebraisch an der Nahtstelle
zwischen Handlungsebene und Grammatik (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1997). The issue of the
journal Semeia devoted to speech-act theory and biblical studies (41 [1988]) proved to be rather
disappointing, (see Anthony C. Thiselton, review article: 'Speech-Act Theory and the Claim that God
Speaks: Nicholas Wolterstorff s Divine Discourse' Scottish Journal of Theology 50 [1997], 97-110
[97 n.3]).
8 Anthony C. Thiselton, 'The Supposed Power of Words in the Biblical Writings' Journal of
Theological Studies 25 (1974) 283-99.
9
Anthony C. Thiselton, New Horizons in Hermeneutics (London: HarperCollins, 1992), esp. 274-300;
'Authority and Hermeneutics: Some Proposals for a More Creative Agenda', in eds Philip E.
Satterthwaite & David F. Wright, A Pathway into the Holy Scripture (Grand Rapids, Michigan:
Eerdmans, 1994), 107-41.
10 Kevin J. Vanhoozer, 'The Semantics of Biblical Literature: Tmth and Scripture's Diverse Forms',
in eds D.A. Carson & John D. Woodbridge, Hermeneutics, Authority and Canon (Leicester: Inter-
Varsity Press, 1986), 53-104.
" Kevin Vanhoozer, 'God's Mighty Speech-Acts: The Doctrine of Scripture Today', in eds
Satterthwaite & Wright, A Pathway, 143-81.
12 Kevin J. Vanhoozer, Is There a Meaning in This Text? The Bible, the Reader and the Morality of
Literary Knowledge (Leicester: Apollos, 1998).
13 Nicholas Wolterstorff, Divine Discourse. Philosophical Reflections on the Claim that God Speaks
(Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1995).
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We aim here to recommend these appropriations as indeed potentially significant and
fruitful for theology, and to develop them for the reconstruction of one particular aspect of
the historical doctrine of Scripture, namely sufficiency. This appropriation of a theory from
general hermeneutical and philosophical disciplines is not intended to be implicit in the
displacement of doctrine by hermeneutics which Webster regrets, but rather to extend the
descriptive scope of doctrine, in the mode which Webster recommends: 'theology has much
to learn from recent work on the nature of texts, especially from those which look at texts as
fields of action. ... But theological appeal to these theories ought only to be ad hoc and
pragmatic, a matter of finding a tool to do a job.'14 This raises the question of the relation of
general and special hermeneutics, which lies behind much of the present study, and which
will be reflected on directly in the concluding chapter.
A second audience is also intended, as we heed Berkouwer's second implicit warning,
that the sufficiency of Scripture not be rejected too hastily. First, in a historical overview of
the doctrine, we will defend seventeenth-century orthodox Protestant theologians, among
whom the doctrine was articulated especially clearly, against the charge that they departed
significantly from the dynamic views of Scripture held by the Protestant Reformers. We
will also, in chapter 5, defend the doctrine of biblical inspiration found in many writers of
the same period. The point of these historical studies within a work of theology is to argue
that a detailed articulation of the 'attributes' of Scripture is not necessarily dangerous to
Christian theology. Second, in discussing and critiquing various hermeneutical approaches
to texts, in chapters 4 and 5, as alternatives to that implied by the doctrine of the sufficiency
of Scripture, we will comment on some contemporary theologians who have developed
analogous approaches to the Bible, and the corresponding problems which they inherit.
This is to suggest that what we will outline as the sufficiency of Scripture is a confession
more appropriate to the content of Christian theology than the view of Scripture expressed
or implied by many contemporary alternative approaches. These implications will become
explicit when the authority of Scripture is discussed directly in the final chapter.
In its address to each of these two groups, this study therefore represents a theological
reflection, informed by speech-act theory and some contemporary hermeneutical issues, on
the doctrine of the sufficiency of Scripture, and a doctrinal reflection, informed by the
classical Protestant doctrine of Scripture, on Christian theology.
Two reasons may be offered to justify our chosen focus on the sufficiency of Scripture:
one theological and historical, and one philosophical and methodological. First, as
Berkouwer says, and as will be argued in chapter 2, the confession of Scripture as sufficient
has been largely central rather than peripheral to the church's confession of faith in general,
14 Webster, 'Hermeneutics in Modern Theology', 329.
4
and more narrowly to its doctrine of Scripture, both before and after the Reformation. At
the time of the Reformation, and even in the post-Reformation period of Protestant
orthodoxy, we shall argue, the doctrine was not one in a list of discrete scriptural attributes,
but represented one particular way of expressing the general Protestant principle of sola
Scriptura. To focus on sufficiency, therefore, is necessarily to discuss the doctrine of
Scripture as a whole. And, as Gerhard Ebeling argues, the principle of sola Scriptura is in
need of reformulation.15
It is important to clarify our intention here. We will offer a contemporary construal of
the sufficiency of Scripture which is, we will argue, in line with the classical Protestant
formulation of the doctrine. This construal is therefore intended as a creative re-articulation
of the classical doctrine, and one which will argue that the doctrine can in fact escape some
of the criticisms most often directed against it. In the current widely diversifying and
splintering theological scene, conservative theologies rightly fear too great an emphasis on
'creativity'; however, simply to refuse to redo old doctrinal formulations in new cultural
and apologetic contexts is equally destructive - indeed, it is effectively to deny the sola
Scriptura principle, treating certain historical doctrinal formulations with a reverence
sometimes barely distinguishable from that accorded to Scripture.
Second, 'sufficiency', as a concept applied to the ontology and function of a text, is a
good analytical tool for setting the classical doctrine of Scripture in dialogue with
contemporary hermeneutics and literary theory. Such a dialogue is called for from the side
of theology, because all doctrinal statements imply theological, philosophical and
hermeneutical claims, on which they are partly based, and it is in reflecting on these implied
bases that our discussion will engage, be informed by and critique contemporary positions
in hermeneutics and the philosophy of language. The dialogue is also legitimate from the
side of these contemporary disciplines because, as Vanhoozer has argued at length, and as
some contemporary theorists recognise, general hermeneutics and literary theory are both
involved in issues which are normally considered to be the province of theology.16
We shall characterise a variety of contemporary views of texts, and theological views of
Scripture, in terms of the supplements which they provide, or deny, as necessary for texts to
give rise to meaning. Are texts to be supplemented by authors, readers, or by nothing?17
15 This is Ebeling's response to contemporary Protestants who argue that sola scriptura is an obsolete
principle, (Gerhard Ebeling, "Sola Scriptura' and Tradition', in Ebeling, The Word of God and
Tradition. Historical Studies Interpreting the Divisions of Christianity trans. S.H. Hooke [London:
Collins, 1968], 102-47 [102]).
16 Vanhoozer, Is There a Meaning, passim. The theorists referred to here are especially Jacques
Derrida and Roland Barthes, whose work will be discussed in chapter 4.
17 An approach to this question will be outlined in theory in the first part of chapter 3, in our
appropriation of speech-act theory. This will provide an analytical tool with which to approach the
issues dealt with in chapter 4.
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What kind of supplementary activity of the Holy Spirit or of magisterial ecclesial authority
is in view, and what is ruled out, when Scripture is declared to be sufficient?18 How are we
to conceive of a biblical text being 'supplemented' by a context - both the textual,
canonical context of Scripture, and the historical, cultural and religious contexts in which it
is read?19 The significance of these questions explains the apparent paradox of our overall
title, which sets a discussion of the sufficiency of Scripture under the assumption of the
'supplementation' of the Word. The purpose of the present work is to clarify in theological
and hermeneutical terms the senses in which 'the sufficiency of Scripture' is necessarily a
circumscribed confession, functioning in relationship to, and in the service of, other
doctrinal confessions - that is, the senses in which it is not a 'self-sufficiency of Scripture'.
Of course, the necessary role of the Holy Spirit in relation to Scripture has hardly ever been
denied - but, as will become clear especially in chapters 4 and 5, attacks on literary
formalism often think of themselves as attacking the proposed 'self-sufficiency' of texts,
and the orthodox doctrine of Scripture can easily be thought of as complicit in literary
formalism.
Jacques Derrida has exploited the notion of the supplementation of texts to the point of
the deconstruction of texts and persons. In the chapter in OfGrammatology entitled "...That
Dangerous Supplement...", he picks up the term 'supplement' as it is used in the writings of
Rousseau.20 Derrida notes that Rousseau, in his public and private texts, reflects on certain
'supplementations' in his life: his writings for his physical presence; education for Nature;
a woman he names 'Mamma' for his actual mother; masturbation for sexual intercourse
with 'Mamma' and with other women. Derrida observes that 'supplement' becomes a
double-edged term in these texts, signifying simultaneously both the addition of one thing to
another, and the replacement of one thing by another, revealing a lack in that thing: 'The
supplement adds itself, it is a surplus, a plenitude enriching another plenitude, the fullest
measure of presence. ... But supplement supplements. It adds only to replace. It
intervenes or insinuates itself in-the-place-of if it fills, it is as if one fills a void. ... Thus
presence, always natural, which for Rousseau more than for others means maternal, ought to
be self-sufficient' - but instead in his texts it turns out to be far from self-sufficient.21
Derrida reads this dynamic of supplementarity as the working in Rousseau's texts of his
notion of differance, the endless deferral of metaphysical presence; he moves straight from
Rousseau's reflections on his own auto-erotic sexual drives to philosophical conclusions:
18 We shall address this question in chapter 3, in relation to Karl Barth's views of Scripture, and in
chapter 4.
19 These questions will be addressed in chapters 4 and 5.
20 Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology trans. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (Baltimore & London: John
Hopkins Univ. Press, 1976), 141-64.
21 Derrida, OfGrammatology, 144-45.
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'The enjoyment of the thing itself is thus undermined, in its act and in its essence, by
frustration. One cannot therefore say that it has an essence or an act (eidos, ousia, energeia,
etc.) ... Such is the constraint of the supplement, ... exceeding all the language of
metaphysics.'22 Derrida performs a similar operation with Rousseau's thoughts on speech
and writing. Rousseau found that he was more able to be himself towards others in his
writings than when physically present with them: 'Paradoxically, he will hide himself to
show himself better, and he will confide in written speech: "I would love society like
others, if I were not sure of showing myself not only at a disadvantage, but as completely
different from what I am.'"23 Derrida regards this ironic mutual supplementation of
presence and absence in Rousseau's texts as the formulation of 'a theory of language ... a
law of language ... [which] operates as a power of death in the heart of living speech';24
more prosaically, Barbara Johnson puts it down to Rousseau's shyness, which led him 'to
blurt out things that represent him as the opposite of what he thinks he is'.25
Derrida summarises the necessary effects of this Taw of language' - '[t]he speculary
dispossession which at the same time institutes and deconstitutes me'26 - on a reading of
Rousseau's texts:
It is so little a matter of looking for the truth signified by these writings
(metaphysical or psychological truth: Jean-Jacque's [.vie] life behind his work)
that if the texts that interest us mean something, it is the engagement and the
appurtenance that encompass existence and writing in the same tissue, the same
text. The same here is called supplement, another name for difference.27
Derrida supplements Rousseau's text with the web of textuality, a field of impersonal
signifiers projected onto the world, which is then sufficiently all-encompassing and
voracious to swallow up the reality of both text and author. We aim, like Derrida, to weave
existence and writing into the same 'tissue' and 'text'. However, where Derrida's
supplementing operation unravels persons and language-use into the cold 'text' of langue,28
we will argue that language be treated as woven into human 'tissue', and into the underlying
divine 'tissue'. We will have our own dynamic of supplementation, then, but one which, in
22 Derrida, OfGrammatology, 154.
23 Starobinski, quoting Rousseau, quoted in Derrida, OfGrammatology, 142.
24 Derrida, OfGrammatology, 142, 141.
25 Barbara Johnson, in 'Translator's Introduction' to Jacques Derrida, Dissemination trans. Barbara
Johnson (London: Athlone Press, 1981), xi. Derrida fails to demonstrate that Rousseau's inability to
be truly himself in company is more paradigmatic of 'a law of language' than is the experience of
those 'others' who do 'love society', i.e., who are able to represent what they take to be their true
selves in social intercourse. Rousseau's autobiographical accounts, like the tale of Cyrano de
Bergerac, are probably more illustrative of the dynamics of being deemed 'abnormal' according to
certain social and societal norms and practices, than they are of anything metaphysical.
26 Derrida, OfGrammatology, 141.
27 Derrida, OfGrammatology, 150.
28 For deconstruction as the 'weaving or unraveling' of textual 'designs', see Derrida, Dissemination,
84.
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a direction opposite to Derrida's, works language into the level of description occupied by
human agency.
It is this supplementation of language - an elevation of language, or, rather,
demonstration of the plane which it in fact inhabits and of the relationships it in fact makes
possible and serves - which is performed by speech-act theory. The constructive section of
this thesis therefore begins, in chapter 3, with an outline of speech-act theory, setting out
those elements which will be continually appropriated through the rest of the work. In the
second half of the chapter a speech-act conception of what it is to speak will fund a reading
of Karl Barth's notion of God as speaker, in order to assess his rejection of fundamental
aspects of the classical Protestant doctrine of Scripture.
The concept of God as speaking is identified in chapter 2 as a fundamental theological
conviction underlying the doctrine of the sufficiency of Scripture. This chapter briefly
surveys the history of the doctrine, and analyses the doctrine into this theological element,
and also into its material aspect - Scripture contains everything necessary to be known for
salvation - and into its formal aspect - Scripture is sufficient for its own interpretation.
Chapters 4 and 5 deal with these two aspects respectively. The overall structure of this
work is therefore that of a historical description which analyses the doctrine in question into
three elements, (chapter 2), each of which is reconstructed in three subsequent chapters,
(chapters 3-5).
Given the extent of theological development since what might be called the hey-day of
the doctrine of Scripture, and particularly of the sufficiency of Scripture - from the
Reformation to roughly the end of the seventeenth century - by no means all the issues
raised by the possibility of a reconstruction of the doctrine can be dealt with in one piece of
work. The aim of the present thesis is to focus on some of the fundamental theological,
philosophical and hermeneutical claims implied by the doctrine of the sufficiency of
Scripture. This is not to assume that the magisterial Reformers, say, were conscious of
holding such positions; in many cases, subsequent thought has revealed that a position
which they and many others previously assumed to be self-evident is in fact just one of a
variety of possible options, and so requires the kind of defence which they had no reason to
offer or possibility of offering.
It will become evident that a number of different issues are brought together, some of
which are already in debate with one another in published literature, and some not. We aim
to create an intersection of a number of topics, as the location for a reconstruction of the
sufficiency of Scripture. The Reformation doctrine of Scripture has regularly been
contrasted favourably with that of subsequent orthodox Protestant scholastic theologians,
who articulated the doctrine most fully. It is intended to question this contrast, and to bring
a carefully delineated historical doctrine of Scripture into creative discussion with some
8
strands of contemporary Christian theology and biblical studies, increasingly informed as
they are by linguistic and literary concerns. More broadly, the question of authority in
church and theology has become even more pressing, as the old certainties of Scripture,
reason or tradition have been widely called into question. David Tracy, for example,
recommends, as fundamental to how we are to think of God, that Christians aim at 'the
extraordinary complexity of a full scriptural understanding of the many faces of God
disclosed in the many scriptural genres to name God.'29 We aim to enter the discussion of
how God is to be 'named', privileging this 'extraordinary complexity' as in some sense
sufficient for the task. The circumspection required in the face of such complexity, at which
Tracy here hints, is a contemporary theme from which we wish to learn in reconstructing
such a confident-sounding doctrine as the sufficiency of Scripture.
More broadly still, the approach taken to our topic is to be located within the question
of how Christian theology is to orient its thinking about God in relation to the related
phenomena of modernity and post-modernity, without falling captive to either. In a
provocative recovery of medieval sacramental theology, Catherine Pickstock has recently
articulated a conception of eucharistic practice which locates the event of the Mass (as
transubstantiation) as the very precondition of meaning, proposing a concept of divine
bodily 'presence' in the elements which is allegedly immune to Derrida's critique of
Western metaphysics.30 For Pickstock, the Mass can function as such because it is 'an
essential action ... [a] linguistic and significatory action rather than extra-linguistic
presence'.31 Kevin Vanhoozer's most recent work can be seen as performing, although less
explicitly, a very similar task for a Protestant theology of the Word, locating semantic
foundations in the divine speech-act by which God comes to us: 'For the Christian, the
divine promise is more reliable than any metaphysical foundation in the world'.32 The
present work is intended as a specific contribution to the latter project, critically retrieving
and developing, where Pickstock looks to pre-modern Roman eucharistic theology, a
particular pre-critical Protestant theology of the Word. It therefore operates in the space
which these two studies create for the possible recovery of old and now widely neglected
Christian doctrines, in the broad attempt to seize the current opportunities in Western
culture to escape monolithic 'modern' and 'post-modern' forms.33 It will be argued that,
despite the inevitable historical and philosophical locatedness of any of its various doctrinal
29 David Tracy, On Naming the Present. God, Hermeneutics, and Church (London: SCM, 1994), 33.
30 '[T]he inhering of bread in Body is not a relation of signification (as for a Zwinglian view) but
more like a condition of possibility for all signification', (Pickstock, After Writing, 263).
31 Pickstock, After Writing, 253, 255, (italics hers).
32 Vanhoozer, Is There a Meaning, 434.
33 Pickstock argues throughout her book that post-modem nihilism is caught in the same dialectic as
modernist desires for absolute self-presence.
9
formulations, including the present one, the doctrine of the sufficiency of Scripture can be
creatively reconstructed in a way which remains faithful to its chief historical formulations,
allowing it to continue to serve as a necessary and ultimately life-giving component of
Christian theology, especially as theology strives to think of God's active presence in the
world.
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2. The Development and Decline of the Sufficiency of Scripture
2.1. Introduction
From the earliest days of the post-apostolic Christian church, the majority of Christians
believers and writers have thought that the Bible contains everything that human beings
need to know for salvation and in order to live a life well-pleasing to God. The articulation
of the doctrine of the sufficiency of Scripture, from the earliest period through to the
Protestant Reformers and their successors, is fundamentally an assertion about authority:
about the means by which God speaks and acts authoritatively with regard to the church and
the world by the Holy Spirit. The various developments of the doctrine have been
influenced by new apologetic and polemical contexts in which theologians have wished to
articulate and defend certain positions on the perennial question of authority in theology and
in Christian life. It is here, in the exercise of authority with regard to the Bible, as we shall
see, that the radicality of the Reformation doctrine of Scripture, with which the doctrine of
the sufficiency of Scripture is particularly and rightly associated, lies. The first part of this
chapter offers a chronological survey of the various articulations of the doctrine of the
sufficiency of Scripture from the Patristic period through to the Reformation, drawing out
the three elements of the doctrine which it is the aim of the rest of the thesis to defend and
reconstruct.
Throughout, a distinction will be drawn between the material and formal aspects of the
sufficiency of Scripture. Since this is not a distinction found everywhere, it requires some
comment. What is most regularly meant by 'the sufficiency of Scripture' is what we are
calling its material aspect: that Scripture contains everything a person needs to know to be
saved and to live in a way which pleases God. The formal aspect of sufficiency relates to
the authority by which Scripture is interpreted, and asserts that Scripture is its own
interpreter. It is these two elements which chapters 4 and 5 will address respectively. The
formal aspect of the doctrine of Scripture is sometimes articulated under the heading of the
perspicuity of Scripture, but it can equally be regarded as an aspect of sufficiency. Thus
G.C. Berkouwer, noting the close relationship between sufficiency and perspicuity, says that
'the confession concerning sufficiency is concerned with the light of Scripture, which was
confessed to be sufficient for life's journey.'1 That a degree of fluidity of terminology is
possible in the expression of a relatively stable doctrinal content will become evident when
we turn to examine the post-Reformation period. Yves Congar uses our chosen terminology
particularly clearly; writing of the Reformers, he makes evident the close link between the
two aspects of sufficiency:
1 G.C. Berkouwer, Studies in Dogmatics. Holy Scripture trans. & ed. Jack B. Rogers (Grand Rapids,
Michigan: Eerdmans, 1975), 299.
It was with the intention of restoring the sovereignty of God alone that they
presented that of Scripture as exclusive. In order to do this effectively, they
affirmed the sufficiency of the Scripture, not uniquely in a material sense, that
is to say as the object quod creditur, but in a formal sense, that is to say of the
means whereby we know, the constitutive light by which we understand, the
principle of the rule of faith. ... Not only was the whole of faith contained in
Scripture, but the Christian, benefiting from the interior witness of the Holy
Spirit, could find it there.2
The extent to which these two aspects of the sufficiency of Scripture are grounded in
the theological claim that God speaks, and that Scripture is a medium of his speech, will be
noted in the treatment of each successive historical period. It is this theological theme
which will be reconstructed in chapter 3.
Sufficiency, like many other aspects of the doctrine of Scripture, reached its highest
degree of specification in the post-Reformation period, in what has become known as
Protestant scholastic theology. As will be documented in our discussion of post-
Reformation orthodoxy, many subsequent writers have judged the kind of theological
specification provided by the scholastics to be a symptom of a malaise which is alleged to
have infected much seventeenth-century orthodox Protestantism, in which it fell away from
the christocentric and therefore holistic and integrated conception of theology held by the
magisterial Reformers - a declension which left orthodoxy vulnerable to the attacks on it
which were rapidly gathering momentum in the same period, and which led ultimately to a
widespread rejection of much traditional Christian doctrine. An attempt such as the present
work to re-articulate one of the traditional claimed attributes of Scripture needs to make
clear where it is to be located in relation to seventeenth-century orthodoxy - that is, to the
climax, and also according to many the nadir, of the systematisation of the Protestant
doctrine of Scripture. This chapter, after the initial chronological survey, will therefore
focus on the issues which have come to the fore in discussions of seventeenth-century
orthodox doctrines of Scripture, in comparison with Reformation doctrines, and will briefly
propose a critical rehabilitation of the Protestant scholastics, more favourable than the
judgments most commonly given, taking the work of the late-seventeenth-century Genevan
theologian Francis Turretin as a particular example.
This engagement with the consensus view of Reformed Protestant scholasticism can
only be tentative. The aim is to create a little 'breathing space' for the thesis as a whole,
suggesting both that not all attempts to articulate the details of a doctrine of Scripture in
terms of Scripture's attributes necessarily fall into the same traps that the Protestant
scholastics undoubtedly did, but also that the scholastics, inevitably working within the
2 Yves M. J. Congar, Tradition and Traditions. An Historical and Theological Essay trans. Michael
Naseby & Thomas Rainborough (London: Bums & Oates, 1966), 116-17. The same terminology is
used by A.N.S. Lane, 'Scripture, Tradition and Church: An Historical Survey' Vox Evangelica 9
(1975) 37-55.
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theological constraints and biases of their time, had an underlying concept of theology and
the place of Scripture in it which did not depart radically from that of the Reformers. To
anticipate, our conclusion will be that a deep concern with the 'attributes' of Scripture is not
necessarily detrimental to a dynamic conception of theology as reflection on the life of the
church in Christ.
The chapter concludes with an analysis of the decline of the sufficiency of Scripture,
again organised under the three elements of the doctrine which will be reconstructed in the
main section of the thesis.
2.2. The Patristic Period
Clement of Alexandria, an early post-apostolic theologian, wrote: 'He then who of himself
believes the Lord's Scripture and his actual voice is worthy of belief.... Certainly we use it
as a criterion for the discovery of the real facts.'3 Here the content of Scripture and the
voice of God are clearly equated, and the authority of Scripture derives at least in part from
this identification.4 From around two centuries later, Augustine provides a particularly
strong statement of the material sufficiency of Scripture: 'among the things that are plainly
laid down in Scripture are to be found all matters that concern faith and the manner of life, -
to wit, hope and love'.5 Similar statements from the period between Clement and Augustine
are commonly cited. Thus Irenaeus calls Scripture 'the ground and pillar of our faith',6 and
Athanasius writes: 'To be sure, the sacred and divinely inspired Scriptures are sufficient for
the exposition of the truth'.7 Tertullian asserts that doctrines not discoverable in Scripture
should not be accepted.8
However, throughout this period no programmatic distinction was made between the
authority of the church and of Scripture. The church was ascribed the right of determining
the correct interpretation of Scripture, but not as an authority over against Scripture. Thus
the above citation from Athanasius continues: '...but there also exist many treatises of our
blessed teachers composed for this purpose, and if one reads them he will gain some notion
of the interpretation of the Scriptures and will be able to attain the knowledge he desires.'
Similarly, Clement of Alexandria seems to regard the teaching of the church and the
message of Scripture as one and the same: 'For being ignorant of the mysteries of the
3 Clement of Alexandria, Stromateis, VII. 16, Library of Christian Classics 2 (London: SCM, 1954).
4 JosefRupert Geiselmann, Die Heilige Schrift unci die Tradition (Freiburg: Herder, 1962), 228.
5 Augustine, On Christian Doctrine, II.9, in Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers 2 ed. Philip Schaff
(Grand Rapids, Michigan: Eerdmans, 1956).
6 Irenaeus, Against Heresies, III. 1, in Ante-Nicene Christian Library 5 eds Alexander Roberts &
James Donaldson (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1868).
7 Athanasius, contra Gentes, 1, in Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers 4 eds Philip Schaff & Henry Wace
(Grand Rapids, Michigan: Eerdmans, 1957).
8 J.N.D. Kelly, Early Christian Doctrines 5th ed. rev. (London: A. & C. Black, 1977), 39.
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knowledge of the Church, and incapable of apprehending the grandeur of the truth, they [the
heretics] were too sluggish to penetrate to the bottom of the matter, and so laid aside the
Scriptures after a superficial reading.'9
Indeed, it was the threat posed by heresy which gave rise to the need to bring the twin
authorities of Scripture and church into virtual identity. In response to Gnostic heretics,
who reinterpreted Scripture and claimed to know a secret apostolic tradition, orthodox
theologians, says Geoffrey Bromiley, invoked 'the common teaching of the apostolic
churches - the tradition - not to oppose or correct or supplement Holy Scripture, but to
bring its true message into focus. The appeal to tradition was in fact an appeal to the very
apostolicity that formed the main criterion of New Testament canonicity.'10 Gerhard
Ebeling observes that neither the Fathers nor the medieval church felt the need to define
'tradition' precisely, because they never imagined that it could be in tension with
Scripture." One of the best known Patristic statements of this position, combining a
confession of the material sufficiency of Scripture with a view of the church as the chief
authority in biblical interpretation, is that of the fifth-century writer Vincent of Lerins:
Here someone may possibly ask: Since the canon of Scripture is complete, and
is abundantly sufficient for every purpose, what need is there to add to it the
authority of the church's interpretation? The reason is, of course, that by its
very depth the Holy Scripture is not received by all in one and the same sense,
but its declarations are subject to interpretation, now in one way, now in
another, so that, it would appear, we can find almost as many interpretations as
there are men.
How, then, is the true interpretation to be reached and validated? 'In the catholic church
itself especial care must be taken that we hold to that which has been believed everywhere,
always, and by all men. For that is truly and rightly "catholic".'12 Increasingly through the
third and fourth centuries the Roman church came to be regarded as 'the appointed
custodian and mouthpiece of the apostolic tradition', although even in Vincent's case the
authority of the tradition is assumed to be that it represents the faithful exposition of
Scripture.13
In summary, we may conclude two things. First, in general the Fathers assert the
material sufficiency of Scripture but deny its formal sufficiency. Second, in asserting the
9 Clement ofAlexandria, Stromateis, VII. 16.
10 Geoffrey W. Bromiley, 'The Church Fathers and Holy Scripture', in eds D.A. Carson & John D.
Woodbridge, Scripture and Truth (Leicester: IVP, 1983), 199-220 (208). See D. Farkasfalvy's
comment that for Irenaeus 'canonicity coincides with apostolicity', (D. Farkasfalvy, 'Theology of
Scripture in St. Irenaeus' Revue Benedictine 78 [1968], 319-33 [332]).
" Gerhard Ebeling, "Sola Scriptura' and Tradition', in Ebeling, The Word of God and Tradition.
Historical Studies Interpreting the Divisions of Christianity trans. S.H. Hooke (London: Collins,
1968), 102-47(103).
12 Vincent of Lerins, 'The Commonitory', in Early Medieval Theology Library of Christian Classics 9,
trans. & eds George E. McCracken & Allen Cabaniss (London: SCM, 1957), 38.
13 Kelly, Early Christian Doctrines, 44, 49.
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sufficiency of Scripture they equate, implicitly as well as explicitly, the teaching of
Scripture with God's voice. This summary therefore distinguishes the three elements of the
sufficiency of Scripture - an underlying theological claim and two aspects of the
sufficiency of Scripture - which it is the aim of this thesis to begin to reconstruct and
defend.
Over such a long period, of course, some significant exceptions to this general rule can
be found, the first of which may be regarded as a strict application of the increasingly
important principle of the authority of the Roman church. In the fourth century, Basil of
Caesarea distinguished what is found in Scripture from what he thought was found in extra-
scriptural apostolic tradition: 'some [of the Church's beliefs and practices] we possess
derived from written teaching; others we have delivered to us "in a mystery" by the
tradition of the apostles; and both of these in relation to true religion have the same force."4
(In the category of extra-scriptural traditions Basil has in mind here such beliefs and
practices as the use of the sign of the cross at baptism, facing east to pray, the words of
invocation at the Eucharist and the blessing of water to be used in baptism.) Although this
breaks the strict overlap of church and Scripture by proposing the existence of extra-
scriptural sources of apostolic tradition, it is not strictly a denial of the material sufficiency
of Scripture for knowledge of salvation, for Basil does not say that extra-scriptural sources
of apostolic tradition contain material which is necessary for salvation and which is not also
found in Scripture. However, Basil clearly thinks the practices he mentions to be of vital
importance in the life of the church, and a necessary apostolic supplement to Scripture in
prescribing the practice of the church. As we shall see, this passage of Basil's work came to
be regarded as a significant precedent by medieval theologians who wished to go further in
questioning the sufficiency of Scripture.
In the work of Augustine is found a prefiguring of the Reformation conviction that
Scripture should be its own interpreter: 'almost nothing is dug out of those obscure
passages which may not be found set forth in the plainest language elsewhere.'15 This
anticipates one aspect of Luther's conception of the analogia fidei, developed especially in
his teaching on the perspicuity of Scripture.16 Augustine of course did not work through the
logic of this statement in the direction which the Reformers did, for in his mind the
authority of Scripture always rested on the authority of the church - by which he meant to
14 Basil of Caesarea, Dp spiritu sanctn, 66, in Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers 8 eds Philip Schaff ft.
Henry Wace (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Eerdmans, n.d.).
15 Augustine, On Christian Doctrine, II.6, 8.
16 On this, and for other ways of construing the analogia fidei, see Henri Blocher, 'The 'Analogy of
Faith' in the Study of Scripture', in ed. Nigel M. de S. Cameron, The Challenge of Evangelical
Theology. Essays in Approach andMethod (Edinburgh: Rutherford House, 1987), 17-38 (18-23).
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strengthen Scripture's authority.17 For example, later in the same work he suggests as
principles for removing ambiguity in biblical interpretation that one study the immediate
literary context, and that one consult the rule of faith, which he says is to be gathered from
Scripture's plainer passages and from the authority of the church - apparently not thereby
distinguishing two different sources of authority.18
Something similar can be identified in Irenaeus. Although Irenaeus also has much to
say about the importance ofwritten tradition, J.N.D. Kelly argues that for him Scripture and
tradition are identical in content, and that what he calls the 'canon of truth' is 'simply a
condensation' of the message of Scripture.19 This means that when Irenaeus calls for the
'canon of truth' to be the hermeneutical principle of biblical interpretation he comes close to
Luther's concern that Scripture interpret itself.20 Moreover, central to Irenaeus' theology of
Scripture is '[t]he presentation of the trinitarian God of the Christian creed as source of all
revelation and salvation': for Irenaeus, God always manifests himself through the Logos,
and at every stage it is the same Spirit who communicates knowledge of God.21 This, too, is
close to what we shall see is the christocentric understanding which Luther has of his rule of
Scripture's self-interpretation.22 Tertullian's concept of the regida fidei functioned similarly
to Irenaeus' concept of the 'canon of truth': not 'a formal creed, but rather the intrinsic
shape and pattern of the revelation itself.'23
Behind the Reformation principle of Scripture's self-interpretation, in conscious
distinction from the previous synthesis of Scripture and tradition, lies the claim that 'the
very object of Scripture is to establish the authority of the content of Scripture.'24 Clement
of Alexandria comes remarkably close at one point to stating this in a form no different
from expressions found in Luther and Calvin: 'So too we, obtaining from the Scriptures
themselves a perfect demonstration concerning the Scriptures, derive from faith a conviction
which has the force of demonstration.' By this 'demonstration' Clement means the
confirmation from one part of Scripture of what one has concluded by studying another part,
17 See Gerald Bray, Biblical Interpretation. Past and Present (Leicester: Apollos, 1996), 108-109.
18 Augustine, On Christian Doctrine, III.2, 2.
19 Kelly, Early Christian Doctrines, 39. See also Congar: 'Irenaeus often invokes the words of the
presbyters or elders in reference to the faith of the Church; but he uses them to confirm, not to
complete the truths of Scripture', (Congar, Tradition and Traditions, 107).
20 Anthony Thiselton makes this point, taking it from the work of Skevington Wood, (Anthony C.
Thiselton, New Horizons in Hermeneutics [London: HarperCollins, 1992], 156).
21 Farkasfalvy, 'Theology of Scripture', 320-25. In this article Farkasfalvy argues that Irenaeus does
indeed have a theology of Scripture; the point cited here is one aspect of it.
22 On Irenaeus' christocentrism, see Thiselton, New Horizons, 156; Farkasfalvy, 'Theology of
Scripture', 323.
23 Kelly, Early Christian Doctrines, 40. See also: 'The idea of the rale of faith as supplementing or
complementing, or indeed adding anything whatever to the Bible, is wholly absent from their
thoughts; indeed, such an idea would be in complete contradiction to their conception of the relation
of rale to Bible', (R.P.C. Hanson, Tradition in the Early Church [London: SCM, 1962], 126).
24 Ebeling, "Sola Scriptura' and Tradition', 133.
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in contrast to his depiction of the Gnostics' approach to Scripture, who, he says, pick out
scattered references to justify their position, focusing on individual words and even
changing their meaning without warrant.25
A key device in maintaining the identity of the teaching and authority of church and
Scripture over time was the allegorical method of biblical interpretation, which allowed a
great deal of material to be 'found' in the texts of Scripture. The prime Patristic example is
Origen, and the method was more fully developed as the quadriga, the four-fold method of
exegesis, in the Middle Ages; it will be discussed further below. What is primarily to be
noted, however, is the Fathers' consistent affirmation of Scripture's material sufficiency for
salvation, linking its content quite directly with the voice of God, and their increasing denial
of Scripture's formal sufficiency, yet without an explicit establishment of the church's
interpretive authority over against Scripture's self-interpreting function.
2.3. The Middle Ages
2.3.1. The Material Extent ofthe Sufficiency ofScripture
Unqualified assertions of the material sufficiency of Scripture, identical to those made by
the Fathers, can be found throughout medieval theology. There is a general consensus
among modern writers on the period that all medieval theology strove to be 'Bible-
theology'.26 In the early medieval period, John Scotus Eriugena (b. early 9th century) states,
in defence of the allegorical interpretation of Scripture, that 'the reward of those who labour
in the study of Holy Scripture ... is a pure and perfect understanding', and then turns to
prayer to Christ: 'For as there is no place in which it is more proper to seek Thee than in
Thy words, so is there no place where Thou art more clearly discovered than in Thy words.
For therein Thou abidest, and thither Thou leadest all who seek and love Thee.'27
Thomas Aquinas makes the same point succinctly, in a clear echo of the Fathers: 'The
truth of faith is sufficiently plain in the teaching of Christ and the Apostles.'28 Aquinas
makes a clear distinction between the authority of Scripture and that of the church: 'Its
[holy teaching's] own proper authorities are those of canonical Scripture. ... It has other
proper authorities, the doctors of the Church, and these it looks to as its own, but for
arguments that carry no more than probability.'29 Congar summarises Aquinas' view of
25 Clement ofAlexandria, Stromateis, VII. 16.
26 Hermann Schiissler surveys the work on this done by Yves Congar, Paul de Vooght and others,
(Hermann Schtissler, Der Primal der Heiligen Schrift als theologisches und kanonistisches Problem
im Spatmittelalter [Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1977], 73ff.).
27 John Scoms Eriugena, Periphyseon (The Division ofNature) trans. I.P. Sheldon-Williams, rev. John
J. O'Meara (Montreal: Bellarmin/ Washington: Dumbarton Oaks, 1987), V, PL 122, 1010.
28 Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, II II q.l a.10 (Blackfriars, 1964-). See similar statements in II II q.5
a.3; IIII q.l 10 a.3; III q.l a.3.
29 Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, I q.l a.8.
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Scripture thus: 'Scripture is the rule of faith, to which nothing can be added, from which
nothing can be deleted.'30 One historian has suggested Bonaventure as the writer of the
twelfth and thirteenth centuries who speaks most highly of the authority of Scripture: for
him, only that which can be shown to be supported by Scripture, the unique and
inexhaustible source of truth, can be treated as binding for Christians.31 Duns Scotus, too, at
least in his early work, viewed Scripture the same way: 'theology does not concern
anything except what is contained in scripture, and what may be drawn from this'.32 The
most vociferous proponent of the sufficiency of Scripture in the later Middle Ages was John
Wyclif, who explicitly links Scripture's authority to the identity of its message with the
voice of God: among his many descriptions of Scripture are vox Christi, unicum verbum
Dei, verbum veritatis and unum perfecte verbum procedens de ore Dei." The same view
can be found into the time of the Reformation, expressed even by those who opposed
Luther's doctrine of sola Scriptura. For example, John Driedo, whom Congar calls 'one of
the best theologians on tradition', allows that the teaching of Christ and the apostles as
contained in Scripture is sufficient to teach the doctrines necessary for the salvation of
humanity, while also clearly advocating the necessity of the action of the Holy Spirit in the
church's tradition for correct biblical interpretation.34
The majority of medieval theologians seem to have restricted the material sufficiency
of Scripture to soteriological matters. According to Geiselmann, the view predominated
that apostolic material on issues of church practice was passed down, either orally (so
Aquinas), or by means of customary practice (Duns Scotus). Geiselmann traces such views
back through Abelard to Origen and Tertullian.35 The question of the extent of the material
sufficiency of Scripture re-surfaces, as we shall see, in post-Reformation debates over the
'regulative principle'.
The overall medieval consensus briefly outlined here must be seen in the context of
related theological issues, whose history through this long period is highly complicated.
Indeed, there exists no scholarly consensus on a variety of topics concerning Scripture in the
Middle Ages; different and sometimes conflicting accounts have been offered by, among
others, David Knowles, Beryl Smalley, Josef Geiselmann, George Tavard, Heiko Oberman
30 Congar, Tradition and Traditions, 114.
31 Schiissler, Primat der Heiligen Schrift, 48.
32 Quoted in Alister McGrath, The Intellectual Origins of the European Reformation (Oxford: Basil
Blackwell, 1987), 140.
33 These are cited, as part of a much longer list of similar descriptions by Wyclif, in Geiselmann, Die
Heilige Schrift, 237-38.
34 Congar, Tradition and Traditions, 116.
35 Geiselmann, Die Heilige Schrift, 257-63.
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and Hermann Schtissler.36 We shall explore these complexities under two topics: the status
of the literal sense of Scripture, and the relation between church and Scripture as authorities
in medieval theology.
2.3.2. The Literal Sense ofScripture
The medieval church inherited from the Fathers a four-fold division of the sense of any
biblical text, a scheme mediated principally through Augustine but which apparently
originates with Clement of Alexandria and Origen.37 This scheme treats the literal sense as
just one of four senses, and can allow the literal sense to be regarded as less important than
the spiritual senses, to which the 'carnal' sense simply provides access. According to G.R.
Evans, this scheme had its basis in both a theological and a hermeneutical conviction.
Theologically, medieval theologians inherited the view that '[i]f the Word was to speak to
us in terms we could understand it was necessary for it to become many words, to multiply
and diversify, to descend to the level of particular sounds for us; ... the one Word of God ...
is expanded and diffused.'38 The hermeneutical point is illustrated from Augustine's theory
of signs, who conceived of 'natural signs', such as smoke signalling a fire, which, unlike
words, are both signs and things. 'It was in making plain this significance of 'things' that
the figurative interpretations of Scripture were believed to be illuminating.'39 To penetrate
beneath the surface of the language 'is to come closer to what the text really means.'40
In practice, this exegetical scheme gave theologians a means by which they could find
in Scripture hints of a wide range of doctrines and traditions, allowing them to affirm the
authority of both Scripture and the church, especially in the potentially more troublesome
areas of tradition on which the literal sense of Scripture did not clearly speak. An excellent
example of this is found in the work of Hugh of St. Victor (d. 1141), who both asserts the
material sufficiency of Scripture for faith,41 and retains a high view of the spiritual sense -
although he qualifies the traditional scheme somewhat by granting a significant place to the
36 David Knowles, The Evolution ofMedieval Thought 2nd ed., eds D.E. Luscombe & C.N.L. Brooke
(London & New York: Longman, 1988); Beryl Smalley, The Study of the Bible in the Middle Ages
3rd ed. rev. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1952, 1983); Geiselmann, Die Heilige Schrift; George H.
Tavard, Holy Writ or Holy Church. The Crisis of the Protestant Reformation (London: Burns &
Oates, 1959); Heiko Augustinus Oberman, The Harvest ofMedieval Theology. Gabriel Biel and Late
Medieval Nominalism rev. ed. (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Eerdmans, 1967); Schiissler, Primat der
Heiligen Schrift.
37 G.R. Evans, The Language and Logic of the Bible: The Earlier Middle Ages (Cambridge:
Cambridge Univ. Press, 1984), 114.
38 Evans, Language and Logic: Earlier, 5.
39 Evans, Language and Logic: Earlier, 52-53.
40 Evans, Language and Logic: Earlier, 56-57.
41 'Solum hoc quod legimus [in Scripture] credere sine dubitatione debemus', ('Only that which we
read [in Scripture] ought we to believe without hesitation', [translation mine].) Quoted in
Geiselmann, Die Heilige Schrift, 230.
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literal sense. According to Beryl Smalley, '[i]nstead of contrasting the lowly foundation of
the 'letter' with the higher spiritual senses, he [Hugh] groups together the letter and allegory
.... The importance of the letter is constantly stressed.'42 Evans traces this recovery of the
literal sense back to Anselm in the eleventh century, who 'was pioneering where others
were to go in the attempt to interpret the literal sense seriously and fully and intelligently
and to find in it matter worthy to be set beside what might be learned from figurative
interpretations',43 and argues that from the twelfth century onwards theologians began to
regard the literal sense as the most important, and as the only one to be used in theological
arguments.44
Smalley's detailed account of the Victorines offers a fuller picture of this progression,
which broadly supports Evans' general claim. Hugh of St. Victor, she says, had a
sophisticated enough understanding of the literal sense to insist that it 'is not the word, but
what it means; it may have a figurative meaning; and this belongs to the literal sense',45 but
judges that overall the Victorine tradition believed in the superiority of the spiritual sense.46
One particular exception to this judgment, whom Smalley also discusses, is Andrew of St.
Victor (d.l 175), of whom she says: 'Andrew is the only medieval commentator known to
me who fears to add anything to his author. The others, convinced that their texts hide a
plenitude ofmeaning, hardly distinguish between exposition and amplification.'47
However the legacy of the Victorines is judged, Smalley is sure that in the thirteenth
century spiritual exegesis was on the decline.48 It seems that in recent years there has been
increased recognition of a development in favour of the literal sense between the twelfth and
fourteenth centuries. This recognition arises in part from a re-assessment of the
philosophical and theological legacy of nominalism. David Knowles charged Ockham with
developing an epistemology which allowed philosophers only 'the intuitive knowledge of
individual things, each of which was so irreducibly individual as to be unsusceptible of any
intelligible relationship or connection with any other individual'. This removed '[t]he
whole fabric of natural theology', and thus demolished Thomism and Scotism.49 With this
view of nominalism, its legacy is taken to be a philosophical void which theologians may
42 Smalley, The Study ofthe Bible, 89.
43 Evans, Language and Logic: Earlier, 26.
44 G.R. Evans, The Language and Logic of the Bible: The Road to Reformation (Cambridge:
Cambridge Univ. Press, 1985), 42-50.
45 Smalley, The Study of the Bible, 93.
46 Smalley, The Study ofthe Bible, 243.
47 Smalley, The Study ofthe Bible, 139.
48 Smalley, The Study of the Bible, 284-93. In the introduction to the 3rd rev. ed. of 1983, Smalley
qualifies this judgment somewhat, acknowledging that spiritual exposition continued to thrive, and
that, for example, Aquinas continued to practice spiritual biblical interpretation, alongside his more
'literal' expositions of Job and Isaiah, (xiii-xiv).
49 Knowles, Evolution, 298-99.
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fill with one of two possible options: 'to reduce revealed doctrine to the message of
Scripture alone', as Wyclif did, or to take refuge in 'mystical certainty'. To Knowles, both
look like tragically impoverished options.50 However, Knowles' posthumous editors point
out that Oberman has offered serious criticisms of this interpretation of Ockham, and also
that recent work on Wyclif has suggested that there is a close link between his realist
metaphysics and 'his belief in the unity and indissolubility of scripture, and its literal truth',
and therefore that his view of Scripture has a significant philosophical foundation.51
The significance of this topic for our concerns is that the Reformation doctrine of
Scripture took a very firm stand on the primacy of the literal sense of Scripture. By
'Scripture' in the phrases 'sola Scriptura' and 'the sufficiency of Scripture' the Reformers
and their successors meant 'Scripture in its literal sense', while agreeing, of course, with
Hugh of St. Victor that the literal sense can include figurative senses, and with Andrew of
St. Victor that, in deciding what we should interpret as figurative, we must be governed by
the author's intention. It was not always recognised at the time of the Reformation that the
Protestant position on the literal sense can be seen as the coming to fruition of a trend which
had been long developing; Smalley suggests that much medieval work on the literal sense
was soon forgotten, noting that Cardinal Cajetan thought himself to be the first to expound
the literal sense of the Psalms.52 These topics of authorial intention and the sense of a text
will occupy much of our attention in chapter 4, in our attempts to defend and re-articulate
the relevant concepts underlying the Reformation understanding of the sufficiency of
Scripture.
2.3.3. Scripture and Church as Authoritative Norms
The medieval assertions of Scripture's material sufficiency cited above can read
misleadingly like assertions of an exclusive Scripture-principle, if taken apart from the
context of other statements made by those same writers on the question of authority.53
Aquinas, for example, in addition to his clear assertions of the sufficiency of Scripture,
regards church teaching, as flowing out of the truth made known in Scripture, as the
'infallible and divine rule' for believers. According to Schtissler, Aquinas in different
contexts emphasises the authority of both Scripture and church. Schtissler also traces back
50 Knowles, Evolution, 302.
51 D.E. Luscombe & C.N.L. Brooke, 'Introduction' to 2nd ed. of Knowles, Evolution, xxiv-xxvi.
Henning Graf Reventlow says that Wyclif s doctrine of the sufficiency of Scripture arose from the
application to the Bible of a Platonic Augustinian view of the world, (Henning Graf Reventlow, The
Authority of the Bible and the Rise of the Modern World trans. John Bowden [London: SCM, 1984],
35-36).
52 Smalley, The Study ofthe Bible, 356-67.
53 Schiissler, Primal der Heiligen Schrift, 48.
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to Duns Scotus the beginning of the widespread use of the concept 'Scripture and Church'
as the basic norms of faith.54
The history of the relationship between scriptural and church authority has been
variously narrated in twentieth-century scholarship. The heart ofGeorge Tavard's argument
is that there was a crucial turning-point around the beginning of the fourteenth century.
Before then, according to Tavard, theologians generally held a 'coinherence' view of the
relationship between Scripture and church: Aquinas and Bonaventure, like most theologians
of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, were faithful to the Patristic legacy, which Tavard
summarises thus: 'there is a sense in which "Scripture alone" is an authentic expression of
Catholic Christianity, inasmuch as, that is, the Scripture is, in the church, the apostolic
tradition, and vice versa.'55 Problems arose however, according to Tavard, when Scripture
and tradition began to come apart. This opened the way either for the church to be made
subservient to Scripture or for Scripture to be made ancillary to the church; Tavard himself
dislikes both possibilities.56 The latter option allowed the further suggestion that the church
possesses revelation independent of that found in Scripture.57 Geiselmann agrees with
Tavard, arguing that around the turn of the fourteenth century there was a move away from
belief in the material sufficiency of Scripture to a view of it as materially insufficient.58
Heiko Oberman offers a slightly different picture. Rather than imagining a Patristic and
early-medieval consensus breaking down around 1300, he proposes that the medieval
church inherited a twin legacy from Augustine, which he terms Tradition I and Tradition II.
The former is what Tavard proposes as the consensus view, namely the coinherence of
Scripture and tradition, and the latter is the treatment of tradition which we saw arose with
Basil of Caesarea, which proposes the existence of an authoritative extra-scriptural oral
tradition.59 Where Tavard and Geiselmann see in the fourteenth century the disintegration
of a previous consensus, Oberman sees the surfacing of a view of the Scripture-tradition
relationship of which there had been growing awareness ever since the time of Basil and
Augustine.60 He locates the increasing influence of Tradition II in the Middle Ages in canon
law and its influence on theology, mentioning especially the Decretum of Gratian of
54 Schiissler, Primat der Heiligen Schrift, 50-52.
55 Tavard, Holy Writ, 11.
56 Tavard, Holy Writ, 41.
57 Tavard traces this suggestion to Heinrich Totting von Oyta (d. 1397), professor of philosophy at the
University of Prague, (Tavard, Holy Writ, 36); Schiissler denies that von Oyta is the source of this
view, (Schiissler, Primat der Heiligen Schrift, 86).
58 Geiselmann's calls this 'Der Ubergang von der inhaltlichen Suffizienz zur Insuffizienz der Schrift',
the title of chapter 9 ofGeiselmann, Die Heilige Schrift.
59 Oberman, Harvest, 370-71.
60 Oberman, Harvest, 391.
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Bologna, which discusses the passage in question from Basil.61 It has been objected, with
some merit, that Oberman's two-fold typology of the relationship between Scripture and
church is too simplistic to portray with any accuiacy die complexity of the options in
relating church and Scripture which were available in the Middle Ages. For example,
Oberman effectively equates the question of the authority of the church with the question of
unwritten traditions, which excludes the question of the exercise of church authority in
biblical interpretation.62
Hermann Schtissler's narrative relates that papal authority in doctrinal teaching began
to grow in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries,63 but that nevertheless even in the fifteenth
century Scripture was still the ultimate basis for theology and faith, although there remained
much unclarity over how the establishing of unwritten traditions could in practice avoid
being at the whim of the church.64 In the midst of this, however, Schiissler identifies at the
turn of the fifteenth century, quite contra Tavard, the growth of what he calls 'ein
korrektives Schriftprinzip', referring especially to the writing of Nicolaus de Tudeschis
(Panormitanus), (1386-1455).65 This trend comprises those many writers who, according to
Schiissler, found a way between the extremes of subordinating the authority of Scripture to
the church, or vice versa, by viewing Scripture as the foundational or limiting norm of the
church's teaching, and the church, by virtue of God's gracious action on and in it, as
guaranteeing access to revelation.66
It seems, though, that this middle way, if it existed, could not have been the solution to
the problem raised by the suggestion of extra-biblical traditions which Schtissler takes it to
be. He concludes that the foundational sufficiency of Scripture for faith and theology was
unaffected by the contents of extra-biblical revelations, as long as these traditions contained
nothing central to the faith and were not established arbitrarily by the church, but recognised
('approbiert') by the church no differently from how Scripture was recognised.67 The
church recognised the authority of Scripture primarily on the basis of apostolicity, and if
extra-biblical traditions were recognised on the same basis then the foundational sufficiency
61 Oberman, Harvest, 369. Alister McGrath, while affirming the existence of the two-source theory,
argues that Oberman is wrong to locate its origin in the canonists, suggesting that where they give the
Pope an authoritative role it is as interpreter of Scripture, not source of extra-scriptural tradition,
(McGrath, Intellectual Origins, 143). McGrath also describes Oberman as proposing a view rather
like Tavard's, i.e. suggesting a fourteenth-century collapse of an early medieval consensus on the co¬
terminous relationship of Scripture and tradition, (McGrath, Intellectual Origins, 142), but this does
not take into account Oberman's explicit criticism of a 'disintegration' model identical to Tavard's,
(Oberman, Harvest, 391).
62 Schiissler, Primat der Heiligen Schrift, 69-70.
63 Schiissler, Primat der Heiligen Schrift, 44.
64 Schiissler, Primat der Heiligen Schrift, 91.
65 Schussler, Primat der Heiligen Schrift, 179-82.
66 Schussler, Primat der Heiligen Schrift, 259.
67 Schussler, Primat der Heiligen Schrift, 294.
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of Scripture for faith was clearly denied. On the other hand, if these traditions contained
nothing central to the faith, then there would be no need to call them revelations in the first
place, and the problem at hand need not have arisen. It seems that, whether one prefers
Oberman's progressive account of the rise of a two-source theory of revelation or Tavard's
'breakdown of consensus' model, by the fifteenth century the existence of extra-biblical
traditions containing material central to the faith, relating often to issues contained in credal
confessions and at the very least to important issues of church practice, was proposed by
many writers, and no easy solution presented itself to the majority.68 For example, the
fifteenth century was the crucial period in the development of the doctrine of the
Immaculate Conception of Mary, centred around the observance of the feast of her
Conception. Rejected by Aquinas, Bonaventure and the Dominicans, defended by Duns
Scotus and the Franciscans, it came to be affirmed by the Council of Basle in 1439.69
To the extent that writers such as Wyclif prefigured the Reformation in their strong
view of sola Scriptura they were relatively uninfluential voices. The critique of the
authority of the Roman church began to bite only when developed in the Reformation, when
the two assertions of the equal authority with Scripture of extra-biblical traditions and of the
church's absolute authority in biblical interpretation came to be regarded by many as
identical assertions of human power over God and his Word, and therefore both to be
rejected with equal force.
2.4. The Reformation
The work of a Franciscan writer, who died in 1527, just as the Reformation was getting
under way in earnest, provides a view of Scripture which shows in clear relief the novelty of
what the Reformers proposed. Tavard refers to Kaspar Schatzgeyer as a writer who held
together the medieval synthesis of Scripture and tradition while ascribing supremacy to
Scripture. Schatzgeyer argued that Scripture consists of three distinct elements: the 'basic
element', which is "everything contained in the letter of the Sacred canonical Scripture
understood in the sense which the Holy Spirit suggests"; the 'virtual element', which
'covers the whole life of the Church, the events and the saints that are instruments of the
Spirit of God'; and the "eminent" content, which includes '"[wjhat is ordered to the
understanding and fulfilment" of Sacred Scripture'. For Schatzgeyer, it is the virtual and
68 Geiselmann mentions Duns Scotus in this regard, who, he says, moved away from belief in the
material sufficiency of Scripture, arguing with regard to Christ's descent into Hades, which is an
article of faith because of its credal confession, and to the sacraments, that the Holy Spirit taught the
apostles about these things, and that they passed them on 'per consuetudinem', (Geiselmann, Die
Heilige Schrift, 263).
69 F.L. Cross & E.A. Livingstone (eds), 'The Immaculate Conception of the BVM', in The Oxford
Dictionary of the Christian Church 3rd ed. (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1997), 821-22.
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eminent contents which transform Scripture into "spirit and life": as they become part of
Scripture, they turn it from a 'datum' into a 'process'. He rejects the view that Scripture
interprets Scripture, claiming that that makes the Holy Spirit irrelevant to Scripture's
meaning, enclosing it 'in the rind of the literal sense'. Schatzgeyer located the work of the
Holy Spirit in the authorising and interpreting of Scripture in the church, and especially in
the councils.70 In asserting the material sufficiency of Scripture, then, the Reformers
introduced no major innovation; the novelty of the Reformation doctrine of Scripture lay in
its claims regarding the formal aspect of sufficiency. Before discussing the formal aspect in
more detail, however, we will document briefly the development of the Reformation view of
the material extent of the sufficiency of Scripture.
2.4.1. The Material Extent of the Sufficiency ofScripture
The Reformed confessions of the first half of the sixteenth century all agree with the
constant tradition we have observed, that Scripture contains everything a person needs to
know to be saved - assuming, as had most earlier writers, that 'salvation' covered both a
life pleasing to God as well as what we might call a moment of 'conversion'. The First
Helvetic Confession (1536) asserts that 'Biblical Scripture ... alone deals with everything
that serves the true knowledge, love and honor of God, as well as true piety and the making
of a godly, honest and blessed life.'71 One of the chief architects of this confession was
Heinrich Bullinger, who in his own writings makes an identical confession: 'in the word of
God, delivered to us by the prophets and apostles, is abundantly contained the whole effect
of godliness, and what things soever are available to the leading of our lives rightly, well,
and holily', quoting in support the reference in 2 Tim. 3.16-17 to 'every good work'.72
Article 6 of the Church of England's Thirty-Nine Articles is similar: 'Holy Scripture
containeth all things necessary to salvation: so that whatsoever is not read therein, nor may
be proved thereby, is not to be required of any man, that it should be believed as an article
of the Faith, or be thought requisite or necessary to salvation.'
It seems that through the sixteenth century, Reformed confessional statements of
Scripture's material sufficiency became more specific. The Second Helvetic Confession
(1566), whose author was again Bullinger, the head of the Zurich church, and which became
the most widely used Reformed confession,73 initially offers the traditional brief statement
70 Tavard, Holy Writ, 173-77. Citations in single-quotes are from Tavard; those in double-quotes are
Tavard's citations of Schatzgeyer.
71 Quoted in ed. Arthur C. Cochrane, Reformed Confessions of the 16th Century (London: SCM,
1966), 100.
72 Heinrich Bullinger, The Decades ofHenry Bullinger trans. H.I., ed. Thomas Harding (Cambridge:
Parker Society, 1849), 61-62.
73 Cochrane (ed.), Reformed Confessions, 220. For the purpose of dividing the sections of this
chapter, we are taking the Second Helvetic Confession as marking the end of the Reformation period.
25
of Scripture's material sufficiency: 'in this Holy Scripture, the universal Church of Christ
has the most complete exposition of all that pertains to a saving faith, and also to the
framing of a life acceptable to God'. However the confession then offers some specification
of this basic confession: 'from these Scriptures are to be derived true wisdom and
godliness, the reformation and government of churches; as also instruction in all duties of
piety'.74
It is perhaps in the nature of doctrinal development, involving as it does reflection on
doctrine and response to objectors, that the level of specification in doctrinal statements
generally increases over time. In any case, it may be argued that the Second Helvetic
Confession, in this specification, is not departing significantly from earlier Reformed
confessions. For example, the Lutheran Reformation was based, as we shall see, in direct
disagreement with Erasmus, on the claim that Scripture provided a sufficiently clear warrant
to instigate a reformation of the church and resistance to what was seen as its false
government from Rome; Bullinger's second confession can be read as simply a restatement
of this basic point. Nevertheless, the increasing length of statements on Scripture in
Reformed Confessions up to 1566 can be seen as a precursor to the lengthy treatises on
Scripture and loci on the topic which appeared through the second half of the century and
especially in the seventeenth century.75
Two final examples may be given which show how closely related the material and
formal aspects of sufficiency were in the Reformation. Luther asserts: 'All the works of
God, especially those having to do with salvation, are thoroughly set forth and attested in
the Scriptures, so that no one can have any excuse';76 he thus allows no distinction between
Scripture setting forth and attesting what is necessary for salvation. The Scottish
Confession of Faith (1560), which remained in force in Scotland until superseded by the
Westminster Confession of Faith in 1647, and whose main author is presumed to be John
Knox,77 is similar in this regard:
As we believe and confess the Scriptures ofGod sufficient to instruct and make
perfect the man of God, so do we affirm and avow their authority to be from
God, and not to depend on men or angels. We affirm, therefore, that those who
say the Scriptures have no other authority save that which they have received
from the Kirk are blasphemous against God and injurious to the true Kirk.78
Cochrane argues that this confession is representative of the mature Reformation, prior to the rise of
Protestant scholasticism, since it avoids a theory of biblical inspiration, (ed. Cochrane, Reformed
Confessions, 222).
74 Quoted in ed. Cochrane, Reformed Confessions, 224.
75 The question of the continuity and discontinuity of the orthodox Protestant doctrine of Scripture
from the Reformation to the end of the seventeenth century will be addressed below.
76 Martin Luther, Luther's Works (Saint Louis: Concordia Publishing House/ Philadelphia: Fortress
Press, 1955-86), 36.144.
77 Cochrane (ed.), Reformed Confessions, 160.
78 Quoted in ed. Cochrane, Reformed Confessions, 177-78.
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It is important to bear in mind this close relation between the formal and material
aspects of Scripture, since it is the Reformation tradition on Scripture which this thesis aims
to reconstruct. This means that the analysis of the sufficiency of Scripture into a theological
underpinning and two aspects - the structure which has arisen in this historical survey and
which establishes the progression of the three subsequent chapters - describes ultimately
not three separate doctrines, but three abstractions, distinguished only for the purposes of
analysis, of the doctrinal claim that in Scripture God, speaking by the Holy Spirit, sets forth
and attests what it is necessary for human beings to know for salvation.
2.4.2. The Formal Aspect of the Sufficiency ofScripture
The distinguishing mark of the Reformation doctrine of Scripture is that it 'declares the
sufficiency and independence of Holy Scripture in respect of its hermeneutic function' -
that is, Scripture is self-interpreting.79 The innovative element in 'sola Scriptura' is
therefore the formal aspect of the sufficiency of Scripture. Ebeling offers three descriptions
of the essential function of the principle of sola Scriptura-. 'it preserves intact the
distinction between text and interpretation'; it 'maintains that the Word ofGod has absolute
authority over the Church as brought into existence by the Word of God'; and it 'maintains
that Christ remains distinct from the Church as its Head, and that the Church is the result of
and dependent on the event that constituted her a Church.'80 The principle functioned in
these ways in a particular polemical context. The Reformers claimed that both Rome and
the 'enthusiasts', by locating the authoritative work of the Spirit outside Scripture, in
respectively the teaching-office of the church and a particular gift of the Spirit to
individuals, exalted human authority over God. The position is stated in the Gallican
Confession of Faith (1559), which is a lightly edited version of a draft by Calvin, Beza and
Viret:81
We believe that the Word contained in these books [of Scripture] has
proceeded from God, and receives its authority from him alone, and not from
men. And inasmuch as it is the rule of all truth, containing all that is necessary
for the service of God and for our salvation, it is not lawful for men, nor even
for angels, to add to it, to take away from it, or to change it.82
The Second Helvetic Confession makes an identical statement, adding what is implicit
in the French Confession, namely that Scripture receives its authority from God alone in that
'God himself spoke to the fathers, prophets, apostles, and still speaks to us through the Holy
79 Ebeling, "Sola Scriptura' and Tradition', 127.
80 Ebeling, "Sola Scriptura' and Tradition', 136. The hermeneutical distinctions between text and
interpretation, and text and community, will be defended in chapter 4.
81 Cochrane (ed.), Reformed Confessions, 138.
82 Quoted in ed. Cochrane, Reformed Confessions, 145.
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Scriptures.'83 This theme is very prominent in Calvin: 'the highest proof of Scripture
derives in general from the fact that God in person speaks in it.'84 B.A. Gerrish quotes
similar statements from Luther, and observes that the same could have been written by the
medieval theologians Ockham, D'Ailly or Biel.85 A few paragraphs further on the Second
Helvetic Confession offers this elaboration, which is worth quoting at length, for it makes
clear that for the Protestant Reformers the question of authority in relation to Scripture,
unlike for most medieval theologians, is largely one of authority in biblical interpretation:
The apostle Peter has said that the Holy Scriptures are not of private
interpretation (II Peter 1:20), and thus we do not allow all possible
interpretations. Nor consequently do we acknowledge as the true or genuine
interpretation of the Scriptures what is called the conception of the Roman
Church, that is, what the defenders of the Roman Church plainly maintain
should be thrust upon all for acceptance. But we hold that interpretation of the
Scripture to be orthodox and genuine which is gleaned from the Scriptures
themselves (from the nature of the language in which they were written,
likewise according to the circumstances in which they were set down, and
expounded in the light of like and unlike passages and of many and clearer
passages) and which agree with the rule of faith and love, and contributes much
to the glory of God and man's salvation.86
Where almost all medieval theologians had appealed to Scripture as their authority, the
Reformers raised the stakes, making the issue of biblical authority an issue not just of
biblical citation but of the right understanding of Scripture.87
Included in the principle that Scripture is its own interpreter is the privileging of the
literal sense of the text. However, this was not a hermeneutical end in itself, but served a
central theological purpose. Luther's primary objection to allegorical exegesis of Scripture
was that 'it obscured the Christological witness of the plain, literal sense of Scripture.'88
Luther's strong christocentrism is of course widely recognised. As well as being the basis
of his argument against allegorical interpretation, it also provides the focus of his view of
the operation of the interpretive activity of the Spirit in Scripture. Althaus comments on
Luther: 'the self-interpretation of Scripture through the Spirit which speaks in it means that
83 Quoted in ed. Cochrane, Reformed Confessions, 224.
84 John Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion Library of Christian Classics 20-21, ed. John T.
McNeill, trans. Ford Lewis Battles (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1950), 1.7.4. T.F. Torrance
comments on texts such as this that, for Calvin, '[wjhile the Word of God certainly does involve the
communication of truths and statements, in and through these God speaks to us directly and confronts
us with the majesty and dignity of his Truth', (Thomas F. Torrance, The Hermeneutics ofJohn Calvin
[Edinburgh: Scottish Academic Press, 1988], 93).
85 B.A. Gerrish, The Old Protestantism and the New. Essays on the Reformation Heritage (Edinburgh:
T.& T.Clark, 1982), 53.
86 Quoted in ed. Cochrane, Reformed Confessions, 226.
87 David W. Lotz, 'Sola Scriptura: Luther on Biblical Authority' Interpretation 35 (1981), 258-73
(267).
88 Timothy George, Theology ofthe Reformers (Nashville: Broadman, 1988), 83.
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Scripture interprets itself in terms of Christ as its center, that is christocentrically.'89 Luther
expresses this particularly forcefully in two much-quoted statements: 'The Scripture must
be understood in favour of Christ, not against him. For that reason they must either refer to
him or must not be held to be true Scriptures'; '[tjherefore, if the adversaries press the
Scriptures against Christ, we urge Christ against the Scriptures.'90
Luther's conception of the relationships between Scripture, Christ, the gospel and the
Word of God have been the subject of much discussion in this century, especially among
neo-orthodox theologians who have wished to enlist Luther as precedent for their
arguments, contrasting his theology favourably with what they think became of Protestant
orthodoxy in the two centuries following the Reformation. (This alleged contrast will be
taken up in the following section.) These terms and the relationships between them, as
understood by Luther, have been defined with particular clarity in an article by David Lotz.
For Luther, according to Lotz, the gospel does not just bear witness to a past event; rather,
'[t]he gospel as spoken Word of God ... is nothing else than the real presence of the exalted
Christ, the living Lord of the church.'91 It is this point which allows Luther to see 'the Word
of God' as primarily Jesus Christ, while also usually equating 'the Word of God' with the
oral proclamation of the gospel. Scripture for Luther is the Word of God written. This
writtenness does not detract from its identity as the Word of God, because in this form its
ultimate author is the Holy Spirit: says Lotz, 'Christ and his gospel are in Scripture, and
Scripture is truly God's Word.'92
It should be noted, though, that this emphasis in Luther's writing is in tension with his
view of the gospel as intrinsically oral proclamation, and of the writing of that proclamation
in Scripture as something of a declension from the nature of the gospel: 'the need to write
books was a serious decline and a lack of the Spirit which necessity [the challenge of
heresy] forced upon us; it is not the manner of the New Testament.'93 It is clear that in
making this claim Luther wished to emphasise that the purpose of the Bible is only ever to
convey Christ. However, this point does seem to flatten Scripture's various generic modes
of expression rather quickly into sermonic form, at times privileging Christ's mode of oral
proclamation over the apostolic narrative, epistolary and apocalyptic modes of expression:
89 Paul Althaus, The Theology ofMartin Luther trans. Robert C. Schultz (Philadelphia: Fortress Press,
1966), 79.
90 Luther, LW34.112.
91 Lotz, 'Sola Scriptura\ 262. Lotz quotes Luther: 'they [who hear Paul's gospel] are not listening to
Paul; but in Paul they are listening to Christ Himself and to God the Father, who sends him forth',
(Luther, LW26.16). Biblical warrant for this can be found in 1 Thess. 2.13.
92 On this basis Lotz judges that Protestant neo-orthodoxy cannot enlist Luther in support, (Lotz, 'Sola
Scriptura', 263).
93 Luther, LW 52.206; see also 35.121-23.
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the gospel should really not be something written, but a spoken word which
brought forth the Scriptures, as Christ and the apostles have done. This is why
Christ himself did not write anything but only spoke. He called his teaching
not Scripture but gospel, meaning good news or a proclamation that is spread
not by pen but by word ofmouth.94
In chapter 5 we shall take up the question of the diversity of the literary genres found in
Scripture, and suggest how the sufficiency of Scripture may broadly be conceived of in a
way which does not flatten that diversity. Further, in chapters 3 and 4 we shall offer a
conception of the ontology of texts which ties texts very closely to the actions of their
authors. This may be thought of as a way of accepting different biblical texts as a personal
divine address, and therefore as 'gospel', which is what Luther always wants us to find in
Scripture, but fully retaining in that conception the literary form in which they are actually
found in Scripture.
All this means that, for Luther, '[t]he written Word exists for the sake of the personal
Word and the spoken Word. Thus one can justly maintain that for Luther Scripture is God's
Word in a secondary or derivative sense.'95 The secondary nature of Scripture's identity
with the Word of God is due to Scripture's epistemological role in the establishing of
personal relationships between God and human beings: it is by means of the Scripture in
which Christ comes to us that we may come to know him. Lotz concludes: 'in urging
"Scripture alone" Luther was urging "Christ alone.'"96 It is within this Reformation
tradition that the positive proposals of this thesis are intended to operate. Our attempt is to
establish theological and hermeneutical frameworks for the sufficiency of Scripture which
keep the doctrine of Scripture christologically oriented, functioning as a servant in relation
to Christ.
Viewed from this functional angle, as a statement of how Scripture serves the necessary
christological focus of theology and Christian faith, the doctrine of the sufficiency of
Scripture appears very similar to that of the perspicuity of Scripture. Expounding Luther's
concept of claritas scripturae, Friedrich Beisser observes that the concept refers not
primarily to a text, but to an audible and public church proclamation: the Word is clear not
in some general sense, but because it is God's Word, and God's saving Word must be
clear.97 This is what Luther refers to as the external clarity of Scripture: 'all that is in the
94 Luther, LW35.123.
95 Lotz, 'Sola Scriptura', 263.
96 Lotz, 'Sola Scriptura', 266. The phrase 'Scripture alone' is open to misunderstanding. When used
by the Reformers, it did not imply that there was only one authority, rather that Scripture alone is the
supreme authority - not the sole authority for theology, but the final authority over other subordinate
authorities. This point is lucidly made by Anthony N.S. Lane, 'Sola Scriptural Making Sense of a
Post-Reformation Slogan', in eds Philip E. Satterthwaite & David F. Wright, A Pathway into the Holy
Scripture (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Eerdmans, 1994) 297-327.
97 Friedrich Beisser, Claritas scripturae bei Martin Luther (Gottingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht,
1966), 83-85.
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Scripture is through the Word brought forth into the clearest light and proclaimed to the
whole world.'98 Calvin makes a very similar point when he talks of Scripture's
effectiveness, by which he means that it makes manifest to human hearts that its truth is
divine truth.99 The clarity of the gospel in Scripture is therefore a counterpart to Scripture's
self-attestation by the Holy Spirit.
The Reformers are not here asserting that Scripture is sufficient to bring about a
response of faith among its hearers and readers. For that, the internal action of the Holy
Spirit is required, as Calvin regularly makes clear: 'Even if it [Scripture] wins reverence for
itself by its own majesty, it seriously affects us only when it is sealed upon our hearts
through the Spirit';100 'Scripture will ultimately suffice for a saving knowledge of God only
when its certainty is founded upon the inward persuasion of the Holy Spirit.'101 Luther
makes the same point through his distinction between internal and external perspicuity: the
latter refers to Scripture clearly bringing forth the gospel of Christ, and the former to the
fact that human failure to grasp God's word is due to our own 'blindness and dullness', not
to something inherent in Scripture.102
For what, then, according to the Reformers, is Scripture sufficient? Thiselton
explicates the epistemological and theological aspects of their answer: epistemologically,
Scripture provides 'a ground on which we may confidently proceed'; theologically
Scripture provides 'a witness to Christ to which we may confidently respond."03 The
christological focus which we have observed is well expressed here; we may add that, for
the Reformers, these are two aspects of the same theological reality. The chief question
which must be addressed as we come to the post-Reformation period is whether or not this
focus was lost in orthodox Protestant theology, that is, whether the further elaboration of the
attributes of Scripture took place in increasing abstraction from the fundamental doctrines of
God, Christ and the Holy Spirit.
2.5. The Post-Reformation Period
The different aspects of the doctrine of the sufficiency of Scripture remain of great
importance in the post-Reformation period: 'the entire doctrine of Biblical authority in
98 Martin Luther, The Bondage of the Will trans. J.I. Packer & O.R. Johnston (Edinburgh: Clarke,
1957), 74.
99 See Thiselton, New Horizons, 185, referring to Calvin, Institutes, 1.8.1.
100 Calvin, Institutes, 1.7.5.
101 Calvin, Institutes, 1.8.13.
102 Luther, The Bondage of the Will, 12-1A. Beisser says that for Luther Scripture is insufficient in
that the Spirit is needed to make the word live in our hearts, (Beisser, Claritas scripturae, 95). This
distinction between the meaning and effect of a text, and the consequent clarification of what is meant
by calling a text in some way 'sufficient', will become significant in chapters 3 and 4, as we
appropriate concepts developed by speech-act theorists.
103 Thiselton, New Horizons, 184-85, (original italics removed).
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Lutheran theology stands or falls with Scripture's sufficiency.'104 Before we come to the
question of continuity and discontinuity between Reformation and post-Reformation
doctrines of Scripture, we shall follow the pattern of the preceding sections by looking first
at the material and then at the formal aspect of the sufficiency of Scripture in this period.
The period under consideration is approximately from the middle of the sixteenth century to
the end of the seventeenth, moving from the second-generation Reformers through to the
period of what is usually known as late Protestant orthodoxy or scholasticism.
2.5.1. The Material Extent of the Sufficiency ofScripture
The majority of statements of the material extent of the sufficiency of Scripture in the post-
Reformation period are in uncontroversial continuity with what we have seen through
earlier periods.105 For the Puritan theologian William Ames, writing in 1623, '[a]ll things
necessary to salvation are contained in the Scriptures and also those things necessary for the
instruction and edification of the church. ... Therefore, Scripture is not a partial but a
perfect rule of faith and morals."06 It is hard to be certain whether or not for Ames those
things 'necessary for the instruction and edification of the church' in fact come under the
rubric of things necessary for salvation. It seems likely that they do, since Ames sees
Scripture as 'a perfect rule of faith and morals', not necessarily of every Christian practice.
Indeed, seventeenth-century Reformed theologians generally did not specify in great detail
what is included under 'everything necessary for salvation'. 'Salvation', in the phrase
'sufficient for salvation', generally covers everything a Christian must know and do to
please God.107 The Genevan theologian Francis Turretin (1632-87) is a good example. In
his main work, Institutio Theologiae Elencticae, he asserts that Scripture is 'a full and
sufficient rule of faith and practice' in matters 'necessary for salvation, whether of faith or
of conduct', while allowing that '[t]here are many matters, appendices and bylaws, as it
were, to religion, dealing with the worship and polity of the church, which are not
specifically covered by Scripture, and are left to the decision of the rulers of the church'.108
The Westminster Confession of Faith similarly limits the material extent of scriptural
104 Robert D. Preus, The Theology of Post-Reformation Lutheranism. A Study of Theological
Prolegomena (Saint Louis & London: Concordia Publishing House, 1970), 309.
105 See Heinrich Heppe, Reformed Dogmatics rev. ed. Ernst Bizer, trans. G.T. Thomson (London:
George Allen & Unwin, 1950), 28; Richard A. Muller, Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics.
Volume 2: Holy Scripture: The Cognitive Foundation of Theology (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1993),
327ff.
106 William Ames, The Marrow of Theology trans. & ed. John D. Eusden (Boston & Philadelphia:
Pilgrim Press, 1968), 187.
107 John F. Robinson, The Doctrine of Holy Scripture in Seventeenth Centuiy Reformed Theology
(PhD; Univ. of Strasbourg, 1971), 140, 191.
108 Francis Turretin, The Doctrine of Scripture. Locus 2 of Institutio Theologiae Elencticae ed. &
trans. John W. Beardslee (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1981), 167-68.
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sufficiency, reflecting a rationalist tendency in its description of how church leaders are to
come to decisions in areas not covered directly by Scripture: 'there are some circumstances
concerning the worship of God, and government of the Church, common to human actions
and societies, which are to be ordered by the light of nature, and Christian prudence,
according to the general rules of the word, which are always to be observed', (1.6).
This question became a significant issue between conformists and Puritans in England
in the controversy over the 'regulative principle'. Hooker argued that Scripture regulated
preaching, but that matters of church polity could be decided differently in different
situations. Whitgift saw no difference between something being 'not against Scripture' and
'according to Scripture'.109 The Puritan John Cartwright felt that all this restricted
Scripture's actual reach: 'I say that the Word of God containeth the direction of all things,
pertaining to the church, yea of whatsoever things can fall into any part of a man's life'."0
One of the noteworthy elements of this debate was that all parties were agreed that Scripture
is sufficient for salvation, both materially and formally, as the source and norm of preaching
and doctrine. In this thesis we shall not endeavour to decide on such questions of the actual
material extent of scriptural sufficiency; we shall restrict ourselves to reconstructing the
bases of the doctrine of scriptural sufficiency to the extent that it was shared by the vast
majority of Protestant theologians of the Reformation and post-Reformation periods,
including those on both sides of this controversy.
A common theme in this period is that 'matters necessary for salvation found in
Scripture' covers also doctrines derived from Scripture. The Westminster Confession
speaks in this regard ofmatters which 'by good and necessary consequence may be deduced
from Scripture', (1.6). This point was necessary to counter claims, made especially by
Socinians, that Scripture cannot be sufficient because, for example, the doctrines of the
Trinity and the deity of Christ are not directly stated in it. Against Roman Catholic
arguments that in this process of deduction Scripture leads us to 'a church that sets forth
new articles of faith', Turretin responds that 'it does not lead to another who teaches, but
brings forth from within itself [teachings] that were implicitly lying there.'111
A short excursus may be made here on the question of the material sufficiency of
Scripture in post-Reformation Roman Catholic theology. Muller notes that many Catholic
theologians of this period found themselves arguing against such medieval theologians as
109 Reventlow, The Authority of the Bible, 116.
110 Quoted in Graham Cole, 'Sola Scriptura: Some Historical and Contemporary Perspectives'
Churchman 104 (1990), 20-34 (22). Cole judges Cartwright to be 'a Scriptural totalitarian'.
111 Turretin, The Doctrine ofScripture, 179-80. Turretin is here responding to the Roman Catholic
Perronius, who argued that Scripture has a 'mediate' sufficiency that leads us to the church which
makes good its defects, (see Muller, Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics, 334).
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Aquinas and Duns Scotus in order to counter the Protestant doctrine of Scripture."2
However, in this century Josef Geiselmann sparked a debate over whether or not the final
text of the Council of Trent on Scripture and tradition, which consolidated the Catholic
position in opposition to that of the Reformation, did in fact affirm the existence of two
sources of revelation - Scripture and the church - as has traditionally been supposed. The
drafts of Trent's declaration on Scripture and tradition spoke of revelation as coming partly
through Scripture and partly through the church (partim ... partim), but in the final text this
was changed to a description of revelation as coming through both Scripture and the church
(et ... et). Geiselmann suggested that this change had semantic, not just stylistic,
connotations: he argued that the final text, in contrast to the drafts, advocates a view not of
two sources of revelation but of the same revealed content coming via two media. Those
post-Reformation Roman Catholics who did advocate a two-source view of revelation -
and there were many - erred, according to Geiselmann, in applying their view to matters of
faith, not just to matters of indifference."3 In this century, however, the majority Roman
Catholic position has shifted from this, to the view that Scripture, while still formally
insufficient, requiring authoritative church interpretation, is materially sufficient for
salvation. That is Geiselmann's own view: the content of Scripture is sufficient 'ihrem
Sein nach', but insufficient '[d]er Erkenntnis nach'."4
The details ofGeiselmann's arguments about the intentions of the Tridentine authors lie
beyond our concerns here. They have been accepted by some"5 and rejected by others."6
Karl Rahner suggests that Trent's formulations were simply not precise enough to answer
the modern question of whether Scripture is materially insufficient 'with regard to its
contents and as compared with tradition',"7 and himself comes to the same position as
Geiselmann on the sufficiency of Scripture, which he calls a Roman Catholic sola
scriptural
The heart of the disagreement of this contemporary Roman Catholic position with that
of the Reformation is over the locus of the action of the Holy Spirit in relation to Scripture:
is the locus of the Holy Spirit's authoritative interpretive work the church or the text?
112 Muller, Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics, 327.
113 Geiselmann, Die Heilige Schrift, 270.
114 Geiselmann, Die Heilige Schrift, 272.
115 E.g. Tavard, Holy Writ, 242-45.
116 E.g. Oberman, Hai-vest, 407.
117 A.N.S. Lane agrees: 'the final text of the decree remains neutral as to the material (in)sufficiency
of Scripture', (Lane, 'Scripture, Tradition and Church', 46).
118 Karl Rahner, Theological Investigations 6 trans. Karl-H. & Boniface Kruger (Baltimore: Helicon/
London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1969), 104-107.
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Theologically, it is this that is ultimately at stake with the Protestant claim that Scripture is
formally sufficient for its own interpretation.119
2.5.2. The Formal Aspect of the Sufficiency ofScripture
In this excursus on the post-Reformation Roman Catholic position on Scripture and tradition
the question of the formal sufficiency of Scripture has already been taken up. In his
scholastic manner, Francis Turretin begins his discussion of 'The Supreme Judge of
Controversies and the Interpreter of Scripture' thus: 'Is Scripture, or God speaking in
Scripture, the supreme and infallible judge of controversies and the interpreter of Scripture,
rather than the church or the Roman pontifex? (Affirmative, against the Roman
Catholics).'120 William Ames, around fifty years earlier, makes a similar statement: 'The
Scriptures need no explanation through light brought from outside, especially in the
necessary things. They give light to themselves'.121 A third example may be given, from
the Westminster Confession of Faith: 'The infallible rule of interpretation of Scripture is
the Scripture itself: and therefore, when there is a question about the true and full sense of
any Scripture (which is not manifold, but one), it must be searched and known by other
places that speak more clearly', (1.9). These statements are typical of Protestant orthodox
theologians in the post-Reformation period.122 Scripture thus came to be spoken of as the
principium cognoscendi for theology and Christian faith: 'If traditions agree with Scripture
they are confirmed by it; if they oppose it they are disproved by it."23 As well as a polemic
against Roman Catholics, this argument was also mounted against Socinians, who based
Scripture's authority on empirical evidence.124
Although this position represents a polemic against Catholic views of the locus of the
action of the Holy Spirit in relation to Scripture, it is important to note what the Protestant
orthodox are not claiming. The position is not a flat rejection of church tradition. Historical
traditions, such as those which state which books the church received as divine, and how
certain passages of Scripture were understood, may be accepted, but remain ultimately open
to questioning on the basis of Scripture. What are rejected are what were called 'dogmatic
traditions', which prescribed 'credenda' and 'agenda' not found in Scripture.125
119 We shall come to the question of the action of the Holy Spirit in relationship to Scripture in chapter
4.
120 Turretin, The Doctrine ofScripture, 209.
121 Ames, TheMarrow of Theology, 188.
122 Further documentation is found in Heppe, Reformed Dogmatics, 33ff.; Muller, Post-Reformation
Reformed Dogmatics, 334ff.
123 Edward Leigh, quoted in Muller, Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics, 337.
124 Preus, Post-Reformation Lutheranism, 298-99.
125 Heppe, Reformed Dogmatics, 30-31.
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Nor, in relation to 'enthusiasts', does this position deny the necessary role of the Holy
Spirit in relation to Scripture: 'The supreme Judge, by which all controversies of religion
are to be determined, and all decrees of councils, opinions of ancient writers, doctrines of
men, and private spirits, are to be examined, and in whose sentence we are to rest, can be no
other but the Holy Spirit speaking in Scripture.'126 Moreover, for the Protestant orthodox
'the most essential requisite [for correct interpretation of Scripture] is faith and life in the
fellowship of the Holy Spirit'.127 What is denied is that individual conviction that a
particular passage of Scripture says a certain thing to a certain person has divine authority to
go unchecked by traditional interpretations, by the literal verbal meaning of the biblical text
in question, or by other places in Scripture.128 The Lutheran Johann Gerhard (1582-1637),
for example, accused both Roman Catholics and 'enthusiasts' of breaking the vital
connection between Scripture's verbum and sensus.'29 The following discussion, in which
we outline the widespread rejection of post-Reformation orthodoxy, and offer some defence,
continues this topic, focusing particularly on the formal aspect of the sufficiency of
Scripture.
2.5.3. Continuity and Discontinuity in the Post-Reformation Period
There is a consensus of opinion that, in the two centuries after the Reformation, many
Protestant articulations of the doctrine of Scripture slipped the theological moorings which
had held the doctrine firmly in place during the Reformation itself. The basic objection is
that what were taken to be Scripture's 'attributes' - typically: perfection, sufficiency,
perspicuity and necessity - came to be grounded less in Christology and more in the fact of
the divine inspiration of Scripture: 'the objectively understood inspiredness of Scripture
becomes the source from which the objective properties are derived."30 These objective
properties, or attributes, attain no definitive listing; within some variation, the four listed
above emerge as the most common and significant.131 The attributes, understood as
126 Westminster Confession of Faith, 1.10.
127
Heppe, Reformed Dogmatics, 39. This raises the question of what in fact correct interpretation is -
merely understanding the text's cognitive content, or in some way 'performing' that content? -
which will be addressed in chapters 3 and 4.
128 Bengt Hagglund says that the Lutheran theologian Johann Gerhard (1582-1637) regarded the
primary evidence of the authority of the Bible, the internal witness of the Holy Spirit, as internal to
Scripture, not the person, (Bengt Hagglund, Die Heilige Schrift und ihre Deutung in der Theologie
Johann Gerhards [Lund: CWK Gleemp, 1951], 94-96).
129 Hagglund, Die Heilige Schrift, 221.
130 Otto Weber, Foundations ofDogmatics 1 trans. Darrell L. Guder (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1981),
268.
131 For different lists of attributes in different theologians, see Heppe, Reformed Dogmatics, 21-22;
Weber, Foundations ofDogmatics, 268. A complex diagram of the attributes claimed for Scripture,
listing many more than the main four, derived from Johann Friedrich Konig's Theologia positive
acroamatica (1664), can be found in Carl Heinz Ratschow, Lutherische Dogmatik zwischen
Reformation und Aufklarung I (Giitersloh: Giitersloher Verlagshaus Gerd Mohn, 1964), 101.
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objective properties of the biblical texts, then become the ground of Scripture's authority,
rather than its authority being located in the Christ to whom the text bears witness. Karl
Barth objected that the Protestant scholastics so dislocated Scripture from its role as witness
to Christ that they turned the proclamation of the gospel into 'a fixed sum of revealed
propositions which can be systematised like the sections of a corpus of law'.132 This
position, and its contemporary forms, is often termed 'biblicism', which is well described as
[a] view of Scripture and its authority which is based on the divine attributes
("perfections") of the Bible as a "supernatural book." The Bible's authority is
thereby located in its "form" as an inspired book, rather than in its matter or
content. The Bible's divine inspiration and factual inerrancy guarantee the
truth of its message, with the result that faith, though directed ultimately to
Christ, is first directed to the Bible as written Word of God.133
The challenge which this section aims to defuse is one which might be directed at the
entire project of the present thesis, on the basis of the consensus argument outlined above:
namely, that to focus on one of the traditional attributes of Scripture in such detail is to be
implicated in the theological errors of 'biblicism' and in its resultant theological distortions.
Two particular resources here will be the work of Robert Preus and Richard Muller, on post-
Reformation Lutheranism and Reformed theology respectively, who both, in the course of
highly detailed historical studies, defend post-Reformation orthodox theologians against the
charge that they departed significantly from the magisterial Reformers.134
The defence of Protestant orthodoxy against this charge will focus especially on the
late-seventeenth-century Genevan Reformed theologian, Francis Turretin, to whose work
we have already had cause to refer. He has been chosen both because he is often quoted as
representing the high-point (or the nadir) of Protestant biblicism,135 and because his work is
representative of the kind of Protestant orthodoxy which was influential on the orthodox
doctrines of Scripture developed by nineteenth-century theologians at Princeton, whose
work has in turn had a significant impact on present-day attitudes to the orthodox doctrine
of Scripture.136 In the middle of the nineteenth century, Turretin's main work, Institutio
132 Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics 1/1 trans. G.W. Bromiley (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1975), 137.
133 Lotz, 'Sola Scriptura\ 268 n.30.
134 In our overall conclusion, chapter 6, we will summarise our response to the anticipated objection
that what this thesis offers is a covert defence of biblicism or even of fundamentalism, one of the most
influential modem forms of biblicism. In addition, Barth's alternative to 'biblicism' will be examined
in chapter 3, and in chapter 5 we will discuss the allegedly 'biblicist' doctrine of biblical inspiration of
B.B. Warfield.
135 Two writers who basically defend Turretin, although not blindly, acknowledge that he is usually
seen as a 'hard case': W. Robert Godfrey, 'Biblical Authority in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth
Centuries: A Question of Transition', in eds D.A. Carson & John D. Woodbridge, Scripture and Truth
(Leicester: IVP, 1983), 225-243 (237); John D. Woodbridge, Biblical Authority. A Critique of the
Rogers/McKim Proposal (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Zondervan, 1982), 22.
136 See Woodbridge, Biblical Authority, 22. Woodbridge cautions, however, against the tendency to
think of the Princetonian view of Scripture as mostly determined by Turretin. Princeton theologians,
he says, read very widely, and, although he used Turretin as a text-book, C. Hodge often disagreed
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Theologiae Elencticae, was translated by a classics professor at Princeton at the request of
Charles Hodge, who wished his students to be able to study it in English.137
In choosing a Reformed theologian, we are not focusing on issues which separated the
Reformed from Lutherans. As regards the doctrine of Scripture, the chief area of
disagreement between Reformed and Lutheran was over the Lutheran claim, and the
Reformed denial, that the Word itself is efficacious. Thus the Lutheran Johann Gerhard, in
response to the claim of Rahtmann that Scripture's efficacious power (Wirkungskraft) is
dependent on the internal illumination of the Holy Spirit, asserted that Scripture has the
power to illuminate and make alive 'in and of itself.138 Preus says of Abraham Calov, a
Lutheran who makes the same claim as Gerhard, that he is attempting only to argue that
Scripture's divine origin must lend it some intrinsic power.139 In stressing Scripture's divine
origin, Lutherans were of course no different from the Reformed.
According to Preus, the Lutheran assertion of the efficacy of the Word is a corollary of
their refusal to answer the question of why some responded to the Word and some did not.
Calvinists answered that question by stating that the call of God in the gospel was not
efficacious in the case of the non-elect, since God did not send his Spirit into their hearts;
Lutherans could only see this as a view of God as sometimes 'not serious' when he called
through the gospel, and preferred to rescue God's action in salvation from apparent
arbitrariness by ascribing efficacy to the Word itself.140 Since we are not concerned here
with the attribute of the efficacy of Scripture, we may treat Reformed and Lutheran
orthodox theologians together. Indeed, the view of orthodox theology as moving towards an
objectifying view of Scripture in the post-Reformation period, which is the consensus
position we wish to question, is levelled at Lutheran and Reformed theologians alike. This
consensus view will be outlined, in three different formulations of its objection to post-
Reformation orthodox theology, and a brief response will be offered to each.141 The
with him, and found his overall theology too scholastic, (Woodbridge, Biblical Authority, 135, 218
n.84).
137 This translation, by George Musgrave Giger, has only recently been published: Francis Turretin,
Institutes ofElenctic Theology ed. James T. Dennison, Jr., (Phillipsburg, New Jersey: P. & R., 1992-
94). For a brief account of the history of Giger's translation see p.xxvii of the editor's preface in
vol.1. A more recent translation by John W. Beardslee of Locus 2 - the locus on the doctrine of
Scripture - has been published separately, in a volume to which we have referred above.
138 'In und bey sich', (Hagglund, Die Heilige Schrift, 255).
139 Preus, Post-Reformation Lutheranism, 368.
140 Preus, Post-Reformation Lutheranism, 376.
141 It is not argued here that no development took place between the Reformation and seventeenth-
century Protestant orthodoxy - rather that whatever development there was did not represent a
fundamental shift from a 'dynamic' to an 'objective' doctrine of Scripture. John Webster suggests,
e.g., that post-Reformation dogmatics inadvertently prepared the way for 'non-theological construals
of the Bible' by developing a theological epistemology that was insufficiently Trinitarian, (John
Webster, 'Hermeneutics in Modem Theology: Some Doctrinal Reflections' Scottish Journal of
Theology 51 [1998], 307-41 [323-24]).
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Westminster Confession of Faith, along with the theology of Francis Turretin, will be taken
as loci classici of post-Reformation Protestant orthodoxy, both here and in subsequent
chapters.
2.5.3.1. The clarity ofScripture: content and words
G.C. Berkouwer sees in the post-Reformation period a shift towards the view that 'the
words of Scripture, particularly in their semantic function' are perspicuous, in contrast to
the Reformers' conception of the clarity of Scripture, which aimed only to emphasise that
the message of salvation really does come through when Scripture is read.142 Ebeling makes
the same criticism: the emphasis shifted 'from the clarity of the subject-matter to the
inviolability of the actual words and letters of Scripture'.143
However, in Turretin's discussion of the perspicuity of Scripture the focus is certainly
on Scripture's content. What he calls Scripture's 'sublime mysteries' are so presented in
Scripture, he says, that 'a believer who has enlightened eyes of the mind can comprehend
these mysteries sufficiently for salvation if he reads carefully."44 The same is true of the
Westminster Confession of Faith's statement on perspicuity: what is plain in Scripture is
'those things which are necessary to be known ... for salvation', (1.7). Muller suggests that
the Reformed orthodox were simply developing what was implicit in the Reformers'
confessions, for once Scripture itself was established as the only norm for interpretation, it
followed logically that 'at least the crucial loci would have to be grammatically clear', in
order for one text to shed light on another without recourse to the church.145 A case may
indeed be made that it was only by linking the clarity of Scripture's content to the clarity of
its words that orthodox theologians were able to keep the confession of Scripture's
perspicuity from falling into obscurantism or nonsense, especially as historical awareness of
the original languages of the Bible began to grow. Luther himself makes this link at one
point, noting that certain passages of Scripture are obscure to us because of our linguistic
ignorance.146 Where the content is perspicuous, that is presumably in part due to our
linguistic capabilities. Thus, a necessary aspect of perspicuity as a theological confession is
a semantic perspicuity, understood as a limited claim about the language, grammar and
words of Scripture. To address semantic issues is not necessarily to fall from the example
set by the Reformers.
Neither does one necessarily fall away by regarding the attributes of Scripture as
implying hermeneutical principles. 'Luther observes that all books are to be interpreted in
142 Berkouwer, Holy Scripture, 272-75.
143 Ebeling, "Sola Scriptura' and Tradition', 139.
144 Turretin, The Doctrine ofScripture, 186.
145 Muller, Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics, 341.
146 Luther, The Bondage of the Will, 71.
39
the spirit of their author', and that therefore Scripture, authored by the Holy Spirit, must be
self-interpreting, since in all cases the spirit of an author is best discerned in his writings.147
Thus in Luther we find perspicuity as a theological principle closely tied to hermeneutical
and semantic claims. If the orthodox successors of the Reformers developed these
hermeneutical and linguistic points, that may be seen as a natural development of, rather
than a departure from, the Reformers' theological construal of Scripture's attributes.
2.5.3.2. The centre ofScripture: Christ and salvation
The consensus view of the Reformed scholastics, and particularly of Francis Turretin, is that
their theology was not christocentric, but was structured and grounded on a rational
demonstration of Scripture's supposed attributes.148 Carl Heinz Ratschow makes the same
argument with regard to Lutheran theology, tracing what he sees as a development in the
Lutheran doctrine of Scripture. Before 1600, he says, it was common for Lutheran
theologians to begin their theologies with a locus on Scripture as the principium
cognoscendi, followed by a locus on God as principium essendi. These two principles were
regarded as two sides of the same res: God himself in his relation to the world. This close
relationship was lost, according to Ratschow, towards the end of the sixteenth century, and
he traces the end of the separation of the two elements to Johann Franciscus Buddheus,
whose main work was published in 1724. Buddheus, says Ratschow, establishes Scripture
as principium on the basis of its attributes, treating Scripture as significant only to the extent
that it provides dogmatic statements. The previous close connection with the salvific
activity of God is lost.149
Robert Preus defends the Lutheran orthodox against this challenge, concluding that one
of their great achievements was to present a doctrine of Scripture which functioned
'soteriologically and doxologically in the service of the living Christ."50 Phillips defends
Turretin against the charge, by examining his concept of 'theology', which Turretin
develops in the prolegomenon to his Institutio. Here, Turretin distinguishes supernatural
from natural revelation, and says of the former that it is from Christ and speaks of him, is
called the Old and New Testaments, and is called Christian because Christ is its author or
object.151 Here at least, Turretin's approach to Scripture seems christocentric. He then says
that supernatural theology can be considered in two different ways: systematically,
'denoting the system of saving doctrine concerning God and divine things drawn from the
147 Althaus, Theology ofMartin Luther, 76.
148 This is well documented in Timothy Ross Phillips, Francis Turretin's Idea of Theology and Its
Bearing Upon His Doctrine ofScripture (PhD; Vanderbilt Univ., 1986), 13ff.
149 Ratschow, Lutherische Dogmatik, 72.
150 Preus, Post-Reformation Lutheranism, 411.
151 Turretin, Institutes 1,1.2.7.
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Scriptures', and habitually, 'after the manner of a habit residing in the intellect'.152 In the
rest of the prolegomenon it is the habitual aspect which becomes significant. This 'habit' is
not 'intellectual' in an ordinary modern sense of that word, however: Turretin relates 'the
habit of knowing' to Greek concepts of knowledge, and concludes that in the case of
theology it is to be understood 'in the Stoical sense, as a collection of all habits, intellectual
as well as moral."53
Phillips argues in addition that Turretin's foundational concept for his theology is that it
is 'ectypal' theology. Turretin bases this designation on the assertion that, in
communicating to us not his essence but a likeness - an ectype of the archetypal theology,
which is 'the original and uncreated wisdom by which God knows Himself - God
nevertheless gives us confidence that our theology speaks truly of him, because of his self-
revelation in Jesus Christ, who is precisely divine revelation in a form suitable to the
creature. Thus, '[t]he ectypal theology is grounded solely in God's action."54 Theology is
then for Turretin, according to Phillips, 'a divine wisdom, a praxis and cognizance of God
and divine things, which is revealed in Jesus Christ through the Word."55 Such a view of
theology could of course not be said to represent a fall away from the Reformation's
christocentric and soteriological emphases.156
If Turretin's doctrine of Scripture is read in the light of his introductory delineation of
the nature of theology, it is hard to conclude that he bases the authority of Scripture not on
its necessary relation to Christ, the Lord of Scripture, but on objective textual attributes.
Further careful reading of his locus on Scripture might lead to the conclusion that in some
ways Turretin does not consistently hold to his prefatory principles when he comes to
develop his doctrine of Scripture. However, the relative lack of discussion available on his
theological prolegomenon suggests that Woodbridge is right to call for more research to be
done on Turretin's work, both published and unpublished, before we decide firmly against
152 Turretin, Institutes 1,1.2.8.
153 Turretin, Institutes 1,1.6.7.
154 Phillips, Francis Turretin's Idea of Theology, 129-32.
155 Phillips, Francis Turretin's Idea of Theology, 331.
156 Indeed, it would be similar to Aquinas' concept of theology as ultimately a wisdom given by the
Spirit, (Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, la. 1, 6). See in addition, on orthodox Lutheran theology of the
scholastic period: 'The notion of theology as habitus GeooSoxoq occurs frequently in Lutheran
Orthodoxy ... Theology is GeooSoxoq simply because its subject-matter, contained in Holy Scripture,
is given by God. All cognitive functions which have their origin in an encounter with that subject-
matter could therefore be described as "God-given" operations, and when "habitualized," as a God-
given habitus', (Kenneth G. Appold, Abraham Calov's Doctrine o/Vocatio in its Systematic Context
Beitrage zur historischen Theologie 103 [Tubingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1998], 65). Rogers & McKim are
quite wide of the mark when they conclude: 'The desire for "certainty" among the post-Reformation
scholastics was for a tangible, human certainty of the Bible's inspiration rather than for a divine
certainty brought about by faith', (Jack B. Rogers & Donald K. McKim, The Authority and
Interpretation ofthe Bible. An Historical Approach [San Francisco: Haiper & Row, 1979], 421).
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him.157 This thesis amounts to an argument that, taking the kinds of theological concerns
expressed in Turretin's prolegomenon to be legitimate concerns, the kind of doctrine of
Scripture he goes on to develop, emphasising the sufficiency of Scripture, is in no necessary
way at odds with them.
2.5.3.3. Canon and inspiration
The post-Reformation orthodox doctrine of the inspiration of Scripture is regarded by the
consensus interpretation of Protestant scholasticism as the cause of a number of different
problems. We shall deal with this topic of the inspiration of Scripture at some length in
chapter 5; here, by way of introduction to that discussion, one point may be made.
On the question of the ground of the canon of Scripture, Edward Dowey contrasts the
Westminster Confession of Faith unfavourably with the Second Helvetic Confession.
Because for Bullinger, in the latter confession, Scripture is the Word of God as 'wort, will
und meinung', and not as sound in the air, ink or paper, says Dowey, the Word is related to
its soteriological centre, and not, as in the Westminster Confession, 'left as a formally
defined canon'.158 Muller rejects this, arguing that the Westminster Confession of Faith
grounds Scripture's authority not on the concept of inspiration but on its nature as Word,
referring to the argument of John Leith that Westminster 'marks a formal development of
the Reformed doctrine of Scripture without any abandonment of the premises of early
Reformed doctrine.'159 Muller agrees with Heppe that the Reformed orthodox did develop
an 'increasingly rigid approach to the canon of Scripture', but argues that this is not, as
Heppe thinks, because they 'set aside an earlier Protestant distinction between Holy
Scripture and the Word of God', but because '[t]he early Reformers were more able than
their successors to allow for an unevenness of quality in Scripture - for a clearer and fuller
communication of the Word in some places than in others."60 In chapter 5 a similar point
will be made about the inflexibility of the terminology of 'oracle of God' which B.B.
Warfield, at the turn of the twentieth century, regularly applied to Scripture, and conceptual
possibilities for thinking of the diversity of Scripture will be investigated. However, we
shall question whether a direct identification of Scripture with the Word of God, and a
concomitant doctrine of inspiration, necessarily entails an attempt to read the gospel of
Christ directly out of every individual verse or text.
157 Woodbridge, Biblical Authority, 116-17.
158 Edward A. Dowey, Jr., 'The Word of God as Scripture and Preaching', in ed. W. Fred Graham,
Later Calvinism. International Perspectives Sixteenth Century Essays and Studies 22 (Kirksville,
Missouri: Sixteenth Century Journal Publishers, 1994), 5-18 (8-9).
159 Muller, Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics, 79-81.
160 Muller, Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics, 417.
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2.5.3.4. Summary
The argument of Muller, Preus and others in defending post-Reformation orthodox
theologians against the charge that they departed significantly from the Reformation
understanding of Scripture is basically that their theology changed in form in comparison
with that of the Reformers, adopting medieval scholastic models, but not to any great extent
in content.'61 Where later Reformed theologians seem to offer a more static conception of
Scripture, that is because their genre, 'fully developed theological system', was different
from that of the Reformers; yet 'nowhere do the orthodox reject the Reformers' insight into
the personal and subjective power of the Word."62
One formal innovation over the Reformation was in the development and placing of a
section on Scripture in systematic theologies immediately after the prolegomenon and
before the discussion of the doctrines of God or Christ. However, defenders of orthodox
theologians regularly point out that in the late sixteenth century the threats to Protestant
orthodoxy were precisely formal, and increasingly sophisticated, coming from Socinianism
and Roman Catholicism. The orthodox necessarily responded on their opponents' terms,
while still stressing the centrality of the gospel's saving content.163 It may well be that, as
often, perhaps always, happens in theology, what began as ad hoc attempts to answer
opponents on their own terms soon made a substantive contribution to theological
formulation; Muller argues that in the period of 'high orthodoxy' (c. 1640-1700) polemic
was consistently rationalised into positive doctrine.164 Nevertheless, a good case can be
made, given a more careful reading of their work than the Protestant orthodox have
sometimes received, that the form of their theology did not significantly obscure the basic
theological content which they inherited from the Reformers.
2.6. The Period of Decline
The reasons for the decline of the doctrine of the sufficiency of Scripture, as one aspect of
belief in the Bible as supremely authoritative for Christianity, are of course highly complex,
and anything approaching a full discussion of them would require more space than is
available here. The focus in this section is on the rise to prominence of critical and sceptical
thought in theology and biblical studies. Contemporary thought has furthered the decline of
the sufficiency of Scripture in many ways, both directly and in attacking its hermeneutical
161 'The key point ofMuller's analysis is that the Reformed scholastics employed medieval models for
systematizing theology but retained the basic doctrinal content of the Reformation', (Martin I.
Klauber, 'Continuity and Discontinuity in Post-Reformation Theology: An Evaluation of the Muller
Thesis' Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society 33 [1990], 467-75 [470]).
162 Muller, Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics, 67.
163 Godfrey, 'Biblical Authority', 237; Muller, Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics, 321.
164 Muller, Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics, 123-24.
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bases; what is begun here will later be developed as these modern questions are addressed
as they arise in chapters 4 and 5.
Henning Graf Reventlow has traced in great detail the mutual influences exercised on
each other by the Bible and intellectual and constitutional developments in England in the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, particularly in relation to the rise of deism. He
concludes that biblical criticism in England was motivated to a great extent by political
concerns, as Whigs wished to deprive High Church Tories of the support they claimed in the
Bible for their political positions.165 Of greater importance, when the decline of biblical
authority is considered in Western Europe as a whole, is a mixture of historical and religious
motivations, galvanised by the desire to rescue Europe from the religious wars which had
devastated large tracts of it. These concerns became focused for many people on the desire
to have God, as Michael Buckley puts it, without either the church or Christ - that is, to
have religion without an ecclesiastical structure able to wield both political and social
power, and without a highly particular theological centre serving to exclude others from the
'true faith'.166
It is clear from even this brief description that in the period under consideration here
political, historical, religious and theological themes coincide in ways that suggest a world
quite different from that of the late twentieth century. In order to limit the following
discussion by focusing on our particular concerns, we will highlight the theological
elements in the decline in belief in the sufficiency of Scripture. This decline will be
analysed into treatments of the decline of each of the three elements of the doctrine
discussed so far; since these three elements are abstractions from the doctrine for the
purposes of our analysis and reconstruction, there is inevitably some overlap in the
discussion of their decline.
Two overall themes may be observed in the gradual decline of the authority of
Scripture. First, there is a growing historical awareness, especially of the original historical
locatedness of biblical texts and of the history of their redaction, canonical compilation and
transmission. Second, there is a rejection of history as the locus of divine revelation - what
Eberhard Jtingel characterises as 'the prevailing interest in the unhistoricality of God.'167
While the simultaneous interest in and rejection of history in biblical and theological studies
which these two themes represent has caused debates about critical biblical scholarship
165 Reventlow, The Authority of the Bible, 329.
166 Michael J. Buckley, S.J., At the Origins ofModern Atheism (New Haven & London: Yale Univ.
Press, 1987), 38-39.
167 Eberhard Jiingel, 'Anthropomorphism: A Fundamental Problem in Modern Hermeneutics', in
Jiingel, Theological Essays trans. & ed. J.B. Webster (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1989), 72-94 (86).
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which still continue,168 it is easy to see how this ambivalence might function in the rejection
of biblical authority: God cannot and does not reveal himself in the particular ways which a
Christian view of revelation-m-history would require, and in this theological context
historical study attempts to demonstrate the Bible's inability to rise in any significant way
above the specificities of its origin to a position of trans-cultural authority.169
2.6.1. Divine Speech
The identification of Scripture with divine speech is grounded on the theological assertion
that God can and does reveal himself in particular ways in some of the specificities of
history, as opposed to in history in general. It is to this theological assertion of supernatural
revelation that the Enlightenment was, says Michael Buckley at the beginning of his large
study of the origins of modern atheism, 'irrevocably hostile'.170 The most well-known
philosophical statement of this view is Lessing's assertion that 'accidental truths of history
can never become the proof of necessary truths of reason'.171
One of its most significant theological expositions is found in Spinoza's Tractatus
Theologico-Politicus, which was influential on Lessing's work.172 For Spinoza, the history
and doctrine which the Bible contains is of no authority for us; religion and biblical
authority are matters ofmorality alone. What he says of the prophets is representative of his
attitude to the whole Bible: 'the authority of the prophets has weight only in matters of
morality, and ... their speculative doctrines affect us little."73 In an argument superficially
similar to that for the sufficiency of Scripture, Spinoza insists that the Bible alone should
determine its own meaning: 'all knowledge of spiritual questions should be sought from it
alone, and not from the objects of ordinary knowledge'.174 However, as regards its truth,
Scripture is radically insufficient, being subject to the adjudication of reason: 'the rule for
such [biblical] interpretation should be nothing but the natural light of reason which is
168 See, e.g., James Barr's rejection of B.S. Childs' claim that nineteenth-century historical criticism
privileged historical over theological questions, and so operated with a reductionist approach to
Scripture, (James Barr, 'The Literal, The Allegorical, and Modem Biblical Scholarship' Journal for
the Study ofthe Old Testament 44 [1989] 3-17).
169 J.S. Semler is an early example of a writer who regarded the New Testament as 'a witness to its
own time, and not primarily as intended for today's reader', (Werner Georg Kiimmel, The New
Testament. The History ofthe Investigation of its Problems [London: SCM, 1973], 65).
170 Buckley, At the Origins, 37.
171 Lessing, Lessing's Theological Writings ed. Henry Chadwick (London: A. & C. Black, 1956), 53.
In his introduction to this volume Chadwick traces the influence of Lessing on Schleiermacher's
Christmas Eve through to D.F. Strauss's divorcing of Gospel history from the 'eternal truths' of
Christianity, (30-32).
172 Chadwick, 'Introduction', in Lessing's Theological Writings, 30.
173 Spinoza, Tractatus Theologico-Politicus, in The Chief Works of Benedict de Spinoza 1 trans.
R.H.M. Elwes (London: George Bell & Sons, 1883), 1-278 (8).
174 Spinoza, Tractatus Theologico-Politicus, 9.
45
common to all'.175 Spinoza therefore establishes something of a provisional sufficiency of
Scripture as regards its meaning, but only in order to nullify its truth-claim and therefore to
deny its actual sufficiency and authority for theology.176 John Webster characterises this as
a view of the self as pre-doctrinal judge of questions of biblical interpretation.177
Spinoza locates the source of natural theology especially in the human mind. In the
context of asserting that even our most ordinary knowledge, including knowledge of
morality, comes from God, he says that '[a]ll that we clearly and distinctly understand is
dictated to us ... by the idea and nature of God'.178 These reside particularly in the mind,
which is 'the true handwriting of God's Word'.179 Jiingel observes that this is an interesting
rationalist version of the dictation-theory of inspiration.180 It is not clear that for Spinoza
even Jesus was any different from the rest of humanity in this regard: God did not 'speak'
to him; rather 'Christ communed with God mind to mind.'181
This reduction of religion to a morality discernible by a human reason in principle open
to use by all is also characteristic of the theological views of the deists who came to
prominence in England in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Most deists tried to
show that the content of the Bible was in accordance with natural religion: Henry Chadwick
generalises that' [t]he theologians of the Enlightenment did not reject the Bible; they found
in it only natural religion.'182 According to Reventlow, however, the deist Thomas Chubb,
while attempting to demonstrate the overlap between Christian revelation and natural
religion, in fact developed a 'moralistic system' with no place for any of the historical
events of Christ's life, nor for the doctrines of substitutionary atonement and original sin.
What Chubb, like most deists, actually rescued from the Bible as authoritative was only a
small fragment containing what they thought was Jesus' actual moral teaching.183
Reventlow, whose detailed work we particularly rely on here, traces the origins of this
fundamental reduction of the material extent of scriptural authority to issues of morality,
and of the flat denial of its formal sufficiency and replacement with the formal sufficiency
175 Spinoza, Tractatus Theologico-Politicus, 119. See also: '[theology] defines the dogmas of faith
... only in so far as they may be necessary for obedience, and leaves reason to determine their precise
truth', (Spinoza, Tractatus Theologico-Politicus, 194).
175 See Hans Frei's comment on the eighteenth century, i.e. the century after Spinoza: 'Belief in the
authority and unity of the Bible declined but confidence in its meaningfulness remained strong,
especially if one did not have to believe that all of it is equally meaningful', (Hans W. Frei, The
Eclipse of Biblical Narrative. A Study in Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuty Hermeneutics [New
Haven & London: Yale Univ. Press, 1974], 110-11).
177 Webster, 'Hermeneutics in Modem Theology', 315.
178 Spinoza, Tractatus Theologico-Politicus, 14.
179 Spinoza, Tractatus Theologico-Politicus, 192.
180 Jiingel, 'Anthropomorphism', 83.
181 Spinoza, Tractatus Theologico-Politicus, 18-19.
182 Chadwick, 'Introduction', in Lessing's Theological Writings, 45.
183 Reventlow, The Authority of the Bible, 386-89.
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of reason, back to earlier developments within Christianity. '[T]he basic oppositions which
are to prove normative for the later periods which will concern us' - a high estimation of a
Spirit-filled individual or group who therefore has no need of sacraments or Scripture -
'are already prefigured in late-medieval Spiritualism'; Reventlow mentions Joachim of
Fiore (d.1202) as a particular medieval example.184 The same theological motifs can be
identified in Erasmus, who bequeathed to the deists a view of religious ceremonies as
fundamentally 'Jewish' and fundamentally Taw', and to be rejected on both counts.185 John
Toland's Christianity Not Mysterious (1696) provides a good example of deism's
theological inheritance, according to Reventlow. Toland thinks that the gospel of Jesus
Christ is originally about perfect morals and reasonable worship, the truth of which can be
tested rationalistically against an autonomous and independently accessible morality, and
that all this was obscured by priests, who introduced religious rituals.186
Thus, Reventlow suggests that there is a surprisingly close relationship between
rationalism and spiritualism, in that each regards divine Tight' to be an individual
possession apart from church or Scripture: 'once the inner light as a charismatic force has
been made a sure possession, it has only to be turned into the light of reason which all
human beings have at their disposal as creatures and later as autonomous subjects, for the
transition to 'Enlightenment' to have been made.'187 He implicates in this shift both the
Latitudinarians,188 and the Puritans, who came to see the Decalogue as 'a codification
corresponding with the lex naturalis\'S9
Clearly, in the present work it is not possible to reconstruct a concept of God's speech
and its relation to Scripture which counters all these concerns. However, it is evident from
the above discussion, granting some validity to Reventlow's arguments, that, from a
theological point of view, the decline in belief in the sufficiency of Scripture resulted from a
dislocation of the activity of God, and particularly of the Holy Spirit, from Scripture - a
dislocation which has deep roots in the history of medieval Christian theology. It is
intended, in chapter 3, to offer a conception of God as speaker in relation to Scripture which
may help to re-envision orthodoxy, and make it a little more robust in defending itself
against attacks which may now come from outside, but which rely in part on theological
positions to which it unwittingly helped to give birth.
184 Reventlow, The Authority of the Bible, 25-31.
185 Reventlow, The Authority of the Bible, 44.
186 Reventlow, The Authority of the Bible, 296-301.
187 Reventlow, The Authority of the Bible, 229. Reventlow here perhaps suggests too neat and logical
a progression from spiritualism to rationalism - although the basic theological similarity between
them is clear.
188 The example given is Edward Stillingfleet (1635-99), Bishop of Worcester, (Reventlow, The
Authority of the Bible, 229-35).
18<) Reventlow, The Authority of the Bible, 124.
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2.6.2. The Sufficient 'Voice'ofGod
In the eighteenth century the sufficiency of Scripture was finally replaced for many by the
sufficiency of natural religion. This frontal assault on the authority of Scripture is evident in
the title of a work by Denis Diderot: De la suffisance de la religion naturellef Diderot
himself moved in the course of his life from orthodox Christianity through deism to
atheism. In fact, before his time, as noted above, most deists wished to demonstrate that the
Bible and natural religion both conveyed similar content. However, they also wanted the
knowledge of truths necessary for eternal life to be, as Reventlow says of Lord Herbert of
Cherbury (1582-1648), 'open to all men and immanent in the instinctus naturalis\191 They
wished therefore to allow for Scripture as a significant 're-publication' of the morality
which people have often failed to follow.'92 Spinoza, too, offers this olive branch to the
Bible, suggesting that its usefulness lies in that it brings great consolation, since very few
people 'can acquire the habit of virtue under the unaided guise of reason."93
However, Scripture as an overlapping, confirmatory, even consolatory source of
religion-as-morality, alongside a reason to whose judgment its truthfulness is always
subject, was left in a precarious position which could not hold for long. When natural
religion turns out to be directly accessible to all, being written on the heart and mind of
every person, and when revealed religion requires professional interpreters, the former soon
becomes all-sufficient, and the latter proves relatively useless and quickly loses its status as
an authority for all important matters. This is evident, according to Reventlow, in the fact
that earlier deists were keen to show themselves to be Christians in a way that later deists,
such as Thomas Chubb, were not.194 Thus, a theological conviction that God does not reveal
himself in particular ways in history underwrites the breaking of a link between the
particular texts of Scripture and divine revelation.
The deistic concern to remove the scandal of particularity from the Christian account of
God's action in the world exercised an influence through the end of the eighteenth century
and into the nineteenth, as attacks on Christian orthodoxy began to form part ofmainstream
190 See Buckley, At the Origins, 38-39. Buckley calls Diderot 'the first of the atheists', both
chronologically and in terms of influence, (Buckley, At the Origins, 249).
191 Reventlow, The Authority ofthe Bible, 187.
192 Reventlow, The Authority of the Bible, 376, commenting on Matthew Tindal.
193 Spinoza, Tractatus Theologico-Politicus, 198-99. Spinoza thus did not share the deists' democratic
view of human reason, wishing to restrict the use of reason as a means of gaining access to truth to an
intellectual elite, (see Roy A. Harrisville & Walter Sundberg, The Bible in Modern Culture. Theology
and Historical-Critical Method from Spinoza to Kasemann [Grand Rapids, Michigan: Eerdmans,
1995], 44-45).
194 Reventlow, The Authority of the Bible, 390-93.
48
thought.'95 D.F. Strauss, according to Robert Morgan and John Barton, wanted the idea of
the unity of God and humanity to extend not just to Jesus but to the whole of humanity - an
idea which he took from Schelling.196 Strauss worked this idea out especially in his famous,
and at the time of its publication notorious, The Life ofJesus (1835), the purpose of which
was precisely to distinguish eternal truth from the historical conditioning of Jesus and the
biblical accounts of him.197
The Bible reappeared as significant at the turn of the nineteenth century in another
guise. Buckley notes that after the atheists Diderot and d'Holbach disposed of a God who
had been argued for 'as the presupposition or as the corollary of nature' by Samuel Clarke,
Isaac Newton and others, by accounting for nature without recourse to God, Schleiermacher
tried to recover God as the presupposition or corollary of human nature.198 This allowed for
the Bible to be regarded as an important witness to the religious consciousness of Jews and
especially of the early Christians.
This situation, which is the shift to a view of the Bible as significant as a 'window',
providing access to something behind the text, has been analysed in particular detail by
Hans Frei, who argued that in the eighteenth century, '[fjirst in England and then in
Germany the narrative became distinguished from a separable subject matter - whether
historical, ideal, or both at once - which was now taken to be its true meaning.'199
According to Frei, three hermeneutical options were available within this overall approach
at the turn of the nineteenth century, all of them locating the Bible's subject-matter in
195 'A crucial precondition for the abandonment of classical Protestant doctrines of scripture is a shift
in the social location of the 'sceptical' position. As represented by the English Deists, for example, it
is still a peripheral, oppositional position that parades its own radicality by attacking the claims of
established churches. Its often crude unsystematic form makes it vulnerable to counter-attack from a
scholarship that deploys the resources of learning to defend moderate, reasonable and orthodox
positions. The shift occurred in the world of the German universities during the second half of the
eighteenth century: the resources of learning were increasingly deployed in the service of non-
orthodox positions, which thereby attracted to themselves not only the inevitable controversy but also
the prestige of Wissenschaff, (Francis Watson, Text and Truth. Redefining Biblical Theology
[Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1997], 130).
196 Robert Morgan with John Barton, Biblical Interpretation (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1988), 50-
51.
197 Thus Hans Frei: Strauss 'prid[ed] himself on the congruence between the negative fruits of his
historical analysis of the story of Jesus and a positive philosophical (or dogmatic) reconstruction of
that very narrative', (Frci, Eclipse, 116). Through the nineteenth and twentieth centuries the felt
problem with the Bible seems not to have been just to do with its particularity, but also, for some,
with the fact that it was a written text. Francis Watson identifies a significant strand of what he calls
'Neo-Marcionism' in theology, which mistrusts textuality in general as a mediation of revelation.
Referring to Schleiermacher, Harnack and Bultmann, he says: 'Textuality is identified with the
Jewish Tetter' and contrasted with the Christian emphasis on speech or 'the word'. ... The formation
of a new, Christian canonical collection is seen as a re-judaizing of Christian faith that can only
obscure that which lies at its heart, the 'essence of Christianity", (Watson, Text and Truth, 12;
Watson expounds this claim in detail, 127-76.)
198 Buckley, At the Origins, 331-33.
199 Frei, Eclipse, 51.
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something behind the text, to which one gained access by a critical reconstruction. One
could take the Bible's subject-matter, the meaning of the narratives, to be 'the state of
affairs in the spatiotemporal world to which they refer', 'the ideas or moral and religious
truths (Gehalt) stated in them in narrative form', or the consciousness they represent - 'one
of necessary and unconscious mythologizing.'200
In chapter 4, in our treatment of Scripture as sufficient, it will not be possible to address
all these issues. In particular, there is no scope for addressing very directly those who are
moving or have moved towards atheism. Instead, the intention is to offer a conception of
what it means to call a text 'sufficient' as the medium for a person's speech, or rather
speech-act, in a way which will help the orthodox position on biblical authority address
contemporary concerns. It will be suggested that it is quite coherent to speak of Scripture as
the sufficient speech-act of God, providing a conception of Scripture which will highlight
some of the problems inherent in the Romantic hermeneutics which lies behind the
historical-critical approach to Scripture. It will also be argued that various hermeneutical
options available today, even down to deconstruction, which can be shown to have
developed from and in reaction to Romantic hermeneutics, and which deny that a text is
capable of functioning as the sufficient medium of an author's meaning, are caught up in the
same kinds of difficulties with regard to language and personal agency in language as earlier
hermeneutical models.
2.6.3. The Canon ofScripture
Richard Muller argues that the use of critical tools in biblical interpretation began in the
seventeenth century among orthodox theologians. Although the use of these tools created
'an increasing worry on the part of those same orthodox over the connection between text
and doctrine', Protestant orthodox exegetes at first 'raised and resolved many of these
issues.' However, over time a pressure arose which began to put a strain on orthodox
systematics, since the link between text and doctrine began to seem more complex or even
questionable than it had before.201
In reaction to this pressure, some orthodox theologians claimed more for Scripture than
had previously been claimed. The assertion of John Owen and others that the vowel-points
of the Masoretic Text are divinely inspired in the same way as the consonantal text -
something which most of the Reformers had denied - is the best example of orthodox
theologians over-reaching themselves, and therefore making the orthodox system 'easy prey
200 Frei, Eclipse, 256-65. Frei's own alternative hermeneutical proposals are very stimulating,
although not without problems; they will be discussed in chapter 4.
201 Muller, Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics, 127-28. Specific questions about the history of
the canon of Scripture, a full discussion of which lies outside our theological focus, will be referred to
briefly in the treatment of B.S. Childs in chapter 5.
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to the inroads of rationalism in the next century.'202 This need not be developed here, since
in chapter 5 the central question of the divine inspiration of Scripture as a unique mark
which distinguishes the canon from all other texts will be taken up at some length,
defending the orthodox view of inspiration, apart from its over-extended claims about
Hebrew vowel-points, via a discussion of the work of B.B. Warfield, who consciously set
himself in line with the main strand of orthodox Protestant thought on biblical inspiration,
and of his contemporary critics.
It was the observations of biblical exegesis, as Wolfhart Pannenberg points out, that led
eventually to the conclusion that the canon of Scripture is too diverse to be able to function
coherently as the ultimate judge of doctrine203 - which represents a loss of belief in the
formal aspect of the sufficiency of Scripture. Of course, some of the critical challenge can
only be countered, if it is to be countered at all, on a case-by-case exegetical basis - a task
which lies outside the scope of this thesis. It will be suggested in chapter 5, though, that a
different account of the referential function of language - one which lends itself
particularly as a way of conceiving of the function of the biblical canon - may allow a re¬
examination of many of the allegations of 'contradictions' in Scripture made by historical-
critical scholarship.
Even if the doctrine of the sufficiency of Scripture had not declined as it has, reconstruction
of it would now probably be called for. Doctrinal statements only ossify and come to be
regarded as redundant when they fail to be subjected to re-examination in the changing
contexts in which Christian faith is to be confessed - and in the industrialised West, at
least, the contexts are changing rapidly. Such reconstructions are necessary, paradoxically,
to preserve the continuity of doctrine. In the case of the sufficiency of Scripture, such a
continuity can indeed be identified. Both before its relatively recent decline, and in many
parts of the church subsequent to its apparent demise, some form of the doctrine of the
sufficiency of Scripture has been, as Berkouwer expresses it, 'the dominating tone for the
entire chorus of the church'.204
To repeat: not all that is positively implied and explicitly stated in the doctrine of the
sufficiency of Scripture can be reconstructed, nor can everything brought to bear against it
in the last three centuries, from both modernity and post-modernity, be countered in one
thesis. The particular focus of the present work is 'bottom up', selecting some of the most
fundamental theological and hermeneutical issues under the headings of the three
202 Muller, Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics, 134.
203 Wolfhart Pannenberg, 'On the Inspiration of Scripture' Theology Today 54 (1997), 212-15 (212).
204 Berkouwer, Holy Scripture, 305.
2.7. Conclusion
subsequent chapters, which have been shown in this chapter to be historically the three
determining elements of the doctrine of scriptural sufficiency. Various possibilities will be
suggested for how we may conceive of the function of language in relation to speakers,
writers, readers and hearers - that is, conceiving of words and their 'supplements' - and
for how these can be used generally and theologically to articulate the bases of the orthodox
doctrine of the sufficiency of Scripture, and to renew that doctrine's own self-
understanding.
In that sense, the present work represents a contemporary theological and philosophical
prolegomenon to a contemporary formulation of an orthodox doctrine of Scripture, both re¬
configuring for a new context, with the supplementation of some modern materials, what is
sometimes regarded as the rubble left over from that doctrine's dilapidation, and arguing
that its original foundations can be shown, when viewed thus, to be relatively intact. That
is, the resources adopted for this initial reconstruction have been chosen because, it will be
argued, they preserve what the orthodox doctrine of Scripture has historically aimed to
express, while introducing categories and concepts which overcome some of the problems
and address some of the oversights which are regularly identified in earlier modes of
orthodox thought and expression on the doctrine of Scripture.
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3. Scripture and the Sufficiency of Divine Speech
3.1. Introduction
The claim that God speaks has of course been used to support other doctrinal statements
than the sufficiency of Scripture. A chapter is devoted to it here because this claim, as the
historical overview in the previous chapter demonstrated, is both the significant theological
basis on which the doctrine of the sufficiency of Scripture rested, and the theological
statement whose content that doctrine aimed to clarify. The decline of the sufficiency of
Scripture, as we also saw, has been closely related to a loss of the conviction that any sense
can be made of the claim that God speaks, except perhaps in the broadest metaphorical
senses of the word 'speak'. What has been broken, among other things, is the connection
between God's activity and human language. Scripture becomes insufficient as a medium
of divine revelation precisely to the extent that it is regarded as an exclusively human
document; its value is as a window, albeit a necessarily distorting one, giving access to
something else - to whatever is taken to be the actual locus of divine revelatory activity in
the world.
Karl Barth, the great theologian of the Word of God in the twentieth century, found a
way out of this situation, as we shall see, to recover a strong conviction that God really does
speak, in the literal sense of the word. In addition, Barth is also regularly credited with
restoring to the Bible a significant level of theological authority. He also deliberately
moves beyond the orthodox Protestant doctrine of Scripture, particularly in his doctrine of
inspiration and his rejection of a direct identification of the Bible with the Word of God.
Therefore, although we will be critical of Barth at some points, the reopening of the
possibility that it is meaningful and true of God to say that he speaks owes much to him.
Despite Barth's influence, the belief that God does speak is still an unpopular one among
theologians. However, it has recently found a skilful and innovative proponent in Nicholas
Wolterstorff. His Divine Discourse. Philosophical Reflections on the Claim that God
Speaks (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), derived from his Wilde Lectures,
delivered at Oxford University in 1993, has already elicited a variety of reviews and
responses.1 Wolterstorff is aware that the claim that God speaks is widely dismissed by
theologians, and considered to be, as he says, 'off the wall' by philosophers.2 In attempting
1 For a very positive reception, see Anthony C. Thiselton, review article: 'Speech-Act Theory and the
Claim that God Speaks: Nicholas Wolterstorff s Divine Discourse' Scottish Journal of Theology 50
(1997) 97-110; for a negative response, see Michael Levine, 'God Speak' Religious Studies 34
(1998) 1-16, with, in the same volume, Wolterstorff s 'Reply to Levine' Religious Studies 34 (1998)
17-23.
2 Nicholas Wolterstorff, Divine Discourse. Philosophical Reflections on the Claim that God Speaks
(Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1995), ix.
to make his case he ranges widely in theology, hermeneutics, epistemology and the
philosophy of language.
We will take our cue from Wolterstorff s use of concepts developed in speech-act
theory, particularly the notion of an 'illocutionary act', using the conceptual tools provided
by that particular philosophy of language to argue for the thesis of the chapter, namely that
good theological sense can be made of the claim that God speaks, especially as that claim is
made in relation to Scripture as a medium of divine speech. This will involve, first, an
analysis of some particular topics in speech-act theory from the work of the speech-act
theorists J.L. Austin and John Searle, as well as Wolterstorff. The aim here will be to reach
a level, sufficient for our purposes, of terminological and conceptual clarity in what is a
complex philosophical field. A key tool in this will be Wolterstorff s concept of the
'normative standing' which speakers conventionally acquire, which, we will suggest, is a
concept with great explanatory and analytical power. Since Wolterstorff applies his
conception of speech directly to the Bible, specifically to the question of divine authorship
of the Bible, that will be treated at the end of the first section of this chapter, as a
preliminary both to our treatment of Barth's view of Scripture and especially to the fuller
treatment of biblical inspiration in chapter 5.
With these clarified conceptualities in mind we will then turn to Barth, and to a
discussion of his proposal for re-establishing the meaningfulness of the claim that God
speaks. The chapter will conclude by suggesting a construal of the orthodox Protestant
identification of the Bible with the Word of God, that is, with God's speech, which satisfies
the concerns which led Barth to reject that identification.
3.2. Speech-Act Theory, Divine Speech and Scripture
3.2.1. Speech-Act Theory: Some Conceptual and Terminological Clarifications
3.2.1.1. Speech-act theory in outline
'Speech-act theory' is the name for a relatively unified area of research which has recently
arisen in the philosophy of language. It has been developed especially by the American
philosopher John Searle from its origins in the seminal, and rather self-effacingly-titled
work, How To Do Things With Words, by the Oxford philosopher J.L. Austin. Austin's
fundamental aim is to question what he calls 'an age old assumption in philosophy - the
assumption that to say something ... is always and simply to state something.'3 He
proposes, by contrast, that 'to say something is in the full normal sense of the word to do
something'.4 In order to explicate this conception of what it is to speak he develops the
3 J.L. Austin, How To Do Things With Words 2nd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), 12.
4 Austin, How To, 94.
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concept of a 'speech-act', which he analyses into different kinds of act which make up the
act of speaking; the most important of these categories are locutionary, illocutionary and
perlocutionary acts. In brief, a locutionary act is the act of simply uttering or writing words
with a certain sense and a certain reference; an illocutionary act is what one does by means
of those words - for example promising, asserting, warning, congratulating, and so on; the
perlocutionary act is the effect one normally wishes to bring about in the addressee by
means of a certain illocutionary act - for example, alerting, in the case of warning, and
convincing, in the case of arguing.5
The main focus of speech-act theory is on the irreducibility of the illocutionary act.
Austin describes his main purpose to be to distinguish the illocutionary from both the
locutionary and perlocutionary: 'There is a constant tendency in philosophy to elide this
[the illocutionary act] in favour of one or other of the other two. Yet it is distinct from
both.'6 Searle accepts this point from Austin: 'the illocutionary act is the minimal unit of
linguistic communication.'7 The tendency to make the illocutionary act of authors,
especially, disappear has increased in the forty or so years since Austin's work, as we shall
see when we come to examine various contemporary hermeneutical options in chapter 4.
From one perspective, much of the present work may be thought of as a recommendation
that a strong sense of the irreducibility of the illocutionary acts of the Bible be applied
rigorously to our conception of the Bible.
Speech-act theory expands the focus of the philosophy of language to include the
pragmatics of language-use in its theory of meaning, taking note of the rules and
conventions which govern speech. That a certain locutionary act counts as a certain
illocutionary act is determined by conventions in force at the time of speaking - for
example, it is by a complex set of conventions that a speaker places certain constraints on
his future actions by uttering the words: "I promise...". For Searle, '[s]peaking a language
is engaging in a (highly complex) rule-governed form of behaviour.'8 That by speaking one
constrains one's behaviour in various ways - that one should keep one's promises, for
example - Searle calls an'institutional fact'.9 Searle distinguishes two kinds of rule which
5 It may be objected that speech-act theory introduces complicated Latinate terms for things which are
obvious on a moment's reflection. The concepts and distinctions which Austin introduced have not in
fact proved to be obvious to many in the recent history of the philosophy of language, and anyone
who wishes is free to suggest simpler-sounding Anglo-Saxon terms.
6
Austin, How To, 103. See William Alston, '[if Austin is right] then the concept of an illocutionary
act is the most fundamental concept in semantics and, hence, in the philosophy of language', (quoted
in Kevin J. Vanhoozer, Is There a Meaning in This Text? The Bible, the Reader and the Morality of
Literary Knowledge [Leicester: Apollos, 1998], 209).
7 John R. Searle, 'What Is a Speech Act?', in eds Heimir Geirsson & Michael Losonsky, Readings in
Language andMind (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996), 110-21 (110).
8 John R. Searle, Speech Acts. An Essay in the Philosophy ofLanguage (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ.
Press, 1969), 12.
9 Searle, Speech Acts, 184-85.
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govern behaviour: 'Regulative rules regulate a pre-existing activity, an activity whose
existence is logically independent of the rules. Constitutive rules constitute (and also
regulate) an activity the existence of which is logically dependent on rules.'10 The rules
governing the performance of speech-acts are constitutive: just as the act of kicking a ball
into a net strung between posts under certain circumstances only counts as a goal, (to
Anglicise Searle's example), given the existence of the rules of football which count that act
as a goal, so the act of uttering certain words such that it counts as the performance of a
certain kind of illocutionary act is only possible given a similarly constituted set of rules.
'[T]he semantic structure of a language may be regarded as a conventional realization of a
series of sets of underlying constitutive rules'." This means that linguists and philosophers
of language are mistaken when they acknowledge the usefulness of speech-act theory in
pragmatics, but suggest, as they sometimes do, that it has no explanatory power beyond that
field.12 As Searle says, since speech-act theory is interested in the question of 'how we get
from the sounds to the illocutionary acts', it must be central to our understanding not just of
pragmatics, 'since it will include all of what used to be called semantics as well as
pragmatics."3
In addition, speech-act theory reconfigures the way one goes about determining the
truth and falsity of a statement. Austin demanded that philosophers of language broaden the
questions they consider, to include what he called 'the total situation in which the utterance
is issued':14 '[t]he truth or falsity of a statement depends not merely on the meanings of
words but on what act you were performing in what circumstances."5
Given the complexity of the many philosophical issues involved in all this, it was
inevitable that Austin left several important matters either only implied or just unclear. We
shall here examine the extent to which Austin successfully distinguished illocutionary acts
from, in turn, locutionary and perlocutionary acts.
3.2.1.2. Illocutions and locutions
Searle argues that the basis on which Austin wishes to distinguish locutionary from
illocutionary acts is not precise enough to distinguish them clearly. Austin distinguishes the
10 Searle, Speech Acts, 34.
11 Searle, Speech Acts, 37.
12 For this view of speech-act theory expressed from within linguistics and the philosophy of language
respectively see Robert de Beaugrande & Wolfgang Dressier, Introduction to Text Linguistics
(London & New York: Longman 1981), 117; Michael Devitt & Kim Sterelny, Language and Reality.
An Introduction to the Philosophy ofLanguage (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987), 20-21.
13 John R. Searle, Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts (Cambridge:
Cambridge Univ. Press, 1979), 178.
14 Austin, How To, 52.
15 Austin, How To, 145.
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locutionary act itself into three aspects, which he calls the phonetic act, the phatic act and
the rhelie act. These lliiee desciibe respectively lluee aspects of what it is to say something,
'the utterance of certain noises, the utterance of certain words in a certain construction, and
the utterance of them with a certain 'meaning' in the favourite philosophical sense of that
word, i.e. with a certain sense and with a certain reference'.16
Searle observes that all of Austin's examples of rhetic acts are in the form of a report of
indirect speech, and all turn the report of that speech into a report of an illocutionary act,
(they begin "he told me to...", or "he asked me whether...", and so on). This, argues Searle,
is inevitably the case because 'no sentence is completely force-neutral'; thus, phonetic and
phatic acts, when used in sentences with sense and reference (that is, when used
'rhetically'), 'are ... already (at least purported) illocutionary acts'.17 Searle concludes that a
rhetic act is always an illocutionary act.18 He therefore proposes that the concept of
'locutionary act' be dropped, and that the concept of a 'prepositional act' be included in the
description of a speech-act. Prepositional acts cover only those aspects of the sentence
which relate to sense and reference - for example, the two sentences "He promised to come
to the party" and "He came to the party" represent identical prepositional acts but different
phonetic, phatic and illocutionary acts - and so remain fully distinct from illocutionary
acts. Searle notes that his concept of a prepositional act is a genuine abstraction, since it is
constituted 'only by those portions of the sentence which do not include the indicators of
illocutionary force'19 - as Austin's locutions and illocutions were also abstractions of a
single indivisible speech-act. However, it is a legitimate abstraction, he argues, because it is
possible for the same reference and predication to occur in completely different speech-acts,
as the above example demonstrates.20





and proposes in its place a revised model:22
16 Austin, How To, 94-95.
17 John R. Searle, 'Austin on Locutionary and Illocutionary Acts' Philosophical Review 77 (1968),
405-424 (412).
18 Searle, 'Austin', 413.
19 Searle, 'Austin', 421.
20 Searle, Speech Acts, 22-23.
21 Searle, 'Austin', 414.






In his later work Searle combines the phonetic and phatic acts into one, and so offers
this three-fold description of the different aspects of the speech-act: utterance acts (uttering
words), prepositional acts (referring and predicating), and illocutionary acts (stating,
questioning, and so on).23
Searle thus tidies up Austin's taxonomy. In Austin, the rhetic portion of the locutionary
act is indistinguishable from the illocutionary force of the speech-act, which threatens the
distinction between locution and illocution upon which his work partly rests. Searle solves
the problem by reducing the descriptive scope of Austin's locutionary act, renaming it an
'utterance act', replacing the rhetic act with a prepositional act, a true abstraction which
describes only the referring portions of the sentence, and leaving the illocutionary act
entirely separate as a description of the 'force' of the sentence. We shall retain Austin's
terminology, in order to retain the neat three-fold structure of locution, illocution and
perlocution; however, by 'locutionary act' we will mean what Searle terms an 'utterance
act'. It should be noted that Searle accepts unmodified the basic point at which Austin was
driving by placing the strict distinction which Austin wanted to draw between locutions and
illocutions on a firmer footing.
3.2.1.3. Illocutions andperlocutions
Austin also, as we observed, protested against any eliding of the illocutionary act into the
perlocutionary act. However, surprisingly, something quite like this eliding seems to occur
both in Austin's own work, at one point, and in part in Searle's notion of 'illocutionary
effect'. Since much of what will be proposed in chapter 4 is based on this distinction, it is
necessary to engage with Austin and Searle on this point. Austin argues that 'the
performance of an illocutionary act involves the securing of uptake', which he defines as
'bringing about the understanding of the meaning and the force of the locution.' This effect
'must be achieved', he says, 'if the illocutionary act is to be carried out.'24 He gives an
example: 'the doubt about whether I stated something if it was not heard or understood is
just the same as the doubt about whether I warned sotto voce or protested if someone did not
take it as a protest'.25
23 Searle, Speech Acts, 24.
24 Austin, How To, 116-17.
25 Austin, How To, 139.
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Similarly, Searle terms the understanding of the speaker's utterance 'the illocutionary
effect', and states that 'in the case of illocutionary acts we succeed in doing what we are
trying to do by getting our audience to recognize what we are trying to do.'26 There is some
ambiguity in Searle, however, which takes him beyond Austin on this point. He recognises
that there are different levels of the 'success' and Tack of success' in the performance of an
illocutionary act: 'There are various kinds of possible defects of illocutionary acts but not
all of these defects are sufficient to vitiate the act in its entirety.'21 When he relates this
point to perlocutionary effects, he concludes that the act of promising has no essential tie to
the bringing about of an effect on the hearer.28
As a counter-example to Austin we may suggest the following situation: I make a
promise to someone, assuming, wrongly, as it turns out, that they understand the language in
which I am speaking. I have thus neither secured the uptake nor brought about the
illocutionary effect of my illocutionary act. Does this state of affairs mean that I did not
make the promise, and that therefore there is no promise which I am bound to keep? To
argue that seems rather questionable. I simply did make the promise; any person within
ear-shot who did understand my language and knew ofmy mistake would likely assume so.
Again: what if I shouted my promise to someone across some distance, but they never
heard my words, which were carried away by the wind? That mishap would not normally
absolve me of the responsibilities associated with the making of a promise. It may be that,
in this regard, the illocutionary act of promising turns out to be a special case of some sort.
For example, if I shout a warning over a hedge to someone in a field - say, "There's a bull
in that field!"29 - but my words are carried away by the wind - have I successfully issued a
warning? We can perhaps answer this question via our answer to another question. Would
I say of the event, "I warned you, but you didn't hear", or "I tried to warn you, but I
couldn't" - or, more ambiguously, "I shouted a warning, but you didn't hear it"? Prima
facie, none of these descriptions of the event is obviously inappropriate, and therefore it
may be that with the illocutionary act of warning there is some ambiguity over whether or
not, in the absence of uptake and illocutionary effect, the warning has been issued.
The question of this ambiguity may be decided by whether or not the speaker took due
account of contextual conditions for the performance of a certain speech-act, as a further
example - the one in which Austin thinks there is doubt - makes clear. If I issue a
warning sotto voce, when the situation requires a loud voice - for example, when I see
someone about to enter a field containing a bull - have I successfully issued a warning?
26 Searle, Speech Acts, 47.
27 Searle, Speech Acts, 54, (italics added).
28 Searle, Speech Acts, 71.
29 An example adapted from Paul Helm, The Divine Revelation. The Basic Issues (London: Marshall,
Morgan & Scott, 1982), 24.
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The answer to this question must take into account the different responsibilities of speaker
and addressee. The speaker cannot claim to have fulfilled the basic conditions - one of
which is that he speak in a loud voice - which the situation required for the performance of
issuing a warning to the person in the field about the bull. In that case, questions would
need to be raised about his vocal capabilities or the choice he made to whisper his warning,
which may leave him open to the charge of having negligently failed to satisfy the
requirements required by the context for the issuing of a warning. In the latter case, we
would probably think of ourselves as dealing with someone who really did issue a warning,
but one which for various contextual reasons was not a 'proper' warning. However, no such
questions arise with the addressee: he cannot be expected to have heard a whispered
warning over a hedge, and so is not responsible for not having heeded the warning.
All this may seem rather esoteric; it is certainly not claimed that the complex question
of the necessary and sufficient conditions for the 'successful' performance of an
illocutionary act has been resolved. Two points, though, are being demonstrated. The first
is that Austin, especially, falls short of drawing the clear theoretical distinction between
illocutionary and perlocutionary acts which he advocates - but that such a distinction can
be made. In any given situation, if it is delineated in sufficient detail, it is possible to
determine whether or not the act of uttering of certain words sotto voce counts as the act of
warning. The second point lies in the demonstration that, in attempting to answer the
questions, 'What is an illocutionary act?', and 'What constitutes and follows from the
'successful' performance of an illocutionary act?', we find ourselves asking questions about
personal responsibilities. It is this aspect of speech which Nicholas Wolterstorff has
particularly developed, under his concept of the moral rights and responsibilities which are
normatively ascribed to speakers and hearers. We shall explicate this concept shortly, in our
discussion of Wolterstorff s work, suggesting that he has made a significant and very
fruitful advance on Austin and Searle - one which we will adopt for our own arguments,
especially in chapter 4.
3.2.1.4. The contexts ofspeech-act theory
In bringing this analytical outline of speech-act theory to a close, it will be helpful briefly to
attempt four things: to show how the basic concerns of speech-act theory are shared by
writers in two different fields of linguistics; to locate our appropriation of speech-act theory
with regard to a particular debate which has arisen among its practitioners; to acknowledge
and respond to objections that have been raised against it from different angles; and to
begin to suggest how an overall view of speech-acts as the basic unit of language-use might
be applied specifically to texts. Each of these is clearly a large topic requiring further work;
what is offered here is sufficient as a provisional defence of our future overall appropriation
60
of speech-act theory, and implies that further work may usefully be undertaken on the
relationship between speech-act theory, other areas of linguistic research and the philosophy
of language, and theology.
Speech-act theory and linguistics. In the last thirty years academic linguistics as a
whole has moved away from a formalist or structuralist approach, towards one which takes
more account of human action and intentionality. Thus, de Beaugrande and Dressier,
introducing the field of 'text linguistics', define a text as 'a communicative occurrence', and
distinguish their approach from that of 'conventional linguistics', which would look for
structures in a language, as one which looks for 'operations of decision and selection' of
those structures, and the implications of those operations for 'communicative interaction'.30
The field of 'conversation analysis' aims to describe 'the procedures by which
conversationalists produce their own behaviour and understand and deal with the behaviour
of others.'31 Like speech-act theory, conversation analysis stresses 'the unavoidable
contextedness of actual talk', and two writers in the field ascribe the development of the
view of utterances as 'conventionally grounded social actions' to a great extent to speech-
act theory.32 They are also happy to use speech-act terminology, referring to 'the crucial
significance of an utterance's placement for the analysis of its illocutionary force.'33
What emerges is that, where the concepts developed by speech-act theory are approved
of and appropriated by these two areas of research, the two key notions of the illocutionary
act as the basic unit of speech and the need to take account of speech-context in semantics
are highlighted as being the crucial concepts - as we saw they were by Austin and Searle
themselves. This is to suggest that the appropriation of speech-act theory for the purposes
of doctrinal reconstruction attempted in the present work does not link the fate of the
doctrine of the sufficiency of Scripture exclusively to what may turn out to be a passing
'movement' in the philosophy of language and linguistics. Speech-act theory has developed
two particular concepts which are currently exercising a considerable amount of influence,
and providing terminological clarification for distinctions often made intuitively, and which
therefore may well remain significant in several areas of study beyond the possible future
waning of a whole philosophy of language called 'speech-act theory'.
An internal debate within speech-act theory. It must be stressed that we are
appropriating speech-act theory only to the extent that it defends these two claims. That
30 De Beaugrande & Dressier, Introduction to Text Linguistics, 3,15. Their definition of a text is very
close to that of Vanhoozer: 'a communicative act of a communicative agent fixed by writing',
(Vanhoozer, Is There a Meaning, 225).
31 John Heritage & J. Maxwell Atkinson, 'Introduction', in eds J. Maxwell Atkinson & John Heritage,
Structures of Social Action. Studies in Conversation Analysis (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press,
1984), 1. I am grateful to Dr Norman Fraser for calling my attention to conversation analysis.
32 Heritage & Atkinson, 'Introduction', 6, 5.
33 Heritage & Atkinson, 'Introduction', 14.
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means that we need take no particular position with regard to the debate that has arisen
among some speech-act theorists over the role of convention and intention in language.
Paul Grice offered this influential definition meaning: 'To say that A meant something by x
is to say that A intended the utterance of x to produce some effect in an audience by means
of the recognition of this intention.'34 Searle argued that, though a good start, this fails to
account for the role of conventions, and, moreover, 'by defining meaning in terms of
intended effects it confuses illocutionary with perlocutionary acts.'35 E.D. Hirsch has
argued that the emergence of this debate calls the whole project of speech-act theory into
question, since it represents the occurrence within speech-act theory of the same polarity
from which the theory was intended to provide an escape.36 However, this debate might not
be as serious as Hirsch suggests. For example, Kevin Vanhoozer has suggested that
convention and intention are not opposing concepts, but may be defined in terms of each
other, if convention is seen as a corporate intention.37
Common objections to speech-act theory. One part of Searle's work on speech-act
theory that has attracted particular attention from critics is his attempt to list the necessary
and sufficient conditions for the performance of the illocutionary act of promising. He lists
nine conditions, which he regards as individually necessary conditions and collectively a
sufficient condition for the successful performance of the act of promising.38 Searle
acknowledges that what he is reaching for is an 'idealization' of a speech-act, and that the
complexity of patterns of language-use in real life is such that we do not have 'absolutely
knockdown necessary and sufficient conditions' for the act of promising, admitting that his
work may therefore have 'a somewhat archaic and period flavor' - but he is nevertheless
happy to list and discuss his nine conditions in some detail.39
Two linguists have objected that speech-act theory is 'rather incomplete in its usual
framework', since it can only account for 'transparent' actions in which 'the uttering is itself
the action' - for example, sentences which begin, "I promise...", "I apologise", and so on.
Everyday communication, they note, is 'far more diversified and far less transparent' than
that: we simply do not say, for example, "I hereby try to get you to comply with my plan."40
In fact, shortly before the publication of this objection, Searle produced a further set of
34 Quoted in Searle, Speech Acts, 43-44.
35 Searle, Speech Acts, 43-44.
36 E.D. Hirsch, Jr., The Aims of Interpretation (Chicago & London: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1976),
300-305. Hirsch has in mind a polarity between Romantic hermeneutics and a constant refining of the
tools of linguistic analysis as providing the means for the determination of meaning. We will see in
our discussion of Wolterstorff below that speech-act theory does in fact succeed in escaping this
polarity.
37 Vanhoozer, Is There a Meaning, 244.
38 Searle, Speech Acts, 57-61.
39 Searle, Speech Acts, 55.
40 De Beaugrande & Dressier, Introduction to Text Linguistics, 117-18.
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studies in which he deals explicitly with part of the complexities of everyday speech under
what he call 'indirect speech-acts', which are sentences such as, "Can you reach the salt?",
in which 'one kind of illocutionary act can be uttered to perform, in addition, another type
of illocutionary act.'41 What in his earlier work was a qualification added to his search for
the 'ideal' speech-act now appears as a primary observation, for he rejects as inappropriate
both the philosophical search for 'a set of logically and necessary sufficient conditions for
the phenomena to be explained' and the linguistic goal of 'a set of structural rules that will
generate the phenomena to be explained.'42 That Searle can make this shift and not be
forced to abandon his commitment to the two central concepts of speech-act theory suggests
that his earlier attempt to list necessary and sufficient conditions for the performance of an
illocutionary act was not central to the theory itself.
Other linguists, this time conversation analysts, have argued that speech-act theory fails
to the extent that it 'has developed within a disciplinary matrix which gives analytic
primacy to the isolated sentence .... The net result is an approach to speech acts that ...
seeks to establish the act accomplished by an utterance considered in isolation'. This fails
to grasp that 'utterances are in the first instance contextually understood by reference to
their placement and participation within sequences of action.'43 This is effectively a claim
that Searle's development of Austin has failed to follow Austin's original and basic
recommendation to philosophers of language that they take full account of 'the total
situation in which the utterance is issued';44 its origin in a specialist area of linguistics
suggests the increasing need for linguists and philosophers of language to engage with the
interests of the other. The objection seems fair - and it sets a particular direction in which
speech-act theory may enrich its account, rather than one which calls its whole project into
question.
However, this new direction would require speech-act theorists to enquire into ever-
broadening contexts of speech - and it is precisely in this expansion of contexts that
Jacques Derrida has attempted to get a foothold on speech-act theory in order to set in
motion what he sees as its internal deconstructive forces. Derrida has been one of Searle's
fiercest critics, and their exchange became increasingly sharp and personal.45 Derrida
applies to both Searle and Austin a claim that he applies to the whole of Western thought:
41 Searle, Expression andMeaning, 30.
42 Searle, Expression andMeaning, 56.
43 Heritage & Atkinson, 'Introduction', 5.
44 Austin, How To, 52.
45 Derrida's two contributions to the debate, along with a summary by the editor of Searle's response,
are collected in Jacques Derrida, Limited Inc trans. Samuel Weber & Jeffrey Mehlman, ed. Gerald
Graff (Evanston, IL: Northwestern Univ. Press, 1988). The debate is lucidly summarised in Jonathan
Culler, On Deconstruction. Theory and Criticism After Structuralism (London: Routledee & Kegan
Paul, 1983), 114ff.
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that the setting of a boundary to a context in order to distinguish one entity from another -
text from context, act from agent, act from act, act from context, and so on - is always an
arbitrary and rhetorical move which philosophers generally refuse to recognise as such.
When Austin asks for an investigation of the 'total speech situation', and when both he and
especially Searle isolate so-called 'marginal' cases of a certain kind illocutionary act in
order to describe the 'ideal' or the 'standard', Derrida detects the totalising and exclusionary
tendencies of Western metaphysics at work. Reflecting in an interview on his debate with
Searle, he concluded that 'the formation of a general theory or of an ideal concept [which
does not account for what it dubs 'marginal' cases] remains insufficient, weak, or
empirical'. Such a project is mounted by those who cannot stand complexity: 'If things
were simple, word would have gotten around, as you say in English. ... Those who wish to
simplify at all costs ... are in my eyes dangerous dogmatists and tedious obscurantists.'46
Speech-act theory requires, he argues, 'a value of context, and even of a context
exhaustively determined, in theory and teleologically.'47 He wishes to assert, by contrast,
that 'a context is never absolutely determinable'.48 Derrida is out to question that
communication, in the case of performative utterances, exists 'in all rigor and in all
purity'.49 Jonathan Culler writes, in basic agreement with Derrida: 'A theory of speech acts
must in principle be able to specify every feature of context that might affect the success or
failure of a given speech act or that might affect what particular speech act an utterance
effectively performed. ... But total context is unmasterable, both in principle and in
practice. Meaning is context-bound, but context is boundless.'50
A fuller response to this claim - one which will suggest that there are ethical flaws in
the deconstructive argument - must await the longer discussion of deconstruction in
chapter 4. However, we may note here, by way of anticipation, that Culler and Derrida
adopt an 'all or nothing' approach to meaning and context: if every aspect of the
semantically-significant context of an utterance cannot be specified, then the meaning of an
utterance cannot be self-identical. However, it does not follow from our inability to specify
every aspect of the context of a speech-act, to hold back 'in all rigor and in all purity' the
boundlessness of context in theoretical description, that an illocutionary act disappears into
its context to such an extent that the very concept of an illocutionary act as the basic unit of
meaning is unworkable. It is arguable that it is a philosophically reasonable position to hold
that something is, while being unable to meet Derrida's demanding philosophical criteria for
the identification of an instance of such an entity. That the edges of human actions are
46 Derrida, Limited Inc, 118-19.
47 Derrida, Limited Inc, 14.
48 Derrida, Limited Inc, 3.
49 Derrida, Limited Inc, 13; see also 20.
50 Culler, On Deconstruction, 123.
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blurry, at least for philosophical description, does not mean that human actions are
philosophically arbitrary concepts. This, as we have seen, is the direction in which Searle's
discussion tends, perhaps in unacknowledged response to Derrida, in Expression and
Meaning (1979), in contrast to Speech Acts (1969).
The Russian theorist, Mikhail Bakhtin, who in many ways shares, apparently
independently, many convictions about language with speech-act theorists, argues that what
determinately separates one speech-act (his term is 'utterance') from another, that is, from
the wider speech context in which it occurs, but by which its own identity is in part
constituted, is 'a change ofspeaking subjects, that is, a change of speakers.'51 It is precisely
such a role for subjectivity which, we will see in chapter 4, Derrida and other post-
structuralists rule out of account in questions of language.
Conceiving of texts as speech-acts. In a volume of the journal Semeia devoted to the
possibilities of literary studies being fruitfully informed by speech-act theory, Hugh White
suggests one of the possible advantages of applying speech-act theory to literature as a
whole: it moves away from formalism, towards a consideration of the text's concrete
context, 'without engulfing it once again in the psychological, social and historical
conditions of its production.'52 In speaking of 'literature' in this way, three different
contrasting pairs need to be distinguished: written and oral modes of communication, so-
called 'literary' and 'ordinary' discourse, and fictional and non-fictional discourse. Mary
Louise Pratt's attempt to work towards a speech-act theory of 'literary discourse' is helpful
in documenting previous work which questions any kind of distinction between 'literary'
and 'non-literary' ('ordinary') discourse,53 but is marred by her inability to hold to a stable
definition of 'literary' discourse; in her work the meaning of the term shifts between the
first item of each of the three contrasting pairs listed above.54
The significant distinction of the three for our project is that between oral and written
forms of discourse.55 Paul Ricoeur is often cited as a writer who warns against a too easy
51 M.M. Bakhtin, 'The Problem of Speech Genres', in Bakhtin, Speech Genres and Other Late Essays
Univ. of Texas Press Slavic Series 8, trans. Vem W. McGee, eds Caryl Emerson & Michael Holquist
(Austin: Univ. of Texas Press, 1986), 60-102 (71). Some particular aspects of Bakhtin's work will be
appropriated for our treatment of the canon of Scripture in chapter 5.
52 Hugh C. White, 'Introduction: Speech Act Theory and Literary Criticism' Semeia 41 (1988), 1-24
(2).
53 Mary Louise Pratt, Toward a Speech Act Theoty of Literaiy Discourse (Bloomington & London:
Indiana Univ. Press, 1977), 73; Pratt refers to the work ofWilliam Labov.
54 When she contrasts 'literary' discourse at times with 'non-literary', she seems to treat that
distinction as equivalent to that between written and oral modes of communication, (Pratt, Toward a
Speech Act Theory, 73); at other times she takes 'literary' to be equivalent to 'fictional', contrasting it
with non-fictional discourse, (Pratt, Toward a Speech Act Theory, 85ff., 113ff.).
55 We are not proposing to establish explicitly whether the Bible's discourse is 'literary' or 'ordinary'
- although our adoption of an aspect of Bakhtin's view of language in chapter 5 will suggest an
agreement with Pratt's collapsing of that distinction. Neither is it necessary here to address the
question of whether the Bible is fiction or non-fiction, since our aim in chapter 5 is to develop a
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identification of oral and written communication, and especially against transferring the
hermeneutical function of speakers uncritically to that of authors. He asserts, for example:
'The writing-reading relation is ... not a particular case of the speaking-answering relation.
It is not a relation of interlocution, not an instance of dialogue'.56 In particular, in the case
of texts '[t]he movement of reference towards the act of showing is intercepted', which
leaves the text 'as it were, 'in the air', outside or without a world.'57 Wolterstorff points out
that in fact Ricoeur means not to contrast speech and writing themselves, but to assert 'the
difference between media of discourse which do not leave their originating situation, and
media which do leave it, by temporally enduring, or spatially reaching, beyond it.'58
Wolterstorff argues that in making this distinction 'Ricoeur doesn't really doubt that the
discerning of illocutionary stance is a legitimate goal of interpretation at a distance'59 -
although it should be noted that Ricoeur does think that, 'to the extent that in spoken
discourse the illocutionary force depends upon mimicry and gesture, and upon the
nonarticulated aspects of discourse, ... it must be acknowledged that the illocutionary force
is less inscribable than the propositional meaning.'60
Gadamer argues similarly to Ricoeur about the relative inability of written language to
convey illocutionary force: 'In writing, the meaning of what is spoken exists purely for
itself, completely detached from all emotional elements of expression and communication.
... What is fixed in writing has detached itself from the contingency of its origin and its
author and made itself free for new relationships.' Yet, again like Ricoeur, he does not
exclude the discerning of illocutionary stance from the process of textual interpretation:
'All writing claims it can be awakened into spoken language', he says, and readers are
'addressed' by texts.61
Kevin Vanhoozer, has recently offered one of the most robust assertions of the
ineradicability of human agency in authoring texts. Not sharing the hesitancy of either
Ricoeur or Gadamer, he argues that the illocutionary act which a text represents persists for
the perception of readers by virtue of the function of literary genres: 'precisely because
writing does not assume a shared situational context, genre creates the possibility of a
theoretical construal of genre, and especially of the collection of genres in a canon, without arguing
exegetically for the identity of any of the biblical genres in particular - although of course almost all
advocates of the doctrine of Scripture which we are trying to rehabilitate see one of the Bible's
'global' genres to be non-fiction.
56 Paul Ricoeur, Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences. Essays on Language, Action and
Interpretation ed. & trans. John B. Thompson (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1981), 146.
57 Ricoeur, Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences, 148.
58 Wolterstorff, Divine Discourse, 144.
59 Wolterstorff, Divine Discourse, 150.
60 Paul Ricoeur, Interpretation Theory: Discourse and the Surplus ofMeaning (Fort Worth, Texas:
Texas Christian Univ. Press, 1976), 27.
61 Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method 2nd rev. edn, trans, rev. Joel Weinsheimer & Donald G.
Marshall (New York: Crossroad, 1990), 392-95.
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shared literary context.'62 For Vanhoozer, it is literary genre which makes illocutionary
force just as 'inscribable' as propositional content: 'The concept of genre ... describes the
illocutionary act at the level of the whole'.63 He defines a text as 'a communicative act of a
communicative agent fixed by writing', suggesting that authors may say of their texts,
analogically if not ontologically, "This is my body".64 Thus, authors' speech-acts are
mediated by texts, themselves 'awakening' writing into 'spoken language'.
This issue will be taken up in more detail when we discuss texts in relation to authors in
chapter 4, using Vanhoozer's conception of authorship and Wolterstorff s related
conception of 'speech' as the basis of a critique of the pragmatic defence of authors offered
by E.D. Hirsch, and of the attack on authors mounted by deconstructive writers.
3.2.2. Nicholas Wolterstorff's Contribution to Speech-Act Theory
Nicholas Wolterstorff s recent work, Divine Discourse. Philosophical Reflections on the
Claim that God Speaks, makes a contribution to speech-act theory which, we will argue, is
of great significance to the theory, and which we will adopt in the following discussion of
Karl Barth's view of the Bible, and in the analysis of various hermeneutical options in
chapter 4.
Wolterstorff attempts in his book to defend a claim which many philosophers would
consider "off the wall": that God may truly be thought of as speaking.65 He addresses three
main issues. He develops a general conception of speech, and argues that God legitimately
may be thought of as a 'speaker' according to this conception. Recognising that Judaism,
Christianity and Islam are text-based religions which have traditionally claimed that God's
voice is mediated textually, he outlines and defends against other interpretive approaches
the 'authorial discourse interpretation' which would seek to hear God's voice mediated
through a text; this is the largest part of the book. He reflects more briefly on some
epistemological questions regarding entitlement to believe that one has heard God speak. It
is Wolterstorff s notion of what it is to speak, and his consequent understanding of God as a
speaker, (or, as Wolterstorff prefers, of 'divine discourse'), that we will explicate below,
62 Vanhoozer, Is There a Meaning, 339.
63 Vanhoozer, Is There a Meaning, 341, (original italics removed). The question of genre will be
taken up again in the treatment of intertextuality in relation to the Bible in chapter 5, using, ironically,
some work of Ricoeur on biblical genres.
64 Vanhoozer, Is There a Meaning, 225, 229. Cf.: 'The application of speech-act theory to writing
enables us to understand writing as a mode of communication, indefinitely extended in time and
space', (Francis Watson, Text and Truth. Redefining Biblical Theology [Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark,
1997], 11). Bakhtin sees all 'utterances' (speech-acts), whether written or oral, as rejoinders in a
dialogue, which aim to elicit a dialogical response from the audience, (Bakhtin, 'Speech Genres', 75-
76).
65 Wolterstorff, Divine Discourse, ix.
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first with regard to speech in general and divine speech in particular, and then with regard to
how this informs his suggestion of how God may be understood to 'authorise' Scripture.
3.2.2.1. What is speaking?
Wolterstorff wishes to separate 'speaking' from two other activities to which it is, to his
mind, often too closely related. He denies, at some length, that speaking is a species of
revealing - in contradiction of the widespread tendency in theology, which he documents,
to subsume divine speech into divine revelation.66 Revelation, he says, is 'the dispelling of
ignorance' in those cases where the dispelling has 'the character of unveiling the veiled, or
uncovering the covered, of exposing the obscured to view.'67 Speaking may on occasion
function so as to reveal, but it is not in itself a kind of revelation. Here, as throughout
Divine Discourse, he uses the act of uttering a promise as an example of speech: 'It's true
that in promising someone something, one reveals various things about oneself. But the
promising does not itself consist of revealing something - does not itself consist ofmaking
the unknown known.'68 He illustrates this with the famous report by Augustine of his
hearing a child saying 'Tolle, lege', and his interpretation of that as God speaking to him,
commanding him to open and read the copy of the letters of Paul in front of him.
Borrowing the speech-act terminology of John Searle, he analyses this command into its
propositional content (that Augustine some time soon open his book) and illocutionary act
(commanding Augustine to do what would make that proposition true). He argues that
commanding Augustine to do what would make that content true is a quite different act
from revealing its truth.69 The point of this distinction between speech and revelation is that
it allows Wolterstorff to deny in addition that speech is to be identified with 'the
transmission, the communication, of knowledge (or true belief) from one person to another':
'Speaking is not communication; it doesn't even require communication'.70
What is speaking, then for Wolterstorff? Fully accepting Austin's and Searle's
argument that the basic unit of speech is the illocutionary act, he develops what he calls a
'normative theory of discourse'.71 He suggests that the performance of a certain locutionary
act comes to count as the performance of a certain illocutionary act by means of the
'normative ascription' of a 'normative standing'. What Wolterstorff means by this is best
explained by simply reproducing the illustration he gives. If, while driving down the road, I
switch on the left-side indicators of my car, I thereby acquire the standing of someone who
66 Wolterstorff, Divine Discourse, 10.
67 Wolterstorff, Divine Discourse, 23.
68 Wolterstorff, Divine Discourse, 19.
69 Wolterstorff, Divine Discourse, 20.
70 Wolterstorff, Divine Discourse, 32.
71 Wolterstorff, Divine Discourse, 76, (original italics removed).
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has signalled his intention to turn left. My standing is normative because it is 'defined in
part by a complex of mutual (prima facie) obligations': I acquire the duty to treat others,
and they the duty to treat me, as someone who is about to turn left.72 The means by which
the ascription of such standings comes about Wolterstorff calls 'arrangements' - for
example, the signalling system for drivers. A system of arrangements itself comes into
effect either by stipulation, or by convention, understood as 'a sort of social stipulation'.73
Hence my normative standing is normatively ascribed.
This, argues Wolterstorff, is how we are to understand how the utterance of a certain
sentence comes to count as the performance of a certain illocutionary act. In saying the
words, "Please give me a drink of water", the normative standing of someone who has
issued that request is normatively ascribed to me, such that the addressee is obligated to give
me a drink of water. 'To institute an arrangement for the performance of speech actions is
to institute a way of acquiring rights and responsibilities.' Moreover, these rights and
responsibilities are moral ones: 'By uttering that sentence, the speaker has altered the moral
relationship' between himself and his addressee. This is the case, says Wolterstorff, even
with assertions: 'Asserting that so-and-so introduces into human relationships the (prima
facie) right to be taken at one's word that so-and-so.'74 Wolterstorff summarises: 'Speaking
introduces the potential for a whole new range of moral culpabilities - and
accomplishments. At bottom, it is our dignity as persons that requires that we be taken at
our word, and take ourselves at our word.'75 A clear consequence follows from this for
anyone reading a text for what the author 'said':
The myth dies hard that to read a text for authorial discourse is to enter the dark
world of the author's psyche. It's nothing of the sort. It is to read to discover
what assertings, what promisings, what requestings, what commandings, are
rightly to be ascribed to the author on the ground of her having set down the
words that she did in the situation in which she set them down.76
12 Wolterstorff, Divine Discourse, 83.
73 Wolterstorff, Divine Discourse, 89-91. Wolterstorff comes to his understanding of what it is to
speak via a critique of Searle's conception of 'institutional facts', (Wolterstorff, Divine Discourse, 80-
81). That he returns to talk of 'social stipulations' suggests that, at this point, he has not escaped what
he wished to critique. We suggest that the concept of 'normative ascription' represents a very creative
direction for speech-act theory, which in fact does not depend on the particular critique of Searle
whichWolterstorff offers here.
74 Wolterstorff, Divine Discourse, 84-85.
75 Wolterstorff, Divine Discourse, 94. What Wolterstorff calls human 'dignity', Vanhoozer, following
Alvin Plantinga, describes as an essential fact about human beings, which is the case because of our
createdness: 'our design plan leads us to believe what we are told by others', (Vanhoozer, Is There a
Meaning, 290). Wolterstorff relates his definition of speech to Thomas Reid's argument 'that our
human constitution includes an inherent disposition toward veracity in speech and, correspondingly,
toward credulity in listeners', (Wolterstorff, Divine Discourse, 89). The theological basis of this
'dignity' is clearer in Vanhoozer than in Wolterstorff, if only because of the different foci of each of
their works, set by their respective sub-titles: Wolterstorff is offering philosophical reflections, and
Vanhoozer is interested in the Bible, the reader and the morality ofliterary knowledge.
76 Wolterstorff, Divine Discourse, 93.
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It might be thought that this concept of 'speech' would lead to gullibility and even
oppression of various kinds. Should Hitler be 'taken at his word' in Mein Kampf?
Wolterstorff supplements his account of the moral rights and responsibilities which accrue
in speaking with the qualification that we should take persons at their word, '[o]ther things
being equal, of course';77 he tends to speak, as we have done, of those rights and duties as
accruing to speakers and addressees prima facie. This is an important qualification, and it
follows from the inherent moral nature of speaking that Wolterstorff describes. He allows
that a speech-act can be, as he says, 'undercut', if one has 'good reason to think that it is
malformed in such a way that the prima facie rights and responsibilities which accrue to
speakers and hearers upon its performance do not, in this case, actually accrue to them.'78
The uttering of a promise provides a good example. If someone utters a promise to do such-
and-such, and the addressee has good reason to believe that the speaker either has no
intention of fulfilling the promise or knows that he is not able to fulfil the promise, then the
rights and responsibilities which would normally accrue to speaker and addressee in this
case do not. Using Wolterstorff s vocabulary, we could say that a person can offend against
his own dignity in uttering something under conditions which serve to undercut his speech-
act, thereby becoming morally culpable, such that for the addressee to take him at his word
would not in this case be a moral accomplishment. The ethical responsibilities which
Wolterstorff places on listeners and readers therefore also include critical responsibdities;
as Vanhoozer comments, in support of the epistemological legitimacy of personal
testimony, '[cjredulity is not gullibility, as John Locke and other modern critics seem to
think.'79 Thus neither does this view of speech lead, as it may be thought to, necessarily to
political or social oppression. Wolterstorff cites the situation of a Norwegian citizen in the
Second World War refusing to obey an order issued by an official of the Quisling
government, as an example of the appropriate response to an 'undercut' speech-act.80
It will be helpful to set Wolterstorff s conception of speech briefly in the context of
speech-act theory in Austin and Searle, and of recent linguistic theory. It is noteworthy to
trace the development in speech-act theory from Austin through Searle to Wolterstorff. The
heart of Austin's innovation was the recognition of the importance of the observation that
even to state something is fundamentally not to communicate knowledge but to perform an
act.81 In his development of this, Searle developed a taxonomy of lllocutionary acts, made
77 Wolterstorff, Divine Discourse, 94.
78 Wolterstorff, Divine Discourse, 88.
79 Vanhoozer, Is There a Meaning, 290.
80 Wolterstorff in fact justifies this by arguing that the official lacks legitimacy (presumably moral
legitimacy) to issue commands in the name of the law; in effect, his position as one who may issue
orders is undercut, such that his locutionary act does not even count as an order in the first place,
(Wolterstorff, Divine Discourse, 89).
81 Austin, How To, 139.
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up of what he calls assertives, directives, commissives, expressives and declarations. What
distinguishes declarations from the other categories for Searle is that '[declarations bring
about some alteration in the status or condition of the referred to object or objects solely in
virtue of the fact that the declaration has been successfully performed.' (Searle has in mind
such speech-acts as the declaration of war, or the appointing of a person to a certain role or
status.)82 What Wolterstorff has done is effectively to show the failure of Searle's
categories by demonstrating that what Searle describes as unique to 'declarations' is in fact
true of every speech-act. Even by just asserting something to someone, the speaker {prima
facie) changes the status of both himself and his addressee, for his assertion implies a
reference to himself as someone who undertakes to be asserting truly and on good grounds,
and to the addressee as someone who is obligated to believe the speaker on those grounds.
The same observation can be made another way. Searle arranges his taxonomy of
Elocutionary acts according to different kinds of 'direction of fit' between speech-acts and
the world. 'Directives', such as requests and commands, have a 'world-to-word' direction
of fit, in that their point is that the world should match the intention expressed in the
Elocution. 'Assertives', by contrast, have the opposite 'word-to-world' fit: the speaker
commits himself to the claim that his words accurately reflect some state of affairs in the
world.83 Only in the case of declarations, says Searle, does the direction of fit go in both
directions: when a judge declares "You are guilty", he both attempts to make a factual
claim (word-to-world) and makes a legal declaration (world-to-word). Again,
Wolterstorff s concept of normative standing, in that it puts the act of speaking in a broad
context of the establishing of moral relationships, suggests that with every speech-act the
direction of fit goes in both directions. Even by uttering a simple assertion - say, "It's ten
o'clock" - the speaker both asserts something about reality (word-to-world) and thereby is
responsible for the coming about of a new normative standing commensurate to the
Elocutionary act which his uttering of the words counts as performing in the given context
(world-to-word).
Wolterstorff s concept of speech may be regarded as a rigorous development of the
implications for human action in general and speaking in particular of Austin's initial
observation that to speak is not to communicate but to act. Searle's development of Austin
is considerable, but he still retains a category of Elocutionary act - an assertion - in which
the point is to make one's words fit the world, and there is no notion that one thereby acts in
and on the world, especially on other persons. Wolterstorff demonstrates that even by doing
something as simple and common as asserting something one acts in profound ways upon
oneself and others.
82 Searle, Expression andMeaning, 12-17.
83 Searle, Expression and Meaning, 3-4.
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It is also noteworthy that Wolterstorff s concept of speech is paralleled and prefigured
in at least one branch of linguistic research. De Beaugrande and Dressier apply von
Wright's general definition of an action as 'an intentional act which changes a situation in a
way that would not have happened otherwise' specifically to language. They advocate
defining a discourse action in terms of the changes in 'knowledge state, social state,
emotional state, and so on' which it effects upon the participants.84 Wolterstorff may be
regarded as treating the changes in these different states as aspects of a fundamental change
in moral status and relationships.
A final point may be made here. Searle at one point seems to anticipate Wolterstorff s
claim that the obligations which accrue in the case of certain speech-acts are moral ones,
and rejects it. '[Obligation to keep a promise probably has no necessary connection with
morality', he says: if I promise to go to a party but then don't go because I don't feel like it,
that is 'remiss' of me, but not immoral.85 Different people may well judge such a breaking
of a promise differently - and much would depend on the complexities of the context in
which it was uttered. However, once we come to see the situation of not keeping a promise
as the breaking of a word to which one had committed oneself with respect to one's future
behaviour in relation to others, and on the basis of which one had invited others to act in the
assumption that the promise would kept, the language of 'morality' seems more appropriate
than that of simply being 'remiss'. Or, perhaps better, to suggest that the breaking of a
certain promise is only 'remiss' sounds like an appeal that the person in question is
responsible for only a small moral failing. In any case, Searle does not explain the
distinction between being 'remiss' and behaving immorally towards others.86
3.2.2.2. Divine speech and Scripture
Wolterstorff argues that, given this account of speaking, it is reasonable to say of God that
he speaks. He suggests initially that we should think of God's speech as the performance of
illocutionary acts, not necessarily performed by means of verbal locutionary acts: 'perhaps
the attribution of speech to God by Jews, Christians, and Muslims, should be understood as
the attribution to God of illocutionary actions, leaving it open how God performs those
actions - maybe by bringing about the sounds or characters of some natural language,
maybe not.'87
He defends the claim that God speaks in two further ways. First, with reference to
divine command theory, he argues, against William Alston's view that God 'does not have
84 De Beaugrande & Dressier, Introduction to Text Linguistics, 124.
85 Searle, Speech Acts, 188.
86 Wolterstorff argues against the suggestion that the rights and duties which accrue in the act of
speaking are linguistic rather than moral, (Wolterstorff, Divine Discourse, 94).
87 Wolterstorff, Divine Discourse, 13.
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and cannot acquire obligations',88 that God does in fact acquire obligations, but only to the
extent that they are imposed not from without but by his own character, specifically his
loving character: 'Some of God's actions are such that they are required ofGod if God is to
act "in loving character.'"89 God's engagement in discourse is then like human engagement
in that he thereby acquires rights and duties, and unlike human engagement in that those
rights and duties are not given or imposed from outside himself. This of course raises
complex theological and philosophical questions which mostly go well beyond our scope
here; to the extent that they touch on the question of God's freedom in relation to the Bible
as in some sense his Word, they will be addressed in the following discussion of Barth's
treatment of the Bible. Second, Wolterstorff argues more generally that his conception of
divine speaking requires that God be thought of as intervening in the world, and that it is
reasonable to think of God as able to 'bring about the events generative of God's
speaking'.90
Wolterstorff s initial suggestion that God's speech may be thought of as consisting in
part of illocutions performed non-verbally represents something of a move, made without
argument, beyond Austin and Searle. Both Austin and Searle are principally concerned with
verbal language; Austin is aware of the fact that certain illocutions can be performed non-
verbally, (he gives the example of threatening someone by waving a big stick), but is
generally ambivalent on the point, insisting at other times on the need for verbal locutionary
acts.91
An important question which Wolterstorff raises, by his comparison of (verbal) speech
and the system of car indicator signals, is the extent to which verbal languages can be
considered in isolation from non-verbal ones - from what might be called quasi-verbal
languages, such as complex signing-systems for deaf people, to rudimentary sign-systems,
such as traffic-lights signals. Nevertheless, it is questionable whether such a complex
speech-act as promising, which the Bible regards as central to God's (speech) actions
towards humanity, and which represents the establishing of a certain person's behaviour in
reference both to other persons and perhaps objects in the world, and to the future, may be
performed by any other means than a locution expressed in a complex (quasi-)verbal
language. The relation of this line of thought to theology becomes evident if we consider
the person of Jesus Christ, as does Wolterstorff and as do most Christians, to be the central
means by which God speaks to us: how does Jesus Christ come to (verbal) speech? The
88 Wolterstorff, Divine Discourse, 103.
89 Wolterstorff, Divine Discourse, 111.
90 Wolterstorff, Divine Discourse, 114-29.
91 Austin, How To, 114, 119-20.
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relation of persons to verbal language, specifically, of God to the Bible, is raised - a
question around which our subsequent discussion ofBarth will revolve.
In fact, despite his initial suggestions about illocutionary acts being performed by non¬
verbal locutions, in the rest of Divine Discourse Wolterstorff concentrates his attention on
divine speech-acts performed by verbal means, since Judaism, Christianity and Islam all
regard certain texts as central to the means by which God speaks to people in the present. In
this regard, he notes James Barr's observation that, although most contemporary theologians
take revelation to be 'revelation through history', the Old Testament regularly portrays God
as engaging in verbal speech; for example, the people of Israel would never have been
delivered from Egypt if God had not told Moses verbally what he did through the incident of
the burning bush.92 Wolterstorff also argues that a good case can be made for seeing the
New Testament apostles, whose message is enscripturated in the New Testament, as Jesus'
representatives or deputies, and therefore for seeing their texts as media of divine
discourse.93
Double agency discourse and the divine appropriation of the Bible. This brings us to a
further (and for present purposes final) concept which Wolterstorff introduces, in order to
describe God's action with regard to the Bible: double agency discourse. He observes that
often 'one person says something with words which he himself hasn't uttered or
inscribed.'94 Wolterstorff considers the case of deputisation. An ambassador, for example,
speaks on behalf of his own government, but mostly using entirely his own words, and
sometimes with his government unaware of what he is saying and even that he is saying
something. The ambassador is performing locutionary acts which count as illocutionary
acts performed by his own government - although of course he may also sometimes
perform illocutionary acts of his own. There is a close parallel between this case and that of
the Old Testament prophets, who regularly move between delivering a message which God
has deputised them to deliver, and speaking in his name in their own words because so
deputised.95
There is another mode of double agency discourse, according to Wolterstorff, in which
one person speaks by means of another's Elocution, not just their locution - what he also
calls speaking by means of someone else's speech, not just their text. This is the act of
92 Wolterstorff, Divine Discourse, 30.
93 Wolterstorff, Divine Discourse, 288-95.
94 Wolterstorff, Divine Discourse, 38.
95 Wolterstorff, Divine Discourse, 45-46. This is of course why we generally don't (or shouldn't)
shoot the messenger. He has not performed the illocutionary act represented by the message;
therefore, as far as the content of the message is concerned, no responsibilities accrue to him.
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appropriating someone else's discourse - for example, when one responds to someone's
else discourse with, "I share that commitment", or "I second the motion".96
Wolterstorff argues that, if the Bible is to be treated as a medium of divine discourse,
the best way to understand the relationship between the human discourse of the texts and the
divine discourse of which they are a medium is as a relationship of appropriation: God
appropriates the human discourse for his own illocutionary actions. Although some parts of
the Bible, such as prophecy, are instances of deputised discourse, deputisation will not do as
a category for thinking of God's relationship to the whole Bible. What, he asks, are we to
make of biblical narrative, Wisdom literature, and particularly the Psalms, in which human
authors address God? A psalm which addresses God cannot itself carry the implicit
ascription "Thus says the Lord", for that would lead to the nonsensical conclusion that God
is addressing himself.
Although Wolterstorff sees each individual book of the Bible as appropriated by God,
the real point of his introduction of the concept is to suggest a way of conceiving of the
Bible as a whole as 'one book of God'.97 He sees the act of divine appropriation taking
place not in some way prior to and in the act of the composition or redaction of the Bible's
individual books, which is where the doctrine of inspiration has traditionally located God's
action in identifying the Bible as his own book. For Wolterstorff, rather, 'the event which
counts as God's appropriating this totality as the medium of God's own discourse is
presumably that rather drawn out event consisting of the Church's settling on this totality as
its canon.'98
Wolterstorff notes that he is not claiming that the doctrine of inspiration is false, merely
that '[a] doctrine of inspiration is ... not a doctrine of divine discourse'.99 '[T]he
phenomenon of X inspiring Y to say such-and-such is not the same as X saying such-and-
such', he says: 'a young student's paper remains very much the medium of his discourse
even though he composes it very much under the inspiration of his professor'.100 When we
come to discuss the doctrine of inspiration in chapter 5 it will be noted that some recent
versions of the doctrine confuse the technical theological meaning of the word 'inspire',
which it and its cognates have in the traditional formulations, with the different meaning the
word usually has in everyday usage. Wolterstorff here, in his illustration of students and
professors, confuses the two in the same way.
Wolterstorff is fully aware that his model of the divine appropriation of the Bible
apparently requires us to answer the difficult question of how certain people might have
96 Wolterstorff, Divine Discourse, 52.
97 Wolterstorff, Divine Discourse, 53.
98 Wolterstorff, Divine Discourse, 54, (original italics removed).
99 Wolterstorff, Divine Discourse, 301 n.8.
100 Wolterstorff, Divine Discourse, 283.
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come to say exactly what God wants to say, so that he could appropriate their texts - which
is the very question which the traditional doctrine of biblical inspiration addressed. He
acknowledges that 'it would be bizarre to think of God as just finding these books [those
containing non-prophetic discourse, for example Psalms, Esther, Song of Songs] lying about
and deciding to appropriate them; the appropriation model calls for some doctrine of
inspiration'. Therefore, a doctrine of inspiration is required, but only as 'a supplement.
However these books came about, the crucial fact is that God appropriates that discourse in
such a way that those speakings now mediate God's speaking'.101
As a preliminary to the later discussion of inspiration, we offer a brief response here.
Once Wolterstorff has reinstated the doctrine of inspiration, because he acknowledges that a
strange doctrine of God would emerge from the claim that God just finds certain books
lying around, finds them appropriate to his purposes and so appropriates them, it seems that
this reinstatement cannot in fact be to any position other than to the central characterisation
of God's relationship to the Bible which Wolterstorff wishes to reserve for appropriation.
Wolterstorff wishes to preserve some kind of doctrine of providence with regard to God's
relationship to Scripture, and he does not think that a purely human text could ever be
suitable as it stands to express God's speech. Once this has been established, it is hard to
see that Wolterstorff really means what he says when he claims that 'a doctrine of
inspiration is really only a supplement'. Given sensibilities about theology and
anthropology which Wolterstorff seems to hold, it cannot just be a supplement: it is a
fundamental guarantee of the possibility that any text written in human language could ever
be viable as a medium of divine discourse.102 We may, though, be able to accept
Wolterstorffs concept of appropriated discourse, viewing God's action in the process of
canonisation as a supplementary act of appropriating texts whose production he previously
superintended by the process traditionally termed 'inspiration'.
3.3. Karl Barth on Scripture as the Word of God
We turn now, in light of the elements of speech-act theory outlined so far, to a study ofKarl
Barth's notion of God's speech, and of its relation to his view of the Bible. Karl Barth is
unusual among recent theologians in that he insists that God speaks, and that he means by
this literal speech:
101 Wolterstorff, Divine Discourse, 187. The divine speech-act performed by, for example, a psalm of
lament, is presumably to be regarded as something like an authorisation that the sentiments expressed
to God in the psalm may legitimately be so expressed.
102 Howard Marshall makes a similar point in response to Wolterstorff, in I. Howard Marshall, "'To
Find Out What God Is Saying": Reflections on the Authorizing of Scripture', in ed. Roger Lundin,
Disciplining Hermeneutics. Interpretation in Christian Perspective (Leicester: Apollos, 1997), 49-55
(51).
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Church proclamation is talk, speech [Rede\. So is Holy Scripture. So even is
revelation in itself and as such. If we stay with God's Word in the three forms
in which it is actually heard in the Church, if we do not go outside the Church
and think of things God might have willed and done but has not done and not
so willed in the Church, we have no reason not to take the concept of God's
Word primarily in its literal sense. God's Word means that God speaks.
Speaking is not a "symbol". ... [I]n this form in which the Church knows
God's Word ... God's Word means that "God speaks," and all else that is to be
said about it must be regarded as exegesis and not as a restriction or a negation
of this statement.103
A recent intellectual biography of Barth summarises the position which Barth came to
hold: 'It was this presupposition - God is speaking - and the attitude of brokenness it
implied which had to be recovered.' Barth arrived at this position through a consideration
of the Scripture-principle of Reformed theology, which 'said simply that revelation means
that God is speaking."04 The concept that the Bible interprets itself was, according to
another commentator, determinative for Barth's work throughout his life.105 This influence
led Barth 'to attribute unique authority to the Bible as the rule of faith and life',106 as is often
recognised: he restored the Bible to its traditional place 'as matrix and norm in which the
church can be viewed'.107 Barth is also well-known for departing from the orthodox
Protestant position, in his rejection of the direct identification of the Bible with revelation.
For these three reasons - that he insists that God speaks, that he gives the Bible supreme
authority, and that he moves away from the view of Scripture and revelation with which the
doctrine of the sufficiency of Scripture is most regularly associated - that Barth's work
requires particular attention here. Speech-act theory will be proposed as a particularly
helpful means for understanding what Barth was intending to say in his statements on God's
speech and the Bible.
3.3.1. Barth's TheologicalMotives
It has been well documented that the controlling concern of Barth's work is that human
beings, in our living, thinking and speaking of God, should continually regard God as
coming to address us with a word from outside us, never succumbing to the attempts to
possess him made by human cognition, spiritual experience and culture. He found fault
with seventeenth-century Protestant orthodoxy at this point, for it wanted, he thought in
regard to its doctrine of the inspiration of Scripture, 'a tangible certainty, not one that is
103 Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics 1/1 trans. G.W. Bromiley (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1975), 132-33.
104 Bmce L. McCormack, Karl Barth's Critically Realistic Dialectical Theology. Its Genesis and
Development 1909-1936 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), 317. McCormack dates this realisation in
Barth to his 1922 lectures on Calvin.
105 It was, (quoting Lindemann), 'zeitlebens bestimmend', (David Ford, Barth and God's Story
Studies in the Intercultural History of Christianity 27 [Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 1981], 19).
106 McCormack, Karl Barth's Critically Realistic, 305-307.
107 George Lindbeck, 'Barth and Textuality' Theology Today 43 (1986), 361-76 (376).
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given and constantly has to be given again, a human certainty and not a divine, a certainty of
work and not solely of faith.'108 He thought of liberalism and the Roman Catholic church
similarly, for he regarded them as treating God as (respectively) generally available as a
predicate of human religious psychology or experience, or inextricably related to a human
institution:
The assertion of fellowship between God and man in the form of an operation
beyond the juxtaposition of the divine and human persons, beyond the act of
divine and human decision, is at least common to both even if one has to
remember that this synthetic operation is regarded as man's work on the side of
Modernism and as God's on that of Roman Catholicism.109
Barth thinks of God's cognitive unavailability to us as an aspect of his sovereign
lordship. It follows from this that when God does present himself to us, he always acts to
do so by his entirely free sovereign choice: 'Lordship means freedom.' This freedom
characterises especially God's active relationship to the Bible: 'It is thus, as the One who is
free, as the only One who is free, that God has Lordship in the Bible.'110 Barth finds the
seventeenth-century doctrine of biblical inspiration, which he took to be an innovation,
wanting particularly at this point: 'the statement that the Bible is the Word of God was now
transformed ... from a statement about the free grace of God into a statement about the
nature of the Bible as exposed to human inquiry brought under control.'"1 For Barth, God
has 'free control over the wording \Wdrtlichkeit] of Holy Scripture'."2 The orthodox
doctrine of inspiration ascribed to God free control over the wording of Scripture in the
process of the Bible's composition in the past; Barth would rather describe that free control
solely in terms of God's action in and through the Bible in the present. He treats the
orthodox doctrine of inspiration as identical in this respect to the liberal tendency to find
revelation 'in the heroic religious personality of the biblical witness'. They are both
'products of the same age and spirit. A common feature is that they both represent means
whereby Renaissance man tried to control the Bible and also tried to set up obstacles to stop
its controlling him, as indeed it ought to do.'113
On the same grounds he also criticises Roman Catholicism, arguing that the Bible in
Roman Catholicism 'is not the Bible in itself, the emancipated Bible, the Bible which
confronts the Church as an authority. The fact that the Bible in its own concreteness is the
Word of God, and that as such it is the supreme criterion of Church teaching, is not
108 Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics 1/2 trans. G.T. Thomson & Harold Knight (Edinburgh: T. & T.
Clark, 1956), 524.
109 Barth, CD 1/1, 68.
110 Barth, CD VI, 306-307.
111 Barth, CD 1/2, 522.
112 Barth, CD 1/1, 139.
113 Barth, CD 1/1, 112-13.
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acknowledged here.'"4 Barth also casts the orthodox Protestant insistence that the Bible
attests to its own authority, an insistence of which he approves, in terms of the Bible's
freedom, asserting that, if we could prove from somewhere else the supremacy of the Bible,
'then the Bible whose supremacy we could establish would obviously not be the free Bible
which constitutes an effective court.'"5 In addition, Barth seems to concur with the
Protestant confession that Scripture is necessary for the proclamation of the gospel of Christ
to us, in that a written text is necessary. A written text, he says, unlike a purely oral
tradition, can 'maintain ... its own life' against encroachments from outside; by contrast,
'[i]n unwritten tradition the Church is not addressed; it is engaged in dialogue with
itself.'"6
One of Barth's fundamental claims about God is that he is an acting, relating, and
addressing subject."7 The freedom of the Word of God for Barth is therefore its identity as
a living and active subject:"8 'All that has hitherto been said about the self-affirmative,
critical and assimilative power of the Word of God can be properly understood only when it
is realised that the Word is first the Subject and only then the object of history.'"9 'What
God and His Word are ... is something God Himself must constantly tell us afresh. ... In
this divine telling there is an encounter and fellowship between His nature and man but not
an assuming of his nature into man's knowing, only a fresh divine telling.'120 The Word of
God has for Barth what he calls a 'purposive character ... . This might be called its
relatedness or pertinence, its character as address."21
This is true of the Word even in the form of dogma, which Barth defines as 'the
agreement of Church proclamation with the revelation attested in Holy Scripture."22 Barth
is wary of equating revelation with dogmatic propositions; if the equation is to be made, he
says, we must understand dogma as command}21 It is evident that Barth shares many of the
insights later articulated by speech-act theorists, in that he refuses to contemplate the Word
of God as existing without an illocutionary force: it is for him an address with purpose,
mediating the encounter between divine and human persons. George Lindbeck notes that
Hans Frei argued that 'Barth's discussion of [revelation] in [Church Dogmatics] 1/1 and 1/2
114 Barth, CD 1/1,257.
115 Barth, CD 1/1,259.
116 Barth, CD 1/1, 105-106.
117 George Hunsinger, How To Read Karl Barth. The Shape ofHis Theology (New York & Oxford:
Oxford Univ. Press, 1991), 30, 45.
118 Geoffrey W. Bromiley, 'The Authority of Scripture in Karl Barth', in eds D.A. Carson & John D.
Woodbridge, Hermeneutics, Authority and Canon (Leicester: IVP, 1986), 271-94 (285).
1,9 Barth, CD 1/2, 685.
120 Barth, CD 111, 132.
121 Barth, CD HI, 139.
122 Barth, CD 1/1,265.
123 Barth, CD 1/1,271.
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can be understood as an analysis, without benefit of J.L. Austin and his successors, of the
logic of performative utterances.'124 We concur with this assessment; it has been developed
by Kevin Vanhoozer,'25 and we shall expand on it in the concluding section of this chapter.
3.3.2. The Word ofGod and Scripture
Barth's continual attempt to construe God in his relation to humanity and the world in such
a way that God always remains in control of his self-revelation is particularly clear in his
well-known account of the three-fold form of the Word of God. These three forms are the
Word preached, written and revealed. The Word revealed occurs in the present, for us who
do not see Christ in the flesh, in identity with the Word preached and written. Revelation is
therefore the form of the Word which underlies the other two: 'If "written" and "preached"
denote the twofold concrete relation in which the Word of God is spoken to us, revelation
denotes the Word of God itself in the act of its being spoken in time.' Revelation is, says
Barth, 'the divine act in itself and as such', whereas proclamation and the Bible are God's
Word in that they become God's Word: 'Revelation is itself the divine decision which is
taken in the Bible and proclamation .... It is itself the Word of God which the Bible and
proclamation are as they become it.'126
Barth regards the inclusion of church proclamation in this three-fold form as providing
a particular bulwark against liberalism's individualistic notion of revelation. He sees this
point as an advance on the orthodox scholastics, who, lacking a link between revelation and
the present which is firmly related to the Word, inadvertently prepared the ground for
liberalism. Of the orthodox scholastics, Barth says: 'Preaching is called "God's Word" in
them too, but the real connecting point between revelation and Scripture in the present is
increasingly something far different from the act of Church proclamation; it is the
knowledge, faith, sanctification and blessedness of the individual.' This 'private divine
institution for so many private persons' left the church easy prey to modernism.127
Barth's doctrine of revelation expresses the (for him) fundamental theological principle
that only God can reveal God. This point is directly linked with his view of God as an
acting subject. We only know God as he is in his revelation of himself to us: 'God reveals
Himself. He reveals Himself through Himself. He reveals Himself If we really want to
understand revelation in terms of its subject, i.e., God, then the first thing we have to realise
124 Lindbeck, 'Barth and Textuality', 368.
125 Kevin Vanhoozer, 'God's Mighty Speech-Acts: The Doctrine of Scripture Today', in eds Philip E.
Satterthwaite & David F. Wright, A Pathway into the Holy Scripture (Grand Rapids, Michigan:
Eerdmans, 1994), 143-81.
126 Barth, CD 1/1, 117-18.
127 Barth, CD 1/1, 124. It is for this reason that Barth sees the focus of his theological project being
the reformation of preaching: 'Hence the direct object of dogmatics today must be Church
proclamation.'
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is that this subject, God, the Revealer, is identical with his act in revelation and also
identical with its effect."28 McCormack relates this theological principle to the Scripture-
principle which influenced Barth early in his career: 'God can only be known through God:
that is the point of the Scripture-principle."29 The only permanent, true 'Word of God' in
itself is therefore Jesus Christ. Barth's strongly Chalcedonian Christology insists that Christ
really is the second person of the Trinity in human form, God come in the flesh. To identify
anything else directly and permanently, in itself, with revelation or with the Word of God,
as the Protestant orthodox did with Scripture, is, for Barth, to threaten the supremacy of
Jesus Christ.
Therefore, 'the Bible is not in itself and as such God's past revelation. ... We thus do
the Bible poor and unwelcome honour if we equate it directly with this other, with
revelation itself."30 Barth most often describes the relation between the Bible and
revelation as an event, an event entirely of God's free choosing, in which the Bible becomes
revelation under his control as he speaks in and through it directly to people:
Recollection of God's past revelation, discovery of the Canon, faith in the
promise of the prophetic and apostolic word, or better, the self-imposing of the
Bible in virtue of its content, and therefore the existence of real apostolic
succession, is also an event, and is to be understood only as an event. In this
event the Bible is God's Word. ... The Bible is God's Word to the extent that
God causes it to be his Word, to the extent that He speaks through it.131
Barth holds to what Vanhoozer calls 'the indirect identity thesis' of the relationship between
the Bible and the Word of God;132 Wolterstorff describes his view of God's speech in the
Bible as 'a relentless eventism'.133
A question may be raised over whether the 'event' of the identity of the Bible and the
Word of God should be thought of as one in a series of discrete events in which it happens
that God chooses to address someone in and through the Bible, which ceases at the end of
the Bible-reading, or when God stops speaking, or even when the addressee closes his or her
heart and mind, (remembering that at one point, cited above, Barth says that God the
revealer is identical with the effect of revelation. In the case of divine speech, Barth here
seems to be eliding illocution into perlocution; this observation will be developed below).
In his exposition of Barth on the event of revelation through the Bible, T.F. Torrance
asserts that 'the bond between the Word of God and the Bible is not a static or necessary one
but a dynamic one, freely established by God which he is pleased unceasingly to affirm and
maintain through the real presence and activity of his Word.' Similarly: 'The Holy Bible is
128 Barth, CD 1/1, 296.
129 McCormack, Karl Barth's Critically Realistic, 317.
130 Barth, CD 1/1, 111-12
131 Barth, CD 111, 109.
132 Vanhoozer, 'God's Mighty Speech-Acts', 169.
133 Wolterstorff, Divine Discourse, 71.
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the Word of God as God himself utters it and thereby acts upon us, and remains the Word
and act of God as God continues to utter it and act upon us.'134 Torrance seems to have in
mind not a series of discrete events but a continuous event of 'becoming' - a word which in
Barth means, he says, 'being in action and time as it continuously becomes what it really
is.'135 This is analogous to Eberhard Jungel's particular exposition and development of
Barth's doctrine of God in the concept that 'God's being is in becoming'. John Webster
argues that by this designation Jiingel does not make God an exemplar of metaphysical
categories, but is attempting 'to specify the voluntary nature of God's self-sacrifice in
identifying himself with the crucified Jesus."36 Jiingel, therefore, likewise regards the
'event' of revelation as a sui generis theological rather than a general temporal category.
There is, he says, no analogia ends between revelation and human language; rather, 'the
language in which revelation should be able to come to speech must, [quoting Barth] 'as it
were, be commandeered' by revelation. Where such 'commandeering' of the language by
revelation for revelation becomes event, then there is a gain to language. It consists in the
fact that God as God comes to speech."37
The term 'event' here refers to the gracious God-wrought miracle by which human
language can achieve something which is impossible according to its own inherent qualities
- it comes to refer to God.138 Thus Jiingel continues: 'When language aims to be revelation
it loses itself as language. But where revelation commandeers language, the word of God
takes place. The word of God brings language to its true essence."39 The 'event' of
revelation refers to this gain to language, not to occasions on which the gain takes place.
Elsewhere, Jiingel contrasts 'event' with a supposed inherent capacity of human language to
speak of God, requiring us to choose between God's address to man conceived of as an
'event' and as '[a] datum of talk about God given with the existence of man'.140 Understood
this way, there is nothing about the nature of the 'event' which determines (how could it?,
since God is radically free) that God cannot bring the event about continuously or even
permanently. What it does fundamentally challenge is a permanent tying, resulting in an
ontological identity, by God of his Word to the Bible, such that one could construe his
134 Thomas F. Torrance, Karl Barth, Biblical and Evangelical Theologian (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark,
1990), 91, 95, (italics added).
135 Torrance, Karl Barth, 97.
136 J.B. Webster, Eberhard Jtingel. An Introduction to his Theology (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ.
Press, 1986), 20-22.
137 Eberhard Jiingel, The Doctrine of the Trinity. God's Being Is In Becoming (Edinburgh: Scottish
Academic Press, 1976), 11.
138 For this theme in Barth, see Hunsinger, How To Read Karl Barth, 44.
139 Jringel, The Doctrine of the Trinity, 14.
140 Eberhard Jiingel, God as the Mystery of the World. On the Foundation of the Theology of the
Crucified One in the Dispute Between Theism and Atheism trans. Darrell L. Guder (Edinburgh: T. &
T. Clark, 1983), 248-49.
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action quasi-deistically as resulting in a quasi-divine or even divine set of texts now left at
human disposal. This is Torrance's point when he asserts, restating a sentence of Barth's,
that the Bible is tied to the Word ofGod, not the Word ofGod to the Bible.141
Two issues arise here: the ability of human language to refer to God, and the question
of the two possible senses of 'event' in Barth's use of the term. As regards the first, in
chapter 5 part of Paul Ricoeur's work will be discussed, developing a suggestion made by
Vanhoozer,142 on the question of how the Bible qua human language might be thought of as
referring to God by means of its polyphonic discourse, while alleviating Barth's concern
that Bible-readers might then think of themselves as 'possessing' God. Barth and Jungel
think of revelation in human language as a gain to language's referential capabilities; in
addition, Barth can be read, as will be noted below, as reducing the Bible as revelation
effectively to the single literary genre of narrative.143 What Ricoeur offers, we will suggest,
is a more nuanced account of reference by means of a full recognition of the Bible's generic
diversity.144 As regards the two possible senses of 'event' in Barth's use of the term, even
granting the legitimacy of Jungel's and Torrance's expositions, there remains a sense in
Barth's use of 'event' that the Bible sometimes is God's Word and sometimes is not. This
is particularly the case because he ties its identity as Word in part to its having an effect in
and on its readers and hearers. When it has that effect it is God's Word; when it fails it is
not. To read 'event' as at least in part a temporal category in Barth seems legitimate.
Precisely the same dynamic is at work in Barth in the relationship between present
church proclamation and revelation as between the Bible and revelation. He refers to 'the
event of God's own speaking in the sphere of earthly events, the event of the authoritative
vicariate of Jesus Christ', and then relates this event to proclamation: 'Real proclamation as
this new event, in which the event of human talk is not set aside by God but exalted, is the
Word of God.'145 It is true, as McCormack observes, that precedent can be found for
drawing no distinction between the Bible and preaching, in that each can become revelation,
141 Torrance, Karl Barth, 102.
142 Vanhoozer, 'God's Mighty Speech-Acts', 174 n.96.
143 Jungel stresses that the 'gain' to language, by which it comes to refer to God, brings language 'to
its true essence'. Webster comments: 'It is difficult to see how this process can be a 'gain to
language' when the corollary is that language which does not 'bring God to speech' has somehow
failed to attain its essence. For all Jiingel's concern to validate human speech from the prevenient
divine Word, there is a real danger of absorption of our language into the divine speech-act, or at least
of the implication that a purely 'natural' languge is a bastard form of speech', (Webster, Eberhard
Jungel, 42).
144 Jtingel's concept of the whole Bible as 'parabolic', which will be discussed below, is analogous to
Ricoeur's notion that in the case of literary texts in general the normal mode of reference is
suspended, and a 'world' is 'projected' 'in front of the text; for this comparison, see Webster,
Eberhard Jungel, 43-45. What will be referred to in chapter 5 is Ricoeur's particular conception of
how, in the particular case of the Bible, the whole refers 'polyphonically' to God.
145 Barth, CD 1/1, 95.
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in Heinrich Bullinger's statement in the Second Helvetic Confession that 'The Preaching of
the Word of God is the Word of God'.146 It will shortly be argued that certain problems
arise in Barth's doctrine of Scripture because of his identical treatment of Scripture and
proclamation in their separate relationships with the Word of God.
However, despite the identical nature of the relationships between the Word of God and
each of the Bible and preaching, Barth retains in practice a very strong reliance on the
authority of the Bible over the church and over all human activity and speech. Although he
establishes great similarities between Scripture and proclamation, there remains 'a
dissimilarity in order, namely the supremacy, the absolutely constitutive significance of the
former for the latter, the determination of the reality of present-day proclamation by its
foundation upon Holy Scripture.'147 He bases this supremacy on the fact of Scripture's
authority as witness to divine revelation, Jesus Christ, the Word made flesh: 'Why and in
what respect does the biblical witness have authority? Because and in the fact that he
claims no authority for himself, that his witness amounts to letting that other itself be its
own authority."48 It was and is now the church's experience that the canon of Scripture by
this witness to revelation presents itself to the church. Except in the most trivial sense, the
church does not write the Bible: 'It is the canon because it imposed itself on the church as
such and continually does so.' Its authority is demonstrated in that it is in the Bible alone
that the church has heard God speak in this way: 'When the Church heard this Word - and
it heard it only in the prophets and apostles and nowhere else - it heard a magisterial and
ultimate word which it could not ever again confuse or place on a level with any other
word.'149
The whole Bible is the authoritative witness to revelation, that is, to Jesus Christ,
because every part of it arises out of a history in which Jesus has been present with God's
people, both before and after his physical appearing on earth: 'although the Bible is a
source and norm which specifically addresses its readers and hearers in the power of the
Holy Spirit, it is also an abiding whole which is given to the community through its history
and in which Jesus accompanies it through this history.' Scripture is therefore like the
pillars of cloud and fire which led ancient Israel - 'an invariably authentic direction to the
knowledge of its [the community's] Lord'. Thus, Scripture's authority is 'based on a direct
relationship to the history of Israel and that of Jesus Christ Himself."50 Barth's grounding
146 McCormack, Karl Barth's Critically Realistic, 340.
147 Barth, CD 1/1, 102.
148 Barth, CD l/l, 112.
149 Barth, CD l/l, 107-108.
150 Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics IV/3 trans. G.W. Bromiley (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1961), 126-
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of the authority of Scripture may be further investigated through an interpretation of his
notion of God as a speaking God.
3.3.3. God as Speaker according to Barth
It has been observed at the outset that Barth insisted that 'God speaks', and that in saying
this he meant to take 'speaks' literally. He insisted that everything else he would go on to
say 'must be regarded as exegesis and not as a restriction or a negation of this statement'.151
We will follow Barth's arguments in the section of Church Dogmatics 1/1 on 'The Word of
God as the Speech of God',152 to which these claims form an introduction, in order to see
how Barth does exegete the claim that God speaks, and what in practice he means by the
claim. He argues that three implications follow from the assertion that God speaks.
First, the Word of God is spiritual in nature, that is, spiritual, 'as distinct from
naturalness, corporeality, or any physical event'. Yet 'there is no Word of God without a
physical event'; such events are the sacraments, 'the letter [Buchstdblichkeit] of Holy
Scripture', and 'supremely ... the corporeality of the man Jesus Christ'.153 It becomes clear
that the notion of God speaking describes the relation between this spiritual nature of the
Word and these physical events:
The Word of God is primarily spiritual and then, in this form, in this
spirituality, for the sake of it and without prejudice to it, it is also a physical
and natural event. This particularity is what is meant when in accordance with
the three forms in which we hear this Word we call it the speech of God.
Speech, including God's speech, is the form in which reason communicates
with reason and person with person.154
To say that God 'speaks', for Barth, is to say that God takes on certain particularities in the
world in the event of the revelation of his Word - supremely Jesus Christ, derivatively
Scripture and sacrament - in order to communicate with human beings.
Second, the Word of God has a 'personal quality': 'It is not "a truth," not even the very
highest truth. It is the truth as it is God's speaking person, Dei loquentis persona'.
Although Barth talks here about a 'personal qualityin fact he means to assert the identity
of the Word of God with the person of Jesus Christ: 'Understanding the Word ofGod not as
proclamation and Scripture alone but as God's revelation in proclamation and Scripture, we
must understand it in its identity with God Himself. God's revelation is Jesus Christ, the
Son of God.' Barth understands this equation as protecting Scripture from the reduction to a
set ofprepositional statements which he thinks it underwent in the seventeenth century: 'In
this equation, and in it alone, a real and effective barrier is set up against what is made of ...
151 Barth, CD 1/1, 132-33.
152 Barth, CDI/1, 132-43.
153 Barth, CDI/1, 133.
154 Barth, CD 1/1, 135, (italics added).
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Holy Scripture according to the later form of older Protestantism, namely, a fixed sum of
revealed propositions which can be systematised like the sections of a corpus of law'.155
There seems to be a contradiction between this equation of revelation with the person of
Jesus Christ and the earlier claim that revelation is speech 'in itself and as such'. Barth
recognises this, and does not want either of the Word's personal or verbal 'qualities' to
erase the other: 'The personalising of the concept of the Word of God, which we cannot
avoid when we remember that Jesus Christ is the Word of God, does not mean its
deverbalising. But it (naturally) means awareness that it is person rather than thing or object
even if and in so far as it is word, word of Scripture and word of preaching.'156 It is not
immediately clear what Barth here means by 'thing or object', which he contrasts with
'person', as the wrong way to understand the Word. However, a clue may be found in
McCormack's discussion of a similar passage from the Gottingen Dogmatics. At one point
in this work, Barth says: 'The procedure of the self-revealing God is a dicere\ its content is
word ... but not thing, matter, nature'. This, says McCormack, was written '[ajgainst those
who wished to associate revelation with an experience of the holy or the irrational'.157 Of
course, Barth's prime objection to such conceptions of revelation was that God was
rendered an aspect of humanity, with no capacity to address us from outside. The identity in
Barth's mind of revelation-as-speech and revelation-as-person, both functioning as
explications of the self-revelation of the Word of God, therefore aims to safeguard
revelation from this reduction. What 'person', as a term and concept, guarantees for Barth
is external address, to such an extent that he identifies the two. He seems to think that
anything short of this identification of 'person' with 'word' and 'speech' leaves the door
ajar to the reduction of revelation to an aspect of humanity or to propositional statement
which he fears.
The third implication is that, as speech, the Word of God 'has purposive character... .
This might also be called its relatedness or pertinence, its character as address. In its form
neither as proclamation, Holy Scripture, nor revelation do we know God's Word as an entity
that exists merely in and for itself. We know it only as a Word that is directed to us and
applies to us.'158 Here, Barth comes close to using the concepts of speech-act theory, while
lacking the terminology. He wants to reject any notion of revelation which does not think of
God as taking an illocutionary stance towards the world as a personal being who addresses
the world from outside. This is what he means when he says that God speaks, and that
'speaking' is not a symbol. By insisting that God speaks, then, Barth means to say that God
155 Barth, CD 1/1, 136-37.
156 Barth, CD VI, 138.
157 McCormack, Karl Barth's Critically Realistic, 341.
158 Barth, CD 1/1, 139.
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in his self-revelation performs an illocutionary act towards the world, without necessarily
performing verbal locutionary acts. Torrance makes the same point in his repeated assertion
that the relationship between speech about God and speech about the Bible is dynamic, not
static.159
This point is evident elsewhere in volume I of Church Dogmatics. Barth equates God
speaking with God deciding something with regard to his relationship with us
specifically, deciding to be present with us: 'God's presence is always God's decision to be
present. The divine Word is the divine speaking'.160 For Barth, the Word of God is God's
act: 'The distinction between word and act is that mere word is the self-expression of a
person, while act is the resultant relative alteration in the world around. Mere word is
passive, act is an active participation in history'.161 This derives at least in part from a
general hermeneutical principle. Of 'the speaker', Barth asks rhetorically:
Did he not say anything to me at all? Did he not therefore desire that I should
see him not in abstracto but in his specific and concrete relationship to the
thing described or intended in his word, that I should see him from the
standpoint and in the light of this thing? How much wrong is being continually
perpetrated, how much intolerable obstruction of human relationships, how
much isolation and impoverishment forced upon individuals has its only basis
in the fact that we do not take seriously a claim which in itself is as clear as the
day, the claim which arises whenever one person addresses a word to
another?162
This is very close to speech-act theory, and to Wolterstorff s definition of speech in
particular, in that Barth insists that for God to speak is for him to change states of affairs in
the world; he breaks the necessity of any link between divine speech and either verbal
locutions or the communication of propositions, in order to see it as fundamentally a way of
acting in and on the world. This is related to a general conception of speech as personal
address. However, he is hampered by his lack of the conceptual distinctions offered by
speech-act theory. He certainly defines speaking as something very like performing
illocutions - which he describes as addressing another in the form of certain particularities
(Jesus Christ, Scripture, sacrament) - but he also defines speaking directly as 'being a
person', as we have seen. Barth sees this identification as necessary, we suggest, because he
lacks the concept of an 'illocutionary act' - a concept which allows us to think of language
as existing qua language in fundamentally dynamic and inseparable relation to a person and
to that person's acting in the world. If words are not conceived of as counting as personal
159 Torrance, Karl Barth, 91, 105, 115.
160 Barth, CDI/1, 321.
161 Barth, CDI/1, 144.
162 Barth, CD 1/2, 465. On the relation of special and general hermeneutics in Barth, see Eberhard
Jiingel, Karl Barth. A Theological Legacy trans. Garrett E. Paul (Philadelphia: Westminster Press,
1976), 74-78. This topic will be taken up directly in the final chapter.
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actions in this way, then in and of themselves they can only be, as Barth fears, 'mere'
words.
Questions may be raised over whether Barth's double definition of speech - personal
address and person - blurs some issues in the event of revelation which require coherent
explanation. Paul Helm observes that 'in the interests of divine freedom Barth has wanted
to compress the whole of God's revelation into what Reformed theology would call
illumination' - that is, the perlocutionary effect which God brings about by the Holy Spirit.
This, he argues, means that, for Barth, in revelation the biblical texts actually change their
meaning: 'Christ bore our sins in his own body on the tree' becomes, for example, 'John
Smith, Christ bore your sins in his own body on the tree'. Helm comments: 'Yet surely
Karl Barth cannot mean that when the Bible becomes the Word ofGod the Bible changes its
meaning.'163 Vanhoozer makes the point this way: 'It is not clear how, or even whether,
Barth accounts for the properly semantic moment of God's self-disclosure. In the last
resort, Barth's doctrine of Scripture moves to Christ too fast.,XM The means by which the
personal Word and the words of the Bible are related, so that human cognition of God's
saving action in Christ, a condition of faithful response to God, is possible, is never made
clear at the level of grammar and semantics in Barth. Wolterstorff is getting at the same
point when he argues that 'there's less in Barth on God speaking than first appears'.165 For
Barth, God speaks, in the strict sense, only in Jesus Christ; everything else is not speech,
but is what Barth calls God's 'activating, ratifying and fulfilling of the word of the Bible
and preaching'.166 God supplements the words of the Bible with the miracle by which they
may come to refer to him, and with the event by which they may come to speak to human
hearts.
Jiingel expounds Barth on this point under the question of how revelation comes to
speech, especially with regard to what he terms 'the analogy of advent'. '[God] introduces
himself in that he arrives. And this his arrival belongs to his very being which he reveals as
arriving. But this is possible only when this arrival takes place as an arrival-in-language'.167
The analogy works thus: 'God relates to his word in such a way that he thereby relates to
man, and in a very particular way relates to man's relationship to his own word. ... The
analogy is in an eminent sense a language event."6S This, however, might simply push our
question back a stage: how does revelation, as Barth portrays it, come to speech in the first
place? How are we to conceive of the coming of Jesus Christ as an 'arrival-in-language'?
163 Helm, The Divine Revelation, 42-43.
164 Vanhoozer, 'God's Mighty Speech-Acts', 169.
165 Wolterstorff, Divine Discourse, 72, (original italics removed).
166 Quoted in Wolterstorff, Divine Discourse, 73.
167 Jiingel, God as the Mystery, 285-86.
168 Jiingel, God as the Mystery, 289.
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Jungel's analogy seems to slide between two definitions of 'word' - on the divine side, a
person; on the human side, language - without explaining how 'word' in the first sense
becomes 'word' in the second.
Jiingel relates Jesus to language by defining his being in terms of a speech-act: 'the
man Jesus is the parable of God (Gleichnis), understanding the being of the man Jesus on
the basis of the Easter kerygma. This christological statement is to be regarded as the
fundamental proposition of a hermeneutic of the speakability of God.'169 He explicates
Jesus as the parable of God in reference to the parables spoken by the earthly Jesus. The
genre of parable is chosen because of its creative potentiality to render the presence of a
subject such that the addressee is changed: 'In a parable, language is so focused that the
subject of the discourse becomes concrete in language itself and thus defines anew the
people addressed in their own existence."70 When the question of revelation in the Bible as
a whole arises, Jiingel rescues the possibility of this event occurring through any part, or at
least many parts, of the biblical canon, as well as through other 'language forms of faith', by
effectively reducing all biblical literature to the single genre of parable: 'Biblical talk about
God knows the parables as one of many possible language forms in which faith expresses
God. But basically all language forms of faith participate in the structure of parabolic
language. In that sense parables serve as the language of faith generally."71 (It has been
argued that Barth similarly regards revelation as mediated through one literary genre:
narrative.)172 Jiingel certainly does not want to restrict the event of revelation to strictly
parabolic material in the canonical Gospels. However, he does not say how biblical texts
which are not themselves parables of the earthly Jesus, or even words spoken by the earthly
Jesus, may come to share in that parabolic structure to such an extent that God as subject is
made 'concrete' in their discourse, and that Jesus, 'the parable of God', comes to speech in
them. It is of this - the Word in the words of the Bible - that Jiingel, like Barth, offers no
overall account.
Where we accuse Barth of a lack, of refusing to explicate a point we take to be vital, he
of course sees a virtue, in that he refuses to speculate on the very thing which he assumes
we are warned against speculating on by the mysterious event of revelation: that, in the real
event of divine self-revelation through the exclusively human words of the Bible and
preaching, '[the] form is not a suitable but an unsuitable medium for God's self-
presentation."73 He might have taken as a compliment Vanhoozer's judgment that 'Barth
fails to provide anything like a clear conceptual analysis of this event [of the Bible
169 Jiingel, God as the Mystery, 288-89.
170 Jiingel, God as the Mystery, 292.
171 Jiingel, God as the Mysteiy, 293.
172 Ford, Barth and God's Story.
173 Barth, CD 1/1, 166.
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becoming God's Word], ... God's Word for Barth is a semantic miracle.'174 The lack of
such an analysis is not an oversight on Barth's part but the centre around which his
understanding of revelation and Scripture is deliberately built. Vanhoozer thinks that this is
not a suitable place to invoke miracle, since revelation has a 'properly semantic moment';
Barth insists on miracle here in order to fend off human attempts to master God. When we
come to offer our positive proposal, which will build on Vanhoozer's suggestion of speech-
act theory as the best way forward for a doctrine of Scripture, we will suggest that it is
possible to identify the Bible permanently with the Word of God, and so account for the
'properly semantic moment' in a way that takes account of Barth's underlying concerns that
human beings should not be able to control God in his self-revelation. The intention is not
to explain away 'miracle', but to suggest the possibility of a comprehensible account of a
divine action which nonetheless lies beyond human control.
3.3.4. The Question of the Unique Authority ofthe Bible in Barth
It was noted above that, according to Helm, Barth collapses the Reformed distinction
between revelation and illumination, shifting the focus of God's inspiring activity away
from what God did in the past in the preparation and composition of the Bible and onto what
God does in the present in pressing the Word on our hearts. This elides illocution into
perlocution and fails, therefore, to offer an intelligible theological distinction between text
and reception.
Neither does Barth offer a distinction between the Bible and proclamation in the
relation of each to revelation. Scripture, he says, is the Word of God 'in exactly the same
sense in which we have said this of the event of real proclamation.'175 McCormack,
narrating Barth's theological development, says that, when the question of language as the
bearer of revelation arose in his thinking, 'the problem of Scripture and preaching as the
Word of God entailed for Barth the affirmation of qualified words', that is, of words
qualified to bear revelation.176 It is noteworthy that at this developmental stage, which
became determinative for his later work, Barth treated Scripture and proclamation
identically in their individual theological relations to revelation. If McCormack is right,
then Barth drew no theological distinction between Scripture and preaching, or, as we might
say, between text and commentary.177
174 Vanhoozer, 'God's Mighty Speech-Acts', 172.
175 Barth, CD 1/1, 109.
176 McCormack, Karl Barth's Critically Realistic, 340.
177 It was largely in order to distinguish text and commentary, and text and reception, that the
Reformation principle of sola Scriptura developed in contrast to Roman Catholic and 'enthusiast'
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This raises the question of the scope of human language which God selects or
commandeers, empowering it by his grace to refer to him. Barth, as we have seen, insists on
and generally puts into practice the supreme authority of the Bible. However, the lack of an
intelligible theological or ontological link between God's action and the Bible suggests that
Barth may not give a sufficient theoretical account of his practical treatment of the Bible.
This can be illustrated through an examination of two contemporary writers on Barth, each
of whom suggests surprising parallels between Barth and a later writer: first, Stanley Fish,
and then Jacques Derrida.
3.3.4.1. Barth and Stanley Fish
It is precisely the distinction between text and commentary that has been the focus of attack
in the neo-pragmatic hermeneutics of the literary critic and theorist Stanley Fish. His work
will be read in some detail in our treatment of contemporary hermeneutical approaches to
authors in chapter 4; the main feature of it may be summarised here as a proposal that
neither the formal features nor meaning of a text reside objectively in the text, but that both
are the product of particular interpretive practices, the choice of which is governed by the
interests of various interpretive communities.
In a recent article, Scott C. Saye draws strong parallels between Barth and Fish.178 At
first sight this may seem a surprising comparison, for Fish has little interest in religion,
denies the supposed 'objectivity' of an authorial voice addressing the reader from outside,
and asserts that we make texts and meanings in our own image. It would be hard to be
further from Barth's basic convictions! However, Saye's argument does have merit. He
notes the difficulty which commentators on Barth have had in finding an interpretive centre
to his biblical exegesis, which often 'reach[es] eclectically for interpretive tools that would
help him to say what he wanted to say.'179 Saye's thesis is that these attempts have failed
because they have sought to describe the coherence of Barth's hermeneutics in terms of
methodology, when methodology was never Barth's concern. 'The most important issue for
Barth is not how one should read Scripture, but rather who is reading it, what is sought, and
where this reading takes place.' Barth's dogmatics are emphatically church dogmatics:
'this context, with all its commitments and practices, does more to create a right reading of
scripture than any hermeneutical or methodological decision."80 Saye thinks that there is
some truth to the claim that the role which this ascribes to the church is more Roman
Catholic than Protestant.181
178 Scott C. Saye, 'The Wild and Crooked Tree: Barth, Fish and Interpretive Communities' Modern
Theology 12 (1996) 435-58.
179 Saye, 'The Wild and Crooked Tree', 435.
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Clearly, this claim, made of the great Protestant theologian of the twentieth century,
would need further substantiation. However, it is evident that Saye's radical comparison of
Barth and Fish finds support in some of the points made in the present treatment of Barth.
Barth's focusing of revelation on the moment of illumination gives great systematic weight
to the church's reception of the Word. Barth may not mean to say, as Helm thinks he does
not, that the Bible changes its meaning when God speaks through it to different people, but
his view of revelation can logically be taken to that conclusion. Saye argues that Barth, like
Fish, does not regard Scripture as 'a stable object with "objective" meaning."82 In by¬
passing the semantic aspect of revelation in his account of Scripture becoming revelation,
Barth leaves open the possibility that that semantic aspect may be located in the moment of
illumination, the reception of revelation. Such a hermeneutical position is very similar to
Fish's. It is certainly at odds with Barth's often repeated assertions that the Bible has
supreme authority over the church, as a means by which the Word of God comes to the
church from outside as an address from God; but it can be shown to follow logically from
his actual account of the relationship between revelation and the Word.
3.3.4.2. Barth and Jacques Derrida
Even more surprisingly, the theologian Graham Ward has devoted a book-length study to
the claim that Barth's view of revelation prefigures Derrida's notion of the economy of
differance. 'For both thinkers, the central problematic is the ineradicable otherness which
haunts discourse and yet the impossibility of transcending metaphoricity and positing a real
presence.'183 Ward's key piece of evidence to support this conclusion is his claim that Barth
works with two conflicting and unresolved models of language. The 'communication
model' describes what happens in the event of revelation, when language is made to refer to
God, while the 'semiotic model' describes the function of language as a human construct.
The two, however, cannot be accommodated with one another:
The communication model (where words adequately represent and
communicate their objects) cannot be accommodated within a model of
language which understands words as constructing the reality of objects.
Similarly, the semiotic model of language (which emphasises the ineradicable
mediation of a 'meaning' which forever lies beyond it) cannot accommodate
the possibility of unmediated, direct disclosure. Knowledge of God, then,
becomes either impossible or contradictory, for each model is the other's
radical alternative.
Each of these model 'contradicts the possibility of the other'.184 In addition, Barth
rejects the account of how God came to speech offered by the old doctrine of the inspiration
182 Saye, 'The Wild and Crooked Tree', 444.
183 GrahamWard, Barth, Derrida and the Language of Theology (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press,
1995), 247.
184 Ward, Barth, Derrida, 30-31.
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of the Bible. Ward summarises: in Barth's work '[t]here is no coherent account of the
Word in the words'; 'we are given, at this point, no insight into how the Word takes
possession of human words and thoughts; we are merely told that it does so.' Barth thus
lacks, as has already been observed, a particularist account of God's 'commandeering' of
certain words in an event of revelation. From this, Ward draws the contentious inference
that Barth's 'ultimate concern is to move on from a theology of Scriptural discourse to a
theology of discourse itself.
In the course of his analysis of ch.5 of Church Dogmatics, Ward observes that 'the
paradox of language issues into a christological discussion. In the aporia between the two
antithetical models for the operation of language Barth places Jesus Christ, the Word made
human. ... It is Barth's Christology that bears the weight of any possible explanation or
synthesis: the eternal Son of God made this particular man, Jesus of Nazareth.' Ward
doubts, however, that the incarnation can bear this weight, given the lack in Barth's
theology which he has noted: 'Christology, as a theology of the Word, itself demands a
coherent theology of language if it too is not to split irredeemably the divine from the
human'.185
Ward's book has been very sharply criticised in a review article by the Barth specialist
Bruce McCormack, who argues that Ward has seriously misread Barth on all significant
points. Of particular relevance to the present discussion is his contention that Barth was
never concerned to offer a general theory of language: 'God's use of language to bear
witness to Himself... involves a selection and Barth is interested only in what occurs in that
act of selection'.186 He argues further that Barth did not hold two antithetically opposed
epistemologies. Instead, Barth's theological epistemology completes his philosophical
(neo-Kantian) epistemology, 'transcending [it] from within through the power of God'. He
concludes: 'There is no aporia in Barth's theory of theological language needing to be filled
by Derrida or anyone else'.187 McCormack further charges Ward with reversing the
relationship which Barth establishes between Christology and the analogia fidei. Barth's
supposed two conflicting models of language cannot be read back into his Christology such
that the divine threatens to separate from the human. 'Barth was no Nestorian!', objects
McCormack; rather, it is his Christology that grounds the analogia fidei.]iS
McCormack is right to assert that Barth does not think of God's presence to us as
endlessly deferred; a key element of his theology is that what is impossible for human
language is made possible in and through human language by God's gracious activity.
185 Ward, Barth, Derrida, 32.
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McCormack describes this as Ward's lack of 'a sound grasp of Barth's relationship to neo-
Kantianism': 'To make theology a frank impossibility is to invalidate the incarnation and
the speaking of God which occurs here and now on that basis'.189 When the human words of
Scripture and preaching become revelation, as Barth insists they can and do, God is really
present, by an action dependent not on the qualities of human words but on God's
transforming of human words into his Word: 'Human words are never final words. They
are never the promise of a specific and definitive coming of the Other. It is proper to God's
Word and to God's Word alone to be also the full and authentic presence of the Speaker
even if this be as the coming One.'190 The note of deferral in the final phrase here does not
nullify the emphasis on presence, as it does programmatically in Derrida.
Nor is it true that Barth is concerned to move on to a theology of language, as Barth in
fact makes very clear: 'It must be shown how and how far the questions already put with
reference to the Bible and proclamation are not spun out of the void, are not those of
random curiosity, do not spring from a logical schematisation applied here as elsewhere, but
necessarily result from the fact that both the Bible and proclamation are or can become
God's Word."91 Barth is simply not interested in the 'void' of language, as Derrida is, but
only in what he sees as the radical presence of God through the linguistic modes of Bible
and preaching.
However, even given McCormack's serious objections to Ward's work, it may still be
asked whether something of Ward's reaction to reading Barth, which gave rise to his
attempt to read him together with Derrida, may survive as a legitimate insight. Ward points
out that, for Barth, God selects certain words to become revelation, but that neither the
scope of the selection nor the relationship between that scope and Scripture is made clear.192
Geoffrey Bromiley, who certainly offers a less creative reading of Barth than Ward, concurs
on this point.193 It is an observation supported by our discussions above. Once the scope of
God's selection of human words has been left theologically vague, the question of language
in general in relation to theology is one that may legitimately be raised.
McCormack thinks that there is no aporia in Barth needing to be filled by anyone, let
alone by Derrida. That is because he finds Barth's 'miraculous' account of the Bible and
preaching becoming revelation satisfactory, sufficient to limit the scope of discussion of
Barth's views of revelation and language to the Bible and church proclamation. In other
words, McCormack finds the 'miraculous' account sufficient because he finds that Barth's
coherent Christology just is a coherent account of what Barth also believes about the Word
189 McCormack, 'Graham Ward's Barth', 104-105.
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in the words of the Bible and preaching. Ward, by contrast, requires a further coherent
account of how a coherent Christology moves to revelation-as-speech. He does not find
Barth's 'miraculous' account sufficient to limit the discussion of revelation to a definite set
of words, for he seems to equate mystery with absence: 'The revelation of the Word does
not occur and cannot occur in Barth's theology, and so its meaning is maintained in
mystery."94
A good case can therefore be made that Ward is wrong to read Barth as Derridean
before his time. Whether or not one thinks that Derrida can, in a much more limited way,
gain some purchase on Barth, opening up at least a general discussion about presence and
absence in language, depends on whether or not one thinks that 'miracle' may be
appropriately invoked in answer to the question of God's present speaking, of revelation
coming to speech in Bible and preaching - that is, whether one finds Barthian Christology
to be itself a sufficient account of revelation in and through language. If one sides with
Ward at all in this disagreement, then one must grant at least that Barth leaves himself open
to a legitimate Derridean reading, even if that reading cannot demonstrate that Barth would
have agreed with Derrida on very much at all.
3.4. Positive Proposal: Scripture as the Speech-Act ofGod
One of Barth's over-riding concerns is that God's revelation never be conceived of such that
human beings could 'possess' it, and by possessing it possess God. He wants to protect God
both in his freedom and transcendence. For Barth, to identify the Bible with God's Word is
to compromise both God's freedom as a personal being and God's free transcendence as
God. We will look at each of these in turn, and suggest the extent to which a construal of
the orthodox Protestant doctrine of Scripture cast in terms of speech-act theory can alleviate
these concerns.
3.4.1. Free Speech
If I make a promise to someone, and they respond with an expression of trust that I will
keep my promise, there seems to be little or no semantic difference between these three
ways of expressing that trust: "I trust you to be true to your words", "I trust your promise"
and "I trust you". It seems that in many everyday linguistic interactions we identify
(without subsuming into each other) words with actions, and actions with persons. Speech-
act theory, as developed by Austin and Searle, accounts for the identification of words and
actions: to speak is to act. Wolterstorff s further development of speech-act theory
accounts for the identification of actions with persons: to act, to perform a speech-act, is to
194 Ward, Barth, Derrida, 250.
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acquire for oneself a new normative standing. There are clearly profound anthropological
issues at stake here. It is not claimed that a person is nothing but the sum of her actions, nor
that human identity is always unstable, such that her identity necessarily changes every time
she performs a new speech-act. What is claimed is that a person's identity, to the extent that
her identity is revealed and given definition by her actions, is partly a function of the
normative standings she acquires, and therefore of the speech-acts she performs, and
therefore of the words she utters.195
For a person to identify herself with her speech-actions and her words therefore does
not represent a reduction of her personhood as external to other persons; nor is it
automatically to hand herself over to possession by, rather than personal encounter with,
others. Indeed, it is fundamental to inter-personal relationships that we do so identify
ourselves; without such an identification it would be impossible to command, request, warn
or promise. The question is not, 'Does the identification of a person with her words entail a
limitation of personal freedom?', but rather, 'Is personal freedom at all conceivable outside
the context of persons who act and in part are precisely by means of such an identification?'
This construal of persons and speech-acts can allow the Bible to be seen as permanently
identified with the Word of God and as the means by which God makes himself personally
present to us, while accounting for Barth's concern. For God to limit his freedom in such a
way is actually the means by which, in certain particularities, (which Barth rightly
recognised to be necessary for speech), he can be present to us as a personal being in
revelation. This is not to say that this identification of a person with acts and words carries
no risks. Barth's fear, that in the process of interpretation we may grapple with words,
syntax and semantics not so as to understand a person in order to be able to encounter him
as a person but in order to gain cognitive 'possession' of him, is realised every day, as he
recognised. However, that the identification can be and is abused does not prove that it
should not be made. It demonstrates that inherent in personhood is an ethical responsibility
towards others, the observance of which can never be taken for granted.
The person of Jesus, as himself a divine speech-act, which is how Barth constantly sees
him, and his relation to the Bible, can be described here in the terms provided by speech-act
195 A helpful survey and analysis of a recent trend in theological anthropology is found in Harriet A.
Harris, 'Should We Say That Personhood Is Relational?' Scottish Journal of Theology 51 (1998) 214-
34. She rejects the view of Alistair McFadyen and others that personhood is constituted by personal
relations, since it establishes an infinite regress that is unable to identify what relationships are formed
out of that bring persons into being. Moreover, Harris argues, it leads into the ethical problem that
personhood becomes a matter of degree, making some human beings apparently less qualified as
persons than others, by virtue of the differing quality of relationships by which they are supposedly
constituted, (232-33). Harris prefers John Macmurray's account, in which our very brief account of
personhood here finds support, the thrust of which 'is not that a being becomes a person through
relations, but that humans are persons because relationality is central to human life', (225). The
relation of the present study to anthropological questions will reappear in the final chapter.
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theory. Jesus, understood as a (temporal) act of revelation, is a divine illocutionary act
performed without a verbal locution. As such, the act may well be incomprehensible, for
the words spoken by the earthly Jesus through the course of his life were necessary (though
not sufficient) for most people who met him to comprehend his identity; one needed at least
ears which could hear. The person and life of Jesus, including the words he uttered, for
those who were present to hear them, is an illocutionary act performed in part by verbal
locutions. The Bible is the performance of the same illocutionary act by verbal means to
later generations - not in that it shares in the 'parabolic structure' of the language of faith,
as Jiingel has it, but in that God speaks through the totality of its various generic and
thematic voices to render the person of Jesus.196 In that an action is an extension of the
existence of a person, Jesus is present in the reading and preaching of the Bible. This is
what Luther insisted on: that Jesus is really present in the proclamation of the gospel.
3.4.2. Transcendent Speech
It may be objected to the previous section that Barth's concerns relate mainly not to the
personhood that humans and creatures share in common with God but to the transcendence
that is characteristic of God's personhood alone. This is the real problem, according to
Jtingel: 'the fundamental distinction between God and man threatens to be lost if God's
word is not basically differentiated from all the words of human language."97
This question will be addressed in part in the discussion of 'biblical polyphony' in
chapter 5. Here we may respond to Barth on this point another way. It is fundamental to
Barth's convictions that God acts in the world. He rescues God's cognitive transcendence
by identifying in the world only the person of Jesus Christ directly with revelation, with
God's self-identifying act. Barth is right to insist that when we think of God coming to act
in the world for salvation we must think of him as coming to possess us, not as coming to be
an object of our knowledge. Yet God identifying himself directly with an action and
supremely with a person in the world is a revelation no less susceptible to human cognitive
possession than God identifying himself with a set of words in the world. The Pharisees
trying to trick Jesus and the crowd calling for his crucifixion represent nothing less than
human attempts to gain mastery over Jesus Christ, the person who is God's Word, his
saving action, his self-revealing. Thus, to identify a person's action, even in the case of
divine action in the world, with a person, even a divine person, rather than with a set of
words, does not make 'possession' impossible, or even less likely. It simply establishes a
context in which any attempt to 'possess' is an immoral assault on the personhood of the
other.
196 This is to anticipate a conception of the canon of Scripture which will be developed in chapter 5.
197 Jtingel, God as the Mystery, 230.
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What Wolterstorff s development of speech-act theory particularly effects is the
bringing of language-use into precisely the same moral context just described for all
personal actions. Therefore, if Scripture is construed directly as God's speech-act,
permanently as his Word, the same is true of it as of all other actions: it is susceptible to
human attempts to possess it. This is simply the vulnerability inherent in all inter-personal
communicative action, and God's self-revelation in the world, if it is be recognisable to
human persons as revelation of the divine persons, cannot be exempt. Yet possession is not
a necessary corollary of reading and interpretation. Careful reading can equally well aim
not just at understanding per se but at understanding so to enable, in part, appropriate
response to the personal address, the illocutionary act, which God performs in the text. As
Mikhail Bakhtin says, 'all real and integral understanding is actually responsive, and
constitutes nothing other than the initial preparatory stage of a response (in whatever form it
may be actualized).'198 If Barth's Christology represents no necessary compromise ofGod's
cognitive transcendence, no domestication of the doctrinal assertion that God speaks and of
the reality of his speech, then neither does the orthodox Protestant doctrine of Scripture.
Barth exalts God as the Lord of Scripture. Divine lordship, however, is revealed in
Christ in the form of divine servanthood. God serves humankind, not least in undertaking to
be true to promises uttered to us in human language, and to honour a covenant made with
(or for) us in human words. God has free control over the Bible's Wortlichkeit, as Barth
insists; we may supplement this by saying that God has that free control over the Bible in
that he is its author, and therefore, as a moral agent, has tied his future action to those words
and what they promise. His free control over the Bible's Wortlichkeit is exercised now in
that contemporary Bible-readers conjure up out of their own reading neither the presence of
God nor their own faithful response to him, and in that they are culpable if they choose to
conjure up their own meaning, rather than the one given in the texts. God freely gives
himself to them to be known by the Holy Spirit in his speech, through the mediation,
including the semantic mediation, of the illocutions of Scripture.
Hunsinger summarises his lucid reading of Barth thus: 'In short, the subject matter
presents itself through its scriptural mediation uniquely, spontaneously, sovereignly,
objectively, and coherently.'199 It is only with the second of these adverbs - God
spontaneously presenting himself in Scripture - that we are taking issue. God is the
sovereign Lord of Scripture; but he is also the servant of Scripture, in that he promises not
to absent himself from any performance of the illocutions of Scripture. Yet the God who
always presents himself to us when the Bible is read is no more a God we possess than the
God who was always present in the earthly life of his Son.
198 Bakhtin, 'Speech Genres', 69.
199 Hunsinger, How to Read Karl Barth, 277.
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3.5. Conclusion
In this chapter speech-act theory has been outlined and then appropriated, especially in
Wolterstorff s development of it, to provide a means by which an ontological link between
God and Scripture may be conceived of, such that the human words of the Bible, as they
mediate divine illocutionary acts, may legitimately be identified directly with the Word of
God. The wording of this summary is intended to exclude both over-identification and
under-identification of the illocutionary acts performed in the Bible with the Word of God.
By 'over-identification' is meant the identification with the Word of God of every illocution
narrated in Scripture - for example a lie uttered by a character in the Bible - as opposed to
an interpretation aiming to identify the divine illocution performed by means of the human
discourse of the Bible. By 'under-identification' is meant the identification with the Word
of God of supposed biblical illocutions derived in abstraction from, that is, with too little
attention paid to, the semantics and grammar of the human words of the Bible.
The critique of Barth offered here is not intended as a denial of the legitimacy of his
concerns about the domestication of God in his revelation. Moreover, in a broad context
Barth does affirm the doctrine of the sufficiency of Scripture.200 However, it has been
argued here that Barth's rejection of the orthodox Protestant direct identification of the
Bible with the Word of God, that is, with the speech of God, and his appeal to a
'supplementary' event of revelation, leads to significant problems. His rapid identification
of revelation with the person of Christ rushes too quickly over the linguistic aspects of
revelation, and leaves revelation insufficiently distinguished from both theology and church.
In fact, a permanent identification of Scripture with divine speech need not turn either God
or his speech from an external address into a possession of human cognition.
200 'We have no right, then, to import into the reality ofGod's process of revelation to and among men
any contribution learned from a source of knowledge different from Scripture. In this respect also, we
must realise the adequacy [Suffizienz] of Holy Scripture as the source of our knowledge', (Barth, CD
1/2, 207-208). This affirms the material sufficiency of Scripture; Barth's acceptance of formal
sufficiency - the principle that Scripture is its own interpreter - has been noted above.
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4. Scripture and the Sufficiency of the Text
4.1. Introduction
It is not central to Barth's account of revelation by means of Scripture to inquire to any
great extent what in general a text is, since what is important for him is the divine
transforming of human text into divine Word. This transformation is an event in which
what counts is that the propositional content of the text as human witness, Jesus Christ,
becomes the propositional content of the divine address, and not that the semantic, generic
and literary qualities of the text as a human text themselves be shown to be appropriated for
that divine address.1 The question of what a text is is much more pertinent for the present
proposal, however, for if God's Word is to be permanently identified with the texts of
Scripture, the general hermeneutical question of what a text is, and how it therefore relates
to its author and should be read, cannot be avoided.
The question of textual ontology is a large one; the discussion will be delimited and
focused here by examining different proposals for supplementing, or not supplementing, a
text with an extra-textual entity, in order to account for how texts give rise to meaning. The
first section looks at two 'non-supplementing' accounts, both of which are often said to treat
texts as in some way sufficient, or, more usually, 'self-sufficient'.2 One of these
' Thus John Webster, on a Barthian view of Scripture: 'to talk of the text as an instrument of divine
action is primarily to say something about God, not about the text. ... Here God speaks in a veiled
form, sacramentally. ... The text is 'sacramental' in that God's agency is real and effective and yet
indirect.... God speaks through the intelligible words of this text and acts in, with and under the acts
of the church's reading of it', (John Webster, 'Hermeneutics in Modem Theology: Some Doctrinal
Reflections' Scottish Journal of Theology 51 [1998], 307-41 [330-32]).
2 Some examples of structuralist readings also treat texts as 'self-sufficient' objects. 'Structuralism' as
a whole has been excluded from this section because it is much broader than a theory of texts, being
more like a theory of culture or of cognition; see, e.g., Frederic Jameson's definition of structuralism:
'an explicit search for the permanent structures of the mind itself, the organizational categories and
forms through which the mind is able to experience the world', (quoted in Mark W.G. Stibbe,
'Structuralism', in eds R..J. Coggins & J.L. Houlden, A Dictionary ofBiblical Interpretation [London:
SCM, 1990], 651). Thus, the label 'structuralist' can be applied to writers in quite different fields,
e.g. to Claude Levi-Strauss in anthropology and A.J. Greimas in literary theory. This is evident in the
appropriation of structuralism by some biblical scholars, the most sophisticated of whom take
structuralism as a 'meta-theory'. As such, says one of these writers, 'it makes room for all the
different research agenda that envision meaning as a multi-dimensional and relational meaning-
cffcct', (Daniel Patte, The Religious Dimension ofBiblical Texts. Greimas's Structural Semiotics and
Biblical Exegesis SBL Semeia Studies [Atlanta, Georgia: Scholars Press, 1990], 26-28). Insofar as
'structuralism' covers a set of approaches to texts which elide meaning into effect, illocution into
perlocution, it will be partly critiqued in the discussions of Fish and Hauerwas below. Insofar as
structuralist analysis is, as another biblical scholar says, 'relational in the most fundamental sense' -
'[n]ot only must we know what is said, but who said it and in what context it was said' - such that
structuralism 'is nothing else than the semiotics of knowledge', (Robert M. Polzin, Biblical
Structuralism. Method and Subjectivity in the Study of Ancient Texts [Philadelphia, Pennsylvania:
Fortress Press/ Missoula, Montana: Scholars Press, 1977], 33-34), we suggest speech-act theory as a
complementary or more profound description of the relationality of language-use. Insofar as
'structuralism' refers not to this meta-level but to the application to texts of formalist reading-
approaches, New Criticism, comes from the field of literary theory; the other is the
application of a basically formalist approach to Scripture by the theologian Hans Frei. The
question addressed will be whether these approaches provide a model of the nature of a text
which may be usefully appropriated for the formulation of a doctrine of the sufficiency of
Scripture. Since the term 'sufficiency' is regularly used to describe the view of both these
approaches to the text, they will be discussed in some detail.
Subsequent sections of this chapter will look at attempts to locate the text in relation to,
first, authors, and then readers. In dealing with these topics we will face some of the most
serious objections to the claim that a text could be said in any way to be sufficient for
anything - that is, those coming from post-structuralist and deconstructive positions. The
response to these objections will take the form of a fairly long section analysing the work of
Stephen D. Moore, a biblical critic who, probably better than any other writer on the Bible,
understands contemporary literary theory and puts it into effective practice in his readings
of biblical texts. The discussion of Moore is justified by the fact that deconstruction is
precisely not another hermeneutical implement for inclusion in the literary critic's tool-box;
its basic positions are best observed in practice - and therefore criticism of it which arises
out of such observation may hope to avoid being simplistic.
Indeed, it is out of the details of our response to Moore, and thereby in part to Derrida,
that specifically ethical questions will arise. It will already be clear that the basic
conceptualities of speech-act theory, supplemented by Wolterstorff s notion of 'normative
standing', will inform our analysis of these various positions on textual ontology. This
chapter thus argues for a realist conception of a text, in that the illocutionary act performed
by means of a text exists independent of any act of reading; moreover, it will be suggested,
texts, when conceived of this way, place certain ethical restraints on readerly activity.
The final section moves the discussion from general to special hermeneutics, drawing
conclusions about how God's act of authoring a text may be conceived of, in light of the
earlier discussions. The nature of the strong links between text and reality which have been
established will point the way to an understanding of the sufficiency of Scripture which, it
will be argued, is different in significant respects from models of textual 'self-sufficiency'.
Finally, by means of a discussion of the 'supplementary' role played by the Holy Spirit in
relation to Scripture, it will be possible to suggest an answer to the question, 'If Scripture is
sufficient, for what and for whom is it sufficient?' This will represent a description of the
sufficiency of Scripture cast in terms of the account of Scripture as the speech-act of God
offered at the end of chapter 3.
practices, it is partly implicitly critiqued in the following discussion of the formalist tendencies of
New Criticism and Hans Frei.
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4.2. Models of Textual 'Self-Sufficiency'
4.2.1. New Criticism: The Self-Sufficiency ofLiterature
The broad and fairly short-lived movement in literary criticism known as New Criticism,
which arose primarily in the United States in the 1940s and 50s, is often characterised as
promoting texts as self-sufficient meaningful objects. The question of possible links
between this critical movement and the doctrine of the sufficiency of Scripture therefore
naturally arises. Although the actual duration of the hegemony of explicitly New Critical
ideas was short, its influence is often argued to have lasted long beyond the apparent demise
of the movement.3 It has been suggested as an influence on the biblical scholar B.S. Childs,4
whose 'canonical approach' to biblical studies bears prima facie similarities to the approach
to the Bible defended in this thesis, and which will therefore be examined in chapter 5.
In fact, New Criticism exhibits a variety of critical concerns, and many subsequent
writers affirm the difficulty of defining precisely the label 'New Critic', since the different
scholars to whom it has been ascribed certainly did not represent, or see themselves as
representing, a homogeneous movement.5 Nevertheless, an identifiable core of emphases is
shared by most of those labelled 'New Critics':
Though hardly homogeneous, the group is generally associated with the
doctrines of the text's objectivity, its self-sufficiency and 'organic unity'; with
a formalist, 'intrinsic' approach to the text; with a resistance to paraphrase and
to the separation of form and content; and above all with the technique of
'close reading' - a mode of exegesis that pays scrupulous attention to the rich
complexity of textual meaning rendered through the rhetorical devices of irony,
ambiguity and paradox.6
Debates over these issues were initially focused around authorial intention, the catalyst
for which was W.K. Wimsatt and Monroe Beardsley's well-known essay of 1946, 'The
Intentional Fallacy'.7 Although New Criticism is widely perceived as slipping rapidly into
disrepute from around the mid-1950s onwards,8 questions of intentionality raised by
Wimsatt and Beardslcy rumbled on in the years following its publication.9
3 This claim forms the basis of Frank Lentricchia's sharp analysis of a variety of American literary
theorists: Frank Lentricchia, After the New Criticism (London: Athlone Press, 1980).
4 John Barton, Reading the Old Testament. Method in Biblical Study (London: Darton, Longman &
Todd, 1984), 141-42.
5 See Murray Krieger, The New Apologists for Poetry (Minneapolis: Univ. of Minnesota Press, 1956),
3-5.
6 Elizabeth Freund, The Return of the Reader. Reader-Response Criticism (London & New York:
Methuen, 1987), 40-41.
7 First published in Sewanee Review (1946), repr. in W.K. Wimsatt, The Verbal Icon. Studies in the
Meaning ofPoetry (London: Methuen, 1970), 3-18.
8 Lentricchia identifies the beginning of the end of New Criticism's hegemony as the publication of
Northrop Frye's Anatomy ofCriticism in 1957, (Lentricchia, After the New Criticism, 7).
9 A collection of essays devoted to intentionality in literature published thirty years after Wimsatt and
Beardsley's article is still greatly concerned with issues which they had raised, (ed. David Newton-de
Molina, On Literary Intention [Edinburgh: Edinburgh Univ. Press, 1976]). Most essays in this
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'The Intentional Fallacy' states rather than argues for its conclusions. Nevertheless,
Wimsatt and Beardsley, along with other New Critics, particularly Rene Wellek and Austin
Warren in their text-book Theory of Literature,10 followed up with more systematic
arguments in favour of their critical stance. The primary argument was against
Romanticism and its critical descendants. In such critical approaches the text11 is seen as a
window into the mind and soul of artists whose extraordinary insight into the world allows
lesser mortals to lift their eyes occasionally from the pettiness of everyday life; Terry
Eagleton calls this 'the Great Man theory of literature'.12 For the interpretation of poems it
was therefore vital to know as much as possible about the writer's intention in writing, and
so great store was placed on what could be reconstructed about his life, character and
especially his intentions for a particular work, from diaries, private letters, and so on. A
poem meant what the author said he wanted it to mean. This approach was characterised by
New Critics as 'historicism' - the original historical meaning governs all - and as
'psychologism' - literary study is reduced to a vehicle for investigating supposedly
superior literary souls and minds. Wimsatt, painting with a very broad brush, divides critics
into two kinds: those interested in the literary work itself and those more interested in the
culture or mind of the artist.13
New Critics did not somehow try and avoid all knowledge of the author, if such a thing
were even possible, as intrinsically irrelevant or misleading in literary interpretation. They
acknowledged that knowledge of the historical background in which a work was written had
in practice shed much exegetical light on texts produced in different ages from our own,14
and that, when a writer was still living, critics had much to gain from 'the advantages we
have in knowing the setting and the time and in the opportunities for personal acquaintance
and interrogation or at least correspondence [with the author]'.15 Such knowledge was
particularly fruitful for New Critics in the limited area of 'explaining] a great many
allusions or even words in an author's work', in order to avoid the danger of ignoring
semantic changes over time. Nevertheless, the conclusion remained that 'it is dangerous to
ascribe to it [background information] any real critical importance'.16 That 'real critical
volume are critical ofNew Criticism, but it also contains a spirited and unrepentant contribution from
Wimsatt.
10 Rene Wellek & Austin Warren, Theory ofLiterature (London: Jonathan Cape, 1949).
11 Wimsatt and Beardsley tend to speak of 'poems' rather than 'texts'. It seems that they mean by this
any work of literary art, although most of the New Critics' practical critical attention was actually
focused on poems.
12
Terry Eagleton, Literary Theory. An Introduction (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983), 47-48.
13 W.K. Wimsatt, 'Genesis: A Fallacy Revisited', in ed. Newton-de Molina, On Literary Intention,
116-38 (117).
14 Wellek & Warren, Theory ofLiterature, 65.
15 Wellek & Warren, Theory ofLiterature, 36.
16 Wellek & Warren, Theory ofLiterature, 73-74.
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importance' may not be granted to knowledge of the author's intention meant that it could
have no significant role in guiding or controlling the interpreter's view of the overall
meaning of a work. In a much-quoted sentence, Wimsatt and Beardsley express this in the
following way: 'The design or intention of the author is neither available nor desirable as a
standard forjudging the success of a work of literary art'.17
Later discussion, with contributions by Wimsatt, especially, has clarified what they
meant by this. (Whether or not this fact represents a performative contradiction of their
original argument remains debatable). The rejection of '[t]he design or intention of the
author' clearly does not apply, as we have seen, to low-level verbal or metaphorical
meanings. Nor does it preclude the possibility or necessity for interpretation of
reconstructing an author's intention from the text itself.18 Wimsatt and Beardsley's
argument is therefore, to quote Frank Cioffi's restatement of their point, that 'biographical
data about an author, particularly concerning his artistic intentions is not desirable [in
interpretation]'.19 Writing in the same volume, thirty years on from 'The Intentional
Fallacy', Wimsatt himself admits only one change ofwording to clarify his and Beardsley's
original intention:
What we meant in 1946, and what in effect we managed to say, was that the
closest one could ever get to the author's intending or meaning mind, outside
his work, would be still short of his effective intention or operative mind as it
appears in the work itself and can be read from the work. ... The statement in
our essay of 1946 should certainly have read: "The design or intention of the
author is neither available nor desirable as a standard for judging the meaning
or value [cf. original 'success'] of a work of literary art".20
Two reasons for the adoption of this position may be identified, one practical and one
theoretical. Practically, New Critics felt that to make an unattainable historical intention
both the primary goal of the interpretation of a work and the chief critical standard for
judging it was to deny our present experience of the meaning of poetry written in past ages.
We are cut off from an author's private intention both by the fact that it is private to him and
therefore internal, and by its temporal distance from us, yet we still find that old poems
speak to us:
The search for the author's generative intention as context of the poem is a
search for a temporal moment which must, as the author and the poem live on,
recede and ever recede into the forgotten, as all moments do. Poems, on this
theory of their meaning, must always steadily grow less and less correctly
knowable; they must dwindle in meaning and being toward a vanishing point.
The best known and most valuable poem must be that written but a moment
ago - and its best or only possible audience must be the author. But poems we
17 Wimsatt & Beardsley, 'The Intentional Fallacy', 3.
18 See Barton, Reading the Old Testament, 149-50.
19 Frank Cioffi, 'Intention and Interpretation in Criticism', in ed. Newton-de Molina, On Literary
Intention, 55-73 (58).
20 Wimsatt, 'Genesis', 136.
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know are not really like that. ... Shakespeare has more meaning and value now
than he had in his own day.21
Behind this empirical point lies a more fundamental theoretical concern, as the concern
for the 'meaning and value' of literature for today evident in the last sentence of the above
citation reveals. New Critics wanted poetry to be restored to a position where it could once
again exert a profound and civilising effect on society. Responding to what they felt was
the repudiation of literature by science, they argued that literature does have cognitive
value, giving rise to genuine knowledge - to a special kind of literary knowledge whose
truth corresponds to universal human experience, and which is therefore itself universal.22
In order not to be devalued, literature must be set in its own particular interpretive context.
The techniques of close textual analysis were designed to reveal a richness and complexity
in literary works which would demonstrate that a literary work is not just an occasion for
'pleasurable excitement' or political propagandising; that it has real significance; and that
it is 'more than a datum in the history of ideas or the life of the author.'23
Typically, New Critics came from the southern United States, and supported its
agrarian traditions against the increasingly powerful technocracy in the north. They
bemoaned what they saw as the disintegration of the ordered world under the impact of
science and scepticism, beginning in the seventeenth century.24 The Marxist critic Terry
Eagleton does not like the ideological attitude towards the world which New Critics tried to
inculcate, finding it to be 'one, roughly, of contemplative acceptance'; Eagleton
acknowledges, though, that in their own way the New Critics did not wish to separate
literature from life, but were committed to locating it in the world.25
The New Critics thus wanted poetry to be in the world but not of it. Wellek says of the
New Critic Allen Tate that he always saw poetry as within history;26 yet New Critics
strongly resisted any move which they thought reduced poetry to something else. This is
the reason behind Cleanth Brooks' rejection of what he calls 'the heresy of paraphrase'.27 It
21 Wimsatt, 'Genesis', 138.
22 'What we cannot know constitutionally as scientists is the world which is made of whole and
indefeasible objects, and this is the world which poetry recovers for us', (John Crowe Ransom, The
World's Body [London: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1938], x-xi).
23 Gerald Graff, 'What Was New Criticism?', in Graff, Literature Against Itself. Literary Ideas in
Modern Society (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1979), 129-49 (141). In this, at least, according to
Lynn Poland, the New Critics were the heirs of the Romantic hermeneutics of Schleiermacher and
Dilthey, for whom literature was the last source of revelation, 'the expression and embodiment of
freedom, order, and value', (Lynn M. Poland, 'The New Criticism, Neoorthodoxy and the New
Testament' Journal ofReligion 65 [1985], 459-77 [461-62]).
24 Rene Wellek, 'The New Criticism: Pro and Contra' Critical Inquiiy 4 (1978), 611-24 (616).
25 Eagleton, Literary Theory, 47.
26 Wellek, 'The New Criticism', 616.
27 'Most of the distempers of criticism come from yielding to the temptation to take certain remarks
which we make about the poem - statements about what it says or about what truth it gives or about
what formulations it illustrates - for the essential core of the poem itself, (Cleanth Brooks, 'The
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also explains why New Critics rejected the inclusion of what they sometimes called
'personal elements' in interpretation. Too great a focus on the intention of the author, as in
Romanticism, reduces the text either to biography or to psychology. The exegetical value of
such studies is not to be denied, but literary criticism which stops at that point is stunted
with respect to its object: 'causal study can never dispose of problems of description,
analysis, and evaluation of an object such as a work of literary art.'28 Similarly, any
identification of the meaning of a literary text with the experience of a reader leads to 'the
absurd conclusion that a poem is non-existent unless experienced and that it is recreated in
every experience. ... We end in complete skepticism and anarchy.'29
In sum, the New Critics tried to steer a course between objectivism and subjectivism:
literature is related to us and to our world, but always rises above it. Our experience of a
poem provides real but only ever partial knowledge of it: 'the real poem must be conceived
as a structure of norms, realized only partially in the actual experience of its many readers.
Every single experience (reading, reciting, and so forth) is only an attempt - more or less
successful and complete - to grasp this set of norms or standards.'30
The criterion of the success of the New Critical enterprise is whether it can make
coherent this particular location of and role for literature: can a poem be other, irreducible
to something else without serious loss, while also linked intelligibly to the world - that is,
to its author, referents and readers? That this is possible is, mutatis mutandis, what the
present work attempts to argue in the case of Scripture. Murray Krieger expresses the size
of the challenge which New Critics set themselves: 'They had somehow to assert at once
the autonomy of art and its unique power to give meaning to our experience, a power
allowed only by its autonomy. This is a highly significant, if difficult, assertion.'31 It will
therefore be profitable to pay particular attention to the evaluation of New Criticism's
ability to make good on this claim.
It should be noted, first, that several of the criticisms often levelled at New Criticism
are quite superficial. Rene Wellek lists three of the most frequently made criticisms, and
argues that they are all baseless.32 First, New Criticism is often accused of formalism,
Heresy of Paraphrase', in Brooks, The Well Wrought Urn. Studies in the Structure ofPoetry [London:
Methuen, 1968], 157-75 [162-63])'.
28 Wellek & Warren, Theory ofLiterature, 65. There is a notable similarity between this and Barth's
rejection of Jtilicher's exegesis of Romans, in his preface to the 2nd ed. of his Romans commentary,
(Karl Barth, The Epistle to the Romans trans. Edwyn C. Hoskyns [London: Oxford Univ. Press,
1933], 6ff.). For some insightful observations on the relationship between New Criticism and neo-
orthodoxy, see Poland, 'The New Criticism'.
29 Wellek & Warren, Theory ofLiterature, 146.
30 Wellek & Warren, Theoiy ofLiterature, 151.
31
Krieger, The New Apologistsfor Poetry, 5.
32 Wellek in fact lists a fourth - that New Criticism was merely a pedagogical device to help
American university students who have to read poetry - but this lies beyond our concerns here, and
Wellek does not rebut it directly, (Wellek, 'The New Criticism', 611).
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indulging in an 'esoteric aestheticism' which is uninterested in social function. It is
charged, second, with an anti-historical bias which isolates works from their past and
context, and, third, with attempting to make literary criticism a scientific enterprise. In
response to the first two criticisms, Wellek points out that Cleanth Brooks' interpretations of
seventeenth-century poems make full use of the work of lexicographers and historians, and
that New Critics had a philosophy of history, 'a total historical scheme', in light of which
they offered a reinterpretation of the whole of English poetry. Wellek calls the third
criticism 'preposterous'. The New Critics' interpretation of Western history in fact placed
much of the blame for the destruction of 'the community ofman' on science - and '[n]one
of the New Critics has any sympathy for the mechanistic technological views of the Russian
formalists.' Where New Critics insisted that criticism should be a systematic and rational
discipline, they did not mean 'a modern value-free social science, for they always stressed
the necessity of judgment, the qualitative experience poetry gives us. ... [Cjriticism is
always subordinated to creation. Its humility contrasts precisely with the aggressions, the
impositions of science.'33 Gerald Graff agrees: the New Critical technique of 'close
reading' was, he says, 'designed not to imitate science but to refute its devaluation of
literature'.34 Wellek's conclusion is worth quoting at length:
The New Criticism surely argues from a sound premise, that no coherent body
of knowledge can be established unless it defines its object, which to the New
Critic will be the individual work of art clearly set off from its antecedents in
the mind of the author or in the social situation, as well as from its effect in
society. The object of literary study is conceived not as an arbitrary construct
but as a structure of norms which prescribes a right response. This structure
need not be conceived of as static or spatial in any literal sense, though terms
such as the well-wrought urn, or Joseph Frank's spatial form, or Wimsatt's
verbal icon suggest such a misinterpretation. All these metaphors aim at a
genuine insight: although the process of reading is inevitably temporal in
criticism, we must try to see a work as a totality, a configuration, a gestalt, a
whole.35
This is a reasonable point; New Criticism is committed to the realist view of texts
which, it will be argued below in reference to Stanley Fish and Stanley Hauerwas, is
essential if solipsism is to be avoided. It is also committed to distinguishing the meaning of
a text from its perlocutionary effect, and from some mental intention of its author.
However, the New Critics' regular preference for static and spatial metaphors cannot be so
easily excused. Some New Critics make statements which lead one to be sympathetic with
the kind of misunderstandings which Wellek, nevertheless with some merit, rejects. In his
later defence of 'The Intentional Fallacy', Wimsatt asserts: 'The poem conceived as a thing
in between the poet and the audience is of course an abstraction. The poem is an act. The
33 Wellek, 'The New Criticism', 615-19.
34 Graff, 'What Was New Criticism?', 133.
35 Wellek, 'The New Criticism', 620.
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only substantive entities are the poet and the audience. But if we are to lay hold of the
poetic act to comprehend and evaluate it, and if it is to pass current as a critical object, it
must be hypostatized.'36
If the poem is in fact an act, while what is studied is a hypostatised form of that act, one
may wonder whether the criticism which Wimsatt advocates is in fact literary criticism at
all, for the object of its work of comprehending and evaluating is not the poem, but an
object to which the poem bears some unspecified relation: the relation, broadly, of an act to
an object. Wimsatt seems, ironically, to have committed the capital offence in New Critical
eyes of reducing a poem to something else. It seems that some violence has been done here
to the nature of poetry in the service of a literary criticism which prizes scientific objectivity
above all else; a statement that begins in basic agreement with speech-act theory, defining
poems as acts, ends in opposition to it.
This suggests that Wellek's attempt to get New Critics off the hook is a little naive.
Referring to the work of the New Critic Cleanth Brooks, he asserts that the stress on 'close
reading' and the rejection of 'the heresy of paraphrase' 'cannot mean a lack of relation to
reality or a simple entrapment in language', since for New Critics poetry 'is turned to the
world', and like everything else human, 'cannot be absolute or pure.' Wellek concludes that
it is a false dilemma to imagine that a poem characterised by 'coherence and integrity'
cannot point to the outside world, for it is in '[t]he very nature of words' to point in such a
way.37 Although perhaps a false dilemma, it is certainly a prima facie dilemma, and how it
is to be resolved Wellek does not say; he appeals to 'the very nature of words', without
telling us what that nature might be.
New Critics wanted to assert both the autonomy of the work of art and its relation to
reality; both are appropriate concerns, but they lacked the conceptual apparatus to describe
how it might be possible. Thus, Lentricchia says of the New Critical claim that 'literature
gives a "special kind of knowledge" of nonliterary, nonlinguistic phenomena', that 'the New
Critic cannot justify that claim, and probably is trapped in an aestheticism of his own'.38
Similarly, Graff concludes that New Critics sometimes contradicted themselves on this
point. Quoting from Brooks, he asks how literary truth can correspond to the outside world,
corresponding with "the facts of experience", if the critic may not go "outside the poem":
'In short, the doctrine of the objectivity of literature was ambiguous: it might be invoked in
order to close the work off from the objective world or to point the work back towards this
world.'39 The results of this unresolved ambiguity are ironic: by often ending up in a
36 Wimsatt, The Verbal Icon, xvii.
37 Wellek, 'The New Criticism', 617.
38 Lentricchia, After the New Criticism, 18.
39 Graff, 'What Was New Criticism?', 142.
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position approaching 'art for art's sake', contrary to their intentions, the New Critics
developed a view of literary texts as self-sufficient aesthetic objects. Such a view, although
designed 'to combat the fragmentation of a presumably hyperrational society, ... only
deepens the divisions of modern culture.'40 As a conclusion regarding New Criticism's
actual success, that is a fair judgment. However, Wellek rightly locates their intention in
broader and continuing discussions: 'The humanities would surely abdicate their function
in society if they surrendered to a neutral scientism and indifferent relativism or if they
succumbed to the imposition of alien norms required by political indoctrination.
Particularly on these two fronts the New Critics have waged a valiant fight which, I am
afraid, must be fought over again in the future.'41
Thus, it seems that the present work has a great deal in sympathy with New Critical
intentions, but can find little material of positive constructive benefit in its formulations.
However, the process of identifying its most serious weakness is instructive. Wellek papers
over the cracks by saying that it is 'the nature of words' which gives a literary work the
paradoxical characteristics of 'coherence and integrity' and the ability to point away from
itself to the objective world. Speech-act theory provides, we have suggested, a powerful
description of 'the nature of words' in relation to speakers, hearers and referents. 'Human
beings ... refer; words do not', as Morse Peckham says in his response to 'The Intentional
Fallacy'.42 In other words, New Critics, while not doing away with human subjectivity, do
not take sufficient account of human agency. Finding the only model of human agency in
literature available to them, Romantic criticism, to be unacceptable, they were unable to
articulate a coherent ontology of the literary work on which to ground their different claims
for the role of literature.43
Peckham draws an interesting comparison between New Critics' understanding of the
nature of a literary work and Roman Catholic sacramental theology. Expanding on Wimsatt
and Beardsley's notion that a poem is embodied in language, he observes that
40 Graff, 'What Was New Criticism?', 147.
41 Wellek, 'The New Criticism', 624. There is, however, also a cautionary note to be sounded here, in
that some New Critics might themselves have had a political agenda which they tried to impose on
literature. Eagleton suggests that they saw poetry as 'the final solution to science, materialism, and
the decline of the 'aesthetic' slave-owning South', (Eagleton, Literary Theory, 49). Nevertheless,
their apparent aim that literature never be rendered fully subservient to political ideology holds out the
possibility that any a priori political agenda is open to correction in the process of reading and
criticism.
42 Morse Peckham, 'The Intentional? Fallacy?', in ed. Newton-de Molina, On Literary Intention, 139-
57(146).
43 See Anthony Thiselton's observation that New Critics 'were addressing a pre-Wittgensteinian
notion of intention as inner mental processes. H.P. Grice, John Searle and others have since argued
that what an utterance means is explicable in terms of what a person means by his or her utterance. ...
There are ways of expressing intention which identify the directedness of a speech act without
presupposing some psychological notion of "inner mental states'", (Anthony C. Thiselton, New
Horizons in Hermeneutics [London: HarperCollins, 1992], 59).
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[t]he notion of something suprasensible being embodied in something sensible
- for both written and spoken words are phenomenal and sensible - has an
irresistibly transcendental ring about it. ... Now anyone familiar with Christian
doctrine can recognize this embodiment thesis as structurally identical with the
theory of transubstantiation. ... A suprasensible quality, poetry, is embodied in
a sensible quality, language, and the result is a unique category of language,
which requires a unique kind of interpretation.44
New Critics have, according to Peckham, created a 'doctrine of semantic real presence'.45
In light of the previous chapter's use of speech-act theory to describe God's speaking
activity, 'semantic real presence' may perhaps be conceived of in relation to Word, rather
than, or in addition to, to sacrament.46 The concluding sections of this chapter will articulate
the sufficiency of Scripture in relation to what may be called divine semantic presence.
4.2.2. Hans Frei: The 'Hyper-Sufficiency' ofScripture
Hans Frei is sometimes said to borrow heavily from New Critical convictions and practices,
and to offer a strong description of Scripture as sufficient.47 What this section aims to show
is that Frei's appropriation of New Criticism was not sophisticated enough, since he
advocated reading practices that were more formalist than those of the New Critics, (given
our partial acceptance of Wellek's defence of New Critics as not truly formalists), and that
his particular conception of Scripture as an autonomous object, sufficiently able to render
the identity of Jesus Christ, advocates a 'hyper-sufficiency', going beyond what the
Reformers and their successors ever meant by 'the sufficiency of Scripture' to such an
extent that his theology encounters serious problems. Nonetheless, Frei's work is often
rightly praised for its imaginative innovations. It is equally true that some of his writing is,
as Nicholas Wolterstorff says, difficult and obscure; Wolterstorff judges that Frei never
found 'a satisfactory set of concepts' for what he wanted to say.48
Frei's most typical and oft-repeated point is that the character of Jesus Christ as
portrayed in the (Synoptic) Gospels is unsubstitutable: the Messiah of Israel and Saviour of
the world is none other than Jesus ofNazareth, narratively rendered especially in the Gospel
accounts of his passion and resurrection. The Gospels, unlike the Gnostic redeemer-myths
which were roughly contemporary with them, do not describe some 'everyman' character;
the identity of Jesus Christ is irreducible to something else. This is what Frei means when
he describes the Gospels' passion and resurrection narratives as 'history-like': he implies
44 Peckham, 'The Intentional? Fallacy?', 143-44.
45 Peckham, 'The Intentional? Fallacy?', 145.
46 Two recent attempts to rethink God's presence by rehabilitating pre-critical theologies of Word and
sacrament were referred to briefly in chapter 1.
47 E.g., Poland, 'The New Criticism', 459.
48 Nicholas Wolterstorff, 'Will Narrativity Work as Linchpin? Reflections on the Hermeneutic of
Hans Frei', in ed. Charles M. Lewis, Relativism and Religion (Basingstoke & London: Macmillan,
1995), 71-107 (73).
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no particular historical claim, but firmly excludes myth as a legitimate category for
understanding the story of Jesus Christ. This represents an ingenious argument against
nineteenth-century interpretations of the Gospels as myths, which offers not the
conservative external and historical objection that the events depicted in the Gospels really
did happen as reported there, but instead the internal and literary objection that the
narratives are not susceptible to mythological interpretation anyway, since, unlike
mythological texts, the central Saviour-figure functions as a character with unsubstitutable
identity. Those whom Frei calls 'mythophiles' are therefore not so much wrong in under¬
estimating the extent to which Scripture in fact refers accurately to history; they have rather
made a fundamental mistake of genre-recognition.
In his detailed work The Eclipse ofBiblical Narrative, Frei offered an interpretation of
the history ofWestern European hermeneutics in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, in
which he argued that the pre-critical view held the meaning of the Gospel narratives to be
simply their literal sense, but that this conviction was lost in the wake of the introduction of
'a logical distinction and a reflective distance between the stories and the "reality" they
depict', with the result that in the eighteenth century 'the sense of ... a passage came to
depend on the estimate of its historical claims, character, and origin.'49 This shift affected
the reading practices of both orthodox (Frei mentions Cocceius and Bengel) and sceptic (for
example, Spinoza), the only difference between them being the extent to which they thought
that the depiction corresponded to historical reality.50 Thus, according to Frei, to locate the
meaning of the Gospel narratives in the events which they depict, assuming them to be real,
or to locate it in the religious consciousness, assuming it to be unreflectively mythologising,
which produced the texts, are identical moves, both of which bring about 'the eclipse of
biblical narrative'. His most regularly repeated conception of this 'eclipse' was of a turn
from seeing the literal sense of the narratives as their meaning to equating meaning with
reference.51
Commentators often find themselves using the term 'sufficiency' to describe Frei's
concept of Scripture - although Frei rarely uses the term for himself. James Fodor says
that for Frei, 'biblical narrative features a sort of internal referent in so far as it creates its
own world. Moreover, this textual world of the Bible is not only the necessary basis for our
orientation within the real world, but is also sufficient for that purpose.'52 For Frei,
49 Hans W. Frei, The Eclipse of Biblical Narrative. A Study in Eighteenth and Nineteenth Century
Hermeneutics (New Haven & London: Yale Univ. Press, 1974), 5, 41.
50 Frei, Eclipse, 5.
51 Frei says that in the eighteenth-century debate between Deists and orthodox over Old Testament
prophecy, 'the meaning of the earlier texts is their reference. ... [TJheir meaning is determined by
their reference or failure to refer beyond themselves to certain events', (Frei, Eclipse, 41).
52 James Fodor, Christian Hermeneutics. Paul Ricoeur and the Refiguring of Theology (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1995), 268.
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everything happens within the text: the meaning lies neither behind the text in some
referent, nor in front of it in some fusion between the text and reader, but inside it. The
textually-rendered Jesus Christ is therefore rendered as a sufficient hermeneutical basis for
theology and Christian life: 'We must neither look for his identity in back of the story nor
supply it from extraneous analytic schemes. ... No. He is what he appeared to be - the
Savior Jesus from Nazareth who underwent "all these things" and who is truly manifest as
Jesus, the risen Christ. Such, it appears, is the story of Jesus in the Gospels.'53
At least in this citation, Frei's view of Scripture appears very similar to that expressed
by the confession of Scripture as materially sufficient. However, a problem arises that has
regularly been identified in the theology of Frei and his Yale colleagues.54 It will be argued
that Frei has severed the links between Scripture, on the one hand, and its author(s), (both
human and divine), its readers, and its historical referents, on the other, thereby establishing
such a profound autonomy, or self-sufficiency, of Scripture, that it becomes unclear how the
theology which he wishes to build on this basis can come to touch reality.
Frei's position on historical reference seems to be that the Gospel narratives become
more historically reliable as their accounts of events move towards the passion and
resurrection. He makes the general comment that, '[ajbout certain events reported in the
Gospels we are almost bound to ask, Did they actually take place?', but suggests that, before
the passion and resurrection accounts, this is an irrelevant question in the sense that 'the
meaning of these texts would remain the same, partially stylized and representative and
partially-focused on the history-like individual, whether or not they are historical.'55 This is
in contrast to the final stages of the story; at the beginning, Jesus' identity is defined for
him by the traditions of Jewish Messianic expectation, but by the end he enters into his
unsubstitutable identity, redefining those traditions by his own being and actions. The
question of historicity surfaces most pointedly with the singular event of the resurrection.
Myths, says Frei, do not lead us to ask the question, 'did this happen?', but the very
singularity of Jesus' identity in the resurrection forces us to ask the question.56 Thus,
although Frei says that the history-likeness of a narrative implies nothing about its
historicity, it does seem that the more un-mythical a narrative is, the more the text forces the
question of factuality on us. This is further borne out by another conclusion which he
draws: ' if the Gospel story is to function religiously in a way that is at once historical and
53 Hans W. Frei, The Identity of Jesus Christ. The Hermeneutical Bases of Dogmatic Theology
(Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1975), 138.
54 See e.g. Gary Comstock, 'Two Types of Narrative Theology' Journal of the American Academy of
Religion 55 (1987) 687-717.
55 Frei, Identity, 132.
56 Frei, Identity, 140.
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Christological, the central focus will have to be on the history-like narration of the final
sequence, rather than on Jesus' sayings in the preaching pericopes.'57
A confusion in Frei's work arises here, in that he immediately undercuts the point he
has just made, suggesting that, although there are points in the narrative where the
individual becomes more clearly accessible to us ('life-likeness to the point of intimate
knowledge of the depicted individual'), it may well be that the more enigmatic episodes,
(Frei cites the cursing of a fig tree in Mark 11.12ff. as an example), 'are much more nearly
reliable historical reports.'58 Is 'life-likeness' synonymous with 'history-likeness'? Perhaps
not. Would Frei categorise the resurrection as 'history-like' but not 'life-like' - an
'enigmatic' episode? It is hard to say. Yet his view of the resurrection does seem to depend
on it being the climactic because most accessible element in Jesus' enactment of his
identity. It is very difficult to systematise Frei's work coherently at this point; it certainly
seems that he is confused about the criteria for historicity in the Gospel narratives.59
What is evident is Frei's opinion that Christians should regard the resurrection as a
historical 'extra-literary' event. He says early on in The Identity ofJesus Christ that Christ
is present to the church now as the one who lived and died in Nazareth and Jerusalem
because he was raised from the dead: 'His having been raised from the dead is not his
presence now, but is the necessary local basis for his presence.'60 The matter becomes more
complex when we ask why this basis, in its particularity ('local-ness'), is a necessary basis
for the presence of Christ now. Frei is always keen not to ground Christian faith in events
which are open to historical investigation, which would lead to attempts to evaluate the
historical reliability of the Gospels.61 He therefore argues, from what he sees to be 'the
logic of ... faith', that believers must affirm that the New Testament writers were correct in
affirming that 'it is more nearly correct' to think of Jesus raised physically than in any other
way. This keeps Christian faith from basing itself on a claim about the relationship of
Scripture to history: 'belief in Jesus' resurrection is more nearly a belief in something like
the inspired quality of the accounts than in the theory that they reflect what "actually took
place.'"62 What is 'the logic of faith' that leads to this position? Frei means by this to
57 Frei, Identity, 140-41.
58 Frei, Identity, 140-41.
59 '[Wjhen, at the end of The Identity of Jesus Christ, Frei suddenly asserts that the fundamental
truthfulness of the resurrection narratives is actually very important, he has no conceptuality available
for making this assertion plausible and is reduced to gnomic utterances about the mysteriousness of
faith', (Francis Watson, Text, Church and World. Biblical Interpretation in Theological Perspective
[Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1994], 224).
60 Frei, Identity, 16.
61 Frei, Identity, 51.
62 Frei, Identity, 150-52.
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propose something like a literary version of the ontological argument for the existence of
God:
This, then, is the identity of Jesus Christ. He is the man from Nazareth who
redeemed men by his helplessness, in perfect obedience enacting their good in
their behalf. As that same one he was raised from the dead and manifested to
be the redeemer. As that same one, Jesus the redeemer, he cannot not live, and
to conceive of him as not living is to misunderstand who he is.63
This quotation may serve as a good starting-point for trying to unravel some of the
threads of Frei's complex text. Wolterstorff says of this argument that 'Frei's Anselmian
language has led him into confusion', and offers an illustration of his point. If in a work
which we knew to be a novel there were a character who had the essential property that he
would be resurrected if killed, the question of factuality would not arise, as Frei says it does
with the character of Christ in the Gospels. This is so, says Wolterstorff, because ' [s]tories
qua stories, no matter how realistic, do not invite the question of factuality' - rather, what
raises that question 'is one's belief that the story has been presented as (in part, at least) a
true description of someone'.64 Frei did in fact anticipate something very like this objection,
casting his response as a reductio ad absurdum:
Someone may reply that in that case the most perfectly depicted character and
most nearly lifelike fictional identity ought always in fact to have lived a
factual historical life. We answer [Frei is here hypothesising how the Synoptic
Evangelists might have summarised their position] that the argument holds
good only in this one and absolutely unique case, where the described entity
(who or what he is, i.e., Jesus Christ, the presence of God) is totally identical
with his factual existence. He is the resurrection and the life. How can he be
conceived as not resurrected?65
Wolterstorff would presumably respond that this re-formulates his point without
answering it: on what basis do we say that these texts are unique in precisely this way? Frei
regularly describes his prescribed method of reading the Gospels as privileging the literal
sense, but when we need an argument explaining why we should not ignore the literal sense,
says Wolterstorff, 'Frei begs off - or gives the impression of begging off.' He does want to
intervene in the Christian practice of reading Scripture, but he wants to ground his plea not
in hermeneutical theory but in 'religious utility. ... Yet he is remarkably chary of stating
what he thinks that religious utility to be.'66 This is an accurate criticism, echoed by other
writers. Gary Comstock compares Frei unfavourably with Ricoeur on this point, saying that
whereas Frei thinks it sufficient to say that the biblical narratives are meaningful, Ricoeur
wants additionally to show that Christians can say that they are true.61 If Christians claim to
63 Frei, Identity, 149.
64 Wolterstorff, 'Will Narrativity Work', 98.
65 Frei, Identity, 145-46.
66 Wolterstorff, 'Will Narrativity Work', 96-97.
67 Gary Comstock, 'Truth or Meaning: Ricoeur versus Frei on Biblical Narrative' Journal ofReligion
66(1986), 117-40(117-18).
114
have a meta-narrative, as Frei would agree they do, 'then we must accept responsibility for
showing not only how one ought to understand the claim, but why it should be affirmed.'68
Wolterstorff goes to the heart of the problem from a literary angle by pointing out a
problem with Frei's understanding of the 'literal sense' of Scripture, and of how a reader
reading for this sense may arrive at it. Frei wants us to isolate the discerning of the
propositional content of the literal sense of the Gospels as the first stage of Bible-reading,
not allowing 'our judgments as to the propositional content of the literal sense of the
Gospels to be influenced by our views as to the truth or falsehood, utility or inutility, of that
content'.69 Wolterstorff makes two objections to this. First, it does not work 'as a general
policy': we regularly conclude that a statement in a text is to be taken metaphorically, for
example, because we decide that the words, if taken literally, would yield a falsehood which
the writer would not have wished to assert. Thus, no reader actually does or indeed can
keep the stages separate, as Frei wishes. Second, Wolterstorff suggests that Frei tends to
think of 'sense' as a sequence of propositions, whereas he (Wolterstorff) thinks of it as a
sequence of speech-acts. This means that Frei holds back the fact that the Gospels are
presented as claims and testimonies until after the interpretation of the 'literal sense'.
Wolterstorff objects that 'part of what goes into the skilled exegesis of works of fiction is
discerning where, amidst the fictionalizing, assertions are being made, wishes expressed,
etc.'70 As Searle and Austin continually assert, the various components of a speech-act
(locutionary act, propositional content, illocutionary force, perlocutionary effect) are only
abstractions from one indivisible act. Frei's interpretive strategy tries to treat propositional
content and illocutionary force as if they were separate elements, susceptible of entirely
distinct levels of treatment by readers, with all aspects of interpretive judgment held back to
a second stage. In fact, Frei never gets much beyond a lengthy defence of the literal sense,
understood purely propositionally, and in practice pays little attention to illocutionary force.
Frei's approach therefore reads against the grain of how language is used. This explains
why many readers of Frei are left confused over whether the Jesus he is talking about is
present in anything more than a literary sense: the writer's illocutionary stance with regard
to the 'literal sense' of the text, (as Frei understands the term), is excluded from the
definition of 'who Jesus is'. The same kind of exclusion occurs at the level of the divine, as
well as the human authors; Wolterstorff points out rightly that nothing in Frei's arguments
requires that the Scriptures be the Word of God.71
68 Comstock, 'Truth or Meaning', 130-31.
69 Wolterstorff, 'Will Narrativity Work', 102.
70 Wolterstorff, 'Will Narrativity Work', 103.
71 Wolterstorff, 'Will Narrativity Work', 101.
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Towards the end of his life, Frei attempted to deal with the problem of the relation
between the sense of the text and extra-textual reality. He did this by identifying the literal
sense of the text with the interpretation of the text by a particular group of real people
outside the text: the Christian community.72 Frei makes clear that by privileging the 'literal
sense' he is not making a hermeneutical claim about the nature of the Gospel texts, but is
attempting to remain faithful to the Christian community's '"rule" for faithful reading':
'There is no a priori reason why the "plain" reading could not have been "spiritual" in
contrast to "literal," and certainly the temptation was strong. The identification of the plain
with the literal sense was not a logically necessary development, but it did begin with the
early Christian community.'73 This begins to solve the problem, according to Fodor,
because '[a]fter all, it is the actual lives of believers and not words or narratives which
refer.'74 There is of course another option for the referring agent of a text, as was argued at
length in chapter 3: the author. In ignoring this option, and grounding the text in reality by
privileging as the 'plain' sense the sense which the church has chosen, Frei brushes against
what we will see below, in the discussion of Stanley Fish, are the solipsistic dangers
inherent in locating meaning in the reading-community.
Kathryn Tanner, a pupil of Frei, has attempted to defend this particular development in
Frei's work, arguing that she can retain Frei's definition of the literal sense without losing a
grip on the possibility that the community may change its practices in the light of the text.75
Her main argument is that the privileging of the 'plain sense' is protected from 'promoting a
rigid uniformity in community life' by two Christian practices. First, the practice of
canonising a limited set of texts as scriptural means that the canon's material content cannot
be given universal relevance 'without some display of exegetical ingenuity', which
inevitably leads to diversity of practice, (there being, perhaps by definition, innumerable
ways of exercising ingenuity). Second, the practice of identifying the plain sense of the
texts as a narrative, as opposed to identifying it as 'cultic regulations or general teachings
about beliefs and behaviors', means that communal practices are not specified; Christian
beliefs and behaviours cannot be drawn with obvious clarity from the particularities of a
narrated unique life.76
The problem with Tanner's essay is that she equivocates in her definition of the 'plain
sense' of the text. Her goal is to develop Frei's argument, and to offer a description of a
72 For a clear discussion of this, see Fodor, Christian Hermeneutics, 301.
73 Hans W. Frei, 'The "Literal Reading" of Biblical Narrative in the Christian Tradition: Does It
Stretch or Will It Break?', in eds George Hunsinger & William C. Placher, Theology and Narrative.
Selected Essays (New York & London: Oxford Univ. Press, 1993), 117-52 (139, 122).
74 Fodor, Christian Hermeneutics, 301.
75 Kathryn E. Tanner, 'Theology and the Plain Sense', in ed. Garrett Green, Scriptural Authority and
Narrative Interpretation (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1987), 59-78 (66-67).
76 Tanner, 'Theology and the Plain Sense', 72-74.
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theological enterprise that would be almost sociological, largely avoiding questions of
epistemology, offering reasons which end and begin, she says, with "This is what we do."
Hence her initial definition of the 'plain sense' of a scriptural text is this: 'what a
participant in the community automatically or naturally takes a text to be saying on its face
insofar as he or she has been socialized in a community's conventions for reading that text
as scripture.'77 However, right here at the beginning there is ambiguity. The sense which a
reader has been socialised into treating as 'plain' may not be related at all to what the text
could be construed as saying 'on its face'. Tanner includes as possible formal definitions of
the plain sense "the sense that God intends" and "the sense Church authorities designate"78
- but these two criteria for determining the sense of the biblical text can be and have been
used to produce senses which cannot possibly be construed as that which the text says 'on
its face'. Her definition, therefore, equivocates precisely between the two kinds of
theological description between which her thesis requires her not to equivocate:
sociological and hermeneutical description in theology. She smuggles in at the beginning a
tendency to define the material content of the 'plain sense' as something very close to 'the
verbal and grammatical sense' of the text. This in the end is what leads her to identify the
'plain sense' of the Gospels as a narrative: that identification is in line with how the
Gospels present themselves to us. This move, however, is precisely the kind of
epistemological move which Tanner has claimed to be able to avoid. Thus, her effort to
bolster Frei's attempt to link Scripture back up to reality fails. To make her point, and to
guarantee that Scripture is not subsumed into the community's use of it, she must make
precisely the kind of hermeneutical and epistemological appeals to the text which she and
Frei want to eschew.
A balanced reading of Frei's work must take account of his theological context, for he
offers a provocative alternative to the 'Chicago school' of narrative theology. Gary
Comstock insightfully analyses the areas of agreement and disagreement between Yale and
Chicago, and the strengths and weaknesses of each, citing Frei's reading of the Bible as a
helpful corrective to the tendency of David Tracy and others to reduce the Christian gospel
to something else.79 Frei's intention to safeguard the Gospel texts from mythologising
accounts, which do violence to the most fundamental characteristics of the Gospels'
depiction of the identity of Jesus Christ, is an admirable one. However, it is a safeguard
bought at too high a price. He secures theological autonomy for the biblical narratives by
77 Tanner, 'Theology and the Plain Sense', 61-63.
78 Tanner, 'Theology and the Plain Sense', 65.
79 To explain Christianity as a 'limit-experience', as Tracy does, just begs the question, argues
Comstock. 'Why accept the categories of hermeneutic phenomenology? Why not turn to the
categories of process theology, pragmatism, deconstruction, or empirical theology for an explanatory
paradigm?', (Comstock, 'Two Types ofNarrative Theology', 703).
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arguing for a formalist approach to interpretation which leaves the Christ depicted in the
Gospels in uncertain relationships to the realities of author, readers and history.80
Particularly with regard to the text-reader relationship, he secures a rejection of the
imposition of 'alien explanatory structures' on our understanding of biblical narratives at the
cost of leaving us with no way of understanding the narratives 'against the readers' world'.81
Frei makes the Gospel narratives so other that the one whom they depict threatens to float
off into unreality. This is what we described as Frei's 'hyper-sufficiency' of Scripture, at
least in his earlier work. An 'unsupplemented' word remains for that reason of questionable
value for life. Lynn Poland comments that Frei substitutes the autonomous biblical text for
Barth's sovereign Word.82
The same anxiety has been expressed about post-liberal theology, on which Frei's work
exerted considerable influence, and which is exemplified by the writing of George
Lindbeck. Thiselton approves of Lindbeck's view that '[i]t is the text, so to speak, which
absorbs the world, rather than the world the text'83 as helpfully serving 'to question this
tendency to give privilege to the present in a necessary way.' Thiselton is also, however,
'extremely cautious about George Lindbeck's tendency to locate the meaning of biblical
texts in intralinguistic or "intratextual" categories to the exclusion of presuppositional and
extra-linguistic contextual factors about states of affairs in the world.'84
What is required, for the purposes of our reconstruction of the sufficiency of Scripture,
is a way of guaranteeing the otherness, the theological autonomy, of Scripture, in the
context of a description of its existence in relationship to the world, especially to its
author(s) and readers. A proposal for how this may be done was begun in chapter 3, with
the reading of Barth in light of speech-act theory. The following two sections of this
chapter will continue this by examining recent literary and theological options for
understanding the relationship between, on the one hand, texts in general and Scripture in
particular, and, on the other, authors and readers.
4.3. Supplementing Authors
4.3.1. E.D. Hirsch: Defending Authors
E.D. Hirsch is well-known as the most unabashed advocate in contemporary literary theory
of a significant role in interpretation for the author, supplementing texts with authors. His
80 'Frei appears to confuse a literary, textual formalism with a theological notion of autonomy; that is
to say, he seems to blur certain structuralist insights with claims regarding the perspicuity and
sufficiency of Scripture', (Fodor, Christian Hermeneutics, 283).
81 Fodor, Christian Hermeneutics, 295, quoting Terrence W. Tilley.
82 Poland, 'The New Criticism', 469.
83 George A. Lindbeck, The Nature ofDoctrine (London: SPCK, 1984), 118.
84 Thiselton, New Horizons, 557.
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defence of the author serves his primary purpose, which is to guarantee that literary
interpretation has a determinate object of study, so that particular interpretations may lay
claim to be objectively valid in the sense that they do more than just appeal to the biases of
the interpreter.85 This, then, is a primary motivation which Hirsch shares with New Critics.
He takes Gadamer as his chief hermeneutical opponent, against whom he argues that
the notion of a fusion of the horizons of text and reader makes no sense if the reader's
activity is turned into the authoring ofmeaning; the meaning must exist in some sense prior
to and other than the activity of readers: 'How can a fusion take place unless the things to
be fused are made actual, which is to say, unless the original sense of the text has been
understood?'86 Hirsch safeguards this determinate sense by distinguishing between a text's
'meaning', which does not change, and its 'significance', which does. 'Meaning' he calls 'a
principle of stability' in interpretation, and 'significance' a principle of change.87 He makes
clear that, in his usage, '[djeterminacy does not mean definiteness or precision. ... [It] first
all means self-identity. This is the minimum requirement for sharability. ... Determinacy
also means that verbal meaning is changeless.'88
Hirsch intends by this distinction between meaning and significance to safeguard what
he takes to be a fundamental epistemological point. Without such a distinction, he says, we
could not know anything in the world, for we know an object to be the same object in
different contexts precisely by distinguishing 'an object of knowledge and the context in
which it is known.'89 Hirsch looks to Husserl to provides the philosophical foundation for
this distinction, finding in Husserl's concept of 'bracketing' 'a simplified, visual metaphor
for our ability to demarcate not only the content but also the mental acts by which we attend
to that content, apart from the rest of our experience. This demarcation, corresponding to
the distinction between meaning and significance, alone assures the potential sameness of
objects in experience over time.'90 Expressed particularly in relation to literary knowledge,
then, 'the term "meaning" refers to the whole verbal meaning of a text, and "significance" to
textual meaning in relation to a larger context, i.e. another mind, another era, a wider subject
85 E.D. Hirsch, Jr., Validity in Interpretation (New Haven & London: Yale Univ. Press, 1967), 27.
86 Hirsch, Validity, 254. In a recent essay, Hirsch modifies his stance towards Gadamer somewhat,
although he does not state that he is thereby going back on his earlier work: E.D. Hirsch, Jr.,
'Transhistorical Intentions and the Persistence of Allegory' New Literary History 25 (1994) 549-67.
This essay will be discussed in chapter 5, in the concluding part of the section on the hermeneutics of
B.S. Childs. Gadamer's hermeneutics will be treated later in the present chapter.
87 E.D. Hirsch, Jr., The Aims of Interpretation (Chicago & London: The Univ. of Chicago Press,
1976), 80.
88 Hirsch, Validity, 44-46.
89 Hirsch, Aims, 3.
90 Hirsch, Aims, 4-5. Hirsch traces the origin of his distinction to Husserl's concept of the 'inner and
outer horizons' of any act of knowing, (Hirsch, Aims, 1-2).
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matter, an alien system of values, and so on. In other words, "significance" is textual
meaning as related to some context, indeed any context, beyond itself.'91
Hirsch claims that the objectivity of 'meaning' (in this sense) can be guaranteed only if
the author's intention is treated as the norm for interpretation. His argument is explicitly
pragmatic, not derived from any ontological claims about the nature of texts. Authorial
intention, he argues, is probably the only norm which 'can be universally compelling and
generally sharable. ... On purely practical grounds, therefore, it is preferable to agree that
the meaning of a text is the author's meaning.'92
It has been argued that in all this Hirsch assumes too great a degree of objectivity in
interpretation, ignoring the nature of understanding itself - the very issue which has been at
the centre of hermeneutical enquiry in recent times. As Kevin Vanhoozer says, he is
concerned with how to adjudicate between conflicting understandings, not with how
understanding is possible in the first place.93 However, Hirsch also acknowledges that the
author's intended meaning can only ever be known probably, not certainly: we might
actually have the author's intended meaning, but we could never know for certain that we
have it.94 It must follow, according to David Couzens Hoy, that understanding, the goal of
interpretation, 'is set out as an ideal [goal]. Such a notion gives an interpreter grounds on
which to assert that his interpretation is correct - insofar as he believes that it approaches
the right understanding and that there is a right understanding to be approached.' This,
concludes Hoy, can be an empty principle, forgetting the need for self-criticism.95 In fact, in
The Aims of Interpretation Hirsch acknowledged that in his previous work, Validity in
Interpretation, he had come close to advocating that the whole process of understanding in
hermeneutics be ignored, and said that he now saw clearly that 'the process of
understanding is itself a process of validation, ... a validating, self-correcting process - an
active positing of corrigible schemata which we proceed to test and modify in the very
process of coming to understand an utterance.'96 He thus comes to articulate his description
of human understanding with the same set of concepts and dynamics which he uses to
adjudicate between interpretations.
91 Hirsch, Aims, 2-3. Hirsch's meaning/significance distinction will be re-articulated in relation to the
Bible and the Holy Spirit towards the end of this chapter. In that it is fundamentally undermined by
practitioners of neo-pragmatic hermeneutics and deconstraction, it will be defended in subsequent
sections of this chapter.
92 Hirsch, Validity, 25.
93 Kevin J. Vanhoozer, 'A Lamp in the Labyrinth: The Hermeneutics of "Aesthetic" Theology' Trinity
Journal 8 (1987), 25-56 (30).
94 Hirsch, Validity, 16-17, 170-71.
95 David Couzens Hoy, The Critical Circle. Literature, Histoiy and Philosophical Hermeneutics
(Berkeley, Los Angeles & London: Univ. of California Press, 1978), 33.
96 Hirsch, Aims, 33-34.
120
The literary critic P.D. Juhl has offered some of the most insightful comments on
Hirsch's work. He acknowledges that Hirsch's advocacy of authorial intention as the norm
for interpretation is meant only as 'a stipulative definition or recommendation', rather than
as a truth-claim about literary meaning, and asks contentiously whether the suggestion of
this as the norm for interpretation is any less arbitrary than, say, a panel of literary critics,
who could equally provide what Hirsch wants, namely 'a genuinely discriminating norm'.97
Juhl points out that, in fact, Hirsch's arguments rest on an implicit truth-claim about textual
meaning. Hirsch observes that when critics talk about multiplicity of meanings, and
conclude that meaning changes, they are often not talking about meaning at all but about
significance. However, observes Juhl, in order to demonstrate this Hirsch 'presupposes that
the meaning of a work is as a matter of fact (or rather of logic) what the author intended to
convey.' This, of course, is more than just a recommendation about the norm of textual
meaning.98
This point needs to be pressed further, for it is a fault-line that runs deep in Hirsch's
hermeneutics. His pragmatism is strong; for example: 'the object of interpretation is no
automatic given, but a task that the interpreter sets himself. He decides what he wants to
actualize and what purpose his actualization should achieve.'99 He knows that there are
moral arguments for identifying textual meaning with authorial meaning - specifically,
arguments based on viewing texts as speech-acts. However, he justifies his pragmatism by
asserting that a reader may or may not accept the notion that language-uses 'carry moral
imperatives' as inter-personal acts; certainly, 'nothing in the mute signs before him will
compel him to change his mind or bring him ill fortune if he does not.'100 However,
Wolterstorff s concept of normative standing, which, it was argued previously, is a
persuasive description of the nature of language-use, asserts that moral imperatives accrue
normatively to speakers and hearers, authors and readers. That a person may not recognise
that they have been so ascribed, or, recognising them, may choose to ignore them - that he
is not compelled to act in accordance with them - is therefore not sufficient reason to offer
only a pragmatic defence of the primacy of the author in determining textual meaning.
The following section of this chapter on deconstruction will offer, among other things, a
practical demonstration of the weakness of this pragmatic refusal to use moral arguments in
the face of recent radical deconstructions of authors in literary theory and biblical exegesis.
Certain kinds of 'ill fortune' will be identified which do befall the reader who refuses to
recognise that language-uses 'carry moral imperatives'. We agree with Hirsch's basic
97 P.D. Juhl, Interpretation. An Essay in the Philosophy ofLiterary Criticism (Princeton, New Jersey:
Princeton Univ. Press, 1980), 18-20.
98 Juhl, Interpretation, 27-28.
99 Hirsch, Validity, 25.
100 Hirsch, Validity, 25-26.
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observation that the concept of 'meaning' is only meaningful if it is understood to be the
meaning of a person, that is, if human agency is invoked;101 our discussion of
deconstruction will outline a moral defence for a hermeneutical approach to the author built
on this foundation.102 It is here that the practical benefits of Wolterstorff s addition of a
strong moral dimension to a speech-act view of language will become especially apparent.
Before coming to that section, it may be observed that there are particular problems
inherent in Hirsch's pragmatic defence of the author. This is evidenced by the fact that he is
led by his pragmatic approach to say some things which rather conflict with the popular
interpretation of him as a robust defender of the author. In Validity in Interpretation, Hirsch
concludes the argument for his pragmatic approach by observing that what he has to say
should also serve other interpretive goals, for, even if the critic regards his role as replacing
the original author as the author of the text's meaning, his point that all meanings require an
author still stands.103 He reflects on this further in his later book on the subject. In the
period between the writing of the two books, Hirsch came to see, he says, that his distinction
between meaning and significance applies equally to constructions of meaning 'where
authorial will is partly or totally disregarded. ... The important feature of meaning as
distinct from significance is that meaning is the determinate representation of a text for an
interpreter.'104 He concludes, however: 'Most interpreters retain a respect for original
meaning, and recognition of this might mollify some of our disagreements.' He therefore
holds out the hope that consensus may be reached that, '[ujnless there is a powerful
overriding value in disregarding an author's intention (i.e. original meaning), we who
interpret as a vocation should not disregard it.'105 Given the model of speech-act theory
advocated throughout this study, the 'vocation' to interpret, which Hirsch attributes to
professional scholars, might be thought to be shared by all human beings.
It is therefore unclear whether Hirsch is anything like the robust defender of the author
which he often presents himself to be, and which is usually offered as a thumb-nail sketch of
his hermeneutical position. In the end he seems to want nothing so much as that
professional interpreters of texts should agree that, however much they might come to
understand textual meaning as polyvalent, they should begin at some point with a
recognition of what the author may have meant, providing professional interpreters with
some shared object of discussion, before they move, however quickly, on from there.
101 Hirsch, Validity, 3-23, argues this simple point succinctly and convincingly.
102 See Hoy's observation that the question at the heart of issues of textual meaning is philosophical
rather than practical - 'must the interpreter believe that there is one right understanding of the text?'
- and therefore that Hirsch's argument for the determinacy of meaning, which operates only at the
practical level, is circular, (Hoy, The Critical Circle, 17-19).
103 Hirsch, Validity, 27.
104 Hirsch, Aims, 79-80, (italics added).
105 Hirsch, Aims, 90, (original italics removed).
122
Hirsch defends authorial meaning since he thinks it the best way to foster methodological
consensus; in the face of the fundamental attacks from deconstruction, though, it will be
argued, authors require more directly committed defenders.
A final point may be made here on the references which Hirsch occasionally makes to
speech-act theory. He has an ambiguous relationship to the conception of texts as speech-
acts. Although he sees the 'convention-intuition' debate within speech-act theory as quite a
problem,106 he nevertheless relies on some of the insights of ordinary-language philosophy
in order to argue his fundamental point that 'absolutely identical meaning' can be expressed
through different linguistic forms.107 He argues that most tests conducted on ordinary
speech conclude that absolute synonymity ofmeaning in different expressions is impossible
because the tests usually confront people with isolated words and sentences. When longer
texts are used - 'when we encounter words in actual use' - most people conclude that in
such texts different words, (for example, 'bachelors' and 'unmarried men'), can indeed be
used synonymously.108 He makes a similar appeal to rectify what he sees as the one-
sidedness of a strictly aesthetic conception of literature, (a view he attributes to New
Criticism): 'The first step would be to regard literature as verbal discourse, not as merely
verbal artifact.'109
Hirsch's weakness is that these positive appeals to the kind of views of language which
are made particularly explicit in speech-act theory remain scattered on the surface of his
texts, and are not woven into the fabric of his conception of authorship.110 Since he has
apparently so much to say about human authorship, but offers very little on either its effects
(human agency) or limitations (human agency),"1 it is not surprising that Vern Poythress
has concluded that
Hirsch needs an author whose human nature is perfectly clearly defined, whose
language is perfectly defined, who somehow knows perfectly what he means,
who expresses it perfectly without manipulation or conniving, and whose
intentions can therefore be read off from the text more or less
unproblematically. ... Hirsch's general theory of human meaning virtually
requires a divine author.112
106 Hirsch, Aims, 25-26. This debate was discussed in chapter 3.
107 Hirsch, Aims, 50.
108 Hirsch, Aims, 59-62.
109 Hirsch, Aims, 124, 143.
110 See Hoy on Hirsch: 'The further "explanation" achieved by linking sentences to consciousness is
either extraneous or explains something else, such as speech acts or practical activity', (Hoy, The
Critical Circle, 23).
111 Wolterstorffis description of how the normative ascription of normative standing may be undercut
in various speech situations, outlined in the previous chapter, represents a reflection on the limitations
of human agency.
112 Vern Sheridan Poythress, 'God's Lordship in Interpretation' Westminster Theological Journal 50
(1988), 27-64(40-41).
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Poythress seems to take Hirsch's silence on the effects and limitations of authorial
agency to be an expression of worshipful awe in the face of the author. If Hirsch would
object to this interpretation, Poythress might respond that he is only attempting to draw an
inference about what must fill the material void in Hirsch's account of what an author
actually is and does. A powerful but purely formal principle, which is what Hirsch's
pragmatism turns out to offer, which lacks an account of its material content, simply invites
such interpretations as that of Poythress to fill the gap. Hirsch ends up with a curiously
vague concept of what a text is, for the concept of the author, the very concept in terms of
which textual meaning is to be defined, turns out to be a purely formal content-less
principle.
4.3.2. Deconstruction: Fending OffAuthors
Post-structuralism in general has been particularly hard on the concept of the author. The
stakes here are high, as Roland Barthes recognises: 'to refuse to fix meaning is, in the end,
to refuse God and his hypostases - reason, science, law' - which is precisely what Barthes
wants to do. Barthes' other reason for rejecting an authoritative role for the author in the
process of determining meaning is to facilitate the liberation of the reader: 'the birth of the
reader must be at the cost of the death of the Author.'113 The reader, so long subjugated
under the tyranny of the author, must now be freed at the cost of the death of his persecutor.
Michel Foucault, who makes a similar move to Barthes regarding the author, argues that
there is nothing natural about the concept, but rather that it is a fairly recent innovation in
Western thought: 'The coming into being of the notion of "author" constitutes the
privileged moment of individualization in the history of ideas, knowledge, literature,
philosophy, and the sciences.'"4 Barthes agrees: 'The author is a modern figure, a product
of our society insofar as, emerging from the Middle Ages with English empiricism, French
rationalism and the personal faith of the Reformation, it discovered the prestige of the
individual, of, as it is more nobly put, the 'human person'.'115 A discussion of the extent to
which the Reformation can legitimately be implicated in the phenomenon of
individualisation lies beyond the scope of this thesis. However, what may be questioned is
what Barthes and Foucault mean by 'author' here, and whether or not the hermeneutical
underpinnings of the orthodox Protestant doctrine of Scripture imply a similar
understanding. With Barthes, at least, it is clear that his target is a Romantic conception of
the author, for he laments that, in much literary-critical work, '[t]he explanation of a work is
113 Roland Barthes, 'The Death of the Author', in Barthes, Image Music Text trans. Stephen Heath
(London: Fontana, 1977), 142-48 (147-48).
114 Michel Foucault, 'What Is an Author?', in ed. Josue V. Harari, Textual Strategies. Perspectives in
Post-Structuralist Criticism (Ithaca, NY: Cornell Univ. Press, 1979), 141-60 (141).
115 Barthes, 'The Death of the Author', 142-43.
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always sought in the man or woman who produced it, as if it were always in the end,
through the more or less transparent allegory of fiction, the voice of a single person, the
author confiding in us.'"6
We have previously (see chapter 1) argued for the legitimacy of reinterpreting the
orthodox doctrine of Scripture in light of contemporary hermeneutical theory; a further
point in this regard may be made here. The Westminster Confession of Faith, the fullest
confessional example of the orthodox Protestant doctrine of Scripture, does not prescribe a
methodology for the interpretation of Scripture. Nevertheless, some tentative conclusions
may be drawn which suggest that the Confession's view of Scripture largely escapes
Barthes' and Foucault's critique of authorship. First, the Westminster Confession does not
suppose that the goal of Bible reading is the gaining of insight into the psychology of the
authors, either human or divine. The human authors are not mentioned at all in the chapter
of the Confession on Scripture, and from the divine perspective what it 'pleased the Lord to
commit ... wholly unto writing' was not his psyche (whatever that might be in the case of
God), but his self-revelation and his will. It is perhaps noteworthy that one of the most
important works on literary theory published in England in the seventeenth century
appeared in 1641, five years before the Westminster Assembly. Timber,117 a posthumously-
published collection of Ben Jonson's most important critical observations, represents,
according to one history of literary criticism, this clearly non-Romanticist viewpoint: for
Jonson, '[ljiterary work was not primarily personal expression but objective imitation ... of
nature'.118 'Imitation', in the context of neo-classical literary criticism, has no naturalist
overtones, meaning merely representation, and 'nature' means reality in general, and
especially human reality."5 A further neo-classical principle was an emphasis on 'the
impersonality and objectivity of the poet'.120 Of course, it is doubtful that the Westminster
Divines reflected at length on Scripture as a work of literature; certainly, it would be
strange to view the hermeneutical assumptions of their Confession as purely a product of the
contemporary secular literary-critical environment. However, it is perhaps possible to argue
that the Westminster Confession, with its anti-Romantic assumption which still takes
account of the personal intention represented by the text, represents, in its cultural context, a
set of sui generis hermeneutical convictions.
116 Barthes, 'The Death of the Author', 143.
117 Full title. Timber, or, Discoveries; Made upon Men andMatter: As they have flow'd out his daily
Reading; or had their refluxe to his peculiar Notion of the Times.
118 William K. Wimsatt Jr. & Cleanth Brooks, Literary Criticism. A Short History 2 Neo Classical
Criticism (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1957), 179.
119 Rene Wellek, A History ofModern Criticism 1 The Later Eighteenth Century (London: Jonathan
Cape, 1955), 14.
120 Wellek, A History ofModern Criticism, 1.
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Second, it is clear that the Westminster Confession does not imagine that the human
authors of Scripture exercise complete control over the meaning of their texts. When a text
is found to be obscure it is to be interpreted not by inquiring into the conscious intention of
the writer, but by interpreting it in the light of other texts: 'The infallible rule of the
interpretation of Scripture is the Scripture itself: and therefore, when there is a question
about the true and full sense of any Scripture (which is not manifold, but one), it must be
searched and known by other places that speak more clearly', (1.9). In modern terminology,
individual biblical texts are to be interpreted intertextually. This means that the individual
human authors of Scripture do not function as supreme arbiters of meaning - the role that is
deconstructed when Barthes and Foucault try to overturn the power of the author.121
However, it may be objected that nevertheless God, the single author of Scripture who
stands behind its individual authors, remains in a position of power over the reader. After
all, the confession that Scripture is its own interpreter is the confession that it is for God, not
for the church or the individual, to determine the meaning of Scripture. In chapter 3 a
proposal of Scripture as the speech-act of God was developed, which ascribed to God, as to
all authors and speakers, the right of determining the meaning of his words - a right which
necessarily entailed concomitant responsibilities accruing to him as much as to the
addressees. The final section of this chapter will develop this by articulating what it means
to call Scripture 'sufficient' in the light of these relationships. In the next section, the
proposal developed in chapter 3 will be applied to the work of one particular deconstructive
biblical critic, who is especially concerned with the power which authors claim for their
literary creations.
4.3.2.1. Stephen D. Moore: fighting to the death with the author
As was noted at the beginning of this chapter, deconstruction is best taken and understood
on its own terms when observed in practice, rather than just reflected on in theory. Stephen
D. Moore has been accurately described as 'the leading practitioner of deconstruction in
biblical studies today'.122 His work demonstrates a high degree of suspicion towards the
power claimed by authors, and of the nature of the God whom the Bible imposes on us if we
choose to make ourselves subservient to what the biblical authors have created, consciously
and unconsciously, in their texts.
121 The claim that the meaning of biblical text is determined intertextually by the text's relationship to
other biblical texts is prima facie in conflict with the primacy of the author. That the two claims
about biblical meaning can be reconciled will be argued in chapter 5, where intertextuality and the
biblical canon will be treated in more detail.
122 J. Cheryl Exum, cited on the back cover of Stephen D. Moore, Poststructuralism and the New
Testament. Derrida and Foucault at the Foot ofthe Cross (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1994).
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In a section of a recent book, God's Gym. Divine Male Bodies of the Bible (New York
& London: Routledge, 1996), Moore applies the work of Foucault and Derrida, especially,
to the Bible, and produces some compelling and extraordinary writing on the theme of the
body of God in the Bible.123 One of Moore's aims in God's Gym is to demonstrate that
Yahweh in the Old Testament and Jesus in the New are projections of male narcissism, and
therefore are highly dangerous religious and literary creations against which Bible-readers
must fight. His 'demonstration' proceeds by means of intertextual readings which run
together three kinds of texts: (i) the Bible, especially its anthropomorphic descriptions of
God, (ii) mystical and apocryphal texts, both Jewish and Christian, which contain explicit
descriptions of the dimensions of God's body, and (iii) the popular literature of the modern
cult of body-building. Moore thus attempts to achieve his interpretive goal by radically
supplementing the text of the Bible with two surprising intertexts. This produces a book
which is by turns entertaining and blasphemous, (as most Christians would probably
understand the latter term). His intertextual exegesis is summarised in what follows.
Does the God of the Old Testament have a body?, asks Moore. He reviews the
anthropomorphic descriptions of God in the Old Testament, including the highly debated,
'let us make mankind in our image, according to our likeness', (Gen. 1.26), noting the
embarrassment of several modern commentators in the face of what he calls the
'disarmingly straightforward interpretation' of this verse, namely that there is a physical
resemblance between God and human beings.124 He notes that several Old Testament
characters are said to see God, but that it is never clear from such accounts whether or not
God has a body. He concludes that, in the Old Testament,
[e\xtreme circumspection in the representation of the divine body is the norm,
even when the medium is verbal rather than visual. References to certain
synecdochically charged body parts do abound - Yahweh's face, eyes, mouth,
ears, arm, hand and feet are frequently mentioned - but anything approaching
a head-to-toe description of the divine physique would be unimaginable in the
context ofthe Hebrew Bible.125
123 Most of the section of God's Gym discussed here was previously published in substantially the
same form in two articles by Moore: 'The Beatific Vision as a Posing Exhibition: Revelation's
Hypermasculine Deity' Journalfor the Study of the New Testament 60 (1995) 27-55; 'Gigantic God:
Yahweh's Body' Journalfor the Study of the Old Testament 70 (1996) 87-115. Moore has previously
published one of the most informed and widely cited arguments that biblical scholarship should learn
in fundamental ways from contemporary literary theory, (Literary Criticism and the Gospels. The
Theoretical Challenge [New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1989]), and has produced two other book-
length applications of post structuralist theory to the New Testament, (Poststructuralism and the New
Testament, and Mark and Luke in Poststructuralist Perspectives. Jesus Begins To Write [New Haven
& London: Yale Univ. Press, 1992]).
124 Stephen D. Moore, God's Gym. Divine Male Bodies ofthe Bible (New York & London: Routledge,
1996), 83-84.
125 Moore, God's Gym, 86, (italics added).
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This circumspection might be thought to bring to a rapid end the search for Yahweh's
body in the Old Testament. Moore, however, will not be so easily deterred, and continues
hunting in the Shi 'ur Qomah, a mystical Jewish text, probably a composite text, dated by
experts anywhere from the second to the seventh century AD, which speculates on the size of
Yahweh's body.126 Moore reads this text intertextually with the anatomical information
found in contemporary body-building literature:
[I]n bodybuilding magazines the gods of the sport are regularly reduced to their
anatomical measurements - "In his prime, Arnold's arms measured 22 inches,
his chest 57 inches, his waist 31 inches, his calves 20 inches," and so on. The
hero of the Shi 'ur Qomah is big - bigger even than Arnold, as it turns out:
"What is the measure of the body of the Holy One, blessed be He ...? ... From
his right shoulder to His left shoulder is 160,000,000 parasangs. ... From His
right arm until His left arm is 120,000,000 parasangs."'27
Moore reads this anatomical speculation back into the Old Testament. IfGod's body is
so massive and perfect, he asks, why are visions of him in the Old Testament so often
restricted to a glimpse of his /ace? He knows the standard answer to this question: the
Hebrew word usually translated 'face' often functions as a metaphor for 'presence'. Moore,
however, wants something more than this: '[t]o content ourselves with such a sensible
explanation, however, would be to fall sadly short of the sublime exegetical standards set by
the ancient Jewish sages. Surely there are other reasons for Yahweh's agonizing shyness in
the Hebrew Bible? Why does he not want anyone to see his body?'128
Now Moore's reading of the Bible really takes off. He asks the question, much ignored,
he says, 'of whether or not [Yahweh's] body is a gendered one'.129 Many modern body¬
builders abuse steroids, he tells us, which can lead to ironic physical results. Excessive
steroid use by men produces oestrogen, sometimes causing the growth of pubescent breasts
and the radical shrinking of their testicles.130 So for Moore, when in Exodus 33 God only
allows Moses to glimpse his back, this must be because God is hiding a pair of female
breasts.131 Similarly Yahweh's anger: '[t]he wrath of God in the Bible is nothing other than
"roid rage' - the aggressive behavioural outbursts induced by excessive steroid use.132
Steroids also - along with the vast quantity of food he consumes, offered in the form of
animal sacrifices - account for Yahweh's massive physique. The God of the Bible is
therefore as insecure in his masculinity as a modern body-builder: the more he strives after
126 Moore, God's Gym, 86-87.
127 Moore, God's Gym, 87. Following measurements offered by Moore, (Moore, God's Gym, 87
n.42), derived from the Shi 'ur Qomah itself and from specialists in the field, it can be calculated that a
'divine parasang' is 6.7 kilometres.
128 Moore, God's Gym, 90.
129 Moore, God's Gym, 91.
130 Moore, God's Gym, 97.
131 Moore, God's Gym, 93.
132 Moore, God's Gym, 96.
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hyper-masculinity, the more his body takes on female characteristics. The only way he can
cope with his on-going insecurity is to drown us, the readers of the Old Testament, with a
flood of masculine metaphors for himself.133
Moore sustains this analysis into the New Testament. 'Like father, like son': Jesus,
too, is a body-builder. After the ignominy of the cross, so the apocryphal Gospel ofPeter
and Acts of John report, the resurrected Christ attained massive physical proportions.
Turning to the vision of God in the book of Revelation, Moore argues that this 'represents
the apotheosis of... [Roman] imperial ideology, its ascension to a transhistorical site'.134 In
support of this he points to parallels which have been alleged between what is known of the
Roman imperial court and various elements of John's vision in that book, including the
twenty-four elders, the huge worshipping multitude and the heavenly throne-room.135 He
notes that several writers on Revelation would draw the opposite conclusion from such
parallels, taking the point of the book to be that 'Roman imperial power is but a parody or
pale imitation of divine power', but responds that this just makes 'the difference between
Roman sovereignty and divine sovereignty ... quantitative rather than qualitative in
Revelation'.136 In all this Moore acknowledges, as he did with the Old Testament, that
Revelation 'does refrain from attempting to describe the divine physique, preferring to focus
attention instead on the adulation and self-abasement of the celestial audience eternally
privileged to behold it'.137
This leaves us with the following vision of God's reign in his kingdom, (Moore here
quotes Richard Bauckham's work on the book of Revelation): '[bjecause God's will is the
moral truth of our own being as his creatures, we shall find our fulfilment only when,
through our free obedience, his will becomes also the spontaneous desire of our hearts'.
This kind of theology makes Moore's blood run cold: '[a] Foucauldian nightmare, this
vision of heaven (but whose?) represents the absolute displacement of outward subjection,
tangible coercion, by inner self-policing, which is now so deeply implanted in the believer
as to be altogether indistinguishable from freedom'.138
133 Moore, God's Gym, 101-102.
134 Moore, God's Gym, 124.
135 Moore, God's Gym, 124-26. However, it should be noted that Iain Provan has questioned the
widespread assumption that Rome is the referent of (at least) ch. 18 of Revelation. He argues that it is
probably not possible for us to be certain about the exact historical references which the author had in
mind, but that the general thrust of the chapter is nonetheless clear from its inter-canonical references
and allusions, (Iain W. Provan, 'Foul Spirits, Fornication and Finance: Revelation 18 from an Old
Testament Perspective' Journalfor the Study ofthe New Testament 64 [1996] 81-100).
136 Moore, God's Gym, 127.
137 Moore, God's Gym, 121.
138 Moore, God's Gym, 128.
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In sum: in order to make his point Moore indulges in deliberately anachronistic
intertextual interpretation.139 The Shi'ur Qomah and the literature of modern body-building
are 'used to fashion a critical midrash' on 'the hypermasculinity of the biblical Yahweh'.140
This is despite his acknowledgement that neither Old Testament nor New Testament offers
head-to-toe descriptions of the physique of either Yahweh or the exalted Christ - quite
unlike the obsession with anatomical details found in the Shi 'ur Qomah and the literature of
modern body-building.
In all this Moore is driven at a deeply personal level. He tells us of his early devout life
as a young monk in his native Ireland - a vocation he abandoned. In one of the several
autobiographical comments which his writings contain, he tells us that, just like some of his
students,
I myself once was [joined at the hip to Jesus], permanently in his presence, in
his gaze, in intimate proximity to him, and carrying on an unceasing internal
conversation with him. I readily confess that I killed this controlling twin. I
had to. Beginning in June 1976, and using a knife I found concealed in the
pages of a New Testament textbook, I began to inflict cuts on him, just nicks
and scratches at first, but eventually great gashes, until he finally stopped
breathing in my ear. This took a long time.141
The implicit fate of the author should be noted in this self-testimony. For Moore the
author is not dead and gone, but is one of the 'living dead', terrorising readers from beyond
the grave through his literary creations. The reader must fight him; the critic must
continually enact the death of the power and the claimed rights of the vampire-author,
killing Yahweh and Jesus, the ultimate textual creations of the biblical authors, with a
wooden stake sharpened on critical scholarship.
Two kinds ofdeconstruction. Moore is deliberately attempting to bring biblical studies
into line with contemporary literary studies, particularly the deconstructive work deriving
from Derrida. It is by identifiably 'Derridean' intertextual reading practices that he supports
his Foucauldian readings of God's body in the Bible. Christopher Norris, in his lucid
analysis of Derrida, distinguishes between two kinds of deconstructive practice. The first
139 Moore remarks: 'The avoidance of anachronism is not, perhaps, my strongest suit as an exegete.
Indeed, I have deliberately employed anachronism throughout this book (taking my cue from the fact
that anachronism is what biblical scholars fear most, that fear is the obverse of fascination, and that
the fascinating merits pursuit rather than flight)', (Moore, God's Gym, 123).
140 Abstract ofMoore, 'Gigantic God', 115.
141 Moore, God's Gym, 70-71. This deeply personal motivation characterises the whole of God's
Gym. In the Preface, Moore explains that the theme of each of the book's three chapters derives from
deep within his psyche, springing from 'a phobia and two fascinations': 'a morbid fear of physical
torture, ... a morbid fascination with depth anatomy, ... a frank fascination with surface anatomy,
specifically the male physique', (Moore, God's Gym, xi). Moore has reflected on the introduction of
autobiographical elements in academic works, in Stephen D. Moore, 'True Confessions and Weird
Obsessions: Autobiographical Interventions in Literary and Biblical Studies' Semeia 72 (1995) 19-50.
This is, typically, the most provocative and entertaining piece in an issue of the journal devoted to the
topic.
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involves extremely rigorous close reading, and is exemplified especially by Derrida himself;
the second welcomes deconstruction as providing legitimacy for the kind of free intertextual
play in interpretation which characterises Moore's recent work. Early in his career Derrida
had a great impact on a number of literary critics in America, including Harold Bloom,
Geoffrey Hartman and J. Hillis Miller. They, like Moore, belong to the second 'free play'
camp, which Norris calls deconstruction 'on the wild side'. What Norris says of Hillis
Miller is also apt as a description of Moore's intertextual free play: ' [i]f interpretation is
always caught up in a chain of proliferating sense which it can neither halt nor fully
comprehend, then the critic is effectively absolved of all responsibility for limiting the play
of his own imagination'.142
Norris argues that these 'wild-side' disciples of Derrida do not live up to the highest
standards set by the master. In an interview Derrida made clear: 'I have never accepted
saying, or encouraging others to say, just anything at all, nor have I argued for
indeterminacy [of meaning] as such."43 This may be a little disingenuous, for much of
Derrida's work is in the form of extended, tortuously detailed and complex readings of
philosophical and literary texts, which focus, seemingly perversely, on tiny textual details,
wilfully losing the wood in the trees.144 It may be thought that Derrida and Moore are both
equally perverse in their readings, the former on a 'micro' and the latter on a 'macro' scale.
However, a distinction can be drawn between them, in that, especially in his early work,
Derrida's strategy is to identify a recurring term or concept in a text, and to show how this
term itselfworks to deconstruct the text in which it is placed. For example, Derrida says of
his reading of the themes of speech and writing in Plato's Phaedrus, '[i]t will involve a
certain amount of violence to the text, but a violence that comes not so much from 'outside'
- from a reading bent upon its own perverse design - but rather from within the text itself,
in those strains and contortions of sense which characterise its language'.145 The same is
true of Derrida's similar reading of Rousseau in Of Grammatology, in which he wishes to
observe, while pushing beyond, the critical demand of 'reproducing, by the effaced and
respectful doubling of commentary, the conscious, voluntary, intentional relationship that
the writer institutes in his exchanges with the history to which he belongs thanks to the
142 Christopher Norris, Deconstruction. Theory and Practice rev. edn (London: Routledge, 1991), 96.
143 Jacques Derrida, Limited Inc trans. Samuel Weber & Jeffrey Mehlman, ed. Gerald Graff
(Evanston, IL: Northwestern Univ. Press, 1988), 144-45.
144 As Vanhoozer says, Derrida is guilty of 'attending overmuch to the inconsequential', (Kevin J.
Vanlioozer, Is There a Meaning in This Text? The Bible, the Reader and the Morality of Literaiy
Knowledge [Leicester: Apollos, 1998], 397).
145 Quoted in Christopher Norris, Derrida (London: Fontana, 1987), 35. See, e.g., the detail into
which Derrida goes in order to justify the inclusion in his reading of Phaedrus of a word which Plato
does not actually use (pharmakos), although cognate to one he does use (pharmakeus), (Jacques
Derrida, Dissemination trans. Barbara Johnson [London: Athlone Press, 1981], 129-31).
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element of language'. Without this, 'critical production would ... authorize itself to say
almost anything.'146 Norris argues that, for Derrida, 'it is a question of locating very
precisely the divergence between logic and rhetoric which twists Rousseau's meaning
against his avowed intentions. And this requires a rigour and scrupulous adherence to the
letter of the text which could scarcely be further removed from that popular idea of what
'deconstruction' is all about."47
Derrida is thus prepared to argue his way out of the straitjacket of Rousseau's declared
intention, starting from within the text, cutting the cords with a knife sharpened on an
intricate dialogue with the text; he offers a rigorous demonstration that the text which the
author wrote itself reveals aporias which themselves invite deconstructive criticism.148
Where Derrida does arrive at free-wheeling zwtertextual interpretation it is only via the hard
road of zntratextual interpretation. Norris offers this summary:
Derrida, unlike some of his disciples, has arrived at this [intertextual] position
through a long and strenuous process of deconstruction. It may seem quaintly
moralistic to say that [Derrida] has 'earned' this right by actually thinking
through the problems his followers have picked up, as it were, ready-made.
Yet this was already Derrida's contention in Of Grammatology: that thought
can break with its delusive prehistory only by constantly and actively
rehearsing that break.149
In God's Gym, Moore does not come close to offering a comparably rigorous and argued
intratextual reading of the biblical texts.150
This ultimately raises the thorny and much-debated question of whether Derrida is a
serious philosopher or a playful literary critic (or both), and Moore of course knows that
there are two Derridas to choose from (or to run together). Norris is Derrida's apologist in
the Anglo-American philosophical academy, suggesting that he has done enough straight-
faced philosophy to justify some occasional bursts of playfulness; Moore thinks that
146 Jacques Derrida, OfGrammatology trans. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (Baltimore & London: John
Hopkins Univ. Press, 1976), 158.
147 Norris, Derrida, 109. Simon Critchley makes the same point: the deconstructive moment, which
brings out the text's alterities, must be founded on a minimum interpretive consensus. 'It is of
absolutely crucial importance that this second moment, that of alterity, be shown to arise necessarily
out of the first moment of repetitive commentary', (Simon Critchley, The Ethics ofDeconstruction.
Derrida and Levinas [Oxford: Blackwell, 1992], 27).
148 See Derrida's heart-felt protestations, made in response to what he thinks is his maltreatment at the
hands of Habermas, that he is 'one of those who love "arguing"', (Derrida, Limited Inc, 156-58).
149 Norris, Deconstruction, 127.
150 It should be noted, in fairness to Moore, that one of his earlier examples of deconstructive criticism
was a reading of ch.4 of John's Gospel conducted entirely within the context of the Gospel, and
markedly lacking in the free play we have seen in God's Gym. (This first appeared in outline in
Literaiy Criticism and the Gospels, 160-63, and in fuller form as 'Are There Impurities in the Living
Water That the Johannine Jesus Dispenses? Deconstruction, Feminism, and the Samaritan Woman'
Biblical Interpretation 1 [1993] 207-27, reprinted the following year as ch.2 of Poststructuralism and
the New Testament.) Mark and Luke also contains examples of such mtratextual deconstructive
reading, but Moore seems deliberately to be moving away from such exegesis.
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playfulness is just as foundational in Derrida (and in the world) as anything else. Where
Norris treats such early texts as OfGrammatology as providing the crucial justification for
what Derrida later practises in his more free-playing 'intertextual' texts, Moore's work has
consciously moved back and forth between the example ofDerrida's more serious work and
that of his 'more audacious texts',151 without ever feeling compelled to offer reasoned
justification for this. In an earlier work, Moore says of a reading he gives ofMark's Gospel:
[f]or reasons of temperament, the Derrida of my own text will be an inventive
writer first and a philosopher second. ... I shall be shuttling from convention to
invention, from conventional criticism, whether Marcan or deconstmctive
("conventional deconstruction" is by now no oxymoron), to some of the
stranger critical outworlds opened up by Derrida's writing.152
Thus, where Derrida can often be found arguing for any 'shuttling' which will take
place in his reading of the texts before him, Moore just informs us that it will happen in his
reading of the Bible; in God's Gym the shuttle is mostly stuck in the inventive mode.153
The rest of this section will reflect on the difference between Derrida as read by Moore and
Derrida as read by Norris, suggesting two ethical responses to Moore's Derrida - criticisms
which may not be levelled so easily at Norris's Derrida.
Intertextuality and free play. The first response is in the form of a simple question
about the authority by which Moore employs his intertextual strategy. On what basis does
he feel free to allow the narcissistic content of modern body-building literature to flow back
thousands of years and across thousands of miles and to spill over into biblical texts,
staining the biblical Yahweh and the biblical Jesus? As we saw, Moore does observe that
there are significant differences between, on the one hand, the anatomical obsessiveness of
modern body-building literature and the speculations on God's body in some non-canonical
mystical texts, and, on the other, the biblical texts, which are invariably circumspect in their
depiction of the divine bodies. These differences suggest that the Bible might escape
Moore's instant Foucauldian analysis of the biblical Yahweh as a narcissistic male
projection.
However, something like the reverse of the 'Midas touch' is at work in Moore's biblical
interpretation: texts are brought into contact with one another so that one might be nullified,
151 Moore, Mark and Luke, xvi.
152 Moore, Mark and Luke, 4. For the record, the 'shuttling' in Mark and Luke may be analysed as
follows: examples of 'conventional' deconstruction (often very sensitive to the text, revealing much
for any critic to consider and respond to): 38-48, 87-110, 125-28; examples of 'inventive'
deconstruction (always entertaining, sometimes exasperatingly perverse): 48-60, 145-58; other
passages are somewhere in between. In comparison with this, the overwhelming predominance of
inventive deconstruction in the biblical sections of God's Gym represents a narrowing down in
Moore's deconstructive strategies.
153 Moore's inventive intertextual readings are good examples of the activity of what Vanhoozer calls
'hyperactive readers': 'Hyperactive interpretation is a frenetic allegorizing that finds associations
never intended by the author by superimposing various decoding devices ... on texts that were
otherwise encoded', (Vanhoozer, Is There a Meaning, 396-97).
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brought down to the level of the other. Whenever the biblical texts begin to show evidence
of how they might resist Moore's relentless Foucauldian reading, as he occasionally admits
they might, he takes it upon himself to invoke intertexts which focus attention only on the
superficial and broad elements which the Bible shares in common with other texts, (for
example, talk of power). This is a strategy designed to blind us to any possible distinctive
characteristics of the Bible's treatment of such concepts. Throughout, we are implicitly
invited to accept, simply on Moore's authority, that some people in the history of critical
biblical scholarship have done some extremely detailed work which justifies his mockery of
the biblical God. Behind his mockery seems to lie the objection that a God described in
human categories, including physical and emotional categories, cannot be a God worthy of
worship. This is a rational argument; it has, to say the least, not been without rational
responses.
The poverty of Moore's strategy becomes evident at the end of God's Gym, where he
makes explicit how he has gone about achieving his purpose. He recognises that much of
what he has said about the Bible has been caricature: '[cjaricature is the necessary
instrument of this uncovering [of the God of the Bible as a narcissistic male projection],
serving to bring the projection into sharper focus'.154 The contrast with Derrida here is very
striking. If Derrida can ever be said to make a point by caricature, the caricature serves to
sharpen a point also made by a closely-argued uncovering (deconstructing) of the text in
question by means of close (if sometimes too close) reading. A reader who wishes to
question Derrida's reading of a text, in this mode, can do so just by reading the text in
question more carefully than him.155 Moore, however, chooses the easier route: he
uncovers by means of caricature. This is an authorial power-play which brings about the
end of dialogue. There is nothing wrong with caricature in itself, but if a conversation is to
take place the point it makes must also be supported by argument. I do not know how to
engage with someone who makes his points only by caricature; he wins a Pyhrric victory,
gaining control of the conversation by killing it.156
154 Moore, God's Gym, 139.
155 See, e.g., Catherine Pickstock's extended argument that Derrida simply got the reasons for the
privileging of speech over writing in Plato's Phaedrus wrong, (Catherine Pickstock, After Writing. On
the Liturgical Consummation ofPhilosophy [Oxford: Blackwell, 1998], 3-46); see also our own brief
response to Derrida's reading of Rousseau, in chapter 1.
156 Michael LaFargue expresses this point well: '[t]he contemporary scene, dominated as it is by a
plurality of contending viewpoints, fosters a style of discourse in which the merely rhetorical
furthering of one's favoured cause prevails... . In this situation, the allegedly indeterminate,
"polysemic" character of the biblical text, and the necessity of a "fusion of horizons," easily become
welcome excuses neither to take the otherness of the biblical text seriously nor to submit oneself to its
challenges. ... This is a formula for nondialogue and cynicism', (Michael LaFargue, 'Are Texts
Determinate? Derrida, Barth, and the Role of the Biblical Scholar' Harvard Theological Review 81
[1988], 341-57 [357]).
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The overturning of structures: inversion or subversion? An irony is evident here
which represents a second ethical criticism of Moore's approach to authors and texts.
Moore wishes to expose the God of the Bible as the projection of male narcissism - one
who oppresses and subjugates while striving to keep out of view those features (remember
Yahweh's breasts) which would reveal him to be the fraud Moore thinks he is.
Yet Moore's intertextual reading, by which he claims for himself absolute control over
a stunning breadth of texts, employs an identical strategy. Although in his text we glimpse
evidence that the Bible resists his intertextual reading strategy, Moore, the master-reader,
sweeps this evidence aside with a flick of his mighty arm, and asks us to trust his
intertextual authority. Moore's reader blesses texts and curses texts, setting them against
one another and in alliance with one another, as surely as Yahweh does the nations.
Moore's strategical move, therefore, to counter the hyper-masculine deity he despises is to
exalt himself as a 'hyper-divine' reader.157
This ironic analogy between Moore and Yahweh (as Moore sees him) also extends to a
gesture of apparent humility which each makes. At one point, Moore accuses Yahweh of
attempting to shore up his crumbling power by appearing to humble himself on the cross, a
master-stroke of feigned weakness designed only to trick us into succumbing to his power
still further; in God's (and especially Paul's) hands the ignominy of the cross becomes
another instrument of oppression, as by the 'disciplinary technology' of the cross 'the
Christian slave is disciplined and kept in line'.158 In an identical move, Moore tries to
disguise the apotheosis of his Bible-reader by lacing his texts with compelling
autobiographical snippets, as we have seen, invoking our pity at the ugly wounds which
Yahweh has inflicted on him. We have seen that Moore has indeed been very damaged by
his earlier attachment to Christianity; the reader is left perhaps pitying him, and certainly
admiring him for his honesty in an academic work. But that is exactly how Moore wants
it.159 Whenever the reader begins to suspect that Moore is as obsessed with power as his
version of Yahweh is, he feeds us with another glimpse of the pain and struggles he has
endured at the hands of Christianity, and we are again rendered subservient, disciplined and
kept in line, as Moore-the-hyper-divine-reader hides behind the mask ofMoore-the-pitiable-
victim-of-Yahweh-and-Jesus.
157 It has been argued that Foucault falls into a similar trap. Anthony Thiselton notes that 'Baudrillard
accuses Foucault's work ofmirroring 'the power it describes ... Foucault's discourse is no truer than
any other", (Anthony C. Thiselton, Interpreting God and the Postmodern Self. On Meaning,
Manipulation and Promise [Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1995], 144).
158 Moore, God's Gym, 25. This is the theme of ch.l of God's Gym. Moore's parenthetical
interpolations to the biblical phrase 'in God's own Son' are especially striking: 'in(mates of) God's
own (pri)son', (Moore, God's Gym, 29).
159 Cf. Moore's comment on what he sees as Yahweh's use of masculine pronouns for himself to
obscure his female side: 'But that is exactly how Yahweh wants it', (Moore, God's Gym, 102).
135
In an insightful work on the relation between deconstruction and feminist biblical
criticism, David Rutledge seems to be more conscious than Moore of the irony of
deconstructive practices leading to the oppression of others, and tries to defuse its impact:
'In the practice of feminist deconstruction, then, the interpreter claims the power to mean, or
signify, while simultaneously relinquishing that power in the knowledge that the desired
attribution of centrality or authority to her "egalitarian" discourse will serve only to
marginalise somebody else's'. (It is noteworthy that Rutledge thinks that this interpretive
dynamic is at work even in the milder non-'wild-side' deconstruction he practises on the
early chapters of Genesis in the last chapter of his book.) Rutledge, though, does not
explain how this (or any) power can simultaneously be claimed and relinquished.160
In short, Moore's approach to texts and authors condemns him forever to repeat and re-
enact the structures against which he fights. He thus falls far short of the goal which
Derrida sets for deconstructive discourse, because he ends up inverting rather than
subverting (deconstructing) the structures with which he engages. Where Yahweh
dominated the reader, Moore's reader attempts to gain dominance over Yahweh, but the
structure of dominance and submission is retained. Moore's text avoids the daunting
Derridean challenge that the deconstructive reader demonstrate how the text itself subverts
the very structures on which it is built - a challenge set in order to protect the reader from
simply authorising himself to say 'just anything'.
Moore's Bible-reader is guilty of one other serious power-play - one which
undermines his whole enterprise. The target of Derrida's deconstruction is the foundations
of Western metaphysics. Moore assumes for himself the right to read the results of this
deconstruction of the Western philosophical tradition back into the canonical Hebrew
scriptures, taking no account of the possibility that these texts have philosophical and
theological origins different from those ofWestern philosophical texts. Derrida reaches the
point where he claims to understand his own inherited philosophical tradition profoundly,
and argues that it falls apart on its own terms, within its own discourse.161 Moore, in a move
quite different from Derrida's, takes it upon himself to read Derrida's deconstructive
conclusions on the Western tradition which he shares with Derrida back into someone else's
non-Western tradition. David Tracy comments aptly: 'Without the wider conversations of
others ... the postmoderns - proud and ironic in their centerlessness - will be tempted not
to heal the breach they expose in Western modernity. Having killed the modem subject,
they too must now face their own temptation to drag all reality into the laughing abyss of
160 David Rutledge, Reading Marginally. Feminism, Deconstruction and the Bible (Leiden: E.J. Brill,
1996), 101.
161 Because of his Jewish ancestry and place of birth (north Africa), Derrida stands both inside and
outside the Western tradition.
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that centerless, subjectless, but very Western labyrinth'.162 At one point Moore in fact
suggests that the Gospel of Luke, at least, 'subtly or utterly, is other to such [Western
metaphysical] categories [as voice and presence]'.163 If the biblical texts are other to such
categories, they also other to a reading-strategy founded on their deconstruction. The hyper-
divine reader ignores this kind ofwarning, like all cultural imperialists.
4.3.2.2. Moore, Derrida, authors and ethics: supplementing Hirsch
Some of the above is my own deconstructive reading of Moore. Since I have been critical
of his brand of deconstruction, I need to explain my intention. I have attempted to
demonstrate that the autobiographical elements of Moore's work can coherently be read
with as much Foucauldian suspicion as Moore employs in his reading of the 'bodies' of the
biblical Yahweh and the biblical Jesus. This does not prove that Moore is a hypocrite; I
have no reason to doubt that he is happy for others to do to him as he does to others.
Instead, my intention is to suggest not that Foucault was right but simply that this is not an
ethical way, that is, a way appropriate to the human nature of authors and readers, to
approach a text. In the end, God's Gym does not give me sufficient reason to pursue Moore,
as Moore pursues the biblical Yahweh, into the Foucauldian abyss of suspicion.164 I wish to
argue instead that a reader who employs Moore's general reading strategy of 'uncovering by
caricature' what he claims to be the real biblical Yahweh dehumanises both himself and the
authors of the texts he reads. He does this both by ignoring the author's actual human
agency, acting towards and upon him, in authoring the text, and by running a great risk
himself, for the reader who wants to save his life by divinising himselfmay lose it.
Further, Moore assumes, perhaps understandably, that the particular interpretations of
Yahweh and of Jesus which have oppressed him in the past are identical to the Yahweh and
the Jesus of the biblical texts. He closes in on himself, and remains deaf to the possibility
that the biblical texts might say something other than what his past experiences have led
him to think they are saying.165 The text is other to him, but he has already decided that it is
an other to be fought, not listened to. The negotiations are over; war has been declared, and
162 David Tracy, On Naming the Present. God, Hermeneuties, and Church (London: SCM, 1994), 21.
163 Moore, Mark and Luke, 101-102.
164 But perhaps I might have more reason to suspect Moore than Moore does to suspect the biblical
God, since there is no tradition which witnesses to Moore offering his life in self-giving sacrifice on
behalf of his readers.
165 Norris's comment on some of the textual interpretations of the ('wild-side') deconstmctive critic
Geoffrey Hartman could also be applied to much ofMoore's work on the Bible: 'they remain fixed at
a level of self-occupied rhetorical juggling', (Norris, Deconstruction, 99). If this is an accurate
description of Moore's work, then his accusation that the biblical God is a narcissistic projection
rather rebounds on him.
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there will be no more talking; this is a fight to the death between critic and Yahweh.166
Comparing the work of biblical scholarship to medical dissection, (the theme of chapter 2 of
God's Gym), Moore concludes: 'If what I have been arguing about the Bible is indeed the
case - that its God is a singularly pure projection of the will to power - then the biblical
critic might have no choice but to clutch his or her scalpel defensively, to brandish it
threateningly, as the hypermasculine hulk that is the biblical God lumbers across the
examining room."67
There are perhaps times in history when such an approach is justified; many would
support the concept of a just war. But if a war is to be deemed 'just', those who wage it
must be very certain that their adversary has first been listened to, comprehended, and
judged on the basis of his own words and actions, not someone else's. That is no less the
task of textual interpretation than it is of international diplomacy, and it is not the task of a
few moments. Those who fight the Bible must show that they have first listened to it - not
to texts to which it bears some resemblance, not to particular interpretations of it, but to it,
the text which individual writers and writing-communities have produced, in all its
profundity and complexity.168 Derrida can be found requiring something like this from
literary critics, demanding from them a 'prudent, differentiated, slow, stratified' reading169 -
a reading which, explains Norris, recognises 'the specific differences of logic and sense that
166 At one point Moore intriguingly suggests a different relationship between himself and the biblical
texts. Referring punningly and neologistically to his own Joycean pun-filled reading of the Gospels
of Mark and Luke, he says that, 'since we are stuck with them, and stuck in them, we might jest for
once readjoyce in them. Like Derrida, I love very much everything that I have deconstricted, with a
love that is ambivalent and ambidextrous', (Moore, Mark and Luke, 154). Does God's Gym abandon
this relationship, or reveal love to be stranger than we thought? Cf. Vanhoozer's opposing conception
of what it is to 'love' a text, which is similar to Jesus' identification of love and obedience (John
14.21): 'insofar as concerns interpretation, loving and obeying the text may amount to much the same
thing', (Vanhoozer, Is There a Meaning, 437).
167 Moore, God's Gym, 139.
168 Rutledge rejects the essentialist view of textual meaning which this argument presupposes as guilty
by association with oppressive practices, particularly those directed against women. He argues that
essentialism too often treats texts in the same way that women are treated in patriarchal societies,
either 'to be approached with holy dread or at least reverent caution' or 'still fascinating but
accessible by means of rational, analytical inquiry into its nature', (Rutledge, Reading Marginally,
62). Each of these approaches has certainly been used by oppressors against those they would
oppress, but in themselves they are not necessarily oppressive. If at least 'reverent caution'
characterized our inter personal relationships more profoundly than it docs at present, oppression of
all kinds would be much less common. Cf. LaFargue's very different vision of the role of the biblical
scholar, which is much closer to the one suggested here, (although it is perhaps not necessary to
ascribe uniquely to professional scholarship the vital role which LaFargue prescribes for it): '... to be
the servant of the biblical text, to guard its otherness, to help make its substantive content something
modern people can in some way experience and understand, in its particularity and its otherness As
scholar, the biblical researcher has this invaluable and irreplaceable expertise and role to perform, and
it should be done self-effacingly', (LaFargue, 'Are Texts Determinate?', 355).
169 Quoted in Norris, Derrida, 25.
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mark one text off from another'.170 Then such readers will be able to engage in meaningful
dialogue with those who read the Bible differently, or have experienced its effects
differently in their lives. Similarly, conservative biblical interpreters who wish to reject
rigorously argued deconstructive conclusions are (ethically) obliged to respond with an even
more rigorous reading of the Bible. They have no excuse but to be more careful readers of
the Bible - that is, more obedient listeners to the author's voice - than anyone else. This
is not the special pleading of a special biblical hermeneutics, but a general ethics of
interpretation to be applied to every reader of every text.
The outcome of this analysis of Moore's rigorous application of post-modem hostility
to authors to a reading of the Bible - his outrageous supplementation of the Bible with
certain intertexts - is the conclusion that the most far-reaching criticisms of his work are
ethical ones. Hirsch's decision to avoid ethical arguments to support his position looks
quite puny in the face ofMoore's violent assault. 'Communicative action calls not only for
hermeneutic rationality but also for communicative ethics'; Vanhoozer's comment explains
the gap in Hirsch's defence of the author.171
It may be objected that in choosing to respond to Moore's extreme position a false
dilemma has been established: one does not have to agree with our criticisms of Hirsch to
find Moore's work objectionable. However, Moore's work represents a rigorous working
through of the logic of the loosening of ontological ties between texts and authors in which
Hirsch implicates himself. If one does not care that literary scholarship appear respectable
before the bar of some supposed objectivity, as Moore profoundly does not, then Hirsch's
single restraining principle in textual interpretation simply has no purchase. If Hirsch's
exegetical practice does not end up like Moore's, that is not because he has well-founded
reasons for stopping short of 'extremism', but because, among other reasons, he happens to
favour critical consensus, whereas Moore seems actually to enjoy picking critical fights.
This is a difference which could be put down to temperament as much as to anything else,
and especially to past experience of the texts in question. Moore's work, therefore, might
best described as 'radical', rather than 'extreme'. It is a deliberate attempt to rub biblical
critics' noses in the messy logical consequences of the hermeneutical decisions which they
170 Norris, Derrida, 25. Where Derrida does argue explicitly in favour of intertextual reading, he
erects a parenthetical waming-sign, past which the juggernaut of God's Gym rushes regardless: 'the
text overruns all the limits assigned to it so far (not submerging or drowning them in undifferentiated
homogeneity, but rather in making them more complex...)', (Jacques Derrida, 'Living On: Border
Lines', in Harold Bloom et al., Deconstruction and Criticism [London & Henley: Routledge & Kegan
Paul, 1979], 75-176 [84], [italics added]).
171 Vanhoozer, Is There a Meaning, 350. See also, interestingly, Derrida: 'I am convinced that speech
act theory is fundamentally and in its most fecund, most rigorous and most interesting aspects ... a
theory of right or law, of convention, of political ethics or of politics as ethics', (Derrida, Limited Inc,
97).
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took some time ago, but which they are unwilling to face up to;172 Moore himself happens
to find wallowing in the mire quite delightful.173 To choose Moore as a dialogue-partner is
therefore not to attack a straw-man, but to demonstrate that a radical defence of the author-
text relationship is best forged through a dialogue (or fight?) with the most radical attempt
to undo that relationship. The final section of this chapter will utilise this ethical defence of
authorship in reconstructing an understanding of the Bible as 'sufficient'.
4.4. Supplementing Readers
Before coming to the final section, it is necessary to examine the other side of the
'relationality' of texts - the relationship between texts and readers. The work of two
writers will briefly be studied - the literary critic Stanley Fish and the theologian Stanley
Flauerwas - who supplement texts with readers in order to account for textual meaning.
That is, they elide the author's illocutionary act into the text's perlocutionary effect. Then
Hans-Georg Gadamer's hermeneutical project will be outlined, as it touches on textual
meaning, and it will be argued that, although not as apparently subjectivist as the account of
textual meaning offered by Fish and Hauerwas, his philosophical description of
hermeneutics is rightly located with their work.
172 This claim cannot be defended in detail here. The basic suggestion is that when biblical scholars
began to see the meaning of the text as not the intention of its author (human and divine), but as the
myth it represented, the historical events it simultaneously witnessed to and obscured, or the religious
psychology it reflected, this breaking of the ontological link between textual meaning and authorial
intention set in motion a chain of reactive hermeneutical moves which can be traced through to
deconstructive reading-practices. Very broadly, the historical-critical objectification of the author,
treating him not as the source of a voice to be heard but as an object of study, shades into redaction
criticism's increasing interest in the literary features of the texts in their present form. Comparative
textual features are regarded as indicative of broad authorial/rcdactive intentions - but these are not
intentions which address readers. The objectified author drops quietly (because now voice-less) out
of sight (and ear-shot) as redaction criticism gives rise to a variety of quasi-formalist narrative
criticisms. Consequently, when some express frustration at the lack of 'personal' elements in biblical
interpretation, the only live subject on the scene available for consideration is the reader. However,
when human subjectivity reappears in this form, it is not, as previously when the author's subjectivity
was taken into account, human subjectivity set in active inter-subjective relations, but a self-regarding
human subject, or collection of subjectivities, not receiving meaning through an address from outside
but creating meaning from within. This, established as the only bulwark against interpretive anarchy,
cannot hold because human subjectivity, when thus depicted as autonomous, proves too fractured to
provide a sufficiently strong hermeneutical foundation, and is easy prey to, and even invites,
deconstructive undoing. The breaking of the reader's inter-subjective links with the author as
significant in textual interpretation can thus be seen to lead logically, if not perhaps inevitably, to the
rigorous critique by deconstruction of a set of proposed hermeneutical foundations which are not up
to the task.
173 Moore suggests that too much 'biblical anal(ysis)' is 'anally retentive', (Moore, Mark and Luke,
146-49).
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4.4.1. Stanley Fish: Sufficient Readers
The essays which form Fish's collection, Is There a Text In This Class? The Authority of
Interpretive Communities (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard Univ. Press, 1980),
document his move from a position which owed a great deal to New Criticism through what
he calls the crucial anti-formalist step of giving up the notion that the text's formal patterns
exist independently of the reader's experience.174 His primary observation, and the catalyst
for this step, is that textual meaning is necessarily constructed in a temporal process by the
activity of readers: 'I challenged the self-sufficiency of the text by pointing out that its
(apparently) spatial form belied the temporal dimension in which its meanings were
actualized.'175 'Meaning' can therefore be said to reside only in the experiences of the
reader.
Fish attempts to demonstrate the truth of this claim with a description of the reader's
experience in reading a certain line from Milton's Lycidas: "He must not float upon his
wat'ry bier/ Unwept...". Fish observes that at the end of the first line the reader is
anticipating a call to action - to prevent the death of a certain character - an anticipation
which the first word of the next line, 'Unwept', takes away. His analysis is that, on
encountering this word, the reader must 'unresolve' the speaker's intention he had inferred
at the end of the previous line, and resolve a new one, at the same time as he picks out the
formal pattern of ends and beginnings of lines. 'This, then, is my thesis: that the form of
the reader's experience, formal units, and the structure of intention are one, that they come
into view simultaneously, and that therefore the questions of priority and independence do
not arise.'176
Gerald Graff points out that Fish makes an unwarranted logical leap. It does not follow
from the temporal nature of the reading process, as Fish wishes to conclude, 'that literary
meanings are not prepositional, much less not referential .... To hold that the temporality of
the reading process cancels the prepositional force of a discourse is in its own way as much
of a reduction as to hold that this process can always be neatly encompassed by a
proposition.'177 Fish confuses epistemology with ontology, reducing the latter into the
former; however, the fact that our access to linguistic meaning, and to the formal literary
structures which mediate that meaning, is never instantaneous, but requires an encounter
with words in a temporal sequence, does not mean that a sentence or text considered as a
174 Stanley Fish, Is There A Text In This Class? The Authority of Interpretive Communities
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard Univ. Press, 1980), 7, 12.
175 Fish, Is There A Text, 2.
176 Fish, Is There A Text, 164-65.
177 Gerald Graff, 'How Not to Talk about Fictions', in Graff, Literature Against Itself, 151-80 (167).
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whole - a whole glimpsed by reflection on the temporal sequence - does not contain
reader-independent structures and meanings.178
It might seem, indeed, that the example from Lycidas counts against Fish's argument,
for, as he is aware, it could be construed as an example of a text containing 'a formal
encoding, not perhaps of meanings, but of the directions for making them, for executing
interpretive strategies'. Fish rejects this, arguing that 'they will only be directions to those
who already have the interpretive strategies in the first place. Rather than producing
interpretive acts, they are the product of one.'179 Again, a false conclusion is based on a
correct observation. Fish acknowledges that we never encounter anything in a text
immediately; we can never by-pass our acts of interpretation. Textual features which we
take to be directions of how to interpret the text only become such directions for us once we
have interpreted them to be such. This is unobjectionable to all except the most naive
realist. Yet it does not follow from this that that which we perceive only by means of
interpretation is only ever a product of our interpretation. Fish does not demonstrate what
his position must require him to demonstrate: that that which can only be known through
structures of interpretation cannot be said to be reality external to the knower. In short, Fish
offers only two options: positivism and solipsism. Seeing the obvious weaknesses of the
former, he pitches towards the latter.
Fish again anticipates the objection, and rejects the accusation of solipsism and
relativism, invoking his concept of 'interpretive communities' as a barrier against these
dangers: 'if, rather than acting on their own, interpreters act as extensions of an institutional
community, solipsism and relativism are removed as fears because they are not possible
modes of being.'180 He anticipates a particular objection here: how do I know that I am a
member of the same interpretive community as another person? How do I know that what I
perceive to be an 'interpretive community' of which I am a part is itself not simply the
creation ofmy own interpretive structures? Fish acknowledges that we can know, although
never with certainty: 'The only "proof' ofmembership is fellowship, the nod of recognition
from someone in the same community, someone who says to you what neither of us could
ever prove to a third party: "we know.'"181 The inconsistency of this - which seems to
provide a rather 'gnostic' basis to the concept of an interpretive community - with the rest
178 Kevin Vanhoozer suggests, against a view of meaning such as Fish's, that the belief that the
intention of an author is incarnated in a text as its meaning does not have to be proven, but is,
borrowing an epistemological concept from Alvin Plantinga, 'properly basic': 'we do not first
observe bodily movements from which we then infer intentions; we simply infer intentional action.
Similarly, we do not read one word after another and then infer a pattern; we simply read poetry',
(Vanhoozer, Is There a Meaning, 290).
179 Fish, Is There A Text, 173.
180 Fish, Is There A Text, 321.
181 Fish, Is There A Text, 173.
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of Fish's work is clear: Paul Noble judges that '[rjesorting in this way to mystical 'nods of
recognition' and empathetic acknowledgements is, of course, totally illegitimate, since it
violates Fish's own fundamental principle that there is nothing that we perceive or
apprehend as an uninterpreted 'given.'"82
Fish's concept of 'the authority of interpretive communities' is given practical
expression in biblical studies in the introduction to the first volume of David Clines'
commentary on the book of Job. In the introduction to this commentary Clines offers
outlines of possible feminist, vegetarian, materialist and Christian readings of Job. He
justifies this with the following:
the combination of the reader's own interests, values, and commitments is what
makes him or her a person with identity and integrity; in no activity of life, and
certainly not in reading the Bible, can one hide or abandon one's values
without doing violence to one's own integrity. If one is, for example, a feminist
pacifist vegetarian - which are quite serious things to be, even if they are
modish - it will be important to oneself to ask what the text has to say, or fails
to say, about these issues.183
Clines says that as readers we cannot hide or abandon our values without compromising
our integrity; it seems hard to disagree. However, the reasonableness of this statement
masks Clines' failure to note that hiding and abandoning one's values are very different
kinds of readerly activity. A reader who hides her values is indeed attempting the
impossible task of coming to the text as someone other than herself, or as a kind of empty
'non-person'. However, to abandon one's values, or to find them modified in the process of
reading the text, may not at all be to lose one's identity and integrity. A reader who
abandons her values might have been brought to that point by a text which has addressed
her, has illuminated her previously-held values in unexpected ways and shown her that they
were perhaps trivial, or simply wrong. Far from such an abandonment representing an act
of 'violence' to one's integrity, as Clines supposes, it would, if followed by the adoption of
more truthful values, represent a move towards integrity. To be addressed by a text in such
a way, a reader in fact must not hide her values, for it is hard to change that which one keeps
hidden away. Within Clines' implicit neo-pragmatic model, however, which borrows
heavily from Fish, it is far from clear how a text could ever induce a reader to abandon her
values, for in her reading she seems doomed simply to inscribe her value-systems onto the
texts which she reads. Frank Lentricchia assesses Fish's hermeneutics quite sharply on this
182 Faul R. Noble, The Canonical Approach. A Critical Reconstruction ofthe Hermeneutics ofBrevard
S. Childs (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1995), 211-12.
183 David J.A. Clines, Job 1-20 Word Biblical Commentary 17 (Dallas, Texas: Word, 1989), xlvii,
(italics added). Jeffrey Stout puts this point in a quite radical manner: 'Meanings, if they exist, could
turn out to be the least interesting thing about texts. What matters is that a reading tells us something
interesting about the text under scrutiny', (Jeffrey Stout, 'What is The Meaning of a Text?' New
Literary History 14 [1982], 1-12 [7]). By this, he means: 'something we find interesting'.
143
point: '[Fish] posits an intersubjective idealism which amounts to a solipsism that wipes out
the past as it promises the oldest of Western maxims - know thyself - in its most
emasculated form, directing us to know ourselves in the absence of dialogue.'184
If Fish's claims about textual meaning are cast in terms of the conceptualities provided
by speech-act theory, his basic claims can be understood with particular clarity. We have
noted above Fish's claim that texts cannot be said to contain directions which guide the
interpretive activity of readers, since these directions, '[rjather than producing interpretive
acts, ... are the products of one.'185 Since the textual directions for guiding interpretation are
an aspect of the illocutionary act as it is incarnated in the text, and since the recognition by
the interpreter of these directions is part of the coming about of what Austin called the
'uptake' (understanding) of the illocutionary act, then Fish's point becomes equivalent to a
claim that only if 'uptake' is successfully brought about can the illocutionary act be said to
exist. That is, an utterance only counts as the performance of a particular illocutionary act if
someone recognises it as such. This problematic claim has already been discussed with
regard to J.L. Austin in chapter 3. It is a claim which is at least counter-intuitive, in most
cases. Few speakers or writers regard the very existence of their illocutionary acts as
dependent on others coming to understand their meaning and force - their effectiveness,
yes; but not their existence. Fish therefore offers a hermeneutics of the semantic self-
sufficiency of the reader: the author's locutions (merely inscribed words) are necessarily
supplemented by the illocutionary/perlocutionary activity of the reader, now become a
writer. This results, as Lentricchia argued, in a very reduced ('emasculated') account of
human being and knowing.
4.4.2. Stanley Hauerwas: The Sufficient Church
Stanley Hauerwas' theological conception of the church's relationship to the Bible bears
particular similarities to Fish's basic hermeneutical position. In a book specifically on the
Bible, he attempts to justify the assertion that '[t]he Bible is not and should not be
accessible to merely anyone, but rather it should only be made available to those who have
undergone the hard discipline of existing as part of God's people."86 He accuses both
liberal biblical critics and fundamentalists of making the same mistake. They 'share the
assumption that the text of the Bible should make rational sense (to anyone), apart from the
184 Lentricchia, After the New Criticism, 148.
185 Fish, Is There A Text, 173.
186 Stanley Hauerwas, Unleashing the Scriptures.
(Nashville: Abingdon, 1980), 9.
Freeing the Bible from Captivity to America
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uses that the Church has for Scripture.'187 They both 'wish to make Christianity available to
the person of common sense without moral transformation.'188
Moreover, the meaning of Scripture is for Hauerwas not the original meaning intended
by the author, but the meaning for the church in the use to which it puts Scripture: 'The
Church returns time and time again to Scripture not because it is trying to find the
Scripture's true meaning, but because Christians believe that God has promised to speak
through Scripture so that the Church will remain capable of living faithful [sic} by
remembering well.'189 Of course, the Reformers, for example, did not see these as two
separate options, but sought the Bible's 'true' meaning precisely because they thought that
this was the meaning through which God had promised to speak. Hauerwas, though,
concludes that the Reformation concept of sola Scriptura, as it has come to be applied in
many Protestant churches, 'is a heresy rather than a help in the Church', since it is used 'to
underwrite the distinction between text and interpretation'.190
Hauerwas explains that his claim is that sola Scriptura has become a heresy, saying that
for the Reformers it represented an important protest. However, he does not make clear
wherein he thinks this importance lay. This is a problem, because a fundamental aspect of
this Reformation protest was precisely a determined effort to disentangle text and (church)
interpretation. Hauerwas' comparison of contemporary and historical Protestant treatment
of the Bible is therefore not sufficiently careful at this point. In fact, while the Reformers
share with many modern Protestants, including liberals and fundamentalists, the belief that
text and interpretation should ultimately be kept distinct, they worked this distinction out in
the context of a great respect for the subordinate authority of creeds, councils and the
history of biblical interpretation. It may indeed be argued, as Hauerwas wishes to argue,
that this is a context of which some groups of contemporary Protestants have lost sight. It is
this loss which, on the fundamentalist side, has led to a significant schismatic tendency,
evidenced in the invoking of the authority of claims made by small and apparently
autonomous groups of Christians for their own unchecked readings of certain biblical texts.
Hauerwas rightly fears such tendencies - as, of course, did the Reformers before him. He
wrongly and simplistically implies that an inevitable link exists between distinguishing text
from interpretation, and both schismatic tendencies based on eccentric interpretations of
details of biblical texts and rationalistic views of the Bible as equally comprehensible to all.
One can introduce a distinction between text and interpretation for reasons other than
those which motivate the practices of fundamentalism and liberalism, as the Reformers and
187 Hauerwas, Unleashing the Scriptures, 18.
188 Hauerwas, Unleashing the Scriptures, 36.
189 Hauerwas, Unleashing the Scriptures, 36.
190 Hauerwas, Unleashing the Scriptures, 27.
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many of their successors constantly demonstrate. By declaring Scripture to be 'sufficient'
and 'self-interpreting', orthodox Protestant theology was not generally trying to claim that
the Bible will make rational sense to all-comers, which is what Hauerwas accuses
fundamentalists and liberals of trying to justify. Protestant orthodoxy may have moved in
this direction in the seventeenth, eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, but rationalism rarely
overwhelmed the Reformation emphasis on the testimony of the Holy Spirit to the truth of
Scripture.191 In a sermon on the events on the Emmaus road narrated in Luke 24.13-35,
Hauerwas states that 'the story of the Emmaus road makes clear that knowing the Scripture
does little good unless we know it as part of a people constituted by the practices of a
resurrected Lord. So Scripture will not be self-interpreting or plain in its meaning unless we
have been transformed in order to be capable of reading it.'192 The published sermon from
which this quotation is taken is entitled, 'The Insufficiency of Scripture: Why Discipleship
is Required'. He makes participation in a practising Christian community the sufficient
condition for the understanding of the Bible. Apart from interpretive supplementation by
such a community, Scripture remains locution; it is within the 'perlocutionary' community
that locution becomes Elocution.
However, the orthodox Protestant doctrine of the sufficiency of Scripture does not make
the claim it must be construed as making ifHauerwas' rejection of it is to have any merit. It
does not exclude the necessity of the reader being transformed by the Holy Spirit in order
that his reading of Scripture not lead to a misreading. The Protestant orthodox doctrine of
Scripture does not think of Scripture as stooping to us to the extent that, as a text apart from
certain contexts of interpretation, it nullifies all the hermeneutical problems created by
human failure to be 'up to' its content. This erroneous view would tear Scripture from both
the trinitarian context in which the Reformers always tried to locate it (particularly in
relation to the Holy Spirit), and the ecclesial context which they tried to rework in the
aftermath of medieval theology, but which they never regarded as unnecessary. As
Vanhoozer comments on this argument of Hauerwas': 'This is unfortunate and
unnecessary. We can agree with Hauerwas that spiritual training is a vital part of biblical
interpretation, not because it creates the meaning of a text, but because it helps us to
discover and to recognize the meaning that is already there'.193
Hauerwas in effect falls into the arms of Fish, then, because he thinks that all attempts
to declare Scripture sufficient for something, based on an attempt to distinguish text and
interpretation, are necessarily implicated in recent liberal Protestant and fundamentalist
practice in Europe and North America. That he does not seriously reflect on the differences
191 This point will recur in more detail in the discussion of biblical inspiration in chapter 5.
192 Hauerwas, Unleashing the Scriptures, 49.
193 Vanhoozer, Is There a Meaning, 379.
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between some contemporary Protestant practice and the Reformation origins of the
Protestant tradition might be regarded as an enactment of the tendency inherent in Fish's
hermeneutics to write contemporary values and views over those of the past.
4.4.3. Hans-Georg Gadamer: Understanding in Tradition
To include the philosopher Hans-Georg Gadamer alongside Fish and Hauerwas in a section
on the supplementation of texts with readers is rather controversial, for Gadamer's
philosophical hermeneutics, as expressed in his magnum opus, Truth and Method, is
variously interpreted. Thiselton argues that Gadamer, in transcending the Enlightenment
rejection of tradition and authority merely qua tradition and authority, succeeds in offering
an account of understanding as not leading to 'the kind of fusion in which critical distance
and tension is entirely swallowed up.'194 Georgia Warnke similarly distances Gadamer from
Fish (as well as from Hirsch), detecting in his hermeneutics 'a peculiar oscillation' between
a view of the text as presenting an external challenge to its readers, and a view of it as doing
so in a way which is entirely contingent upon the readers' understanding of its truth.195
Vanhoozer, by contrast, regards Gadamer as 'abandoning] realism in favor of
pragmatism'.196
As is widely observed, the title Truth and Method is ironic, for Gadamer is precisely not
interested in prescribing an interpretive methodology; his aim is to describe philosophically
how understanding is possible, without falling into what he sees as the mistakes of
Romantic hermeneutics. Where Schleiermacher had advocated that interpreters strive to
understand the author better than he understood himself, Gadamer asserts: 'it is true in
every case that a person who understands, understands himself, projecting himself upon his
possibilities. Traditional hermeneutics has inappropriately narrowed the horizon to which
understanding belongs.'197 For Gadamer, the subjectivity which a reader brings to a text,
formed in large part out of the reader's location in a tradition - what he calls the reader's
'prejudices and fore-meanings' - does not hinder understanding, but is a necessary
condition of it.198
What Warnke calls the 'peculiar oscillation' between subjective and objective views of
textual meaning, Gadamer himself calls a 'tension' or 'play', and it is precisely here that he
194 Anthony C. Thiselton, The Two Horizons. New Testament Hermeneutics and Philosophical
Description with Special Reference to Heidegger, Bultmann, Gadamer and Wittgenstein (Exeter:
Paternoster, 1980), 305-308.
195 Georgia Warnke, Gadamer. Hermeneutics, Tradition and Reason (Stanford, California: Stanford
Univ. Press, 1987), 48, 98-99.
196 Vanhoozer, Is There a Meaning, 409.
197 Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method 2nd rev. edn, trans, rev. Joel Weinsheimer & Donald G.
Marshall (New York: Crossroad, 1990), 260-61.
198 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 295-96.
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locates the hermeneutical question: 'there is a tension. It is in the play between the
traditionary text's strangeness and familiarity to us, between being a historically intended,
distanciated object and belonging to a tradition. The true locus of hermeneutics is this in-
between.'199 Gadamer speaks of the 'real meaning of a text, as it speaks to the interpreter',
and of the co-determination of meaning 'by the historical situation of the interpreter and
hence by the totality of the objective course of history.'200 The apparent objectivity of
meaning referred to here is a function of only one interpreter's apprehension of the text;
Gadamer continues, in direct contradiction of Schleiermacher: 'Understanding is not, in
fact, understanding better, ... in the sense of superior knowledge of the subject .... It is
enough to say that we understand in a different way, if we understand at all.,20{ 'Real
meaning' for Gadamer must therefore mean 'real meanings'.
The same dynamic is at work in Gadamer's famous notion of the 'fusion of horizons',
the horizons of the text and the reader, which expresses the fact that '[pjart of real
understanding ... is that we regain the concepts of a historical past in such a way that they
also include our own comprehension of them.'202 Gadamer insists that the horizons which
are fused do not in fact have prior existence independently of one another: 'There is no
more an isolated horizon of the present in itself than there are historical horizons which
have to be acquired. Rather, understanding is always the fusion of these horizons
supposedly existing by themselves.' That is, the horizons we are to conceive of as being
'fused' together in the process of understanding are always/already 'confused'. Gadamer
himself raises the question: why then speak of a fusion of horizons, and not of the
formation of a single horizon? His answer restates what, we have seen, is for him the locus
of hermeneutics: 'Every encounter with tradition that takes place within historical
consciousness involves the experience of a tension between the text and the present', and
hermeneutics may not cover over this tension.203
One of the things at stake for Gadamer in the insistence that this tension not be
overlooked, as he thinks Romantic hermeneutics overlooked it, is best seen in his construal
of the act of reading a historical text as the posing of contemporary questions to a text which
itself is the answer given by an ancient author to ancient questions. It is here that
Gadamer's account of textual meaning sounds particularly neo-pragmatic. He argues:
understanding is always more than merely re-creating someone else's meaning.
Questioning opens up possibilities of meaning, and thus what is meaningful
passes into one's own thinking on the subject. Only in an inauthentic sense can
199 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 295, (original italics removed).
200 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 296, (italics added). He also refers to 'the true meaning of a text',
(298, [italic added]).
201 Gadamer, Truth andMethod, 296-97.
202 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 374.
203 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 306.
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we talk about understanding questions that one does not pose oneself - e.g.,
questions that are outdated or empty ... [for example, perpetual motion]. ... To
understand a question means to ask it. To understand meaning is to understand
it as the answer to a question.204
First, Gadamer is of course right to say that outdated and empty questions do exist -
such as the scientific one which he gives as an example. However, by no means all
historical texts are answers to such questions. Literary and religious texts, for example, give
answers to questions about the human condition which may have trans-historical validity,
which accounts in large measure for the regular occurrence of contemporary readers being
gripped by the content of old texts.
Second, in its argument that it is inauthentic to talk about 'understanding' questions that
one has not asked oneself, Gadamer's statement is strikingly similar to David Clines'
assertion, discussed above as an example of neo-pragmatic hermeneutics in biblical studies,
that 'in no activity of life, and certainly not in reading the Bible, can one hide or abandon
one's values without doing violence to one's own integrity'.205 Unlike Clines, Gadamer
does want to preserve the text in its integral relation to the reader as an address from
outside. He also sees this as a move beyond Romantic hermeneutics: 'a text is not
understood as a mere expression of life but is taken seriously in its claim to truth.'206 He
assumes, however, that this relation will be 'inauthentic' as an event of understanding for
me if the content of the text is not transformed into an answer to questions which / am
asking, which are the only 'real' questions: 'reconstructing the question to which the
meaning of a text is understood as an answer merges with our own questioning. For the text
must be understood as an answer to a real question'.207 Such a transformation may well take
the form of what we may call 'illocutionary authorship': the reader writes his own
illocutionary force onto the text's propositional content.208
204 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 375.
205 Clines, Job 1-20, xlvii.
206 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 297.
207 Gadamer, Truth andMethod, 374.
208 The notion of an illocutionary act is a helpful tool for analysing the description of Gadamer's
hermeneutics which Warnke offers in order to demonstrate that it is not reducible to the hermeneutics
of either Fish or Hirsch. She summarises: 'when a text is understood its meaning cannot be attributed
to either writer or reader. The meaning of the text is a shared language, shared in the sense that it is
no one person's possession but is rather a common view of a subject-matter', (Warnke, Gadamer, 48).
The crux here is the definition of the 'subject-matter' of a text, with regard to which author and reader
are to take a 'common view'. If 'subject-matter' refers only to the text's propositional content, then
the reader provides the text's illocutionary force, and the meaning is to be attributed predominantly to
his/her action - which, contra Warnke, comes very close to Fish's hermeneutics. There would then
be no 'common view' shared by author and reader. If 'subject-matter' refers to the propositional
content and illocutionary force of the text, then the text's meaning is to be attributed solely to the
author's action - which, also contra Warnke, is very like Hirsch's hermeneutics. The reader then
agrees to hold a 'common view' of the text's meaning with its author.
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This means that, as with Clines, it is unclear in Gadamer's account how a reader may
ever be addressed by a text in such a way that he is given a new, more adequate question to
ask. It is probably true that to 'understand' in the fullest sense - for example, in the sense
of existential encounter which Barth would always insist on when 'understanding' the Bible
is at issue - requires that the question to which the text is an answer become also my
question. Nevertheless, the process of being confronted by a text, discovering or inferring
the question to which it is an answer, and seeing that question as forced on me, bearing a
significance greater than any question I was consciously asking, is a quite authentic sense in
which to talk about understanding.
4.5. Towards a Conception of Scripture as the Sufficient Speech-Act of God
4.5.1. The Supplements of the Text
The initial conclusion to be drawn, for the purposes of the present work, from the preceding
analyses of various literary critics, hermeneutical theorists and theologians is that a careful
articulation of the sufficiency of Scripture requires descriptions of the relationships between
authors and textual meaning, and readers and textual meaning; that is, descriptions of how
any approach to or understanding of a text must conceive of that text as necessarily
'supplemented' by its author and readers Moreover, this description should be cast at least
partly in ethical terms. This would propose Scripture as in some relational sense a
sufficient, rather than a self-sufficient entity.
Where writers have tried to establish some conception of the objectivity of texts,
wishing to fend off the reduction of literary meaning to whatever the reader wishes to
construct, but without taking human agency into account, as have, in their different ways,
Hans Frei and the New Critics, the resulting textual object, having no necessary ontological
relations to any person, begins to resemble either some quasi-religious object or some object
of scientific study. The objectivity of a text is mistakenly equated with the self-sufficiency
of a text, and insurmountable problems arise over how texts can be linked back up to reality,
and therefore over the status of textually-mediated knowledge.
Fish and Hauerwas see this problem clearly, and write a firm link between text and
reality into the most fundamental level of their conception of hermeneutics. However, since
their hermeneutics lacks an ontology of the text which would protect its otherness in this
relationship, the text disappears into the activity of the reader. Thus those who try hardest
to recover the importance of readers end up leaving them with no relation to a distinct other
- which is not a respectful service to render to a human being. Something similar happens
in Gadamer's description, although not as programmatically as in Fish, as he attempts to
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offer an account of the understanding of texts as the answering of questions which readers
are already asking.
Wolterstorff s conception of speech is helpful here. The principle that, other things
being equal, our dignity as persons requires that we be taken at our word bears directly on
the question of the role of human authors in the process of determining meaning. Taking
someone at his word requires from readers an initial acknowledgement that the speaker has
the right to determine the meaning, that is, the propositional content and illocutionary force,
of his speech-act.209 (This right can presumably also be regarded as a responsibility towards
readers in cases where there is confusion over the meaning of the speech-act, and the author
is still alive.) This right, however, does not describe the entirety of the author's action and
status in authoring a text - indeed, it is just the beginning. It is a right which necessarily
entails responsibilities - the right of having the determinate voice in establishing the
propositional content and illocutionary force of one's speech-act, which force itself
determines the particular moral responsibilities which accrue both to speaker and addressee,
given the new moral relationship established between them, in the case of a performance of
that speech-act.
Derrida, and those such as Moore who have largely followed elements of his work,
therefore direct their deconstruction of the stability of textual meaning at a notion of
language which turns out to be false. A text is simply not analogous to a signifier in a
semiotic system, because a sentence or speech-act is not analogous to a word. A sentence is
more than a string of words; the whole is greater than the sum of the parts. Words,
understood as items in a semiotic system, do not refer. Groups of words, however,
constructed conventionally, can be made the means of the performance of certain actions,
and thereby also made to refer, by the performative and referring intention of a speaker.
Texts, like all speech-acts, are not mutually supplementing signifiers, but personal acts
which exist only as the communicative act of an agent, and therefore their ontology is only
properly accounted for by their relation to agent and addressee - a kind of necessary
conceptual 'supplementation' of the text 'itself. A speech-act is only what it is in that it is
an act performed and addressed by someone to someone. Therefore, both a general textual
ontology and a doctrine of Scripture developed along the lines of speech-act theory escape
the force of Derrida's deconstruction of textual meaning. David Lyle Jeffrey makes this
209 This is not to return to a Romantic hermeneutic which equates textual meaning with mental
intention. It is not the case that an author can force a text to mean what he says he mentally intended
it to mean, even when he composed it so carelessly that the intention embodied in it was something
quite different. Authorial rights pertain to authorial intentions to the extent that the latter can be
shown to be indeed embodied in the grammar and semantics of the text. To stress authorial rights in
this way is therefore not to come into conflict with the emphasis laid by speech-act theory on
contextual factors in the determination ofmeaning.
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point well in his recent study of what he calls 'literary theory in Western scriptural
tradition':
Since meaning resides finally in the person and is not intrinsically a property of
mere words, reading responsibly is regarded as an ethical activity. Here ... we
come to the most unfortunate loss in deconstruction's misrepresentation of
literary theory in Western scriptural tradition - the latter's foregrounding of
the ethical in questions of interpretation and literary theory.210
This comment provides an implicit explanation of the intrinsic link between Derrida's
mistaken reduction ofparole to langue and Wolterstorff s argument on the responsibilities
which accompany speech.
All the other writers examined in this chapter share to some extent in Derrida's and
Moore's denial of the hermeneutical and consequent ethical significance of human agency
in texts and textual meaning. This is true even of Hirsch, who, although he wants to speak
up for the author, does not treat human agency as an ontological characteristic of meaning
and texts. However, it is not possible to do justice to human agency in authoring a text if
ontology is excluded. If human agency really is, rather than being either a formal principle
or a trivial fact to which appeal might be made for a time to serve some other end, then
some important anthropological and consequent moral claims must follow. The assertion of
the determinacy of textual meaning is therefore to be regarded as the assertion of the
determinacy of the relationships of author, text and reader.
What Wolterstorff s model offers, building on speech-act theory, is a conception of
how authors, their texts and meanings, and readers, exist meaningfully only in that they are
related to one another, without the otherness of any one element being subsumed into
another. Texts, conceived as speech-acts, are never in danger of drifting away from reality
because it is never possible to talk or conceive of them outside of talking or conceiving of
inter-subjective relationships in the world - the relationships which collectively determine
that a certain locutionary act counts as a certain illocutionary (inter-subjective) act.
All the writers analysed in the sections of this chapter therefore in some way also break
the link between language and reality. In the end there is little difference between an
objectification of a text in order to protect it, as the 'really real', from the ravages of history
210 David Lyle Jeffrey, People of the Book. Christian Identity and Literary Culture (Grand Rapids,
Michigan & Cambridge: Eerdmans, 1996), 11. Deconstruction does not completely disregard ethics,
however. Derrida regards his questioning of the Western philosophical tradition as ethical, (see
Norris, Derrida, 236), and in his earlier work, at least, as was argued above, always tries to show how
the process of deconstruction arises from within the texts he reads, rather than being imposed on them
by the whim of the interpreter. Similarly, the rejection of the author is sometimes construed as an
ethical move which liberates the creative interpretive activity of contemporary readers - although our
approach must regard that as a liberation won at the cost of the unethical treatment of authors.
Indeed, in the philosophy of Levinas ethics becomes 'a 'first philosophy' that disrupts ontology or
logocentrism', (Critchley, The Ethics ofDeconstruction, 9). Jeffrey's target here is the later work of
Derrida and of some of his followers, such as Harold Bloom, which rejects all restrictions on
polysemeity, (Jeffrey, People of the Book, 10).
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and readers, and the subsuming of all supposed 'textual reality' into the endless play of
boundless semiotic systems. Both the current defenders and detractors of language take an
all-or-nothing approach to language: the defenders (New Critics and Frei) offer a
description of the 'all' of language which, ironically, collapses into something very like
'nothing' as the text loses contact with reality; the detractors (Derrida and Moore) delight
in pushing the text further into unreality, ingeniously developing this ironic identity of 'all'
and 'nothing'. The work of writers such as Hirsch, Fish, Flauerwas and Gadamer, who do
not fall under this polarity of 'defenders' and 'detractors' of language, can nevertheless be
shown to contain problems in their different construals of the act of authorship and its
relation to the reality of text and reader - problems which become particularly evident, as
we have attempted to demonstrate, through an analysis conducted according to the
conceptualities of speech-act theory. It is to the detriment of literary theory, hermeneutics,
the philosophy of language, and, most pertinently for present concerns, of theology, that
speech-act theory has not been given more opportunity to anchor the reality of language,
stressing that language exists only in that it serves as a medium by which persons interact
with one another. This basic conclusion can now be applied more specifically to Scripture as
the speech-act of God.
4.5.2. Sufficient Scripture and the Holy Spirit
Wolterstorff, as was observed in chapter 3, argues that God may be conceived of as a
speaker who is subject to rights and responsibilities in the same way as human persons.211
By performing a speech-act to us God takes for himself the responsibility to keep his word.
When God's relationship to Scripture is conceived of in this way, the right of God the
author to determine the meaning of his textual speech-act(s) loses the totalitarian aspect
which much post-modern theory assumes to be inherent in this power, since the act of
authoring a text is not reduced to an act of determining meaning, and therefore not left
relation-less, and with the potential to mutate into an act of tyranny. Instead, as author, God
simply acquires the right to determine the nature and content of his speech-act(s). Far from
destroying relationality in an act of tyranny, it opens up possibilities for relations between
persons (in the case of Scripture, between divine and human persons) in a profoundly moral
environment. To grant God that right is not necessarily to subjugate oneself unthinkingly
before a God who may turn out to be as malevolent and objectionable as Moore's portrayal
him, for the conditions under which a speech-act can be regarded as undercut may equally
apply to God's speech-act(s) as to those of any human being. We can at least conceive of a
211 God can be argued to be unique in this, as we saw in chapter 3, only with regard to the source of
those rights and responsibilities: they are not imposed on him from outside, but determined by his
own character.
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supposedly divine being who would claim our allegiance while making promises which he
failed, either by design or through impotence, to fulfil.
The orthodox Protestant understanding of Scripture regards the biblical texts as the
vehicle, or the representation, of the address of Another. The text is not self-sufficient in
that it is a reified object of study cut off from its author (as in New Criticism), nor can its
referential function be rendered intra-textually to the extent that doubt arises over the extra-
textual status of the referents of the text (as in the work of Hans Frei). The text does not fill
the stage; it is no more, and no less, than inter-personal communicative action. Scripture is
sufficient for the communicative action (illocutionary force and propositional content,
referring to God, humanity and the world) which God intends to perform by means of it.
However, it is not ,s'e//-sufficient, in that it exists only in relation to its author and readers,
and has as its sole purpose the mediation of a relationship between him and them.
This scriptural sufficiency can be described in terms of the action of the Holy Spirit;
some traditional Latin terms will be helpful here. The text itself cannot produce faithful
response; it is sufficient for notitia ('intelligent cognition' of 'intelligible information'), but
insufficient for the two stages of faithful response, for which the Holy Spirit is required:
assensus ('cognition passed into conviction': 'truth believed as applicable to ourselves, as
supremely vital and important for us') and fiducia ('conviction passed into confidence':
'the engagement of person to person in the inner movement of the whole man to receive and
rest upon Christ alone for salvation').212 Inspired Scripture - the text itself - is sufficient
for simple understanding of the message of Scripture,213 while illuminated Scripture - the
text plus the work of the Spirit - is sufficient for a response of faith. The Spirit is therefore
a kind of supplement to the text, but only in the sense that he brings the possibility of
appropriate response to the text's illocutionary act; '[t]he Spirit is not some kind of
Derridean supplement that adds to or improves upon the written Word.'214 In the
terminology of speech-act theory, Scripture is sufficient for the performance of the divine
illocutionary act, which includes the conveying of its necessary propositional content, but
insufficient to bring about the intended perlocutionary effect. For that, as, for example, the
Westminster Confession acknowledges, the work of the Holy Spirit through the Word is
212 The definitions of the three terms are taken from John Murray, Collected Writings ofJohn Murray
2 Systematic Theology (Edinburgh: Banner of Truth Trust, 1977), 257-58. Vanhoozer suggests even
that '[t]he Spirit enables understanding', because readers' ideologies are especially liable to distort
readings of texts 'that require behavioral change', (Vanhoozer, Is There a Meaning, 428, [italic
added]).
213 Of course, that the text of Scripture now may be described as inspired depends on the past action of
the Spirit in the course of the text's composition and possible canonical editing. Thus, the concept of
'the text itself, viewed historically, is not entirely Spirit-free. The point is that it excludes the
necessary continuing role of the Spirit now. (A section of the following chapter will deal specifically
with the inspiration of Scripture.)
214 Vanhoozer, Is There a Meaning, 410.
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required.215 This is analogous to what Luther calls the external and internal perspicuity of
Scripture: Scripture is 'externally' sufficient but 'internally' insufficient.216
Does the perlocutionary activity of the Holy Spirit change the meaning of biblical texts,
as their effects are brought about in the lives of believers throughout history and across
cultures? This, we saw in chapter 3, was a possible although unwelcome and unintended
corollary of Barth's doctrine of Scripture: that in each case when God addresses someone
through the Bible the Holy Spirit performs through the locutions of the Bible a new speech-
act with new propositional content. It would also conflict with the definition of the
sufficiency of Scripture which has just been given. Richard Bauckham and others have
recently argued persuasively, against a consensus, that the New Testament Gospels were
addressed not to particular Christian communities, (the putative Markan, Matthean, Lukan
and Johannine communities), but to 'any and every Christian community in the late-first-
century Roman Empire.'217 It is not clear, given the extent of this argument, that the level of
cultural diversity in the Roman Empire in this period was qualitatively lower than that
between the first century and subsequent centuries. That is, there seems to be no significant
hermeneutical difference between being separated from the particular culture of the writer
by space and culture, or being separated by time and culture. It may be, then, that
Bauckham's argument can be expanded to include the possibility that the Gospel-writers
intended also a future reference to all Christians in all ages; trans-cultural reference may
include trans-historical reference. People and situations of whom the Gospel-writers knew
nothing are therefore referred to in the text to the extent that the particularities of the text
claim to be of universal significance. Thus Vanhoozer: 'the Spirit does not alter but
ministers the meaning'; '[t]he Spirit's role ... is not to change the meaning but to charge it
with significance.'218 This is therefore to accept the basic legitimacy of the distinction
which Hirsch draws between meaning and significance, and to apply it theologically to the
Bible. The action of the Holy Spirit in relation to the Bible is not to perform a new speech-
215 '[0]ur full persuasion and assurance of the infallible truth, and divine authority thereof, is from the
inward work of the Holy Spirit, bearing witness by and with the word in our hearts', (Westminster
Confession of Faith, 1.5). 'The supreme Judge, by which all controversies of religion are to be
determined, and all decrees of councils, opinions of ancient writers, doctrines of men, and private
spirits, are to be examined, and in whose sentence we rest, can be no other but the Holy Spirit
speaking in the Scripture', (1.10).
216 'Internal perspicuity' refers to the fact that, without the Holy Spirit, even though Scripture may be
discussed and quoted, '[a]ll men have their hearts darkened'; 'external perspicuity' claims that 'all
that is in the Scripture is through the Word brought forth into the clearest light and proclaimed to the
world', (Martin Luther, The Bondage of the Will trans. J.I. Packer & O.R. Johnston [Edinburgh: James
Clarke, 1957], 73-74).
217 Richard Bauckham, 'Introduction', in ed. Richard Bauckham, The Gospels for All Christians.
Rethinking the Gospel Audiences (Grand Rapids, Michigan/ Cambridge, U.K.: Eerdmans, 1998), 1.
218 Vanhoozer, Is There a Meaning, 413, 421.
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act, but to bring about the perlocutionary effect of the speech-act(s) which God has
performed and continues to perform.219
4.6. Conclusion
Models of textual self-sufficiency break the links between text and reality and are unable to
rebuild them; Frei's biblical hermeneutic does violence to the inseparability of the
propositional, referential and illocutionary aspects of a speech-act. E.D. Hirsch's linking of
text and author is less foundational in his work than first appears, since it is grounded
entirely pragmatically, motivated only by a desire to provide a critical criterion for
adjudicating between interpretations, and making no claim about the ontology of texts.
Where Hirsch treats a text as a self-sufficient entity with which he wishes to supplement
another self-sufficient entity, the author's intention, without loss to either, deconstructionists
see the supplementation of text by author as revealing an 'originary lack' in both, which
authorises deconstructive reading practices. The attitudes of Hirsch and Stephen Moore to
the author therefore reflect the two different senses of the double-edged word 'supplement',
which Derrida has so exploited.220 Fish and Hauerwas, it was argued, both end up with no
guard against solipsism; Gadamer confuses a text with its effects, and so has no clear
account of it as an address external to readers. The notion of a text as an illocutionary act
performed by an author offers, it was suggested, a better way to conceive of a text in
relation to its author and reader, without dissolving the identity of any of the three elements
into that of any of the others.
This conclusion was applied to Scripture, conceived of, in light of chapter 3, as a text
by which God speaks, to state what Scripture is sufficient for: Scripture is sufficient for the
performance of the divine lllocutionary act(s). That is, Scripture is materially sufficient for
the bearing of propositional content (the presentation of Jesus Christ as the means of
salvation) and conveying of illocutionary force (the call or invitation to have faith in him).
Since it performs an illocutionary act, Scripture is integrally related to its speaker; since it
is thus an active address calling for a certain perlocutionary effect and imposing, like any
other text, certain ethical constraints, it is integrally related to its addressees; since, as with
all speech-acts, the referential and propositional content cannot be abstracted from the
singularity of the act, it is integrally related to its referents: God, humanity and the world.
In the performance of this divine illocutionary act, Scripture is sufficient for the
mediation to any and all readers of what was referred to in the above discussion of New
219 This particular claim about the function of the canonical Gospels will be given a general
hermeneutical basis, and related to the whole of the Bible, when the topics of human and divine
authorship of Scripture, and inter-canonical exegesis, are discussed in chapter 5.
220 See chapter 1.
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Criticism as God's 'real semantic presence' to human beings. Divine 'semantic presence'
becomes divine 'personal presence' when the text's perlocutionary effect is brought about in
the life of the reader by the action of the Holy Spirit through the text in him or her. This
restates the christocentric thrust of Luther's understanding of the sufficiency of Scripture:
to urge 'Scripture alone' is to urge it as alone the means by which Christ comes in such a
way that true knowledge of him is possible. To assert this is not to assert that Scripture is a
sufficient guarantee of cognition of the divine illocutionary act (notitia), let alone that it can
bring about in the reader the appropriate perlocutionary effect (assensus and fiducia). A
reader of Scripture can still fail to recognise Christ, or, recognising him, may still reject
him. This chapter has therefore developed the argument of chapter 3. It was argued there
that it is meaningful to conceive of God as speaking and to identify his Word with a (set of)
text(s); here we have outlined what is involved in calling those texts, thought of as a divine
speech-act, materially sufficient.
Does this model of the sufficiency of Scripture suggest a possible definition of a secular
'sufficiency of the text'? A full answer to this question goes well beyond the scope of this
thesis, but the analyses of this chapter suggest an answer in the affirmative. What has been
argued about the sufficiency of Scripture in relation to the illocutionary act of God may be
applied, given the parallels which Wolterstorff draws between human speakers and God-as-
speaker, to the illocutionary act of an author: a text is sufficient for the performance of an
illocutionary act. Authors can be ' semantically present' to readers by virtue of their texts,
while lacking the unique divine capacity to be spiritually 'personally present' to them across
time and space. Again, this is not to say that the text is always sufficient for our recognition
of that act for what it is. This is especially evident in the case of the speech-acts of persons
separated from us by distance of culture, whether geographically or temporally, whose
speech-acts are mediated to us textually. Yet any extra-textual evidence invoked to
establish the meaning (propositional content and illocutionary force) of the text provides
only a context to illuminate what is already there: that someone has said - understood with
the richness which Wolterstorff invests in this simple word - something to someone about
something.
In that its conclusion may be thus cast as a claim about general hermeneutics, and with
the exception of the above section on the Holy Spirit, this chapter has treated Scripture like
any other text. However, Scripture is not just a text but a diverse set of texts: a canon. This
point has clearly been lurking in the present discussion, as we have equivocated between
singular and plural in referring to the 'illocutionary act(s)' which God performs in 'this (set
of) text(s)'. It is therefore to the formal aspect of the sufficiency of Scripture, which asserts
that the diverse set of texts which compromise the canon of Scripture is in some way
uniquely marked off from all other texts, such that they are 'self-interpreting', subject to no
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external authoritative interpretation, that we now turn in the third and final (re)constructive
chapter. The focus will again be on hermeneutical, literary and theological issues, in the
attempt to conceive of the texts of the canon of Scripture as together uniquely rendering, as
Hans Frei would say, the unique identity of Jesus Christ.
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5. Scriptures and the Sufficiency of the Canon
5.1. Introduction
Protestant orthodoxy has traditionally made two main claims regarding the canon of
Scripture: that there is good reason to mark off this specific set of texts as authoritative
above all else in faith and practice, and that questions of the interpretation of individual
canonical texts are ultimately an internal matter of canonical self-interpretation.1 Although
the latter claim is often termed the perspicuity of Scripture, the terminology is relatively
fluid, and it can equally well be described as a claim of the formal sufficiency of Scripture.2
This is so because of the close relationship between the two claims: if Scripture is
ultimately authoritative, the principle by which interpretations are adjudicated cannot be
external to it, as is the case if either magisterial church authority or a charismatic voice of
the Holy Spirit internal to the individual are invoked as the authoritative interpretive
principle.
The question of the validity of this rule has been a complex one, and two particular
questions can be distinguished. First: how can a set of texts exhibiting such thematic and
literary diversity legitimately be said to be self-interpreting? Three models for conceiving
of the relations of the individual biblical texts with one another may initially be suggested:
univocity or, perhaps, symphony (the diverse texts are to be resolved into one overall
'voice'); polyphony (the texts are not disunited but yet not ultimately resolvable into one);
and cacophony (the texts jostle discordantly with one another). A move will be made
towards a choice of one of these options through a discussion of the concept of
'intertextuality', as it has been used by both literary theorists and biblical scholars. The
term 'intertextuality' covers a diverse set of theories and practices according to which a text
is supplemented by other texts - from the conservative establishing of a self-interpreting
canon to the radical opening up of every text to a limitless intertextual space. Locating on
this spectrum what we propose as the principle of Scripture's self-interpretation, particularly
with regard to the arguments of the previous chapter on texts in relation to authors and
readers, will help to clarify the kind of arguments for the formal aspect of the sufficiency of
Scripture which can be mounted in the contemporary context.
Second: on what basis can such a chronologically and religiously diverse set of texts be
regarded as self-interpreting? Why and in what ways do these particular texts supplement
each other? This very broad question will be engaged via an examination of the canonical
hermeneutics of B.S. Childs, (which Childs most often calls a 'canonical approach' to
1
E.g.: 'the infallible rule for the interpretation of Scripture is the Scripture itself, (Westminster
Confession of Faith, 1.9).
2 This terminological fluidity was discussed in chapter 2.
biblical interpretation), for it is particularly in relation to Childs' work over the last thirty
years that discussions of this topic have been conducted.
A theological gap will be identified in Childs' work which requires supplementation by
a doctrine ofbiblical inspiration. This is perhaps not surprising, since divine inspiration was
the doctrine traditionally invoked to account for claims of the unique function of the biblical
canon in theology and church.3 The subsequent discussion of inspiration will return in part
to the question of the role of that doctrine in post-Reformation Protestant orthodoxy, which
was treated briefly in chapter 2. It is often claimed that in the seventeenth century the
inspiration of Scripture came to be established in orthodox circles as a formal principle on
which the authority of the canon of Scripture was grounded: the texts were regarded as
authoritative not so much by virtue of their content but because their authors were uniquely
protected from error by the special inspiring activity of the Holy Spirit. Focusing
particularly on the orthodox development of biblical inspiration as it found expression at the
end of the nineteenth century in the work of B.B. Warfield, who was significantly informed
by such seventeenth-century orthodox theologians as Francis Turretin, who was discussed in
chapter 2 and to whom we will also return here, it will be argued that the orthodox
Protestant doctrine of biblical inspiration largely escapes these critiques. A minor critique
will be offered of Warfield's doctrine, supplementing it with the hermeneutical and literary
concepts outlined in the first part of the chapter.
5.2. Supplementing One Text with Another: The Canon and Intertextualitv
5.2.1. Introduction: The Diversity ofthe Canon
This chapter is concerned with the rule of canonical self-interpretation. This rule, in literary
terms, represents the claim that the relationships between the canonical texts are
determinate: the clearer places interpret the more obscure, and the whole is interpreted in
the light of Jesus Christ, its thematic centre. It has always been noticed, of course, that the
canon of Scripture includes a wide diversity of material - diverse both in content and
literary form. From the earliest times of the Christian church, inheriting the Jewish attitude
to the Hebrew Scriptures, this diversity was not generally thought to be so extensive as to
lead to theological incoherence. According to John Goldingay, '[i]t is historically certain ...
that the Jewish community believed that its Scriptures were theologically coherent, ... and
3
By 'traditionally' here is meant, at least from the sixteenth century. Bmce Metzger argues that in the
Patristic period the Bible was regularly said to be inspired, but that 'the concept of inspiration was not
used in the early Church as a basis of designation between canonical and non-canonical orthodox
Christian writings', (Bmce M. Metzger, The Canon of the New Testament. Its Origin, Development,
and Significance (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987), 256.
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the first Christians naturally shared such a belief.'4 This general view held right up to the
Reformation and beyond. For example, in the sixteenth century the Lutheran theologian
Martin Chemnitz concluded from his detailed examination of the four canonical Gospels
that they exhibit 'a very concordant dissonance', (concordissima dissonanlia).5 The
questions of how much 'dissonance' Scripture in fact possesses, and of how much
'dissonance' can be tolerated in a supposedly 'concordant' scriptural canon, before it must
be judged 'discordant', are questions that separate orthodox theologians like Chemnitz from
later critical biblical scholars and theologians. Thus, in a recent short article on the
inspiration of Scripture, Wolfhart Pannenberg argues that the doctrine of the literal
inspiration of Scripture, articulated especially by Chemnitz' orthodox Protestant successors
in the seventeenth century,
disintegrated in the course of time, not so much because theologians turned to
other norms of truth than Scripture, but primarily because the idea of a
doctrinal unity among all the sentences of Scripture without any contradiction
among them, an idea that followed from the doctrine of literal inspiration,
could not be defended in the long mn. It was falsified by observations of
scriptural exegesis. This conception of the inspiration of Scripture broke down,
then, because it proved to be irreconcilable with the first principle of the
Protestant Reformation, the authority of Scripture in judging all the teaching of
the church.6
The doctrines of the literal inspiration and formal sufficiency of Scripture both
collapsed under the weight of exegetical observations. The operation of the formal
sufficiency of Scripture - Scripture's self-interpretation judging the church's teaching -
breaks down if actual Bible-reading produces more evidence of self-contradiction than it
does evidence for the possibility of successful self-interpretation.
More recent defenders of the doctrine of the literal inspiration of Scripture are
vulnerable to the charge that they have not offered a significant response to those who
conclude from exegesis that Scripture is too diverse doctrinally to function as the ultimate
authority in the church. This is a significant gap, for there is at least prima facie plausibility
in the claim that the diversity of denominations and practices to which Protestantism has
given rise is a direct result of the Protestant attempt to take such diverse Scriptures as one's
4 John Goldingay, Theological Diversity and the Authority of the Old Testament (Grand Rapids,
Michigan: Eerdmans, 1987), 27-28. This can only be described as a general view; Metzger argues,
following Oscar Cullmann, that in the early church the existence of a plurality of authoritative
Gospels was seen as a theological problem by those for whom to accept such a plurality was 'as good
as admitting that none of them is perfect', (Metzger, The Canon ofthe New Testament, 262).
5 Chemnitz thought that the Holy Spirit had given the Gospels this characteristic 'in order to exercise
the minds of the faithful in humble and careful investigation of the truth, whereby we learn that the
four evangelists did not write by mutual agreement but by divine inspiration.' Quoted in Robert D.
Preus, The Theology of Post-Reformation Lutheranism. A Study of Theological Prolegomena (Saint
Louis & London: Concordia Publishing House, 1970), 360.
6 Wolfhart Pannenberg, 'On the Inspiration of Scripture' Theology Today 54 (1997), 212-15 (212).
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ultimate authority. B.B. Warfield, for example, persistently uses the term 'oracle(s) (of
God)' and its cognates as a description of the Bible. The regularity with which he uses these
terms might suggest an insensitivity to and flattening of the complex and diverse nature of
Scripture, and a consequent glossing over of the difficulties involved in moving from text to
theology. Warfield will be discussed in more detail in the later section on the doctrine of
inspiration, where this prima facie judgment on him will be assessed.
5.2.2. 'Intertextuality' in Literary Theory and Biblical Studies
Since Warfield's day, much work has been done in literary studies, especially under the
topic of 'intertextuality', on the subject of how texts are to be related to one another. This is
not of course an entirely new interest in literary theory, but in the last thirty years the term
'intertextuality' has become prominent, and has itself acquired a diversity of meaning,
covering both old and new ways of reading texts together. This section will look first at
some uses of 'intertextuality' in recent literary theory, and then at some appropriations,
some more critical than others, of such literary theories by biblical scholars. Some work of
the Russian theorist Mikhail Bakhtin will then be brought forward, for he lies behind much
contemporary interest in intertextuality, and one attempt to appropriate his work directly for
biblical studies will be discussed. Finally, we focus on two theological attempts to develop
in relation to the Bible a concept of 'polyphony' - a concept for which Bakhtin, it will be
argued, offers helpful philosophical support.
The aim is to introduce concepts of literary relationships between texts, and of literary
meaning and reference, under which it is possible to conceive of textual coherence more
broadly than has often been allowed in the case of the Bible. Of course, this will not
provide a category of 'unity in diversity' which will be able to account for all the
contradictions which critical exegesis has alleged to exist in the Bible; those who wish to
respond to such allegations will always need to do so largely with biblical exegesis of their
own. However, concepts will be offered, in light of which some of what has been alleged
about the disunity of Scripture can be acknowledged to be indeed the case, not so as to
challenge the orthodox doctrine of Scripture, but so as to offer a more nuanced description
of the complex operation of the rule of its self-interpretation.
There is an initial difficulty, however, in that the semantic diversity which the term
'intertextuality' has acquired in general literary theory can occasionally lead to pointless
arguments about who has the best claim on the term as a description of his or her particular
position. Heinrich Plett distinguishes three positions, which will be adopted here in order to
focus the discussion: 'progressive intertextuahsts', who give the term a post-modern or
deconstructive slant; 'traditional intertextualists', who use the concept to rediscover the
wealth of quotations and allusions in literary works; and 'anti-intertextualists', who assert
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that the notion of a 'traditional intertextualist' is redundant, since even in ancient times
concepts such as typology adequately described relationships between texts.7 It will be
suggested that 'traditional intertextualist' is in fact not a redundant notion, and in what
follows we will concentrate on the significant substantive disagreement between the first
two of Plett's categories.
5.2.2.1. 'Progressive intertextnality'
The term 'intertextuality' was introduced around thirty years ago by Julia Kristeva,
particularly in two essays, 'The Bounded Text' (1966-67) and 'Word, Dialogue, and Novel'
(1967).8 (The latter essay, especially, helped to introduce the work of Mikhail Bakhtin to a
Western audience.) Its original meaning was what Plett terms 'progressive' - that is, with
a deconstructive slant. Attributing the insight to Bakhtin, Kristeva asserts: 'any text is
constructed as a mosaic of quotations; any text is the absorption and transformation of
another. The notion of intertextuality replaces that of intersubjectivity.'9 Like Derrida,
Kristeva extends the concept of textuality beyond written texts, to cover human beings as
subjects. In this extension of 'textuality', Kristeva's appropriation of Bakhtin adds a level
of semiotic description missing, as we will see, in the Russian's work: 'Rather than a
discourse, contemporary semiotics takes as its object several semiotic practices which it
considers as translinguistic; that is, they operate through and across language, while
remaining irreducible to its categories as they are presently assigned.' In this perspective,
the text is 'a permutation of texts, an intertextuality: in the space of a given text, several
utterances, taken from other texts, intersect and neutralize one another.'10 Already here,
especially in the emphasis on the mutual neutralising in a text of the many intertexts of
which it is composed, Kristeva is moving beyond structuralism," and it is for her
deconstructive trajectory that many have wished to preserve the term 'intertextuality'.
However, the term has also been adopted by writers working on theories of influence,
(Plett's 'traditionalists'), who trace how particular texts, authors and traditions influence
subsequent writing. In the 1970s Kristeva objected to this broadening of the term, referring
to its new use 'in the banal sense of "study of sources'", and proposed a new term for her
original concept: 'we prefer the term transposition .... If one grants that every signifying
7 Heinrich F. Plett, 'Intertextualities', in ed. Plett, Intertextuality Research in Text Theory 15 (Berlin
& New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1991), 3-29 (3-5).
8 They appear in English in Julia Kristeva, Desire In Language. A Semiotic Approach to Literature
andArt ed. Leon S. Roudiez (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1980), respectively 36-63 and 64-91.
9
Kristeva, Desire, 66.
10 Kristeva, Desire, 36.
11 Toril Moi says that 'Word, Dialogue, and Novel' is 'in many ways a divided text, uneasily poised
on an unstable borderline between traditional 'high' structuralism ... and a remarkably early form of
'post-structuralism", (The Kristeva Reader ed. Toril Moi [Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986], 34).
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practice is a field of transpositions of various signifying systems (an inter-textuality) one
then understands that its "place" of enunciation and its denoted "object" are never single,
complete, and identical to themselves, but always plural, shattered, capable of being
tabulated.'12
What Kristeva particularly takes from Bakhtin's work is the insight that the utterance of
any speaker or writer is always a borrowing of other utterances, genres and styles, always
inhabited by previous modes of speaking and writing. Thus Bakhtin: 'Language is not a
neutral medium that passes freely and easily into the private property of the speaker's
intentions; it is populated - overpopulated - with the intentions of others.'13 Kristeva
casts this point in semiotic terms, describing the historical formation of the 'specific
signifying system' of the novel, for example, as 'a result of a redistribution of several
different sign systems: carnival, courtly poetry, scholastic discourse.'14 Thus, by
'intertextuality', and subsequently 'transposition', Kristeva has in mind much more than
relations between written texts; she is thinking of highly complex relations within a
universe of sign systems.
Roland Barthes is the outstanding example of a literary critic who has taken
intertextuality in a post-structuralist direction, applying it to literary texts and linking it with
his notion of 'the death of the author'.15 He argues that all writers are caught between, on
the one hand, the push towards freedom and creativity, committing themselves and showing
themselves clearly as individuals by the choice 'of tone, of ethos' in their writing,16 and, on
the other, the power exerted by the fact that we only ever use second-hand language, whose
earlier usages echo in our own. '[WJriting still remains full of the recollection of previous
usage, for language is never innocent: words have a second-order memory which
mysteriously persists in the midst of new meanings."7 The act of writing has powerful
12 Julia Kristeva, Revolution in Poetic Language trans. Margaret Waller (New York: Columbia Univ.
Press, 1984 [1974]), 60.
13 M.M. Bakhtin, 'Discourse in the Novel', in Bakhtin, The Dialogic Imagination ed. Michael
Holquist, trans. Caryl Emerson & Michael Holquist (Austin: Univ. of Texas Press, 1981), 259-422
(294).
14 Kristeva, Revolution, 59.
15 This was discussed in chapter 4.
16 Roland Barthes, Writing Degree Zero trans. Annette Lavers & Colin Smith (New York: Hill &
Wang, 1967), 13.
17 Barthes, Writing Degree Zero, 16. As is common in post-structuralist writing, the term 'writing' is
a complex one in Barthes' work. By it he means, like Derrida, primarily neither the act of putting
putting pen to paper (or finger to keyboard) in order to produce words, nor the words so produced.
Unlike Derrida, he uses it to refer to the relation between intention and language. In her introduction
to Writing Degree Zero, Susan Sontag suggests that, rather than 'writing', '[a] more helpful
translation of what Barthes means by ecriture - the ensemble of features of a literary work such as
tone, ethos, rhythm of delivery, naturalness of expression, atmosphere of happiness or malaise -
might be "personal utterance." ... In contrast to a language and a style ecriture is the writer's zone of
freedom, "form considered as human intention'", (Barthes, Writing Degree Zero, xiii-xiv).
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effects on history, although its duration as a free act is only momentary: 'Writing as
Freedom is therefore a mere moment. But this moment is one of the most explicit in
History'. As soon as the 'moment' is past, the literary tradition in which one is writing
starts to raise its own voice over that of the late-come writer. Beyond the 'moment', all our
language is so shop-soiled that we can never truly make it our own:
True, I can today select such and such a mode ofwriting, and in so doing assert
my freedom, aspire to the freshness of novelty or to a tradition; but it is
impossible to develop it within duration without gradually becoming a prisoner
of someone else's words and even ofmy own. A stubborn after-image, which
comes from all the previous modes of writing and even from the past of my
own, drowns the sound ofmy present words.'8
However, it is hard to understand this as a coherent claim. Barthes does not say how
the previous words and 'modes of writing' ever gained sufficient force over time ('within
duration') to drown out the sound of his own present words. An infinite regress is
established: how do the previous words manage still to sound above the din of what was
said before them? Barthes is caught between Romantic desires for a moment of the creation
of an absolutely free language and deconstructive despair over the possibility of the
durability of the distinctiveness of any authorial voice. He thus establishes a false
dichotomy, presenting us with a momentary authorial 'meaningful gesture ... [which]
reaches the deep layers of History', and then with a post-history of the created text which
sees the authorial voice drowned out in the cacophony of 'all the previous modes of
writing'.
A number of writers have applied a model of intertextuality like Barthes' to the Bible.
The editors of a volume of the journal Semeia devoted to the topic reject the use of the term
'intertextuality' 'as a restrictive tool for nailing down authorial intent and literary
influence'; they have in mind such 'traditional intertextualist' biblical scholars as Richard
Hays, whose work will be discussed below. 'Thinly veiled in such efforts', they argue, 'are
conservative ideological and theological interests in maintaining the primacy of certain
(usually Christian) texts over against secondary (usually Jewish) precursors.'19 The
application of intertextuality to the task of biblical interpretation in this volume tends in a
'progressive' deconstructive direction. For example, Gary Phillips' essay on Luke's Gospel
makes similar claims about the coerciveness of Luke's text to those made by Stephen Moore
in his free-playing deconstructive readings of Luke.20
18 Barthes, Writing Degree Zero, 17.
19 George Aichele & Gary A. Phillips, 'Introduction: Exegesis, Eisegesis, Intergesis' Semeia 69/70
(1995), 1-18 (7-8).
20 Gary A. Phillips, '"What is Written? How are you Reading?" Gospel, Intertextuality and Doing
Lukewise: Reading Lk 10:25-42 Otherwise' Semeia 69/70 (1995) 111-47; Stephen D. Moore, Mark
and Luke in Poststructuralist Perspectives. Jesus Begins To Write (New Haven & London: Yale Univ.
Press, 1992). See the detailed discussion ofMoore in chapter 4. See also, from a similar collection of
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5.2.2.2. 'Traditional intertextuality'
The strict distinction between intertextuality (in its original Kristevan sense) and influence
studies, which all the 'progressive intertextualists' make, has been called into question. The
volume Influence and Intertextuality in Literary History is a collection of essays which
argue that the two notions are more closely linked than either Kristeva or Aichele and
Phillips suggest. Two of the contributors discern Derrida as an intertext in Kristeva's
semiotic reading of Bakhtin, since she takes observations which Bakhtin makes about the
'intertextual' nature of words and applies them to texts. This, they argue, produces a
concept of 'intertextuality' very different from anything which can be found in Bakhtin.21
The contributors to the volume all see human agency as important in literary
interpretation, and locate that agency especially in the author.22 Susan Stanford Friedman,
referring to Kristeva's rejection of 'banal' uses of her term 'intertextuality' and to her
attempt to substitute a new term for her original concept, argues that this shows not so much
that she is inconsistent as that post-structuralist attempts to keep the discourse of
'intertextuality' uncontaminated by the discourse of influence cannot succeed.23 The death
of the author can be declared, but authors find it hard to play dead for long.24
It might be concluded from this that 'traditional' intertextualists would be better to
abandon the term. However, the work of Jonathan Culler can be cited as evidence that this
is not the case. Friedman suggests that Culler's work demonstrates that intertextuality need
not necessarily take the form of 'the death of the author',25 and Clayton and Rothstein point
out that it is not only Barthes' deconstructive theory which finds its roots in semiotics, but
essays on intertextuality and the Old Testament: 'discovering intertextual connections is a reader-
oriented enterprise. While some texts direct our attention to other texts through explicit allusion,
more often it is the reader who perceives textual relations', (Danna Nolan Fewell, 'Introduction:
Writing, Reading, and Relating', in ed. Danna Nolan Fewell, Reading Between Texts. Intertextuality
and the Hebi-ew Bible [Louisville, Kentucky: Westminster/John Knox Press, 1992], 11-20 [17-18]).
In the same volume, Timothy K. Beal concludes: 'Every text - as an intersection of other textual
surfaces - suggests an indeterminate surplus of meaningful possibilities. Interpretation is always a
production ofmeaning from that surplus', (Timothy K. Beal, 'Ideology and Intertextuality: Surplus of
Meaning and Controlling the Means of Production', in ed. Fewell, Reading Between Texts, 27-39
[31]).
2' Jay Clayton & Eric Rothstein, 'Figures in the Corpus: Theories of Influence and Intertextuality', in
eds Clayton & Rothstein, Influence and Intertextuality in Literary History (Madison: Univ. of
Wisconsin Press, 1991), 3-36 (18-19).
22 Clayton & Rothstein, 'Figures in the Corpus', 29.
23 Susan Stanford Friedman, 'Weavings: Intertextuality and the (Re)Birth of the Author', in eds
Clayton & Rothstein, Influence and Intertextuality, 146-80 (153-54).
24 In particular, Friedman argues that the death of the author is an unhelpful notion if texts and
literature are to have the kind of transformative role in society which Kristeva wishes. This is
particularly pertinent to feminism, she suggests, quoting Nancy Miller: 'only those who have it
[status as subject] can play with not having it', (Friedman, 'Weavings', 158).
25 Friedman, 'Weavings', 156.
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also Culler's 'semiotic path that argues for increased certainty for the reader'.26 Thus,
according to Clayton and Rothstein, Kristeva's reading of Bakhtin can be taken to introduce
a new and useful concept, which says something in addition to, although not separately
from, theories of influence, without falling into Barthes' advocacy of 'the death of the
author'.
Culler's initial definition of intertextuality is little different from Kristeva's. The
intertextual nature of any 'verbal construct', he says, is that it is 'intelligible only in terms of
a prior body of discourse - other projects and thoughts it implicitly or explicitly takes up,
prolongs, cites, refutes, transforms'.27 This, he says, gives intertextuality a 'double focus':
it is opposed to the view that texts are autonomous, that they have meaning only in relation
to prior texts, and therefore it designates the text's 'participation in the discursive space of a
culture: the relationship between a text and the various languages or signifying practices of
a culture and its relation to those texts which articulate for it the possibilities of that culture.'
He then observes, however, that it is difficult to make the concept of a vast, undefined
discursive space 'usable' without giving particular examples. This, though, tends to deny
the initial definition, for the point made by the specific examples seems not to rise above
traditional source-study. To this extent, Culler argues, Kristeva's work does not move
beyond 'the study of identifiable sources'.28
Culler suggests, however, that this apparent unworkability of the concept should not
lead us to abandon it; rather, we need 'multiple strategies' to explicate it and to put it into
practice.29 Borrowing from linguistics the distinction between logical and pragmatic
presuppositions, he suggests two strategies, both of which impose significant constraints on
intertextual interpretive practice. First, intertextualists might look at 'the specific
propositions of a given text, the way in which it produces a pre-text, an intertextual space
whose occupants may or may not correspond to other actual texts'. For example, the
question "Have you stopped beating your wife?" presupposes a certain prior state of
affairs.30 Second, 'the study of rhetorical or pragmatic presupposition ... leads to a poetics
which is less interested in the occupants of that intertextual space which makes a work
intelligible than in the conventions which underlie that discursive activity or space.' For
example, the utterance "open the door" presupposes the presence of a room with a closed
door. As Culler says, in these cases 'one is working on the conventions of a genre of speech
act', asking about the 'discursive or intertextual space which gives rise to the conventions
26 Clayton & Rothstein, 'Figures in the Corpus', 21.
27 Jonathan Culler, The Pursuit of Signs. Semiotics, Literature, Deconstruction (London & Henley:
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1981), 101-103.
28 Culler, The Pursuit ofSigns, 106-109.
29 Culler, The Pursuit ofSigns, 111.
30 Culler, The Pursuit ofSigns, 118, 111.
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that make this sentence intelligible and significant as a speech act.'31 The concept of human
agency in language-use, which disappeared in the work of Barthes and Kristeva, reappears
here as a significant aspect of Culler's notion of intertextuality.
Thus, where Barthes, and Aichele and Phillips, took Kristeva's early work on
intertextuality in a direction which leads ultimately to the kind of interpretive practice
exemplified in Stephen Moore, Culler develops, from a similar starting-point, discussions of
genre-determination and speech-act conventions. In other words, 'intertextuality', as
theoretically outlined in an account such as Culler's, and distinguished from studies of
influence, promises to be fruitful in the kind of description of the inter-relationships
between biblical texts which we aim to suggest here.
We turn here to the work of the New Testament scholar Richard Hays on Paul's use of
the Old Testament. This is not to say that Hays follows Culler in inquiring into the logical
and pragmatic presuppositions of the Pauline epistles; in fact, Hays takes his cue from the
work of John Hollander on the trope of metalepsis ('allusive echo').32 Nonetheless, Hays'
(and Hollander's) work represents a good example of the kind of intertextual practice with
constraints which Culler proposes. It may be a third strategy, in addition to the two which
Culler offers, in building up the 'multiple strategies' of intertextual reading; or it is perhaps
a particular example of texts (Pauline epistles) becoming 'intelligible and significant as a
speech act' within 'the discursive space of a culture' (Paul's inherited Jewish culture) which
is itself in fact largely constituted by textual speech-acts (the Old Testament).
Hays' basic assertion is that Paul 'repeatedly situates his discourse within the symbolic
field created by a single great precursor text: Israel's Scripture.'33 He sets this claim in
explicit contrast to liberal Protestantism, especially as represented by von Harnack and
Bultmann. In Bultmann's view, the Old Testament provides no serious constitutive
elements in Paul's theology; he simply occasionally expressed the kerygma through
mythological language and symbols.34 The bulk of Hays' book is taken up with
substantiating his counter-claim in great exegetical detail from the undisputed Pauline
epistles. Using Saussure's terminology, he asserts of Paul's relationship to the Old
Testament the opposite of Barthes' confident assertion of his own inability to be heard
above the babble. Hays writes of the epistle to the Romans:
It would be inadequate to say that Scripture was langue and Paul's discourse
parole, as though Scripture were merely a pool of lexemes from which Paul
draws; rather, Scripture's poetry and narratives materially govern his
confession. Scripture's parole, already spoken, rebounds and is heard once
31 Culler, The Pursuit ofSigns, 116-18.
32 Richard B. Hays, Echoes of Scripture in the Letters of Paul (New Haven & London: Yale Univ.
Press, 1989), 20.
33 Hays, Echoes ofScripture, 15.
34
Hays, Echoes ofScripture, 7-8.
168
again in Paul's discourse. Consequently, Paul's sentences carry the weight of
meanings acquired through earlier narrative and liturgical utterance. This
allusive evocation of earlier declarations of God's faithfulness to Israel covertly
undergirds the burden of Paul's overt argument.35
Moreover, most of Paul's quotations from the Old Testament 'require the reader to
engage in serious sustained deliberation about the relation between Scripture's mundus
significans and the new situation Paul is addressing.'36 Paul simultaneously locates his
discourse within the world-view of the Old Testament, (he is fundamentally un-Marcionite),
and proclaims the new message of the gospel of Jesus Christ; indeed, the latter is only
possible by virtue of the former. Hays thus articulates a profound complexity of
relationships between the Pauline writings and the Old Testament which justifies the
description 'intertextuality', going beyond what might be attributed simply to 'influence'.37
Hays' reading of Paul's use of the Old Testament can be therefore be cited as a
significant counter-example to Roland Barthes' view of human agency in authorship, for he
mounts a convincing argument that Paul's discourse both develops 'within duration' (in his
own life-time and beyond), and is enormously in debt to previous modes of writing (the Old
Testament), without becoming captive to those previous modes. The Old Testament does
indeed provide a 'stubborn after-image' in Paul's texts - but this fact does not drown out
Paul's own voice; it is rather a necessary condition of him saying what he wanted to say.
Subsequent readers of Paul can only properly hear the distinctive contours of his texts in
their own right if they hear them in relation to the previous modes of writing which he
indwells. Whereas Barthes sees authors moving only between absolute freedom and
absolute slavery, Paul develops the particular creativity and even freedom of his discourse
precisely by virtue of his captivity to earlier texts. Barthes and Hays seem to be working
with very different underlying understandings of the nature of human freedom.
Hays' work concentrates on intertextual biblical relationships at the level of citation and
allusion, and suggests that they are complex. Paul creates his own discourse only by virtue
of his indwelling of Old Testament discourse; he moves beyond the Old Testament without
silencing it. How might such textual inter-relationships, which are in effect mutually
supplementing relations between biblical texts, themes and genres, be described
35
Hays, Echoes ofScripture, 70.
36 Hays, Echoes ofScripture, 175.
37 Hence, contra Plett's 'anti-intertextualists', 'traditional intertextualist' is not a redundant term, for it
is called for by Hays' account of the relationship between Pauline texts and the Old Testament. In
various asides, Hays tends to draw significant distinctions between Paul's use of the Old Testament
and that of other New Testament writers. He suggests, for example, that on the whole Matthew did
not wrestle with the context of the Old Testament texts he cited as Paul did, (Hays, Echoes of
Scripture, 175). Hays' work on Paul could productively be followed by equally careful work on other
New Testament writers, investigating whether such comments are justified. For a hugely detailed
account of intertextuality within the Old Testament, see Michael Fishbane, Biblical Interpretation in
Ancient Israel (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985).
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hermeneutically? A key term here, we suggest, is 'polyphony'. Under the concepts of
'heteroglossia' and 'speech genres', Mikhail Bakhtin offers a philosophical description of
language which will fund an account of the intertextual interaction between the diverse
canonical texts as 'polyphonic'.
5.2.3. Canon and Polyphony
5.2.3.1. Mikhail Bakhtin: heteroglossia and speech genres
Bakhtin's work is sometimes difficult and often fragmentary. His published works cover
broad areas in literary theory, philosophy, ethics and theory of culture. In addition, there are
problems with deciding whether he sometimes wrote pseudonymously, and therefore the
precise extent of his oeuvre is uncertain; only undisputed works will be referred to here.
Not the least of the problems in the interpretation of his work are those caused by his very
difficult circumstances as an intellectual in Stalinist Russia.
As was noted above, Kristeva was primarily instrumental in introducing Bakhtin to a
Western audience, and since then his work has been quite influential.38 However, as we also
saw, even at the beginning Kristeva read Bakhtin in a particular way; given the breadth and
sometimes apparently self-contradictory nature of his work, this is perhaps hard to avoid.
Since the 1960s, and as interest in his work has grown, Bakhtin has been welcomed by some
as a forerunner of deconstruction, on the basis particularly of his concept of carnival,39 and
by others as representative of a more restrained ethical position. Generally, those who have
translated and edited Bakhtin's work take the latter view. One such writer, Michael
Holquist, comments on Bakhtin's essay, 'The Problem of Speech Genres': 'Given its
emphasis on normative restraints that control even our most intimate speech, the essay
should at the very least sound a cautionary note for those who wish to invoke Bakhtin in the
service of a boundless libertarianism.'40 Similarly, Wayne Booth insists that Bakhtin
establishes firm links between language and extra-linguistic reality,41 and Gary Saul Morson
that Bakhtin retains, while rendering highly complex, commitments to intention and
authorship.42
38 See, e.g., ed. Gary Saul Morson, Bakhtin. Essays and Dialogues on His Work (Chicago & London:
Univ. ofChicago Press, 1986).
39 Apart from Julia Kristeva's use of Bakhtin in post-structuralist literary theory, see, e.g., the
theological treatment of 'carnival' in Mark C. Taylor, Erring. A Postmodern A/theology (Chicago &
London: Univ. ofChicago Press, 1984), esp. 161-64.
40 Michael Holquist, 'Introduction', in M.M. Bakhtin, Speech Genres and Other Late Essays Univ. of
Texas Press Slavic Series 8, eds Caryl Emerson & Michael Holquist, trans. Vem W. McGee, (Austin:
Univ. of Texas Press, 1986), xvii.
41 Wayne C. Booth, 'Introduction', in Mikhail Bakhtin, Problems ofDostoevsky's Poetics Theory and
History of Literature 8, ed. & trans. Caryl Emerson (Manchester: Manchester Univ. Press, 1984), xxv-
xxvi.
42 Gary Saul Morson, 'Who Speaks for Bakhtin?', in ed. Morson, Bakhtin, 1-19 (17).
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It is important to note that what will be adopted here as a 'polyphonic' view of
language is what Bakhtin outlines under the concepts of 'heteroglossia' and 'speech genres'.
Confusingly, for the present discussion, Bakhtin also has a concept which he calls
'polyphony', and which is quite different from what we will come to mean by 'polyphony'.
The reason for renaming Bakhtin's 'heteroglossia' 'polyphony' in this study is that the
former term, apparently an English neologism translating Bakhtin's Russian neologism, has
not been widely adopted by others, whereas 'polyphony' is a standard English word, and has
been used by several writers on the Bible. In order to clarify this point, it will be helpful to
explain briefly what we are not appropriating from Bakhtin - that is, his concept of
'polyphony'; this will also give a fuller picture of Bakhtin's overall work.
Bakhtin uses 'polyphony' to describe a particular stance which the author of a novel
can take with regard to the characters in his novel. He discusses the concept in greatest
detail in relation to the work ofDostoevsky, whom he credits with inventing polyphony, and
with being one of its rare exponents - possibly its only successful exponent. Dostoevsky,
he asserts,
created something like a new artistic model of the world .... A plurality of
independent and unmerged voices and consciousnesses, a genuine polyphony
of fully valid voices is in fact the chief characteristic of Dostoevsky's novels.
... Dostoevsky's major heroes are, by the very nature of his creative design, not
only the objects of authorial discourse but also subjects of their own directly
signifying discourse.43
Thus 'polyphony' is for Bakhtin a theory of the creative process.44 He imagines that
Dostoevsky did not plan his novels, but first created specific 'voices'. In a 'monologic'
novel, and the vast majority of novels are 'monologic', we are offered a report of a finished
dialogue; in a polyphonic work, 'we see the author addressing characters like people
"actually present ... and capable of answering him.'" Thus, there is genuine (by which
Bakhtin would mean open-ended) dialogue between author and characters.45 The great
virtue of the polyphonic novel for Bakhtin is that '[t]he single adequate form for verbally
expressing authentic human life is the open-ended dialogue. '46 His admiration for
Dostoevsky is based on the fact that he thinks that that novelist invented a creative process
which embodied this ethic in literary form. It has been suggested that even if Bakhtin's
reading of Dostoevsky is wrong, we are still left with a remarkable approach to human
culture, and one with significant ethical consequences.47
43 Bakhtin, Problems, 3, 6-7, (original italics removed).
44 Gary Saul Morson & Caryl Emerson, Mikhail Bakhtin. Creation ofa Prosaics (Stanford, California:
Stanford Univ. Press, 1990), 243.
45 Morson & Emerson, Mikhail Bakhtin, 246, (quoting Bakhtin).
46 Bakhtin, Problems, 293.
47 Morson & Emerson, Mikhail Bakhtin, 251.
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To apply this concept of Bakhtin's to the Bible would entail seeing God as a
'polyphonic' author with regard to various created characters. However, the biblical texts
will not allow us to go very far with a conception of God as a novelist who remains in open-
ended dialogue with his 'characters', never exerting any final authority over them. This
would seem to exclude eschatology, among other things.
More fruitful for our purposes is Bakhtin's concept of 'heteroglossia'. It is this that
Kristeva was primarily borrowing when she first developed her concept of intertextuality.
Bakhtin has a fundamental objection to viewing language in any significant sense as langue.
Despite attempts to regularise grammars and linguistic usage, (for example, into 'standard'
and 'non-standard'), he asserts, every utterance is inhabited by a variety of genres, of modes
of speaking. This is the case because '[e]ach separate utterance is individual, of course, but
each sphere in which language is used develops its own relatively stable types of these
utterances. These we may call speech genres.'' There is an 'extreme heterogeneity of
speech genres (oral and written) ... from the proverb to the multivolume novel.'48 'Morson
and Emerson summarise the point well: for Bakhtin, language is always languages'.49 It is
this characteristic of language which Bakhtin refers to as 'heteroglossia'.
Bakhtin has a fundamentally dialogical view of language. To be a listener is not simply
to be a passive receptor of someone else's meaning: 'all real and integral understanding is
actively responsive, and constitutes nothing other than the initial preparatory stage of a
response'.50 Bakhtin and speech-act theorists thus share, apparently independently, many
fundamental themes. What Austin and Searle term a speech-act is identical to what Bakhtin
calls an 'utterance', which he distinguishes from the sentence as 'the real unit of speech
communication': an 'utterance' is always language in use; a 'sentence' is a string of word
that could be used for a variety of utterances, that is, with a variety of Elocutionary forces.
The material extent of an utterance is defined precisely by its dialogical relations to the
utterances of others: 'Any utterance has, so to speak, an absolute beginning and an absolute
end: its beginning is preceded by the utterances of others, and its end is followed by the
responsive utterances of others.'51 This means that the speech genres which arise out of
different spheres of language-use reflect different ways in which people habitually respond
to the world, and especially to one another. It is by means of the multiple heteroglossia of
language, then, by ourselves inhabiting these linguistically inherited Elocutionary stances
towards the world, that we come to take specific and different points of view on the world:
48 M.M. Bakhtin, 'The Problem of Speech Genres', in Bakhtin, Speech Genres and Other Late Essays,
60-102 (60-61).
49 Morson & Emerson, Mikhail Bakhtin, 140.
50 Bakhtin, 'Speech Genres', 69. This was referred to in our appropriation in chapters 3 and 4 of
Wolterstorff s account of the ethical responsibilities which accme to the addressees of speech-acts.
51 Bakhtin, 'Speech Genres', 71.
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All languages of heteroglossia, whatever the principle underlying them and
making them unique, are specific points of view on the world, forms for
conceptualizing the world in words, specific world views, each characterized
by its own objects, meanings and values. As such they may be juxtaposed to
one another, mutually supplement one another, contradict one another and be
interrelated dialogically.52
Kevin Vanhoozer, developing the insights of speech-act theorists, says of literary
genres exactly what Bakhtin says of heteroglossic 'speech genres': 'genres are literary
practices that enable complex ways of engaging reality and of interacting with others'. He
also suggests that there are generic tllocutions which supervene on individual sentences: for
example, following Susan Lanser's work on narrative, 'the novel's basic illocutionary
activity is ideological instruction.'53
Bakhtin's basic observation about language is therefore strikingly similar to Barthes':
human speech is not some linguistic creatio ex nihilo. We cannot avoid using second-hand
forms of language. However, from the same observation he draws precisely the opposite
conclusion to Barthes. For Bakhtin, a complex speech genre, such as a literary genre,
composed out of simpler speech genres, is sufficient to bear a mark of the author's
individuality, distinguishing his utterance from that of other works: 'The speaker's will is
manifested primarily in the choice of a particular speech genre.'54 Words exist for speakers
in three different aspects, he asserts: as a neutral word, belonging to no one, (as in langue);
as an other's word; and as my word.55 Of these, Barthes allows only the first two aspects to
persist. Bakhtin agrees that human linguistic creativity is not easy - we do not always
mark our speech with our own individuality: 'many words stubbornly resist, others sound
alien, sound foreign in the mouths of the one who appropriated them and now speaks them'.
However, unlike Barthes, he does not think it impossible to make something of one's own
out of what has been used by others: 'The word in language is half someone else's. It
becomes "one's own" only when the speaker populates it with his own intention, his own
accent, when he appropriates the word, adapting it to his own semantic and expressive
intention.'56 Ultimately, Bakhtin thinks, if we each had to originate our own speech genres
in order to speak, communication would be impossible.57 Barthes establishes as a necessary
52 Bakhtin, 'Discourse in the Novel', 291-92.
53 Kevin J. Vanhoozer, Is There a Meaning in This Text? The Bible, the Reader and the Morality of
Literary Knowledge (Leicester: Apollos, 1998), 338, 341.
54 Bakhtin, 'Speech Genres', 75-78, (original italics removed).
55 Bakhtin, 'Speech Genres', 88. 'Speech genres' therefore functions as a third term between
Saussure's langue and parole, offering a more sophisticated account of how language, considered as a
semiotic system, is related to actual speech-acts.
56 Bakhtin, 'Discourse in the Novel', 293-94.
57 Bakhtin, 'Speech Genres', 79.
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condition for 'free speech' that the human speaker be like God; Bakhtin thinks that, to
speak for herself, a human person does not have to be the Creator.58
'Heteroglossia', we suggest, is a fruitful stand-point from which to consider the work of
Richard Hays, outlined above. Hays' exegetical conclusions on the relationship between the
Pauline epistles and the Old Testament can be expressed in Bakhtinian theoretical terms:
Paul makes the languages of the Old Testament his 'own' by successfully 'populating' them
with and adapting them for his own intention; yet in this act of 'appropriation' the
languages of the Old Testament are not silenced - that is not at all Paul's intention.59 Of
course, it is intended here to portray these relationships in the Bible as always 'mutually
supplementing', and never contradictory, as Bakhtin characterises some relationships
between 'the languages of heteroglossia'. Whether this is in fact the case with the Bible can
only be established in the discussion between theology and biblical exegesis.
5.2.3.2. Bakhtin and biblical studies
The literary critic Walter Reed is so far the only person who has attempted at some length
directly to relate Bakhtin's basic concepts to the Bible as a whole.60 He adopts Bakhtin's
underlying and controlling concept of 'dialogue' in order to interpret certain biblical texts.
This concept lies behind other terms, such as 'polyphony' and 'heteroglossia'. As is usually
the case with Bakhtin, the meaning of 'dialogue' emerges with his use of it, not by
definition. In increasing order of level of description, Morson and Emerson suggest that for
Bakhtin 'dialogue' is 'a term for a specific type of utterance, opposed to other, monologic
utterances', 'a description of language that makes all utterances by definition dialogic', and
'a view of the world and truth (his global concept).'61
58 Bakhtin probably had his own particular view of how his ethical and philosophical agendas were
related to theology. Morson and Emerson suggest this summary of Bakhtin's attitude to Christian
theology: 'To participate directly in the "world symposium," God allowed Himself to be incarnated
and tested. ... Christ "lived into" the world and proved himself to be the perfect dialogue partner,
addressing people with "dialogic intuition" that never finalized them', (Morson & Emerson, Mikhail
Bakhtin, 267). Bakhtin's ultimate image of dialogic faith is conversation with Christ: 'The word as
something personal. Christ as Truth. I put the question to him.' Morson and Emerson suppose that
Bakhtin's conversation with Christ would be interminable and absorbing disagreement, (Morson &
Emerson, Mikhail Bakhtin, 62, quoting Bakhtin). In that case, what the book Revelation says of
heaven - 'When the Lamb opened the seventh seal, there was silence in heaven for about half an
hour', (Rev. 8.1) - is more like Bakhtin's notion of hell; similarly Matthew's claim, presented at the
end of his Gospel, of the authoritative position held by the resurrected Christ.
59 'Christian' readings of the Old Testament will be discussed below, in relation to the work of B.S.
Childs. We will there suggest a necessary condition if a 'Christian' reading of an Old Testament text
is not to be a supercessionist imposition.
60 Walter L. Reed, Dialogues of the Word. The Bible as Literature According to Bakhtin (New York &
London: Oxford Univ. Press, 1993). Kenneth M. Craig, Jr., Reading Esther. A Case for the Literary
Carnivalesque (Louisville, Kentucky: Westminster John Knox Press, 1995), applies Bakhtin's
particular concept of 'carnival', developed in his reading of Rabelais, to one particular biblical text.
51 Morson & Emerson, Mikhail Bakhtin, 486.
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In practice, Reed does not distinguish these three levels, (as Bakhtin himself admittedly
sometimes does not), and so approaches the task of biblical interpretation with a rather blunt
analytical tool. This vagueness renders his 'Bakhtinian' readings of the Bible rather
unsatisfactory. On the one hand he imposes Bakhtin's concept, usually in a mixture of the
first two senses of it given above, uncritically on the Bible, which leads to conclusions
which do violence to the text and would be hard to justify exegetically. For example, he
claims that Bakhtin's concept allows us to recognise that the Scriptures 'are
overwhelmingly and persistently concerned with one thing': 'the ongoing dialogue between
God and people'.62 On the other hand, he reaches conclusions on certain texts which, say, a
narrative criticism completely uninfluenced by Bakhtin could have equally have produced -
for example, that in Mark's Gospel the account of Peter's denial is set in sharp contrast to
Jesus' witness to his true identity in his trial: an episode with 'dialogic character',
according to Reed.63
Finally, Reed muses on the extent to which a 'dialogic' Scripture may be said to be a
unity. He claims that the literary critic will always observe more 'coherence' in the
'anthology' (that is, in the canon of Scripture) than the historian, who views the Bible as an
'archive'. However, he notes, '[cjoherence is not the same as unity, and the diversity of the
anthology and the testimony of texts outside the collection are always an embarrassment to
the theologian, even the "biblical" theologian.'64 That a high degree of canonical diversity
can be tolerated before the "biblical" theologian needs to feel embarrassment is what the
following section aims to defend.
5.2.3.3. Accounts of the biblical canon as polyphonic
Karl Barth asserts that 'theology confronts in Holy Scriptures an extremely polyphonic, not
a monotonous, testimony to the word and work ofGod.' The Scriptures have this character
because of 'the objective multiplicity and inner contrasts sustained within the motion of the
history of the covenant which they recount and affirm.'65 This kind of description of the
canon of Scripture has been developed at greatest length by Paul Ricoeur in two
thematically overlapping essays. Before discussing Ricoeur, reference will be made first to
a work by Mark Wallace which, at the end of a comparison of Barth and Ricoeur, offers a
reflection on biblical polyphony which, it will become evident, is different from Ricoeur's
in one significant respect.
62 Reed, Dialogues ofthe Word, 16.
63 Reed, Dialogues ofthe Word, 32-34.
64 Reed, Dialogues ofthe Word, 170.
65 Karl Barth, Evangelical Theology: An Introduction trans. Grover Foley (London: Weidenfeld &
Nicolson, 1963), 33.
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Wallace argues: 'If and when revelation has occurred within the Christian
environment, this disclosure should be read through the polyphonic play of meaning within
the Bible, a play that should not be stopped by an isolation of one trajectory of meaning
within Scripture as "the" biblical message.'66 He adds: 'all discourse about God, including
that of the Bible, both is and is not adequate to that about which it speaks.'67 Thus, the
biblical texts are to be held in determinate relations to one another, in that dynamic
polyphonic play occurs within the Bible, not running over the limits of the canon. It is in
this dynamic set of relationships, not in the reduction of the themes of the Bible to one
single theme, or in the reduction of the diversity of biblical genres to one mode of
expression, that the Bible's discourse becomes in some way adequate to that about which it
speaks.
However, Wallace provides in addition a significant role for the reader in the
establishing of the nature of the inter-relationships between different biblical trajectories.
The kind of hermeneutics he advocates 'will focus on the give-and-take between text and
audience; it will maintain that Scripture is more like a lively and open-ended game between
its world and the world of the reader than it is a closed book whose meaning is exhausted by
the standard theological lexicon.' He provides a practical example of what he means. We
note, he says, that at times God is described in the Bible as a mighty warrior - '[y]et this
martial and patriarchal imagery is questionable in a time when many of us have been
victimized by sacralized violence.' However, the Bible also depicts God as a mother
brooding over her young, and as liberator of the poor, and it is these images which we
should now privilege.68
It seems here that, despite his stated intention, Wallace has stopped the play of inter-
canonical ways of naming God somewhat, isolating, if not one trajectory of meaning in
Scripture, then at least a group of trajectories which seem to him relatively easy to reconcile
with one another - and this for modern socio- and gender-political reasons. However, it is
questionable whether the biblical texts which contain this martial imagery can be so easily
exculpated. It surely cannot be the case that 'sacralized violence' is only a modern
phenomenon, that no one fell victim to it in the ancient world, in the period when these texts
were written. If such imagery is questionable now, why not then? This is particularly
curious, since Wallace also laments the present theological scene, in which, he says, the
void left by the removal of the assumption that God has revealed himself has been filled
with 'a dizzying array of various genitive theologies (such as liberation theology or feminist
66 Mark I. Wallace, The Second Naivete. Barth, Ricoeur and the New Yale Theology Studies in
American Biblical Hermeneutics 6 (Macon, GA: Mercer Univ. Press, 1990), 117-18, (original italics
removed).
67 Wallace, The Second Naivete, 121.
68 Wallace, The Second Naivete, 119.
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theology).'69 In fact, many liberation theologians do precisely what Wallace does -
relegating the authoritative significance of certain biblical 'names' of God, and promoting
others, such as 'liberator of the poor', in the light of modern concerns, as expressive of 'the'
message of the Bible. Wallace delimits the breadth of biblical polyphony by means of
precisely the same criteria whose implementation has led directly to the presented splintered
theological scene beyond which he wishes to move.
In a suggestive article, Paul Ricoeur argues that the individual biblical texts should be
understood as each separately saying something determinate of God, and collectively, in
their diversity, referring to a God who, while escaping each separate attempt to refer to him,
is nevertheless successfully referred to (we may say) 'canonically'. Speaking of the
different ways in which the Bible 'names' God, Ricoeur says:
The referent "God" is thus intended by the convergence of all these partial
discourses. It expresses the circulation of meaning among all the forms of
discourse wherein God is named. ... The referent "God" is not just the index of
the mutual belonging together (appurtenance) of the originary forms of the
discourse of faith. It is their common goal, which escapes each of them.70
Ricoeur takes the individual texts and genres of the Bible to be real, albeit partial, acts
of discourse. Where texts meet or intersect they refer to something beyond themselves - to
a real extra-textual and 'extra-readerly' God. Francis Watson outlines a conception of the
mode of biblical reference very similar to Ricoeur's, which he calls 'intratextual realism',
'which would understand the biblical text as referring beyond itself to extra-textual
theological reality, while at the same time regarding that reality as accessible to us only in
textual form, in principle and not only in practice.'71
In a related article Ricoeur applies this concept to revelation. His aim, he says, is 'to
carry the notion of revelation back to its most originary level, the one, which for the sake of
brevity, I call the discourse of faith or the confession of faith.' His subsequent discussion of
various biblical genres shows that the latter terms refer primarily to the Bible. In Bible-
reading, rather than 'transforming these different forms of discourse into propositions, we
encounter a concept of revelation that is pluralistic, polysemic, and at most analogical in
form'.72 This is where he wants theology to start. We should not begin with some
philosophical notion that 'God exists'; rather, if we succeed in avoiding turning the Bible
69 Wallace, The Second Naivete, 113-14.
70 Paul Ricoeur, 'Naming God' Union Seminary Quarterly Review 34 (1979), 215-27 (222).
71 Francis Watson, Text, Church and World. Biblical Interpretation in Theological Perspective
(Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1994), 224-25.
72 Paul Ricoeur, 'Toward a Hermeneutic of the Idea of Revelation', in Ricoeur, Essays on Biblical
Interpretation ed. Lewis S. Mudge (London: SPCK, 1981), 73-118 (74-75).
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into assertion and proposition, 'we arrive at a polysemic and polyphonic concept of
revelation.'73
This model insists on the irreducibility of biblical polyphony while, unlike Wallace,
providing no extra-biblical criteria by which to de-emphasise certain biblical names for
God. In chapter 3, in the discussion of Barth, Barth's conviction that human language is
simply incapable of referring to God qua human language was noted. Ricoeur, by contrast,
regards 'poetic discourse', by which he means a diversity of literary genres, as
fundamentally performing something more than an act of reference: 'My deepest
conviction is that poetic language alone restores us to that participation-in or belonging-to
an order of things which precedes our capacity to oppose ourselves to things taken as
objects opposed to a subject.'74 Like Barth, though, he adds that biblical poetic language is
unique in that the Name of the unnameable God is the vanishing-point of all the Bible's
partial discourses about God.75 One may ask, however, whether the divine referent of
human biblical language is unique in this way. Not even a human person is fully captured
by a single discourse; as referents of the discourse of others and of ourselves about
ourselves, we too escape each of them, but may be known and referred to, by ourselves and
others, partially but nevertheless adequately and truly, as the common goal which escapes
each of the discourses themselves. As God presents himself to us in the world, the biblical
canon, in its polyphonic inter-canonical poetic functions, allows us to name him in the same
way. Kevin Vanhoozer argues thus:
in an important sense, we can say what lies beyond our words. While we may
not have nouns that 'name' God, speaking is more than a mere matter of
'labelling' the world. ... Where individual words are unable to articulate the
majesty and glory of God, sentences succeed in so doing. I do not wish to be
misunderstood. I am not suggesting that sentences describe the divine reality
without remainder, but rather that some sentences themselves contain a 'surplus
ofmeaning' (Ricoeur) which is richer than any literal paraphrase.76
What Vanhoozer describes as a 'surplus of meaning' at the level of the sentence, we call,
also following Ricoeur, the polyphonic circulation of meaning, exceeding the capacity of
any one of the individual discourses, at the level of the canon as a whole.
73 Ricoeur, 'Toward a Hermeneutic', 90-92. For the significance of Ricoeur's proper recognition of
the polyphonic nature of revelation, see David Tracy's summary of the recent history of the doctrine
of revelation, in which he has Ricoeur specifically in mind: 'The need for second-order, conceptual
discourse for a doctrine of revelation was studied with care and precision. The contours of the actual
first-order religious discourse of the Scriptures (prophetic, narrative, poetic, wisdom, proverbial,
parabolic, letters, hymnic) were, with a few notable exceptions, left largely unthematized until the last
fifteen years', (David Tracy, On Naming the Present. God, Hermeneutics, and Church [London:
SCM, 1994], 109-10).
74 Ricoeur, 'Toward a Hermeneutic', 101.
75 Ricoeur, 'Toward a Hermeneutic', 104.
76 Kevin Vanhoozer, 'God's Mighty Speech-Acts: The Doctrine of Scripture Today', in eds Philip E.
Satterthwaite & David F. Wright, A Pathway into the Holy Scripture (Grand Rapids, Michigan:
Eerdmans, 1994), 143-81 (172 n.92).
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5.2.3.4. Canonicalpolyphony and biblical authority
Walter Reed would perhaps consider the present work an exercise in 'biblical theology', and
therefore necessarily embarrassed by the diversity of the canon. However, given Bakhtin's
arguments about the sheer complexity and irreducible heteroglossic nature of even the
simplest utterance, it is possible to account for a greater degree of canonical diversity than
Reed supposes before the 'biblical theologian' need blush in the face of the biblical texts.
Both biblical literary genres and thematic statements derived from the content of the Bible
are points of view on reality. The themes of justification, adoption and reconciliation, for
example, are each partially and truthfully expressive of the reality of God's act of salvation
as it is depicted in the Bible. Moreover, each of these themes can only be given expression
in different literary genres, each of which takes a different viewpoint - a different
illocutionary stance - on the theme: as a narrative which demonstrates the reality ofGod's
act of adoption of a people in history, as a prophecy which speaks direct encouragement
regarding the future for those who have been adopted, as a psalm which provides a model of
praise to God for his act of adoption, as a set of laws which prescribe how the adopted
should live, and so on.
As far as biblical interpretation is concerned, we propose a model of 'traditional
intertextuality', in the sense given by Plett: the interpreter must be aware of the extent to
which canonical texts, in the wealth of their mutual quotations, and especially of their
literary and thematic allusions to each other, refer in polyphonic ways to divine revelation.
Since 'canon' implies a clearly delimited set of texts, this intertextuality may also be called
an 'intratextuality'; it is Scripture which interprets Scripture. This 'intratextuality' is
analogous to George Lindbeck's notion of 'intratextual theology', if Lindbeck is read as
proposing a realist conception of truth. He writes: 'Intratextual theology redescribes reality
within the scriptural framework rather than translating Scripture into extrascriptural
categories.'77 Since what Lindbeck proposes here is a only a redescription of reality, this
statement certainly tolerates a realist interpretation. However, there is disagreement over
whether Lindbeck has a basically realist or non-realist view of biblical language about
God.78 What is proposed here - and it is also the name we would give to Ricoeur's basic
hermeneutical view of the Bible - is Watson's notion of 'intratextual realism', explicated
as functioning 'polyphonically', as a model for how the Bible speaks of God and the world.
77 George A. Lindbeck, The Nature of Doctrine (London: SPCK, 1984), 118. Lindbeck's
'intratextuality' was referred to in relation to Hans Frei in chapter 3.
78 'George Lindbeck's The Nature of Doctrine is ... an extended exploration and defence of
theological non-realism', (Francis Watson, Text, Church and World, 133). Mark Brett takes the
opposite view, (referred to in Iain Provan, 'Canons to the Left of Him: Brevard Childs, His Critics,
and the Future of Old Testament Theology' Scottish Journal of Theology 50 [1997], 1-38 [25 n.51]).
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To determine how far the diversity of the Bible's content can stretch before its
polyphonic unity breaks - that is, before it becomes unworkable as the supreme authority in
the church - is of course an enormous task. However, as a preliminary to such work, it can
be argued, on the basis of such observations as Ricoeur's, supplemented by a Bakhtinian
philosophy of language, that it can stretch further - indeed, must stretch further - than is
often supposed. The diverse nature of the referents of Scripture - God, humankind, the
world, God's action in Christ, protology and eschatology, the history of redemption - seem
to require, as regards both theme and genre, a wide range of 'partial discourses', and a high
degree of heteroglossic languages (complex 'speech genres') in the canon, if the texts are to
render the referents to a community of readers at all adequately.79 If a unique hypostatic
union of human and divine natures really did take place in the person of Jesus of Nazareth
as the culmination of a process of divine action in history, anything less diverse than the
canon of Scripture we have might be thought too simplistic to speak of such a reality.80
John Goldingay writes, in a work which shares a similar view of the Bible's theological
diversity: 'Recognizing the complexity of reality itself, we attempt the task of
comprehending as fully as we can that complex reality as a whole, in the light of the witness
the OT has given to various aspects of it in unsystematic ways.'81 What confronts us in the
Bible is what David Tracy has called 'the extraordinary complexity of a full scriptural
understanding of the many faces of God disclosed in the many scriptural genres to name
God.'82 If the canonical texts of Scripture ultimately sing in unison about the whole of the
divine redemption of humankind in Jesus Christ, that is only by virtue of their singing
polyphonically, in unsystematic mutually supplementing ways.83 Biblical polyphony neither
79 See Michael Fox's comment that in biblical interpretation '[m]uch of what is called indeterminacy
is actually effective mimesis of a determinate but complex reality', (quoted in Vanhoozer, Is There a
Meaning, 302).
80 In speaking of 'the canon of Scripture we have', no distinction between different Christian versions
of the biblical canon, such as the different lists of Roman Catholic and Protestant canons, and the
different forms of Hebrew and Greek canons, is necessarily made here. As regards diversity at the
theoretical level of the present discussion, they are similar enough to one another to be described
under the same categories. More specific historical questions about which canon is confessed to be
sufficient will be addressed briefly in the following section on B.S. Childs' hermeneutics.
81 Goldingay, Theological Diversity, 184.
82 Tracy, On Naming the Present, 33.
83 'Polyphony' is preferred, in order to catch the unsystematic character of Scripture, over
'symphony', which Origen uses to describe the relationship between the Old and New Testaments,
(referred to in J.N.D. Kelly, Early Christian Doctrines 5th ed. rev. [London: A. & C. Black, 1977],
69). 'Unsystematic' here refers to the fact that different biblical texts address different particular
situations. In this regard, Metzger offers a historical account of biblical unity-in-diversity which the
present theological account serves to complement: 'The homogeneity of the canon is not jeopardized
even in the face of tensions that exist within the New Testament. These tensions, however, must not
be exaggerated into contradictions as a result of giving inadequate consideration to the divergent
situations within the early Church to which the writers addressed themselves', (Metzger, The Canon
of the New Testament, 280-81).
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reduces into univocity nor expands into cacophony, just to the extent that Paul's discourse
neither collapses into nor contradicts the Old Testament in its simultaneous indwelling of it
and moving beyond it.
5.3. The Sufficiency of the Canonical Form: The Hermeneutics of B.S. Childs
5.3.1. Childs' 'CanonicalApproach'
B.S. Childs is well known for having made the most concerted recent attempt to restore the
canon to a central place in biblical studies. Early in his career he offered a programmatic
outline of a new direction for biblical studies, in which he assumed the necessity of moving
beyond historical-critical description to 'theological exegesis'. Theological exegesis is
legitimate, he argued, because it is commensurate to the theological content of the biblical
texts in a way that historical-critical exegesis alone is not; it is necessary because exegesis
must take account of the theological reality which brought into being the witness of the
text.84 As Childs later made clear, he did not aim to supersede critical readings of the Bible
with a new methodological 'canonical criticism'; rather, he wanted an overall 'canonical
approach': 'a stance from which the Bible can be read as sacred scripture'.85 His chief aim
has been, in the wake of the failure of the American Biblical Theology Movement, to find a
means to further the Movement's basic aim of recovering 'a theological dimension of the
Bible.'86 He has pursued this by arguing that the canon is the most appropriate basis on
which biblical theology may be done.87 Childs has endeavoured to put his theological
exegesis into practice in a series of books over the past thirty years, culminating in his most
recent large work, Biblical Theology of the Old and New Testaments (London: SCM, 1992).
Although Childs has changed his position on certain emphases and points of detail over
the years, the key themes of his work have remained unaltered since the publication of his
foundational article. He has kept to his basic claim that the concept of the canon is an
intrinsic aspect of the biblical texts as we now have them, and so must be taken seriously.
The canon is the end result of a process of selecting and redacting texts which served as a
normative authority, first in ancient Israel and then in the early Christian church. The object
of critical biblical study must be the final form of the texts, for that alone bears witness to
84 Brevard S. Childs, 'Interpretation in Faith. The Theological Responsibility of an Old Testament
Commentary' Interpretation 18 (1964), 432-49 (438, 443).
85 Brevard S. Childs, Introduction to the Old Testament as Scripture (Philadelphia: Fortress Press,
1979), 82. Mark Brett argues that this distinguishes Childs from James Sanders, whom he calls a
canonical critic: Sanders, like historical critics, is interested in the construction of the canon; Childs
is interested in the final result of the process, the Hebrew canon of the first century AD, (Mark G.
Brett, Biblical Criticism in Crisis? The Impact of the Canonical Approach on Old Testament Studies
[Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1991], 20).
86 Brevard S. Childs, Biblical Theology in Crisis (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1970), 33.
87 Childs, Biblical Theology in Crisis, 99.
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the full history of revelation. It is precisely by taking note of this canonical aspect of the
texts that the church will continue to be able to appropriate the biblical texts in its
contemporary life, for the process of canonical shaping evident within the canon
demonstrates how texts from earlier situations were readdressed to later generations. For
example, Second Isaiah, originally a sixth-century text, has become, by virtue of its
canonical placing, 'a prophetic word not tied to a specific historical referent, but directed to
the future.'88 Childs contends that critical biblical scholarship rendered the text
theologically mute for the contemporary church precisely because it stripped away these
canonical elements in order to arrive at some historical event or religious mind-set.89
Childs has been said to regard the canon as sufficient for the guidance of the church;90
in examining his implied concept of the sufficiency of Scripture, the focus will be on how
he justifies the principle of canonical self-interpretation to which he holds, and which funds
what he takes to be 'theological' interpretation. In this section, therefore, a question
specific to the Bible - what does 'self-interpretation' mean within this specific set of texts?
- is primarily the one addressed.
In general, Childs' work has so far met with more rejection than acceptance, although
of late his work has found at least three readers who think that there is some merit in
defending his basic insights, while attempting to re-formulate and correct what they see to
be the weaknesses of his work: Mark Brett, Paul Noble and Iain Provan.91 Subsequent
sections will take what for present purposes have been the two most significant areas of
discussion relating to Childs' work: what Childs actually means by the concept 'canon',
and the basis on which he proposes the final form of the texts as the proper object of biblical
study.92 A final section will reflect on what seems to be a theological assumption that
Childs makes: namely, that the canon of Scripture, authored multiply by human authors, is
also authored singly by God.
5.3.2. Childs' Concept of 'Canon'
Childs defines 'canon' as 'that historical process within ancient Israel, particularly in the
post-exilic period, which entailed a collecting, selecting and ordering of the texts to serve a
88 Brevard S. Childs, 'The Exegetical Significance of Canon for the Study of the Old Testament' Vetus
Testamentum Supplements 29 (1977), 66-80 (70).
89 Iain Provan provides a very clear and concise summary of this aspect of Childs' programme:
Provan, 'Canons to the Left ofHim', 3-4.
90 Watson, Text, Church and World, 43-44.
91 Brett, Biblical Criticism in Crisis?-, Paul R. Noble, The Canonical Approach. A Critical
Reconstruction of the Hermeneutics ofBrevard S. Childs (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1995); Provan, 'Canons
to the Left ofHim'.
92 There is a danger in reading Childs' work synchronically and too systematically, for he has changed
his position on various issues over the years. However, he has been quite consistent in emphasising
the primacy of the final form of the canon.
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normative function as Sacred Scripture within the continuing community.'93 However,
distinct from the historical-critical programme of attempting to reconstruct the interesting
and complex pre-history of the biblical texts, Childs invokes the concept of 'canon' in order
to limit the scope of the study of this process to the extent that it can be found embodied in
the final form of the texts: 'Canon implies that the witness to Israel's experience with God
lies not in the process, which has usually been lost or purposely blurred, but is testified to in
the effect on the biblical text itself.'94
It is this theoretical emphasis on 'the biblical text itself which leads Brett to call
Childs' canonical approach to the Bible 'formalist', and one which requires 'a theory of
relatively autonomous meanings'.95 Similarly, John Barton insists that Childs has been
greatly influenced by New Criticism,96 and James Barr suggests a parallel with structuralist
reading practices.97 Noble points out, however, that when Childs comes to interpret biblical
texts he does not employ formalist reading practices, which might focus on, for example, the
plot and characters of biblical narrative. Rather, he is interested in the function of the text
as a theological norm. In practice, he seems to work in territory very different from that of
literary critics, and therefore to label him directly with a term borrowed from literary
criticism involves something of a category mistake.98
The nature of Childs' basic concern in raising the issue of the canon becomes evident
when the question of the meaning of the canonical texts arises, for here he modifies
somewhat his understanding of 'the biblical text itself. In his essay on the literal sense of
the Bible, he suggests that one way in which exegesis can ensure that it does not end up
divorcing text from reality is by studying the biblical text 'in closest connection with the
community of faith which treasured it. ... The literal sense of the text is the plain sense
witnessed to by the community of faith.'99 When this point is put theologically, the
93 Childs, 'The Exegetical Significance', 67.
94 Childs, 'The Exegetical Significance', 69.
95 Brett, Biblical Criticism in Crisis?, 26, (see also 69, 115). Brett argues that Childs has wrongly
been called a kind of redaction critic by some, but also notes that, within Childs' focus on 'the text
itself, 'his exegetical interest is actually founded on an account of editorial motives', (Brett, Biblical
Criticism in Crisis?, 20).
96 John Barton, Reading the Old Testament. Method in Biblical Study (London: Darton, Longman &
Todd, 1984), 141-42. Barton acknowledges that Childs did not borrow consciously from New
Criticism.
97 James Barr, Holy Scripture. Canon, Authority, Criticism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983), 158.
98 Noble, The Canonical Approach, 42.
99 Brevard S. Childs, 'The Sensus Literalis of Scripture: An Ancient and Modem Problem', in ed.
Herbert Donner et al., Beitrage zur alttestamentlichen Theologie (Gottingen: Vandenhoeck &
Ruprecht, 1977), 80-93 (92). This definition of the literal sense seems to be very similar to that
developed a few years later by Hans Frei in a late essay, and defended by Kathryn Tanner; both were
discussed in chapter 4.
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following conclusion results: 'the Church's regula fidei encompasses both text and tradition
in an integral unity as the living Word of God.'100
Thus, a certain blurring between text and community takes place in Childs' practical
handling of the biblical canon. Indeed, significant hermeneutical problems arise for Childs
in what is really the question of authority. On the question of where the authority of
Scripture is to be grounded, Douglas Knight judges that Childs does not make clear whether
it is 'in the literature by virtue of some special character it has, or in the community which
chooses to vest the literature with authority, or in some other source (such as the deity)
external to these other two.'101 At times, Childs seems to think of 'canon' as identifying
certain features of the text, such as its witness to revelation, but at other times the term
seems to refer to the community's use of the text.
It can also be unclear in Childs' work which community defines the 'literal sense' of a
text. In his earlier work, quoted above, the community in question seems to be the
community which was responsible for the production and compilation of the final form of
the canon. In a more recent work, the 'community' seems to extend broadly, as in Hans
Frei's later work, to the (undefined) 'church' in general: 'The term canon as used
throughout this volume functions as a theological cipher to designate those peculiar features
constitutive of the church's special relationship to its scripture.'102 Childs' response to
Knight's charge was simply to acknowledge his observation, without either resolving or
defending the ambiguity.103
The above points on the locus and ground of authority can be identified as the main
theological difficulties with Childs' lack of clarity in both his defining of 'canon' and his
practice of canonical interpretation. Bruce Metzger introduces a helpful distinction between
theological and historical questions about the canon: 'Discussions of the notae canonicitatis
... should distinguish between the ground of canonicity and the grounds for the conviction of
canonicity. The former has to do with the idea of canon and falls within the province of
theology; the latter has to do with the extent of the canon and falls within the domain of the
historian.'104 While it is on the former that the present discussion concentrates, it should be
noted incidentally that, as a biblical scholar, some of Childs' main critics have been other
100 Childs, 'The Sensus Literalis', 93. See also: 'the theological enterprise involves a construal by the
modem interpreter, whose stance to the text affects its meaning', (Brevard S. Childs, Old Testament
Theology in a Canonical Context [Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1985], 12).
101 Douglas A. Knight, 'Canon and the History of Tradition: A Critique of Brevard S. Childs'
Introduction to the Old Testament as Scripture' Horizons in Biblical Theology 2 (1980), 127-49 (140).
Noble agrees, arguing that Childs locates authority in both text and community, without showing how
these two loci of authority are to be correlated, (Noble, The Canonical Approach, 62-63).
102 Brevard S. Childs, Biblical Theology ofthe Old and New Testaments (London: SCM, 1992), 721.
103 Brevard S. Childs, 'A Response' Horizons in Biblical Theology 2 (1980), 199-221 (209).
104 Metzger, The Canon ofthe New Testament, 284.
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biblical scholars who have presented primarily historical objections. It lies beyond the
scope of the present work to engage these historical questions in detail; however, the two
most important issues can be briefly outlined, and the present reconstruction of scriptural
sufficiency located in relation to these questions, suggesting from which historical research
support might be drawn.
Following the basic outlines ofwork done by A.C. Sundberg, both James Barr and John
Barton have distinguished between 'scripture' and 'canon'. They take 'scripture' to refer to
an open set of authoritative religious texts, and 'canon' to a closed collection of texts.105
They argue that the core texts of both the Old and New Testaments reveal a self-
understanding as 'scripture', but that there was no sense that either the Jewish or Christian
Scriptures, in the first few centuries of the Christian era, existed in the form of a closed
'canonical' list of books.106 Barr concludes that the concept of 'scripture', that is, of certain
texts which bear a religious authority, is essential for biblical Christianity, but that 'canon',
a determinate list of authoritative books, is not.107
This view has been contested by Roger Beckwith, in a work which Barton, while hostile
to its conclusions, calls 'a completely authoritative compendium of all the evidence we have
on the subject' of the formation of the Old Testament canon.108 Beckwith argues that from
the second century BC onwards the Old Testament had 'a settled structure', such that for
Jesus only the books of the Hebrew canon were Scripture.109 Barton argues vigorously that
Beckwith has drawn wrong conclusions - wrong because anachronistic - from largely
correct historical observations.110 This debate, as conducted in Barton and Beckwith's
reviews of each other's work, seems to depend greatly on whether or not one allows that the
ancient listing of books considered Scripture counts as evidence of the awareness of 'canon'
as an exclusive collection.111
105 E.g., John Barton, Oracles of God. Perceptions of Ancient Prophecy in Israel After the Exile
(London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1986), 30.
106 Barton, Oracles ofGod, 55; John Barton, The Spirit and the Letter. Studies in the Biblical Canon
(London: SPCK, 1997), 24-28.
107 Barr, Holy Scripture, 63-64.
108 John Barton, review of Roger Beckwith, The Old Testament Canon of the New Testament Church,
Theology 90 (1987) 63-65.
109
Roger Beckwith, The Old Testament Canon of the New Testament Church (London: SPCK, 1985),
164.
110 He does not contest Beckwith's facts, but argues that the conclusions he draws from them are 'pure
fantasy', (Barton, review of Beckwith, 64).
111 Barton thinks that before the fourth century intorost in such lists had a 'comparatively abstract and
theoretical character', (Barton, The Spirit and the Letter, 28), and that Beckwith wrongly concludes
what an ancient writer intended to say from mere casual utterances, (Barton, review of Beckwith, 65).
Beckwith argues that Barton thereby ignores most of the evidence that would count against his view,
(R.T. Beckwith, 'A Modem Theory of the Old Testament Canon' Vetus Testamentum 41 [1991], 385-
95 [393-95]). Barton seems to go to excess in not allowing inferences to be drawn from historical
evidence; much respectable historical work of all kinds trangresses this mle. Beckwith might also be
able to mount an argument from silence, to the effect that Barton is more guilty of anachronism than
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Iain Provan and John Goldingay both question this distinction between 'scripture' and
canon', suggesting that Barton's notion of 'scripture' implies that some books are not
authoritative, such that some limitation - some 'canon' - is unavoidably invoked. That at
a certain point in time the canon was not closed does not mean that there was no
consciousness of canon; one can be conscious simultaneously of a principle of canonicity
and of the fact that there is more canonical material to come."2 The fundamental question is
the extent to which inclusivity implies exclusivity, in the case of the biblical canon."3
Childs himself questions Sundberg's original distinction, arguing that '[t]he formation of the
canon was not a late extrinsic sanctioning of a corpus of writings, but involved a lengthy
series of decisions deeply affecting the shape of the material.'"4 As far as the present work
is concerned, it is not strictly necessary to agree with Beckwith on the precise dating of the
closure of the Old Testament canon. However, that the canon is now closed, and that
'canon' as a closed list is essential to Christianity, are necessary corollaries of the claims
that Scripture is fundamentally separate from the church as a voice from outside, and that
Scripture interprets itself.
Second, there is the question of which Bible is to be thought of as the 'correct' Old
Testament of the Christian Bible. Goldingay summarises the two basic positions: the
Protestant view is that the Hebrew canon is the right one, and the Roman Catholic and
Orthodox view prefers a version of the Greek Bible."5 Various attempts at mediation
between the two positions have been made. Dominique Barthelemy has argued forcefully
for a critical modification of the Roman Catholic view, asserting that the Old Testament has
two mutually supplementing original forms - the Hebrew canon and the Septuagint - on
the basis that the latter was 'Holy Scripture' for the Christian church for the first four
centuries of its existence, and that no biblical criticism may be allowed to undo that by
declaring the Greek text inauthentic."6 Rolf Rendtorff thinks that it makes no difference
which of the two we take as that adopted into Christian Scripture, 'for in the Septuagint too
the Holy Scriptures are summed up as "the Torah and the Prophets," as New Testament
he is: the 'canon' as Beckwith perceives it was self-evident to ancient writers, and, not having Barton
to argue with, they did not write as discriminatingly as he now requires of them.
112 Provan, 'Canons to the Left ofHim', 5-11. 'Scripture does not become canonical only when there
is a formal canon. To reserve the notion of "normativity" for canon as opposed to "scripture" is to
render the latter expression vacuous', (John Goldingay, Models for Scripture [Grand Rapids:
Eerdmans, 1994], 104).
113 'To call some writings "scripture" is implicitly to give them a significance denied to other writings;
to include is implicitly also to exclude', (Goldingay, Models for Scripture, 104).
114 Childs, 'The Exegetical Significance', 67.
115 Goldingay, Models for Scripture, 168.
116 Dominique Barthelemy, 'La place de la Septante dans l'Eglise', in Barthelemy, Etudes d'Histoire
du Texte de I'Ancien Testament (Gottingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1978) 111-28.
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citations show (Matt. 5:17; 7:12, and frequently).'"7 Childs, in agreement with the
Protestant Reformers, advocates the supremacy of the Hebrew Bible, which is recovered
through the Masoretic Text, since, he argues, in the first century it achieved a stability
which no other version did.118 The basic doctrine of Scripture argued for in the present work
presupposes the legitimacy of Childs' argument about stability, since a 'sufficient' Scripture
must be a stable Scripture.
Does this mean that the doctrine of the sufficiency of Scripture can tolerate no
'fuzziness' around the edges of the canon - over the book of Esther, for example? To the
extent that such a book has no substantive theological content not also found in at least one
other canonical book, it may be possible to affirm the sufficiency of Scripture and also in
practice live unproblematically with a canon without sharply defined edges. A canon
without the book of Esther would not be substantially different theologically from one with
it, although it may lack an important witness to an aspect of a particular period of the history
of Israel. A canon with Esther permanently on the edge might seem a sensible middle
option. However, what has been argued in previous chapters about the importance of
offering a clear theological account of God's tying of his Word to a certain set of human
texts suggests that the sufficiency of Scripture, although in practice it can and does function
with unresolved questions over a small number of marginal books, cannot tolerate a
principial 'fuzziness'. In the end, God either has or has not tied his Word in part to the
book of Esther. It seems, in general, to be the case that a lack of absolute certainty over
whether some marginal books do or do not belong in the canon does not overthrow the
sufficiency of Scripture."9 This is analogous to the enterprise of biblical textual criticism:
we cannot be certain of precisely where the current best texts deviate from the biblical
autographs; however, that 'fuzziness' at the margins does not itself make it illegitimate to
identify the Bible with the Word of God, as a basis for faith and practice.120
117 Rolf Rendtorff, Canon and Theology. Overtures to an Old Testament Theology trans. & ed.
Margaret Kohl (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1993), 55. This is in contrast to Barton, who argues that
the different ordering of the books in the two forms of the Old Testament demonstrates that, in the
Hebrew, Torah is thematically central, and, in the Greek, prophecy, (Barton, Oracles ofGod, 21-23).
118 Childs, Introduction to the Old Testament, 97-100.
119 See Metzger's comment that what is remarkable about the Bible in the early church is not that
some 'fringe' books were debated over several centuries, but that in congregations scattered across a
huge geographical area a high degree of unanimity over which books to include in the canon and
which to exclude was reached in the first two centuries, (Metzger, The Canon of the New Testament,
254).
120 Childs sccm3 to have come to a similar position to this in his later work, Biblical Theology of the
Old and New Testaments. According to Provan, he thinks that '[j]ust because the outer limits of the
Christian canon remained unsettled, or because the role of translations was assessed differently among
various groups of Christians, the conclusion cannot be drawn that the church has functioned without a
scripture or in deep confusion. The areas of disagreement, in fact, have made little theological or
practical difference.' Childs therefore now talks about 'the search for the Christian Bible', which
Provan rejects as inconsistent with his actual exegetical practice, in which 'Childs seems to know
187
5.3.3. Why Focus on the Final Form of the Bible?
Childs offers various reasons for his advocacy of the final form of biblical texts as the object
of biblical interpretation. At a basic hermeneutical level, the final form offers at least a
common object of study as the grounds for theological reflection.121 Childs thinks that this
is a positive advantage over historical criticism, which often bases a great deal on
reconstructions of phenomena behind the text which, given our necessarily limited
knowledge of the history of ancient Israel and its texts, could only ever remain conjectural,
and so of little practical value for the church's contemporary theological appropriation of
Scripture.122 Second, from a literary point of view, the texts as we have them are not
conducive to the kind of analysis which historical criticism wishes to perform: 'the various
elements have been so fused together as to resist easy diachronic reconstructions which
fracture the witness of the whole.'123 Third - theologically, and most importantly - only
the final form 'bears witness to the full history of revelation. ... It is only in the final form
of the biblical text in which the normative history has reached an end that the full effect of
this revelatory history can be perceived."24
The hermeneutical argument does not carry much weight, since it just takes for granted
that historical criticism was wrong to assume that the easier path is not necessarily the better
- that, despite the attractiveness of 'simply' reading the final form, we must not be
distracted from the difficult task of reconstructing earlier textual layers. The literary
argument depends on a similar implicit appeal; no historical critic in fact supposes that
diachronic reconstruction is easy. The supposed historical layers of a biblical text cannot be
split apart as neatly as a piece of slate tapped gently at the right point, but the critic must
push beyond whatever mechanisms of resistance are built into the final form of the texts, in
order to treat earlier witnesses with full integrity.
Many of Childs' readers have found the third and most significant argument, as the
centre of his approach, especially difficult to accept. Barr argues that, for all that Childs
attacks historical criticism, his approach differs from it not so much in framework and
method, but simply in 'its will to focus on a different segment of historical and literary
exactly which OT he is working with, on the whole; and it is largely the same OT as before',
(Provan, 'Canons to the Left ofHim', 12-16). To call the position we have suggested - i.e., within
the context of a predominantly established canon debates continue over a few marginal books, with
some 'fuzziness' tolerated at the edges of the canon - a search for a Christian Bible is to use too
strong a term.
121 Childs, 'The Exegetical Significance', 79. In the desire for a commonly agreed object of study
Childs shares a concern similar to E.D. Hirsch; see chapter 4.
122 Childs, Introduction to the Old Testament, 40.
123 Childs, Old Testament Theology, 11.
124 Childs, Introduction to the Old Testament, 76.
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development, namely the approach to the final text."25 Childs' conception of 'canon'
suggests that this observation is basically correct - and this raises the question of why the
text, that is, the interpretation, of one particular community at a particular point in Israel's
history should be privileged. Douglas Knight objects to this privileging of the final
redacting and canon-forming community, which he thinks over-emphasises what had, he
admits, been 'a neglected phase' in the development of the biblical literature.126 His main
accusation is that Childs does not exercise enough suspicion in his hermeneutical attitude to
the compilers and redactors of the final form, for his approach must assume what cannot be
known for certain, namely that their motives were both pure and entirely theological, rather
than ideological, political or sociological. Rudolf Smend insists that each stage of the
biblical tradition must be attended to equally, 'precisely because their [the biblical
redactors' and compilers'] theological judgment cannot be trusted.'127 Brett concludes that
Childs offers only a weak response to the suggestion that 'the final form is simply a
monument to the victors of vicious conflict', and that the suspicion arises that below the
surface he is invoking a doctrine of the Holy Spirit to justify a privileging of the final form
of the texts.128
Behind such objections appears to lie a disagreement with Childs over the nature of
divine revelation in history. If God is thought of as revealing himself to his people in
increasing measure over time, in the course of a teleological process of salvation worked out
within history, then there is a prima facie case for privileging the witness of the later
communities who were witnesses to the greatest extent of that revelation. Childs does not
articulate it as such, but that seems to be his underlying view of revelation. A reading of the
Old Testament which assumes this view of revelation will naturally give theological
privilege to the later compilers of the final form of the canonical texts. By contrast, behind
the objections of those who criticise Childs on this point may lie a history-of-religions
approach which treats the Old Testament as a set of responses to a divine revelation which,
if given at all, is given from the start and not developed in any special way in the
particularities of history. In this view, every Israelite generation has the same possibility for
insight into and understanding of 'revelation'.
125 Barr, Holy Scripture, 103. In fact, Childs' conscious attitude to historical criticism, both in theory
and practice, is more ambivalent than Barr suggests. From Provan's (very different) point of view,
Childs accepts too many of the conclusions of historical criticism uncritically, (Provan, 'Canons to the
Left ofHim', 25-29).
126 Knight, 'Canon and the History of Tradition', 130.
127 Brett, Biblical Criticism in Crisis?, 97, summarising Smend's position.
128 Brett, Biblical Criticism in Crisis?, 133-34. This latter suggestion will be developed below in
relation to a doctrine of biblical inspiration.
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In fact, Brett rightly points out that Childs' position involves something more subtle
than simply trusting the judgments of one community, or of a small number of communities,
towards the end of the Old Testament period. Childs, he says,
has not arbitrarily privileged the canonizing generations over all the others; he
has repeatedly affirmed that much old material has found its way into the final
form. However, he is disposed to accept the decisions of the successive
biblical communities as both theologically and exegetically important. He has
shown no desire to remake decisions about the relative value of the variety of
theological traditions found in the Bible.129
Childs' canonical approach is therefore fundamentally a hermeneutics of trust, not
suspicion.
In addition to the overall defence of a hermeneutics of trust offered in the previous two
chapters, two particular points may be made here in support of Childs' position. First, it
may be asked what a biblical canon which really was the end-product of ideological
conflicts - a canon written by the winners - would look like. It would most likely be
theologically quite homogeneous: history written by the winners of a long fight usually tells
only one story. The Old Testament, however, tells a wide variety of narrative and
theological stories. Goldingay argues that '[different groups had grasped aspects of the
truth and each of those aspects came to be part of the canon. This may itself reflect the need
for consensual as well as conflict models of the social processes that generated the canon'.130
Second, Childs has partly created for himself the problem of having to trust an
unknowable number of editorial decisions by agreeing with historical-critical biblical
scholarship that a long and murky process of redaction does indeed lie behind the final form
of the biblical texts. The apparent problem of trusting in relatively inscrutable theological
judgments would be alleviated somewhat if those judgments could be seen both as fewer in
number and perhaps as more broadly accepted by the wider religious community of Israel.
This would the case be if a much lower level of redactional activity were posited behind the
texts. Provan points out that increasingly careful reading of the final form of the texts has,
in some recent scholarship, led to a revised understanding of the redactors as skilful and
careful 'authors' in their own right, who did far more than crudely piece texts together. The
more artful a supposed redactor can be shown to be, the more he begins to look like the
text's author, and the less his existence as a redactor needs to be posited in order to account
for the features of the text; John Barton calls this the phenomenon of 'The Disappearing
Redactor'.131 For example, R.W.L. Moberly refers to work done on the Genesis flood
narrative which explains the features of the text in terms of the narrative art of its writer not
129 Brett, Biblical Criticism in Crisis?, 97-98.
130 Goldingay, Models for Scripture, 107.
131 Barton, Reading the Old Testament, 56-58; he credits Alec Motyer with being the source of the
phrase, (219 n.24). See also Provan, 'Canons to the Left of Him', 27-28.
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of its pre-history; he concludes that it is likely that the more final-form reading is practised
on biblical texts in this way, the more the results will justify the practice.132
This may alleviate anxiety over Childs' alleged hermeneutical gullibility to some
extent, but it does not offer a full defence of his privileging of the final form. Why should
one not seek to look behind even one redactive act, to discover if it wilfully or
incompetently repressed an earlier and better theological insight?
Childs' lack of clarity on the locus of the authority of the Bible, which was discussed
above, re-surfaces here. It has been argued that, in the wake of the failure of the Biblical
Theology Movement to offer a convincing material principle to mark off the canon of
Scripture as normative, he has offered a purelyformal principle, which will be able to tell us
what to do with the biblical texts but will never be able to tell us why we should do it.133 It
is important to remember this scholarly context: Childs' predominant concern is not so
much to advocate a hermeneutic of final-form reading of the Bible per se but to offer a new
framework for the doing of biblical theology, following the failure of the Biblical Theology
Movement. He arrives at final-form reading since he thinks it offers the best way forward
for biblical theology, but he has paid insufficient attention to justifying it as a valid
exegetical principle. This failure explains why, even in the work which represents the
culmination of his career, Biblical Theology of the Old and New Testaments, Childs has
made little progress towards explaining how his christological readings of the Old
Testament avoid becoming the arbitrary imposition of Christian interpretation. As Noble
points out, Childs shows what the early church did with the Old Testament, and himself
reads Old Testament texts in a similar way, without ever showing that they were right -
right, that is, from the viewpoint of the Old Testament - to do what they did.134
Brett attempts to supplement Childs' advocacy of the final form by seeking
hermeneutical support in Gadamer's notion of the 'classic text'. According to Brett,
Gadamer sees classic texts as illustrative of the principle that 'human life is deeply marked
by the historical influences which can never be totally illuminated by critical reflection.'135
The classic text is one which has proved itself by speaking for itself in each new situation;
it is 'an exemplary written tradition which has demonstrated its validity throughout the
vicissitudes of time.'136 Brett argues that final-form reading can then be justified thus: 'It is
132 R.W.L. Moberly, At the Mountain ofGod. Story and Theology in Exodus 32-34 JSOT Supplement
Series (Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1983), 27.
133 Noble, The CanonicalApproach, 31-32; Barr, Holy Scripture, 135.
134 Noble, The Canonical Approach, 73-76.
135 Brett, Biblical Criticism in Crisis?, 135.
136 Brett, Biblical Criticism in Crisis?, 142-43.
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the final form which has continued to demonstrate its truthfulness in new situations to those
who have been transformed and tested by their conversation with this classic text.'137
Noble, however, argues that the notion of a 'classic text' cannot rightly be applied to
the Bible, precisely because the problem of the Bible in the world is that it, or at least
significant parts of it, 'have largely failed to display the contemporaneity which the church
expects of its Scriptures.' Even if one argued that Childs belongs to a strand of Christianity
for which the Bible has in fact never ceased to be a 'classic text', Noble's point simply
reappears in another form: on what basis does Childs want to categorise the experience of
his particular community as normative for those Christian communities for which the Bible
has ceased to function as a classic text? Given Gadamer's conception, it is not clear on
what basis one would even want to reinstate a previously 'classic text' in its former role,
except perhaps for reasons of nostalgia, nor how one would justify the attempt. Noble
thinks that, for these reasons, Brett's attempt to find support for Childs' final-form readings
in general hermeneutics fails; he argues that Childs' work ultimately requires theological
supplementation from a doctrine of biblical inspiration.
5.3.4. The Canonical Approach: Multiple and Single Authorship
Noble suggests that, below the surface of Childs' advocacy of 'canonical context' as the
appropriate one for biblical interpretation, quite a strong doctrine of inspiration seems to be
doing a lot of work.138 Indeed, in the course of his work Childs has occasionally appealed to
inspiration. His analysis of the demise of the Biblical Theology Movement, in an early
work, is that '[o]ne of the major factors in the breakdown of the Biblical Theology
Movement was its total failure to come to grips with the inspiration of Scripture.' Childs
sympathises with this failing, saying that (what he calls) the fundamentalist tendency to
attach a theory of inerrancy to inspiration had brought the doctrine into disrepute, and that
the liberal attempt to relate inspiration to the religious imagination of the biblical writers did
not offer 'a solid theological alternative'. The Biblical Theology Movement basically
replaced the inspiration of Scripture with a theology of Scripture as revelation, which Childs
concludes to be a failure: 'The strain of using orthodox Biblical language for the
constructive part of theology, but at the same time approaching the Bible with all the
assumptions of Liberalism, proved in the end to cause an impossible tension.' Childs then
offers his own rather vague description of inspiration, which is more a statement of how the
doctrine functions, than a formal definition of it: 'the claim for the inspiration of Scripture
137 Brett, Biblical Criticism in Crisis?, 146. David Tracy has appropriated at length the concept of a
'classic text' for Christian theology; he summarises his use of it in Tracy, On Naming the Present,
109-19.
138 Noble, The Canonical Approach, 30-31.
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is the claim for the uniqueness of the canonical context of the church through which the
Holy Spirit works.'139 However, in his later work Childs has not clarified this tentative
understanding of inspiration, nor reflected at length on the extent to which his own biblical
theology might be dependent on a doctrine of inspiration. Since he judged that the same
omission contributed greatly to the demise of the Biblical Theology Movement, this is a
sizeable gap in his own overall project.
Noble has attempted to develop a stronger ground for Childs' basic approach by
supplementing his work with a doctrine of inspiration. He points out that Childs' contention
that the meaning of a biblical text should be arrived at by interpreting it in the context of the
whole canon 'is formally equivalent to believing that the Bible is so inspired as to be
ultimately the work of a single Author'.140 The closest Childs comes to a recognition of this
is when he speaks of 'canonical intentionality'. However, he has regularly left this term
quite vague, presumably because to clarify what he means by it would require the kind of
discussion of single divine authorship of the canon and its relation to the authorial activity
of the human Bible-writers which he has avoided. This, however, is all that Noble says
directly on the inspiration of the Bible; he is concerned to go on to discuss how the
invocation of the single divine authorship of the Bible should affect exegesis. His basic
suggestion, though, is persuasive, and in the subsequent section a fuller discussion of the
inspiration of Scripture will be offered, as a necessary supplement to Childs' canonical
approach to Scripture.
Noble invokes divine authorship of the whole Bible in order to answer the question of
how a particular text can be interpreted in a canonical context, and be said to mean
something which the original writer could not possibly have intended: 'a model of the
canon which posits God as its ultimate author at least opens up the possibility that the book
of Isaiah speaks of things beyond the natural knowledge of the historical prophet - for
example, that it anticipates the birth and death of Jesus.'141 In fact, God's single authorship
of the Bible, in its traditional orthodox Protestant form, is invoked, as we shall see, not in
the first instance to justify a canonical hermeneutic, but as a theological description of the
truth and authority of the Bible, asserting that God's special operation in the production of
the Bible was such that it speaks truly and authoritatively of him.
We stay for the moment with the question of how a text may be said to 'mean'
something which its (human) author could not possibly have intended. Within general
hermeneutics, E.D. Hirsch has recently offered a conception of authorial intention which, it
139 Childs, Biblical Theology in Crisis, 103-104. See also his claim that revelation may not be
appealed to apart from inspiration, (Childs, 'The Sensus Literalis', 92).
140 Noble, The Canonical Approach, 340.
141 Noble, The Canonical Approach, 343.
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is argued, is helpful here. Hirsch's essay warrants discussion here for two reasons. First, it
provides a description of authorial intention which will allow us to think of some Christian
interpretations of the Old Testament as justified by the Old Testament itself, and not as
eisegetical impositions. This is intended to provide part of the justification for Childs'
Christian readings of Old Testament texts which he himself does not. This is a general
hermeneutical account of what the 'Scripture interprets Scripture' principle implies about
the human authorship of Scripture. Second, to invoke the canonical context of a biblical
book as the appropriate one for its interpretation seems to conflict with the importance,
argued for in chapter 4, of respecting authorial intention in interpretation. Does the
ascription to a biblical text of a 'canonical intention' represent the overriding of the human
intention by an implicit claim about divine intention?142 In light of the discussion of
intertextuality earlier in this chapter, and the construals of speech and authorship offered in
chapters 3 and 4, the same question can be phrased thus: does 'canonical intratextuality'
conflict with Wolterstorff s claim about the responsibilities which accrue normatively to
readers and the rights which accrue normatively to authors?
In his essay, Hirsch argues that, in the production of what he calls 'transhistoricaf or
'transoccasionaf writings, by which he means particularly the texts of literature, law and
religion, 'one almost always intends "contents" that go beyond the literal contents of one's
mind'.143 For example, describing Augustine's attitude to Moses as the author of the book
ofGenesis, which Augustine developed as a justification of his allegorical biblical exegesis,
Hirsch says: 'The historical Moses intended readers to apprehend relevant truths that he,
Moses, did [s/c] not and could not be directly aware of."44 Hirsch argues, following
Gadamer, that the future application of a text is part of its meaning.145 Hirsch takes this step
because the burden of his article is to argue for the legitimacy of allegorical interpretations.
It is possible, though, to accept his observation on trans-occasional authorial intentions,
without construing it, as Hirsch does, as an argument in defence of allegorical interpretation,
and without adopting his consequently broadened definition of the 'meaning' of a text.
An example from Isaiah 52.13-53.12, taken from a detailed reading of the passage by
David Clines, may prove illustrative. Clines begins by documenting the scholarly
142 According to Watson, 'how the christological orientation of the Old Testament texts is to be
rendered in such a way as to preserve rather than to suppress their particularity is ... the only serious
theological question that Old Testament theology must face', (Francis Watson, Text and Truth.
Redefining Biblical Theology [Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1997], 203).
143 E.D. Hirsch, Jr., 'Transhistorical Intentions and the Persistence of Allegory' New Literaiy History
25 (1994), 549-67 (552).
144 Hirsch, 'Transhistorical Intentions', 557.
145 Hirsch, 'Transhistorical Intentions', 552. Although this partial acceptance of Gadamer seems to
represent something of a shift from his earlier work, discussed in chapter 4, Hirsch does not discuss
the point.
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disagreements over the identities of three of the four personae in the text referred to only by
pronouns - 'he', 'we' and 'they', (the fourth, 'I', is almost certainly Yahweh) - and
concludes of the passage that 'it is of its essence that unequivocal identifications are not
made and that the poem in this respect also is open-ended and allows for multiple
interpretations.'146 He then analyses, concentrating on 'the text itself, that is, in the first
place, irrespective of its context', certain relationships between those four personae, which
are the main focus of the text. He argues that the centre of the poem is the relationships in
which 'he' figures - relationships with each of 'I', 'we' and 'they'. The T/'he'
relationship has 'a dual aspect': 'I' supports 'him' but also lays suffering on him. 'We'
begin by scorning 'him', but end up appreciating him. In the 'he'/'they' relationship, 'there
is again a contrastive duality, of non-involvement and involvement', in that 'they' begin by
merely looking at him and hearing of him, being astonished by him, and end up being
involved with him, as he is proved innocent in their sight, bearing their guilt and 'suffering
in intervention for them'.147 Borrowing the concept of a 'language event' from E. Fuchs and
G. Ebeling,148 Clines argues for a formalist view of the text as possessing a life of its own,
and giving rise to multiple meanings, in that the world projected by the text 'seizes'
different readers in different ways.149
Clines wants to treat the text in isolation from its literary or historical context, in order
to avoid what he sees as the problems created by historical criticism's view of the poem as
conveying information about historical references, but in a form which, for modem readers
at least, is rather cryptic. Since meaning requires some context, Clines invokes instead the
multiple contexts of multiple readers, which give rise to multiple meanings. However,
Clines ignores the fact that there are some things about the historical and literary context of
the poem which can be known without us first having to crack a historical code now
virtually incomprehensible to us, and which allow us to say some quite determinate things
about the writer's intention.150 Isaiah151 writes about the servant of Yahweh in the context of
146 David J.A. Clines, I, He, We, and They: A Literary Approach to Isaiah 53 Journal for the Study of
the Old Testament Series 1 (Sheffield: Journal for the Study of the Old Testament, 1976), 33. I am
grateful to Stewart Weaver for his own detailed reading of this text, and for calling my attention to
Clines' text, and also to the work of John Oswalt and Christopher Seitz on Isaiah referred to below.
147 Clines, I, He, We, and They, 37-39.
148 Clines, /, He, We, and They, 53-56.
149 Clines, I, He, We, and They, 59-65.
150 John Oswalt argues against Clines' 'multiple meanings': 'while we may agree that what the text
says is capable of several applications, we may not say that we do not know what is being said. Thus
it is possible to describe in considerable detail the character and work of the Servant. How and to
whom this should apply may be a matter of inference and deduction, but the intention of the material
itself is clear enough', (John N. Oswalt, The Book of Isaiah. Chapters 40-66 The New International
Commentary on the Old Testament [Grand Rapids, Michigan/ Cambridge, U.K.: Eerdmans, 1998],
377-78).
151 This is shorthand for the writer inferred from the intention embodied in the text; nothing is
necessarily implied about the actual composition or formation of the book of Isaiah.
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a hopeful orientation to the future beyond the exile, in expectation that Yahweh will come
and rescue his people. That is, he looks for Yahweh to disambiguate the means by which
Yahweh will definitively save Israel, both within and exceeding the general pattern of his
saving acts already revealed through, for example, Moses, who is himself regularly dubbed
'the servant of the Lord'.152 G.B. Caird explains rather more simply how language may be
oriented to the future in this way: a speaker can make a statement about a referent 'which
contains enough general truth to make it readily transferable to another, ... [describing] in
some detail a person whose identity is not yet known'. This, he says, is analogous to a
detailed 'Situation Vacant' notice.153
The question of whether or not Isaiah 53 'speaks about Jesus' is a vexed one, and it
invites superficial answers on both sides. However, in light of our adoption ofClines' basic
reading of the text itself, and of our location of it, contra Clines, in its immediate and
undisputed literary and historical context, it is argued that the text itself invites the kind of
disambiguation of its future-oriented central themes which the New Testament provides in
its portrayal of Jesus Christ.154 A christological interpretation of Isaiah 53 is not necessarily
an imposition from outside on 'the Old Testament itself, any more than is the appointment
of an excellent candidate for a job vacancy an external imposition on the meaning of the
advertisement for the job. Such an interpretation must, and can, if the New Testament's
witness to Jesus as the promised Messiah of Israel is to be taken seriously, demonstrate that
it is not an imposition, by arguing that it supplements the Old Testament text in a way which
is precisely in accord with what is determinate in that text's future orientation.
Such future disambiguation of Isaiah 53 does not add a specificity of meaning to the
Old Testament text which it previously lacked, as Hirsch would suggest. For Hirsch, in
contexts in which Isaiah is not taken to refer to Jesus of Nazareth, the text lacks that
'meaning'. In the terminology of speech-act theory, Isaiah's speech-act, according to
Hirsch, retains its identity only at the level of the locution; it takes on different
propositional contents, and perhaps also different illocutionary forces, in different contexts.
This, somewhat surprisingly, given his substantial earlier work, seems to move Hirsch in the
direction of Stanley Fish.
152 Exod. 14.31; Num. 12.7-8; Deut. 34.5; Jos. 1 passim; 8.31-33; 11.12, 15; 22.2-5; and many other
Old Testament references.
153 G.B. Caird, The Language and Imagery of the Bible (Grand Rapids, Michigan/ Cambridge:
Eerdmans, 1997 [1980]), 57-58. See also: 'The servant is not just one more individual prophet in a
long line of prophets stretching back to Moses; the servant is that history of prophecy individualized,
especially in respect of that history as still awaiting fulfillment', (Christopher R. Seitz, Word Without
End. The Old Testament as Abiding Theological Witness [Grand Rapids, Michigan/ Cambridge, U.K.:
Eerdmans, 1998], 189).
154 'Precisely when understood 'in its own terms', the Old Testament itself raises the question of its
relation to the New', (Watson, Text and Truth, 197).
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It is preferable to apply the argument of Hirsch's essay to a christological interpretation
of Isaiah in the following way. The claim that 'Isaiah 53 refers to Jesus Christ' is a claim to
the effect that the Old Testament author performs a textual speech-act with an illocutionary
stance of future expectation, the propositional content ofwhich is a minimal description of a
certain kind of being, whom he only names 'he', who exists in a certain set of determinate
relationships with regard to both Yahweh and to two groups of people, 'we' and 'they'.
Whether or not the writer had a particular person in mind as the referent of this passage is
probably impossible for later readers to determine, as Clines suggests; however, the
openness of his text to the future establishes a second level of reference, the propositional
content of which is left indeterminate, but which he nevertheless intends. That is, in
Hirsch's language, the writer of Isaiah 53 intended a 'content' that went beyond the possible
literal content of his mind. His determinate ambiguity sanctions the following of historical
and intertextual threads to a wider historical and literary context. When the New Testament
claims to identify Jesus of Nazareth as Isaiah's servant, this is a claim whose validity is to
be established to a significant extent by reading Isaiah's text. A christological interpretation
of the Old Testament is therefore justified not simply by reference to the New Testament,
but exegetically from within the Old Testament itself.155
Therefore, it can be said that Isaiah referred to Jesus Christ, without claiming that the
meaning - the propositional content and illocutionary force of his text - has changed.
First, the illocutionary force of his text remains the same; second, although Christians may
be able now to say that they know more about the propositional content intended by Isaiah's
speech-act, that is only the case by virtue of his orienting his text towards a certain kind of
future disambiguation; it does not change its propositional content. In sum: Isaiah's
future-oriented ambiguity invites future disambiguation of the 'he' (and 'we' and 'they') of
his text, within the limits of what he has said determinately about the relationships and
activity of the 'he' with regard to Yahweh and humankind.
It is illuminating to contrast the Old Testament with the New in this context. Like the
Old Testament, the New has a future orientation, both to the life of the church in the present
as the body of Christ and to the future coming again of Christ as Lord. In respect to both,
the New Testament is open to a certain kind of disambiguation. With respect to the church,
it does not specify the details of the out-workings of faithful practice in every possible
situation. In that it will be applied to situations of which its writers could have known
nothing, it is, as almost all Christian writers have of course recognised, materially
155 See Noble's argument against John Sawyer, that Isa. 7.14 cannot be said to refer to the virgin birth
simply on the basis that Matt. 1.23 interprets it that way: 'the exegetically and theologically
important question, I would argue, is whether Matthew 1 has understood Isaiah 7, or whether it has
imposed an alien meaning on it', (Noble, The Canonical Approach, 345).
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insufficient to legislate in detail for any and every situation.156 With respect to the events of
the parousia, the Bible's apocalyptic language leaves many details uncertain, as may be
inferred from the multiple interpretations to which the book of Revelation has given rise.
However, unlike the Old Testament, the New leaves no possibility of future disambiguation
of the identity of the one through whom Yahweh will bring the history of salvation to final
consummation, nor of the fundamental means by which he will achieve this. The New
Testament is oriented to a future in which the identity of the one to come is already
sufficiently known to enable truthful human behaviour with regard to the future, and in
which the nature of his activity towards and relationships with Yahweh and humankind has
already been sufficiently revealed - in accordance with, and in more explicit detail than,
Isaiah 5 3.157 As regards the identification of the locus of God's saving action, and of what is
necessary to be known about that saving action in order to respond in faith, in the texts of
the New Testament there is no intended 'content' which exceeds the content of the writer's
mind; the situation is no longer vacant. The New Testament thus orients itself to the future
not by speaking as the Old Testament does of an unnamed 'he', but precisely by referring
back to the crucified and risen Christ of the first century.158 It opens to the future by closing
the canon back on itself.159
Paul Noble develops what he calls 'a new typology', which is similar to what has been
argued from this reading of Isaiah 53 about the intention of individual Old Testament texts
and canonical reading. He picks up Robert Alter's concept of 'type-scenes', taking as an
example the type of 'the encounter with the future betrothed at the well', and tracing how
such scenes in the Old Testament set a pattern for the coming of the husband-Messiah to an
unlikely woman in John 4.160 This, he says, gives the Old Testament independent integrity:
'There is a principled way of deciding from the Old Testament itself what is and is not
typologically significant. ... [Identifying a recurrent pattern means that there is a basis in
156 See the discussions of the material aspect of the historical doctrine of the sufficiency of Scripture
in chapter 2; this point will be picked up in the concluding section of this chapter, in order to clarify
exactly what is meant by asserting Scripture to be sufficient with regard to this future orientation.
157 To take another Old Testament text: the one who names himself 'I am', or 'I will be', (Exod.
3.14), is, and from our temporal perspective has now named himself, the Father of the Son, who
reveals himself through the Son, (John 1.18; 14.9-11).
158 Where the Old Testament does appeal to the past, primarily to the Exodus and the Mosaic
covenant, it serves as a reminder to Israel of Yahweh's past and consequent future faithfulness, tying
them in to the history which will lead them from those past events to the new thing which Yahweh
will one day bring about, (e.g., Jer. 31.31-33). In the New Testament, by contrast, the new thing has
already happened; what is to come is only its experiential fulness and the revelation to the world of
its now hidden reality, (Rom. 8.18-25; 1 John 3.1-3).
159 '[T]he doctrine of fulfilment so basic to early Christianity meant that there was a finality about the
New Covenant which would mb off on the collection of books which came to embody it and bear its
title', (Frances Young, The Art of Performance. Towards a Theology of Holy Scripture [London:
Darton, Longman & Todd, 1990), 41.
160 Noble, The Canonical Approach, 313-19.
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the stories themselves for deciding which are their significant features.'161 It is a 'new'
typology because it avoids fanciful pietistic typologies, the development of which, argues
Noble, led eighteenth-century rationalistic scholars to insist that the text has only one
meaning, thereby killing off all typology.162
This account of authorial intentionality articulates, in a way that Childs does not, how a
single over-arching intentionality may possibly arise out of a mutually-referring set of
chronologically diverse texts, each embodying a set of different individual authorial
intentions. It can arise without a divine intention necessarily supervening on human
intentions. However, this single intention is rightly ascribed to God - not primarily in
relation to exegetical practice, but in order to justify a claim about the truthfulness and
unique authority of the Bible. A doctrine of inspiration is required to provide support for
the claim that the biblical texts not only refer to the human response to divine activity but
also, in that witness, speak truly of God. It may be thought that our adoption of Hirsch's
argument on human intention has excluded divine intention from the Bible. However, some
defence will be offered of the tradition of Protestant orthodoxy, which holds that in the
production of the Bible, at the level of both individual texts and the canon as a whole,
human and divine intentions operate concursively.
Childs' main conception of the Bible in relation to God is as a witness to divine
revelation, rather than as the voice of God. However, a claim that the Bible is theologically
normative (which is one of Childs' overriding concerns) must come to rely on the latter
conception to some extent. In light of his objection that historical criticism ignored the
theological function of Scripture, and of his rejection of George Lindbeck's intratextual
hermeneutics,163 it seems that Childs wants an approach which treats the final form of the
Bible as in some way referring truly to God. It is to justify such a view of the Bible,
offering this kind of theological description of its uniqueness over against all other human
texts, that the doctrine of the inspiration of Scripture has most often been developed.
5.4. Supplementing Scripture with Divine Action: The Canon and Inspiration
Noble's suggestion that Childs' advocacy of final-form canonical interpretation requires
supplementation from a strong doctrine of inspiration will now be taken up and developed.
In the main, the traditional orthodox Protestant version of the doctrine, as articulated most
fully by B.B. Warfield, will be defended against contemporary critiques and alternative
161 Noble, The Canonical Approach, 322-24. See also Watson: 'Typological exegesis cannot be
clearly demarcated from 'ordinary' exegesis, for typological exegesis is precisely what these texts
require if their true nature is to be brought to light', (Watson, Text and Truth, 205).
162 Noble, The Canonical Approach, 310-11.
163 See Childs, Biblical Theology ofthe Old and New Testaments, 723.
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notions of inspiration. Warfield's understanding of the Bible as inspired will be
supplemented with some of the concepts developed in the first section on intertextuality, in
order to rectify some problems which may be identified in his account.
5.4.1. B.B. Warfield's Doctrine ofBiblical Inspiration
The Princeton theologian, B.B. Warfield, is the writer who has written in most detail and
with greatest skill in defence of the orthodox Protestant doctrine of the inspiration of
Scripture.164 His presentation of the doctrine will be outlined, and the widespread modern
rejection of it and recent alternative versions of inspiration will be discussed.
The doctrine of inspiration is, for Warfield, an assertion that the Bible is God's book
because he is its ultimate author. What he calls 'the church doctrine of inspiration' views
Scripture as 'a book which may be frankly appealed to at any point with the assurance that
whatever it may be found to say, that is the Word of God."65 Of 'inspiration' as used in the
Westminster Confession of Faith, which Warfield sees himself as defending, he says that it
was 'a technical term in common theological use at the time, by which the idea of divine
authorship, in the highest sense of the word, is conveyed."66 This is important; for
Warfield, 'inspiration' is a technical term invoked to refer to what he takes to be the Bible's
thoroughly divine origin. He does not mean his advocacy of this doctrine to assert anything
about the mechanics of the composition of the biblical texts; again on the Westminster
Confession of Faith, he says that the 'most outstanding fact' about its doctrine of inspiration
is that it asserts the fact of inspiration without formally defining its nature.167 Reformed
theology in general, he asserts, takes the mode of inspiration to be 'inscrutable';168 he
argues that the key passage in 2 Tim. 3.16 asserts that 'the Scriptures are a Divine product,
without any indication of how God has operated in producing them."69 He therefore means
to distance carefully himself from the theory ofmechanical dictation which came to be held
164 It has been alleged that nineteenth-century Princetonians introduced an innovation over earlier
Protestant orthodoxy by asserting the inerrancy of the original autographs of Scripture, (see Jack B.
Rogers & Donald K. McKim, The Authority and Interpretation of the Bible. An Historical Approach
[San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1979]). For a detailed rebuttal, see John D. Woodbridge, Biblical
Authority. A Critique of the Rogers/McKim Proposal (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1982). Although
Warfield derives inerrancy from inspiration, we are dealing solely here with inspiration, on which
Warfield is in agreement with earlier Protestant orthodoxy.
165 Benjamin Breckinridge Warfield, The Inspiration and Authority of the Bible (Philadelphia:
Presbyterian & Reformed, 1948), 106.
166 B.B. Warfield, Selected Shorter Writings of Benjamin B. Warfield 2 ed. John E. Meeter
(Phillipsburg, New Jersey: Presbyterian & Reformed, 1973), 581. These shorter pieces will be
referred to regularly here, alongside his longer articles, because they often provide clear summaries of
his longer arguments.
167 Warfield, Selected Shorter Writings 2, 572.
168 Warfield, Inspiration and Authority, 420.
169 Warfield, Inspiration and Authority, 133.
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by a number of writers in the seventeenth century.170 It is in fact possible to use the term
'dictation' to refer to God's activity towards the biblical writers, he says, but thereby to
stress only Scripture's divinity, and not to regard the biblical authors as mere writing-
instruments in the hands of God.171
Warfield argues that his doctrine of inspiration does not involve the extension of a
prophetic model of revelation to the entire Bible, as the theory of mechanical dictation does.
He does call inspiration a form of revelation, but it represents a different form of revelation
from prophetic revelation: it differs from prophecy 'precisely by the employment in it ... of
the total personality of the organ of revelation, as a factor.'172 Warfield's regular term for
this difference is the 'concursive operation' of divine and human factors in the production of
the Bible: 'By "concursive operation" may be meant that form of revelation illustrated in an
inspired psalm or epistle or history, in which no human activity - not even the control of
the will - is superseded, but the Holy Spirit works in, with and through them all in such a
manner as to communicate to the product qualities distinctly superhuman."73 The human
writers are therefore not passive instruments in the hands of God, nor are we to think of
their books as basically their own production, with God intervening at various points to
protect them from error. Rather, the Holy Spirit works confluently, 'in, with and by them',
with the result that the Bible in its entirety is God's book.174 Warfield is particularly hard on
any writer who argues that an increased recognition of the human element in Scripture must
lead to a corresponding shrinkage of the divine element. The two elements do not compete
with one another for space in the production of Scripture, he argues, but rather are both fully
present. The result of 'concursive operation' is that 'every word is at once divine and
human.'175
This 'concursive operation' functions both in the actual composition of the writing and
in its preparatory stages. Inspiration, says Warfield, covers the preparation of both the
material and the writer. '[God] prepared a Paul to write [the epistles], and the Paul he
brought to the task was a Paul who spontaneously would write just such letters."76 At the
end of this long process comes 'inspiration' in its technical sense: an 'additional Divine
operation' which allows the product to rise above mere human attainment.177 This is
170 He lists the Lutherans Quenstedt, Calov and Hollaz, the Reformed Heidegger and Buxtorf, the
Anglican Hooker and the Puritan John White as examples of those who did hold a 'mechanical
dictation' view, (Warfield, Selected Shorter• Writings 2, 543).
171 On this basis he defends Gaussen, an influential nineteenth-century orthodox writer on inspiration,
(Warfield, Inspiration and Authority, 421 n.4).
172 Warfield, Inspiration and Authority, 94.
173 Warfield, Inspiration and Authority, 83.
174 Warfield, Inspiration and Authority, 95.
175 Warfield, Selected Shorter Writings 2, 545-46.
176 Warfield, Inspiration and Authority, 155.
177 Warfield, Inspiration and Authority, 158.
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inspiration proper, to which the doctrine of the inspiration of Scripture refers, and it is to be
distinguished from 'other divine activities operative in the production of the Scriptures',
such as the preparation of material and writer.178 This technical sense of inspiration is the
sense intended by those whom Warfield calls the 'exact writers', in comparison with writers
who treat the interaction of human and divine agency in exactly the same way with regard to
both the Bible's composition and the preparation ofmaterial and writer.179
The notion of 'concursive operation' is a particular expression of a fundamental
doctrine of God: 'The philosophical basis of this conception is the Christian idea of God as
immanent as well as transcendent in the modes of his activity.' It is analogous, he says, to
the functioning of providence and grace.180 This suggests an analogy between the doctrine
of Scripture and Christology; Warfield insists, however, that the analogy is only partial: he
proposes no hypostatic union of divine and human in Scripture.181
The function of Scripture, conceived of as inspired in this way, is that through it God
speaks directly to Christians. There is no need, says Warfield, for the reader 'to make his
way to God painfully, perhaps even uncertainly, through the words of His servants, ... but
[he] can listen directly to the Divine voice itself speaking immediately in the Scriptural
word to him."82 This provides Christian believers, whose hope in Christ is bound up with
the trustworthiness of the Bible, with what they must lean on: 'a firm basis of trust for all
the details of teaching and all the items of promise.'183
It is important to note what this last claim does not entail for Warfield. He is not
aiming to establish an inspired Scripture as the formal basis of its own authority - though
its inspiredness may, once established, be used to support its authority:
If ... the apostles were appointed by Christ to act for him and in his name and
authority in founding the Church - and this no one can doubt; and if the
apostles gave the Scriptures to the Church in prosecution of this commission -
and this admits of as little doubt; the whole question of the authority of the
Scriptures is determined. ... But when inspiration has once been shown to be
fact, it comes mightily to the reinforcement of their authority.184
Similarly, he states: '[The Scriptures] we first prove authentic, historically credible,
generally trustworthy, before we prove them inspired."85 Nor does he establish an inspired
178 Warfield, Selected Shorter Writings 2, 615.
179 Warfield, Selected Shorter Writings 2, 632.
180 Warfield, Selected Shorter Writings 2, 546.
181 Warfield, Inspiration and Authority, 162.
182 Warfield, Inspiration and Authority, 158.
183 Warfield, Inspiration and Authority, 121-22.
184 Warfield, Selected Shorter Writings 2, 537-40. This suggests that Warfield is not vulnerable to the
charge that 'evangelicals have attempted to account for the authority of Scripture with reference to
inspiration rather than to revelation', (Kem Robert Trembath, Evangelical Theories of Biblical
Inspiration. A Review and Proposal [New York & Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1987], 67).
185 Warfield, Inspiration and Authority, 210.
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Scripture as the formal basis of Christian truth in general: 'Inspiration, in its more exact
sense, cannot come into the discussion until theism, the reality of revelation, the authenticity
and historical credibility of the Scriptures, the divine origin and character of the religion
which they present, and the general trustworthiness of their presentation of it, have already
been established."86 He defends the Westminster Confession of Faith against the charge
that, since it excludes the Apocrypha from the canon on the basis that it is not inspired, it
wishes to prove inspiration first and canonicity second, noting that the Confession lists the
books which it does regard as canonical, and only consequently asserts the fact of their
inspiration.187 A clearly rationalist tone is evident here in Warfield's conception of how
biblical authority is discerned and defended, and this probably eclipses somewhat the stress
found in Reformation and post-Reformation writers on the witness of the Holy Spirit to
Scripture.188
That this rationalism does not imply a formalist approach to the authority of the biblical
canon can be demonstrated by inquiring into the basis which Warfield offers for his doctrine
of inspiration. The only basis he offers for the doctrine is not some a priori theological
assumption about God's truthfulness, but what he takes to be the case in the Bible's content
- what he calls 'exegetical fact'.189 He asserts his doctrine of biblical inspiration because he
believes that 'Christ and his apostles are historically shown to have taught the plenary
inspiration of the Bible'.190 He argues on the basis of John 10.34ff. that for Jesus '[i]t
belongs to Scripture ... down to its most minute particulars, that it is of indefectible
authority.'191 He knows that by 'Scripture' Jesus means the Hebrew Scriptures, and argues
for the legitimacy of placing the New Testament on the same level.192
186 Warfield, Selected Shorter Writings 2, 632. See also: 'there is a sense in which it would not be
tme to say that the truth of Christian teaching and the foundations of faith are suspended upon the
doctrine of plenary inspiration, or upon any doctrine of inspiration whatever. They rest rather upon
the previous fact of revelation. ... [T]he supernatural origin and contents of Christianity, not only
may be vindicated apart from any question of the inspiration of the record, but, in point of fact,
always are vindicated prior to any question of the inspiration of the record. We cannot raise the
question of whether God has given us an absolutely trustworthy record of the supernatural facts and
teachings of Christianity, before we are assured that there are supernatural facts and teachings to be
recorded. The fact that Christianity is a supernatural religion and the nature of Christianity as a
supernatural religion, are matters of history; and are independent of any and every theory of
inspiration', (Warfield, Inspiration and Authority, 121).
187 Westminster Confession of Faith, 1.2; Warfield, Selected Shorter Writings 2, 562.
188 John Woodbridge and Randall Balmer, who otherwise defend Warfield's doctrine of Scripture,
make this criticism of him, (John D. Woodbridge & Randall H. Balmer, 'The Princetonians and
Biblical Authority: An Assessment of the Ernest Sandeen Proposal', in eds D.A. Carson & John D.
Woodbridge, Scripture and Truth [Leicester: IVP, 1983], 245-79 [271]).
189 Warfield, Inspiration and Authority, 180.
190 Warfield, Inspiration and Authority, 122-23; see also 128.
191 Warfield, Inspiration and Authority, 140 43. In this brief summary ofWarfield's arguments it may
seem that he indulges in proof-texting. In fact, he wants to distance himself from the mistakes of 'the
older dogmaticians', who, he says, relied too much on isolated proof-texts. He wishes to leam from
'the whole body of modem scholarship' to seek "a form of Scripture proof on a larger scale than can
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In particular, Warfield devotes a long discussion to the meaning of the adjective
0eo7tv£t)aTO(;, which is applied to 'all Scripture' in 2 Tim. 3.16, arguing against the views of
two scholars, H.G.A. Ewald and Hermann Cremer. He notes that Cremer, in the second
edition of Herzog's Realencyklopaedie (1880), defines Beorcvewcoq as 'inspiring its
readers', and he traces this view back to Ewald.193 Neither writer, though, wishes to give the
word a fully active sense; they regard its meaning as being nearer to 'full of God's Spirit'
than 'God-breathing'.194 Warfield's criticism is that Ewald and Cremer can conceive of
only two options for the translation of the word: 'God-inspired', a wrong translation which
uncritically follows the Vulgate's misleading translation 'inspiratcC, and their own, which
Warfield alternatively terms 'God-imbued'.195 He proposes a third option, which he claims
is the most likely in the canonical context in which 2 Timothy is set. In this context, which
ultimately includes the creation narratives of Genesis, the breath ofGod is thought of not as
'in-spiring' or as filling something with God, but simply as creating by his breath.196
Warfield concludes that the word BeoJiveuoToq 'is primarily expressive of the origination of
Scripture, not of its nature and much less of its effects.'197
He then goes on to provide a detailed survey of uses of the word in non-Christian
ancient Greek literature, on the basis of which he concludes that in no case does it speak of
'even such a quasi-active idea as that of "redolent of God." Everywhere the word appears
as purely passive and expresses production by God.'198 The absoluteness of this conclusion
rather over-states what Warfield has in fact succeeded in demonstrating, for elsewhere he
reports from his study of the sixth edition of Liddell and Scott's Greek lexicon that, of the
eighty-six compounds of Beoq ending in -xoq which he discovered there, at least seventy-
five refer to 'a result produced by God'. Warfield acknowledges that this statistic does not
prove his case conclusively, but argues that it points to his translation of the word as the
most plausible.199
As we turn now to discuss some recent alternative notions of biblical inspiration, it will
become evident both that much of what has been presented here of Warfield's doctrine has
be got from single texts", (Warfield, Inspiration and Authority, 198). The last quotation here is from
Schleiermacher, and Warfield quotes it with approval. It is beyond the scope of this chapter to
investigate whether or not Warfield's exegetical practice lives up to his aim; however, prima facie the
detailed nature ofmany of his discussions suggests that his main mode of biblical exegesis is far from
simplistic.
192 Warfield, Selected Shorter Writings 2, 634-35.
193 Warfield, Inspiration and Authority, 247.
194 Warfield, Inspiration and Authority, 277-78.
195 Warfield, Inspiration and Authority, 283.
196 Warfield, Inspiration and Authority, 285-86.
197 Warfield, Inspiration and Authority, 296.
198 Warfield, Inspiration and Authority, 272.
199 Warfield, Inspiration and Authority, 281-82.
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been found inadequate, but also that what is rejected is sometimes a quite different
understanding ofWarfield's doctrine from the one offered here.
5.4.2. Response I: Biblical Inspiration the Same Yesterday and Today
A number of contemporary writers wish to give the term 'inspiration' a broader reference
than the specific, technical sense which Warfield gives it. James Barr asserts that God just
does not 'straightforwardly communicate articulate thoughts or sentences to men', and that
we cannot conceive of how God - 'by his Spirit, shall we say? - somehow guided' the
Bible-writers. Rather, '[tjoday I think we believe, or have to believe, that God's
communication with the men of the biblical period was not on any different terms from the
mode of his communication with people today.' Pleading that he is 'only a spare-time
theologian', Barr does not say what that universal mode might be.200
Similarly, Paul Achtemeier argues that we must think of the Holy Spirit continuing to
inspire present-day reading and proclamation of Scripture in the same way as he inspired its
production, if Scripture is not to become a museum-piece: 'The same Holy Spirit at work in
the production of inspired Scripture is also at work, and in the same way, in the production
of the proclamation of inspired Scripture.'201 This is so, for Achtemeier, because inspiration
is located in the inter-relationships of the elements of tradition, of new situations which
require reinterpretations of that tradition, and of the activity of those who compose, shape
and compile that material.202 Although he does not want the composing, shaping and
compiling of the canon to continue, describing it as a foundation which does not need to be
relaid,203 it seems that the on-going relationships between the first two elements are
sufficient for 'the inspiration of Scripture' to be a continuing divine activity.
William Abraham defines inspiration thus: '[God] inspires in, with, and through his
special revelatory acts and through his personal guidance of those who wrote and put
together the various parts of the Bible.'204 Since God continues to inspire people to faith by
his special revelatory acts, Abraham conceives of God's inspiring activity as continuing
beyond the closure of the canon.205 Finally, Kern Robert Trembath goes beyond Barr,
Achtemeier and Abraham in that he wishes to say nothing about God's activity in the
production of the Bible. For him, '"the inspiration of the Bible" should be taken to refer ...
to the fact that the church confesses the Bible as God's primary means of inspiring salvation
200 James Barr, The Bible in the Modern World (London: SCM, 1973), 17-18, ix.
201 Paul J. Achtemeier, The Inspiration of Scripture. Problems and Proposals (Philadelphia:
Westminster Press, 1980), 143, (italics added).
202 Achtemeier, The Inspiration ofScripture, 131-34.
203 Achtemeier, The Inspiration ofScripture, 135, 144-45.
204 William J. Abraham, The Divine Inspiration ofHoly Scripture (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1981),
67.
205 Abraham, The Divine Inspiration, 71-72.
205
within itself.'206 This definition identifies biblical inspiration with the Bible's
perlocutionary effect.
None of these writers offers a convincing account of the closure of the canon, although
in practice none wishes to allow for additions to it or continuing redaction of it. Achtemeier
sees the canon as a foundation which does not need to relaid - but if the Holy Spirit is still
working in present-day believers in the same way as in the past, inspiring reinterpretation of
received traditions, it is not at all clear why the foundation should not be altered. Similarly,
Abraham grounds the closure of the canon in the fact that in it is 'recorded and enshrined'
the divine speaking to prophets and apostles, and the account of God's actions in history.207
However, since he also thinks that God still 'inspires' by speaking and by his saving acts in
this same way, it is not clear on what basis Abraham can be certain that canonical texts are
not still being authored.
In the following discussion, under two headings, we shall focus on the approaches to
biblical inspiration offered by Abraham and Trembath, since they both develop their notions
in explicit contrast to Warfield and the tradition he exemplifies. This dialogue will allow us
to clarify the tradition which Warfield represents, and offer a defence of it.
5.4.2.1. 'Deductive' and 'inductive' approaches to biblical inspiration
Both Abraham and Trembath call their approach to the inspiration of the Bible 'inductive',
and contrast it favourably with what they call the 'deductive' approach of the Warfieldian
tradition. '[D]eductivist approaches to biblical inspiration begin by discussing and
formulating a doctrine of God'; since the formulated doctrine asserts that God cannot lie,
deductivists must explain how Scripture can be called the Word of God in a way that
ensures its truthfulness.208 However, each writer has a different understanding of an
opposing 'inductive' approach. For Trembath, 'inductivists' take biblical inspiration 'to
refer primarily to effects which the Bible has among those persons who call it inspired.
Only then do they attempt to account for how it is that the Bible may be taken as the vehicle
of inspiration.'209 Abraham's inductivists 'consciously attempt to work out a position on
inspiration that will accommodate the results of inductive study [of the Bible].'210 By this,
Abraham seems to mean the results of historical-critical study of the Bible, which he
characterises, somewhat naively, as 'a natural and honest study of the Bible'.211 Warfield's
doctrine of inspiration, which leads to a view of the Bible as inerrant, is immune, says
206 Trembath, Evangelical Theories, 5.
207 Abraham, The Divine Inspiration, 90.
208 Trembath, Evangelical Theories, 8; see also Abraham, The Divine Inspiration, 16.
209 Trembath, Evangelical Theories, 47.
210 Abraham, The Divine Inspiration, 40.
211 Abraham, The Divine Inspiration, 29.
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Abraham, to modification in the light of observations made about the phenomena of the
text.212
We may respond first to both together. John Woodbridge notes that the basic
distinction between old orthodox 'deductive' and new 'inductive' approaches to biblical
inspiration is not itself a new one: it was made in the second half of the nineteenth century,
for example by the contributors to the volume Essays and Reviews. Woodbridge comments:
'Obviously, neither party was solely deductivist or inductivist in approach.'213 Although it
is rather fruitless to attempt to establish the precise amounts of inductiveness (in Abraham's
sense) and deductiveness on each side, it may be noted that Abraham's and Trembath's
work, along with that of Barr and Achtemeier, is noticeably lacking in (inductive) biblical
exegesis, in comparison with Warfield.
Most striking in this comparison is the imbalance in attention given to the word
GeojrveuaTog. Trembath excuses his lack of discussion of the word by suggesting that it is
hard to know what the term means, since it is a New Testament hapax legomenon, and we
do not know the identity of the Scriptures of which the writer predicates it.214 Abraham is
confident that it refers to the Septuagint texts which Timothy would have used, and also
knows what the word means, asserting that the question of how to translate the opening
phrase of the verse is an 'irrelevant issue', for all that is said is that Scripture is inspired.215
To this 'irrelevant issue' Warfield devotes a lengthy article, which aims to question the very
thing which Abraham assumes - that the correct translation of the word in this text is
'inspired'.216 Trembath's agnosticism and Abraham's uncritical confidence both seem quite
weak in the face of Warfield's detailed scholarship on this question. Neither writer makes
significant reference to Warfield's discussion of this issue; in addition, neither deals at any
length with Warfield's exegesis of Scripture's self-testimony and of the attitude of Jesus and
the apostles to Scripture.
These gaps must be considered a serious shortcoming in the work of Abraham and
Trembath. They may suppose that Warfield's exegetical conclusions have been pre¬
determined by his prior convictions about what must be the case a priori with God and
consequently with the Bible, but Warfield does offer an exegetical defence of his doctrine of
inspiration on grounds which are open to challenge.217
212 Abraham, The Divine Inspiration, 21-22.
213 Woodbridge, Biblical Authority, 225 n.23.
214 Trembath, Evangelical Theories, 6.
215 Abraham, The Divine Inspiration, 93.
216 'God-Inspired Scripture': ch.6 ofWarfield, Inspiration andAuthority, see discussion above.
217 Warfield's biblical exegesis, to the extent that it argues for biblical inerrancy, has indeed been
challenged in some detail: see, e.g., James D.G. Dunn, 'The Authority of Scripture According to
Scripture' Churchman 96 (1982) 104-22, 201-25, as well as the response to Dunn: Roger Nicole,
'The Inspiration and Authority of Scripture: J.D.G. Dunn Versus B.B. Warfield' Churchman 97
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As regards Abraham in particular, Warfield in fact seems at one point to anticipate his
advocacy of a particular kind of inductive approach. It may not be objected, he argues, that
the nature of inspiration 'is to be inferred by induction from the phenomena of Scripture,
and not learned from the teaching of Scripture.' This is so because once the general
'evidences' have established Scripture's trustworthiness, any scriptural phenomena
apparently inconsistent with that trustworthiness are to be categorised as 'difficulties' yet to
be explained.218 This comment goes to the heart of the disagreement, and the different
categories of 'induction' and 'deduction' which Abraham introduces rather blur the issue. It
is not a question of induction or deduction at all, but of which of the Bible's different
'phenomena' one regards as fundamentally revelatory of its true character. Warfield
privileges what he takes to be the good historical grounds for seeing the Bible as trustworthy
- a conclusion which accords, he argues at length, with its constant teaching about itself.
He acknowledges that there are difficulties with the doctrine of inspiration, but asserts that
Christians believe it primarily because Christ and the apostles believed it.219 Abraham
prefers to let the observations of historical-critical scholarship win out over that biblical
self-testimony, and then tries to provide some general semantic content for the word
'inspiration' as a description of God's activity in relation to the Bible, as he has now come
to see it. Which of the two locates the right phenomena at the centre must remain a
continuing discussion; thus far, though, Abraham's attack has missed the point and basis of
Warfield's doctrine.
Turning now to Trembath, it becomes evident that his particular 'inductive' version of
biblical inspiration is forged in response to the rather acrimonious debates over biblical
inerrancy conducted in the United States in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Although
Abraham's work is also marked by these debates, only Trembath deals with inerrancy in
some detail. He concludes his book with a chapter on the topic, in which he argues that 'the
inerrancy position makes the maturing of faith dependent on a purely intellectual concept:
the evaluation of truth claims. ... [Growth in salvation] occurs entirely outside of the
(1983) 198-215; 98 (1994) 7-27. See also, Goldingay, drawing on a comment by W.C. Kaiser: 'it is
strange to multiply discussion of topics such as inspiration and revelation without reconsidering the
biblical material that relates to these concepts, as if Gaussen and Warfield had said it all', (Goldingay,
Models for Scripture, 13).
218 Warfield, Selected Shorter Writings 2, 632-33.
219 Warfield, Inspiration and Authority, 128. In an essay on critical biblical scholarship, Warfield
argues that the New Testament writers' claim that Scripture is inspired can be tested by asking
whether or not their claims were accepted by their contemporaries who were able to assess them, (he
says they were), and by assessing whether or not 'contradictory phenomena' are present in their
writings, (he judges they are not). He discusses a few particular instances of alleged error in the
Bible, and concludes that as biblical criticism continues its work increasing numbers of alleged errors
are being shown not to be errors at all, (Warfield, Inspiration and Authority, 423ff.). Our point here is
simply that Warfield's defence of biblical inerrancy, being in large part exegetical, is open to rebuttal.
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believer; in systematic terms, it calls only for notitia rather than fiducia.'220 The 'greatest
advantage' of his theory of inspiration, he says, 'is that it does not shift the focus of
Christian belief away from the saving presence of God among believers.'221
It may be that the doctrine of the sufficiency of Scripture necessarily implies the
inerrancy of Scripture; it is not proposed to enter the complex discussion of biblical
inerrancy here. However, granting for the moment that sufficiency does entail inerrancy, it
may be argued that the notions offered in previous chapters - of Scripture as the speech-act
of God, and of Scripture as sufficient (not self-sufficient) for the performance of God's
speech-act, remembering Wolterstorff s profound conception of what it is to speak, as well
as what has been argued in this chapter about the polyphonic nature of Scripture - are not
subject to the critique which Trembath makes, probably fairly, of the versions of inerrancy
with which he was faced.222 This suggests that there is the possibility of a much more
profound debate about biblical inerrancy, which cannot be developed here, than that
conducted in recent American skirmishes.
5.4.2.2. A human analogyfor biblical inspiration
Having rejected Warfield's understanding of inspiration, Abraham tries to reconceive the
term by analogy with its meaning in everyday usage. 'We need to pursue in its own right an
analysis of the concept of inspiration', he says, examining the use of the word 'inspire' as
applied to human agents, before attempting to understand its use when applied to God's
activity. Abraham thinks that much confusion has resulted from a failure to engage in this
process, which he regards as the very process by which we come to describe what is meant
by the analogous use of such verbs as 'love', 'know' and 'forgive', when used of God's
220 Trembath, Evangelical Theories, 97-98.
221 Trembath, Evangelical Theories, 115.
222 Trembath fears that 'deductivists' 'reinforce the idea that biblical inspiration is an objective
property of the words of the Bible which may be discerned by believer and unbeliever alike',
(Trembath, Evangelical Theories, 68). He concludes that the confession of the inspiration of
Scripture has usually been taken to mean that 'the uniqueness of the Bible could be entirely explained
by examining the Bible itself rather than by examining the effect that it mediates to the believing
community', (Trembath, Evangelical Theories, 70-71). He seems insufficiently aware that Reformed
theology, at least before the nineteenth century, asserted both that the Bible possesses certain
'objective properties' and that we come to discern its authority primarily by the action of the Holy
Spirit. The Westminster Confession of Faith provides one of the best examples: 'We may be moved
and induced by the testimony of the Church to an high and reverent esteem of the Holy Scripture, and
the heavenliness of the matter, the efficacy of the doctrine, the majesty of the style, the consent of all
the parts, the scope of the whole, (which is to give all glory to God), the full discovery it makes of the
only way of man's salvation, the many other incomparable excellencies, and the entire perfection
thereof, are arguments whereby it doth abundantly evidence itself to be the Word of God; yet,
notwithstanding, our full persuasion and assurance of the infallible truth, and divine authority thereof,
is from the inward work of the Holy Spirit, bearing witness by and with the word in our hearts',
(Westminster Confession of Faith, 1.5).
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action.223 Abraham gets at what he calls the 'root meaning' of 'inspire' by considering the
case of a teacher inspiring his students. The characteristics of this situation are chiefly that
there can be degrees of inspiration in different students, that the students' own talents are
not nullified, and that the students may well commit what the teacher considers to be errors,
since they are not exclusively under his influence.224 While acknowledging that this model
is too 'intellectualist' to be a perfect analogy for a theological use of 'inspire', since God
'inspires in, with, and through his special revelatory acts and through his personal guidance
of those who wrote and put together the various parts of the Bible',225 Abraham largely
builds his conception of divine inspiration on the three characteristics of this model.
Trembath accepts the model uncritically as providing a legitimate analogy with divine
inspiration. He also develops it further than Abraham, arguing that in a situation in which a
teacher is said to have inspired a student, 'inspiration is more a predicate of the student than
of the teacher.'226 This observation supports his definition of inspiration as referring not to
the Bible itself but to its effects in the lives of believers.
This analogy, however, introduces confusion rather than clarification into discussions
of biblical inspiration, especially when it is offered as a better model of inspiration than
Warfield's. First, Abraham and Trembath both miss Warfield's explanation that his use of
'inspiration' is derived from his biblical exegesis and especially his philological research
into the meaning of GeoTrveuaToq. As Howard Marshall points out, the evidence rather
counts against the legitimacy of Abraham's assumption that he can transfer the field of
meaning and usage of the English word 'inspire' to the Greek word GeoTtveuatoq.227
Warfield himself also points out the same problem inherent in this methodology, which he
either anticipated or which was already current in his day, (he does not say which), in a
passage to which, curiously, neither Abraham and Trembath respond.228
Second, the human analogy obscures the theological convictions which undergird the
Warfieldian technical definition of 'biblical inspiration'. It was noted above that Warfield
regards his notion of 'concursive operation' as resting on 'the Christian idea of God as
immanent as well as transcendent in the modes of his activity', and as analogous to
providence and grace.229 The reworkings offered by recent writers, including Abraham and
Trembath, seem to be governed partly by unarticulated objections to Warfield's notions of
divine providence and divine immanence and transcendence - on both of which he stands
223 Abraham, The Divine Inspiration, 61-62.
224 Abraham, The Divine Inspiration, 63-64.
225 Abraham, The Divine Inspiration, 67.
226 Trembath, Evangelical Theories, 65.
227 1. Howard Marshall, Biblical Inspiration (Carlisle: Paternoster Press, 1995 [1982]), 40.
228 Warfield, Inspiration and Authority, 154.
229 Warfield, Selected Shorter Writings 2, 546.
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in a long orthodox tradition.230 Bruce Vawter, for example, who has produced one of the
most influential Roman Catholic versions of biblical inspiration of recent times, building on
the work of Karl Rahner, argues that the recognition of the influence of a writer's social and
linguistic context on the words he is able to choose in order to communicate has made it
harder to postulate concursive divine and human actions in relation to the actual words of
the Bible.231 This argument, though, carries weight only if one has a very wooden
conception of providence - one which cannot conceive of God acting concurrently with the
limitations of human situatedness.232
The question of divine providence comes closest to the surface in the work of Abraham
and Trembath in a particular charge which both level at 'deductivists': that they wrongly
equate inspiration with divine speaking. For Abraham, this is 'the fundamental problem' of
the 'deductive' approach.233 This is in effect the claim that the Warfieldian tradition
wrongly extends a prophetic model of divine-human interaction to the divine-human
interaction operative in the production of the whole Bible. Vawter makes the same point:
'scriptural inspiration must have been as diverse as the human efforts that conspired to
produce the Scripture.'234 Warfield, however, does not treat the whole Bible as divinely
dictated prophecy in this way, for he distinguishes, as was noted above, revelation by
prophecy from revelation by inspiration precisely in that the latter takes into account the
'total personality' of the human agent.235 He does not think of divine inspiration as an act of
speaking; the verbs he uses most regularly to describe God's action in the production of the
Bible aim simply to describe it as a providential act: safeguarding 'a record of his will' in
written form, 'communicating] to the product qualities distinctly superhuman', guiding and
superintending,236 and so on. When Abraham argues that Warfield, although he does not use
the vocabulary of 'dictation' to describe inspiration, has retained the concept, offering a
notion of revelation as 'a kind of telepathic dictation without the writer being aware of it',
and that, whenever the emphasis is on the Bible as divinely given word for word, there is 'a
carry-over from a dictation theory',237 he is effectively rejecting Warfield's view of divine
230 J.I. Packer argues provocatively that to deny that the Bible is fully authored by both human beings
and God is to deny divine providence, substituting deism for Christian theism, (J.I. Packer,
'Fundamentalism ' and the Word ofGod [London: I.-V. F., 1958], 80-81).
231 Bruce Vawter, Biblical Inspiration (London: Hutchison, 1972), 128.
232 Vawter's implied notion of providence would not seem to be able to cope with the assertion that in
the events leading up to the crucifixion of Jesus God was both freely acting to go to the cross and
working concurrently through the actions of those (very limited, situated) people who handed him
over, called for his execution and actually crucified him.
233 Abraham, The Divine Inspiration, 37. See Trembath, Evangelical Theories, 67-68.
234 Vawter, Biblical Inspiration, 163.
235 Warfield, Inspiration and Authority, 94.
236 Warfield, Selected Shorter Writings 2, 632; Inspiration and Authority, 83, 95.
237 Abraham, The Divine Inspiration, 36-37.
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providence. Warfield's notion of biblical inspiration is not a theory of divine dictation if
one accepts Warfield's understanding of divine providence.
In conclusion, therefore, it is suggested that further creative work on biblical inspiration
would be most fruitfully conducted by engaging at length with the doctrines of divine
immanence and transcendence, of divine providence, as well as with the tradition of biblical
exegesis which Warfield exemplifies. This would help to avoid the confusions introduced
by Abraham and Trembath when they give new semantic content to the word 'inspiration' in
light of their particular exegetical and theological assumptions. Here it has not been
possible to open up such discussions, since much preliminary work is required in order to
recover the precise nature of Warfield's understanding of inspiration, as representative of a
particular tradition. If our portrayal of Warfield's doctrine is accurate, then it may be
judged to escape some of the criticisms most often directed at it. Our description also
suggests that the focus of much contemporary discussion of biblical inspiration is blurred by
its failure to acknowledge that its fundamental disagreement with Warfield lies in questions
of divine providence.
5.4.3. Response II: Biblical Inspiration and the Gospel ofJesus Christ
Wolfhart Pannenberg has recently articulated an alternative account of the inspiration of
Scripture. He criticises '[the] use [of the inspiration of Scripture] in seventeenth-century
Protestant theology in the attempt to justify a formal concept of scriptural authority before
any discussion of the biblical writings.'238 In this period, he says, both Reformed and
Lutheran theologians began to extend inspiration to 'the act of recording itself, thus
equating God's Word with the actual wording of Scripture. The motivation for this alleged
shift was the fear was that 'the scripture principle of the Reformation might be abandoned if
scripture no longer stood outside human judgment as a divine authority that is inviolable
both as a whole and in detail. ... Once one concedes that anything in scripture is of human
origin, its divine authority is lost.'239 He has in mind here Lutheran theologians, but on the
substantive points they were in agreement with Reformed theologians.240 Thus, Pannenberg
objects to what he takes to be the use of the divine inspiration of Scripture as a formal
principle on which the divine authority of Scripture was grounded.241
238 Pannenberg, 'On the Inspiration of Scripture', 214. In this short article Pannenberg clarifies some
points he makes in his Systematic Theology 1 & 2 trans. Geoffrey W. Bromiley (Grand Rapids:
Eerdmans, 1991-94).
239 Pannenberg, Systematic Theology 1, 32.
240 This was argued briefly in chapter 2.
241 Reformed systematic theologies of the seventeenth century do indeed, as was noted in chapter 2,
regularly place a locus on Scripture before direct discussions of Christology.
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Pannenberg wishes to correct this, locating inspiration not in the wording of Scripture
but in its content, the gospel of Jesus Christ. He argues that the conclusion that the New
Testament writings 'participate in some way in ... divine inspiration ... is valid only insofar
as those writings witness to the Pauline gospel of God's saving activity in Jesus' death on
the cross and in his resurrection. ... Certainly, the Scriptures are to be understood as
divinely inspired in the literal concreteness of their wording, but only insofar as they
witness to the gospel of Jesus Christ.'242 This argument relates to Pannenberg's overall
theological programme in that it allows for objectivity in historical knowledge of Jesus
Christ: 'the statement that scripture is inspired presupposes conviction as to the truth of the
revelation of God in the person and history of Jesus Christ .... This conviction has its basis
elsewhere.'243
What is intriguing about this statement, in light of our discussion so far, is that both
Pannenberg and Warfield deny that biblical inspiration is the ground of biblical authority.
Like Pannenberg, Warfield locates the basis of the conviction of the truth of divine
revelation in Jesus Christ elsewhere than in the divine inspiration of Scripture, as was noted
above: 'These [Scriptures] we first prove authentic, historically credible, generally
trustworthy, before we prove them inspired'; even if the Bible-writers were no more than
'credible reporters of revelations of God, ... their testimony would be entitled to belief.244
Where Warfield differs from Pannenberg is in what follows from the conclusions of his
biblical exegesis. For Warfield, 'Christ and his apostles are historically shown to have
taught the plenary inspiration of the Bible'245 - that is, this can be demonstrated without
presupposing the divine inspiration of the Scriptures - which makes the doctrine 'a very
important and valuable element' in the Christian faith. 'In such circumstances their
inspiration is bound up inseparably with their trustworthiness, and with all else that we
receive on trust from them.'246 For Pannenberg, by contrast, the conviction of the truth of
God's revelation in Christ is found by distinguishing the 'Christ-event', which 'has meaning
in itself, from the New Testament witness to that event.247
Warfield's doctrine of inspiration does not exercise the kind of function which
Pannenberg rules out for the doctrine - that is, as a formal conception of scriptural
authority, prior to any discussion of the Bible or the gospel of Jesus Christ. However, his
exegetical consideration of the Bible and the gospel does lead to a conception of biblical
242 Pannenberg, 'On the Inspiration of Scripture', 213, 215.
243 Pannenberg, Systematic Theology 2, 463-64.
244 Warfield, Inspiration and Authority, 211-12, quoting (in the latter statement) George P. Fisher.
245 Warfield, Inspiration and Authority, 122-23.
246 Warfield, Inspiration and Authority, 211-12.
247 Wolfhart Pannenberg, 'What Is a Dogmatic Statement?', in Pannenberg, Basic Questions in
Theology 1 (London: SCM Press, 1970), 182-210 (197-98).
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inspiration which gives the Bible a secondary, although not foundational, role as a formal
principle in theology. The Bible is, for Warfield, in this sense, but only in this sense, the
principium cognoscendi.
Pannenberg has developed his notion of inspiration in response to what he takes to be
that held by post-Reformation orthodox Protestant theologians. As was noted in chapter 2,
the seventeenth-century theologian Francis Turretin exercised some influence on nineteenth-
century Princetonian theology. Turretin has often been cited as a particular exponent of the
use of inspiration, allied with a strong doctrine of biblical inerrancy, as a formal principle of
biblical authority in abstraction from the content of Scripture. Jack Rogers and Donald
McKim have been particularly harsh: 'Turretin predicated the authority of the Bible on the
claim that it was verbally inerrant. He was willing to rest the whole weight of Scripture on
the point of one particular.'248 They generalise thus: 'Among Protestant scholastics, the
doctrine of inspiration was refined and the locus of scriptural authority shifted away from
the Reformation emphasis on the Holy Spirit's witness to Christ towards rational
argumentation to prove Scripture's inspiration.'249
The central thesis of Rogers' and McKim's work - that post-Reformation Protestant
scholastics introduced an innovation by extending biblical infallibility to include all the
words of the Bible, and all the incidental details which the Bible relates - elicited a book-
length and almost point-by-point rebuttal from John Woodbridge.250 In addition, W. Robert
Godfrey has responded that the placing of the locus on Scripture in a formal position in
Turretin's Institutio Theologiae Elencticae, prior to his discussion of the actual content of
the gospel, does not by itself reveal a move to a formal conception of biblical authority.
Turretin was attempting to respond to the main challenges presented to orthodox Protestant
theology in the seventeenth century, which were precisely formal ones, particularly those
coming from Socinians and Roman Catholics. This particular ordering of individual loci is
not, however, evidence that Turretin neglected the importance of Scripture's content, the
saving message of the gospel.251 In the locus on Scripture, according to Godfrey, Turretin
argues that the authority of Scripture is established by its own self-testimony and by the
248 Rogers & McKim, Authority and Interpretation, 176; also 172-84 passim.
249 Rogers & McKim, Authority and Interpretation, 166. Rogers and McKim regard Turretin's
advocacy of the divine inspiration of the Hebrew vowel-points, given bold expression in the Formula
Consensus Helvetica (1675), to which Turretin was a significant contributor, as '[t]he most notable
implication of Turretin's concentration on the form of Scripture', (Rogers & McKim, Authority and
Interpretation, 180).
250 Woodbridge, Biblical Authority. Of Rogers' and McKim's treatment of Turretin, Woodbridge
points out that they seem to be entirely dependent for their view of his writings on a single secondary
source, a Th.M. thesis written by Leon M. Allison in 1958, (Woodbridge, Biblical Authority, 116-17).
251 Robert W. Godfrey, 'Biblical Authority in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries: A Question of
Transition', in eds D.A. Carson & John D. Woodbridge, Scripture and Truth (Leicester: IVP, 1983),
221-43 (237).
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marks which God has impressed upon it. Of the latter, the internal marks 'are more
significant', and they are primarily to do with the content of Scripture: 'the matter of
Scripture (Christ and the gospel), the style, the form (the harmony of the doctrine), and the
end (the glory of God and the salvation ofmen).'252
Nor is it true that the Spirit is absent from Turretin's account, for he assumes that
Scripture's 'marks' do not testify to the authority of Scripture in and of themselves, but only
insofar as they are taken up by the Holy Spirit. On the question of 'The Knowledge of
Scriptural Authority', he says:
When the French Confession says (article 5), "We believe the books of
Scripture to be canonical, not so much by the common consent of the church as
by the witness and internal urging of the Holy Spirit," by "Holy Spirit" must be
understood the Spirit speaking both in the Word and in the heart. So the same
Spirit, acting objectively in the Word to set forth the truth, acts efficiently in
the heart to impress the truth on our minds, and so is very different from
fanatical enthusiasm.253
This is not a rationalist account of scriptural authority, but an attempt to steer a course
between Roman Catholicism and 'enthusiasm', relating the testifying work of the Spirit
intrinsically to the conveying ofChristian truth by means of the Scriptures.
In sum, Turretin grounds the authority of Scripture in the truth of the content of the
gospel of Jesus Christ, which content is derived exegetically from Scripture; and the
assurance of the truth of this content, and therefore of the authority of Scripture, is
impressed on believers by the Holy Spirit, working objectively in the Word and subjectively
in the believer's heart. This is some way from Pannenberg's portrayal of seventeenth-
century Protestant theology as grounding biblical authority in a formal principle of biblical
inspiration. For Turretin, as for Warfield, Scripture functions as a formal principle in
theology in a secondary, not a foundational, sense. It comes to function as a formal
principle, but that function is not grounded formalistically. Its formal functioning is
secondary because of its derivation, as was observed in the treatment of Turretin in chapter
2, from the nature of theology, which Turretin discusses in the first locus of his Institutio -
a section which has regularly been overlooked in negative assessments of his doctrine of
Scripture.
252 Godfrey, 'Biblical Authority', 239, summarising Francis Turretin, Institutio Theologiae Elencticae
II.4.9. Godfrey suggests that Turretin may be more rationalist than Calvin on this topic, in that he
thinks of Scripture's marks as being useful in coming to accept the Bible as authoritative, whereas
Calvin treats them as 'very useful aids' only for believers, (Godfrey, 'Biblical Authority', 240).
253 Turretin, Institutio, II.6.14, (trans, from Francis Turretin, The Doctrine of Scripture: Locus 2 of
Institutio Theologiae Elencticae ed. & trans. John W. Beardslee [Grand Rapids: Baker, 1981]).
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5.4.4. Warfield 's Doctrine ofInspiration and Canonical Polyphony
At the beginning of this chapter, reference was made to Pannenberg's observation that the
doctrine of biblical inspiration disintegrated 'primarily because the idea of a doctrinal unity
among all the sentences of Scripture without any contradiction among them, an idea that
followed from the doctrine of literal inspiration, could not be defended in the long run. It
was falsified by observations of scriptural exegesis.'254 One of the most striking features of
Warfield's doctrine of biblical inspiration is his persistent use of the term 'oracle(s) (of
God)' and its cognates as a description of the Bible. The regularity with which he uses the
term might suggest an insensitivity to and flattening of the complex and diverse nature of
the canon, and a consequent glossing over of the difficulties involved in moving from the
canon of Scripture to theology. Warfield offers other descriptions of the Bible, some of
which similarly suggest a rather static conception of Scripture. He calls the Scriptures 'a
compact mass of words of God', and says that the New Testament writers regarded the Old
Testament as 'nothing other than the crystallized speech of God.'255 The highest expression
of this 'oracular' view of Scripture comes in his recommendation that each book or sentence
be conceived of 'as an unmediated divine word coming directly to the soul'.256
In the first place, it is evident that Warfield does not mean in practice what the word
'unmediated' in the latter phrase might suggest, for he employed, as we have seen, a high
level of philological rigour in order to determine the precise meaning of biblical words, and
wished to disassociate himself from the practice of proof-texting. Thus he did not believe
that correct belief could simply be read straight off the pages of the biblical text. (This is
one reason why Warfield cannot properly be called a precursor of American
fundamentalism.) It seems, in fact, that Warfield's use of 'oracular' as a description of the
Bible has a single aim: to articulate the claim that Scripture is to be permanently identified
with the Word of God. At one point he says that the church doctrine of inspiration views
Scripture as 'a book which may be frankly appealed to at any point with the assurance that
whatever it may be found to say, that is the Word of God.' There follows immediately the
comment that the Bible is 'an oracular book'.257 It is most likely that the latter description is
intended as no more than a summary of the immediately preceding statement. As far as the
content of his argument is concerned, then, Warfield's use of the language of 'oracle(s)'
arguably adds nothing substantive to the claim that 'what Scripture says, God says', and that
with no other instance of human linguistic activity may this identification be made in the
same way.
254 Pannenberg, 'On the Inspiration of Scripture', 212.
255 Warfield, Inspiration andAuthority, 147, 406.
256 Warfield, Inspiration and Authority, 388-89.
257 Warfield, Inspiration and Authority, 106.
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The simple answer to the question of why Warfield chooses to describe his view of the
Bible in terms of 'oracles' is that it is a term which the New Testament uses for the Old
Testament as a whole, or possibly for just the Torah or the Decalogue.258 However, in his
essay on 'The Oracles of God', it becomes evident that a significant influence on Warfield's
choice of terminology is Philo, for whom, he says, every passage of Scripture is a Afiyiov,
and whose most common term for the Bible as a whole is probably oi %pr|cpoi,.259 Warfield
has been judged, fairly, to have been 'paralyzed by Philo' on this point, for the New
Testament's uses of xa Afiyra xofi Geob provide no warrant for 'any leveling of biblical
passages to a "compact mass of words" like some gigantic and tedious pagan xpriopoq'.260
The significance of this point is that it is often alleged that Warfield's doctrine of
inspiration flattens the diversity of the biblical witness to the Word of God. Trembath
argues that the doctrine of plenary biblical inspiration affirms that the Word of God is found
wherever one looks in the Bible.261 Colin Gunton rejects the doctrine because he wants to
'dispense with the need to wring equal meaning out of every text.'262 In fact, it can be
argued that Warfield does have a nuanced understanding of the relationship between the
Bible and the Word of God. He rejects proof-texting; he acknowledges the progressive
nature of revelation; and in practice his description of Scripture is determined
christocentrically, since he privileges what he takes to be Christ's view of Scripture. His
'oracular' view of the Bible does not leave him insensitive to literary genres or unable to
identify interpretive centres in the Bible. Simply, the Gospels and the main Pauline epistles
in practice loom larger inWarfield's work than, say, 3 John or the book ofEsther.
We may grant that Warfield lacked, simply by virtue of his particular historical
location, the conceptualities which would have allowed him to articulate, and to put more
consciously into exegetical practice, a sophisticated approach to the genre, literary
characteristics and Elocutionary force of the whole biblical text being studied. Such
conceptualities, suggestions for which were outlined in the first section of this chapter,
would allow a more nuanced description of how the various statements and literary units in
the Bible function in relation to one another than the model suggested by the description of
the Bible as 'a compact mass of words ofGod'.
Nevertheless, this does not destroy the legitimacy of the single claim which Warfield's
entire corpus on inspiration attempts to uphold: that God is the ultimate author of Scripture.
Much depends on how the word 'says' is understood in Warfield's fundamental axiom,
258 E.g., Rom. 3.2; Warfield, Inspiration and Authority, 148.
259 Warfield, Inspiration and Authority, 384-87.
260 Douglas Farrow, The Word of Truth and Disputes About Words (Winona Lake: Carpenter, 1987),
104.
261 Trembath, Evangelical Theories, 92.
262 Colin E. Gunton, A Brief Theology ofRevelation (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1995), 66.
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'What Scripture says, God says'. As has been argued in previous chapters, speaking is a
much richer and more complex activity than has often been realised. The recognition that
Scripture 'says' many things in various ways only signals the end of the 'church doctrine' of
inspiration if it is assumed that God can only 'say' in one way. Given the conception of
divine speech in relation to Scripture developed in chapter 3, the axiom can survive,
however, and perhaps even flourish, if a recognition of the complexity of both Scripture and
speech is allowed to modify our understanding of what and how 'God says'. The basic
structure of Warfield's doctrine of inspiration does not crumble with the removal of the
language of 'oracles', and can be constructively developed by supplementation from the
notions of speech and canonical polyphony which have been proposed in this thesis.
5.5. Conclusion
The first section of this chapter argued, from the philosophy of language developed by
Mikhail Bakhtin, that language, both in its referential capacity and more fundamentally as a
means by which persons act in relation to one another, should be conceived of as
fundamentally polyphonic. This was suggested as providing philosophical support for Paul
Ricoeur's 'intratextually realist' account of the polyphonic diversity of Scripture.
Reflecting specifically on the biblical canon, the canonical hermeneutics of B.S. Childs
were examined, and found to be lacking on the question of the justification of final-form
readings and inter-canonical interpretations of the Bible which he practices. A general
hermeneutical basis for such canonical readings of Scripture was identified in a recent
suggestion made by E.D. Hirsch. In order to supplement Childs' work with a specifically
theological basis, we turned to a discussion of the inspiration of Scripture. It was argued
that the strong doctrine of inspiration held by the Protestant orthodox, and as articulated
especially by B.B. Warfield, can, with certain modifications of Warfield's terminology,
withstand much of the attack directed at it. That is, Warfield's doctrine of the inspiration of
Scripture functions not as a formal principle invoked prior to a discussion of, and therefore
grounding the authority of, the content of the gospel and the biblical texts, but as an
exegetical conclusion drawn from the testimony of Christ and the apostles to Scripture.
Scripture comes to function as a principium cognoscendi, but only in a secondary sense. It
may be argued that, for Warfield, both the authority and sufficiency of Scripture are derived
from the authority of Christ.
As a basis for an 'intratextual' approach to Scripture, this conception of biblical
inspiration establishes biblical intertextuality not as an endlessly self-referential web of
literary patterns, as in deconstructive models of intertextuality, but as a web of literary and
thematic patterns which ultimately focus on one central individual. Biblical intertextuality
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has an internally established centre and telos. It is in him that the uniqueness and ultimately
the authority of the Bible is located.
It may be still be objected that an extended discussion of a particular attribute of
Scripture, such as that offered in the present work, represents a challenge to the supremacy
of Jesus Christ, the subject matter of Scripture, who is actually present in its reading and
proclamation. Ultimately, it might be thought, one cannot serve two masters; one must
choose between Christ and Scripture: 'Christians are not those who believe in the Bible, but
those who believe in Christ'.263 Barth makes a similar point in his 'equation ofGod's Word
and God's Son', which he establishes as 'a real and effective barrier' against what 'the later
form of older Protestantism' made of church proclamation: 'a fixed sum of revealed
propositions which can be systematised like the sections of a corpus of law.'264 This also
lies behind Gunton's concern that Christians should not encumber themselves with a
doctrine of Scripture which requires them 'to wring equal meaning out of every text.'265
This seems to be equivalent to a warning that it is possible to make Scripture too sufficient;
the doctrine of Scripture, including the confession of the sufficiency of Scripture, must not
be allowed to extend beyond its christological limits. It amounts to a rejection of the
possibility of the Bible functioning as what we have called a secondary principium
cognoscendi, established non-formalistically.
The formulators of the orthodox Protestant doctrine of the sufficiency of Scripture saw
very clearly that Christ, the material content of Scripture, is unavoidably served by his
relation to the formal aspect of Scripture.266 The content of Scripture is ultimately the living
Christ, and our knowledge of the identity of Jesus of Nazareth as the promised Messiah of
Israel, the Saviour of the World, and the risen, ascended and coming Lord, is established
and safeguarded by the sufficiency of the canon of Scripture to witness to him as this one
and no other. If 'Jesus Christ' is set up as the sole unquestionable principle of the self-
interpretation of Scripture, the 'centre' in the light of which other parts of Scripture are
judged not to witness truly to him, to fall short of his gospel - which is the direction in
which Pannenberg's account of biblical inspiration tends - then the 'Jesus Christ' in terms
of whom we read Scripture will be a Jesus Christ whose identity is formed for us only partly
by Scripture - most likely by those parts which most appeal to us. The primacy of Jesus
263 John Barton, People of the Book? The Authority of the Bible in Christianity (London: SPCK,
1988), 83.
264 Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics 1/1 trans. G.W. Bromiley (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1975), 137.
265 Gunton, A Brief Theology ofRevelation, 66.
266 This was argued in chapter 2 in relation to the Reformation and post-Reformation periods.
219
Christ in revelation is secured, rather than threatened, by the orthodox Protestant confession
of scriptural sufficiency.267
It is important to clarify what is not entailed in this claim for the sufficiency of
Scripture. Francis Watson, along with several others, notes the lack in Childs' work of a
theological justification for his actual approach to biblical interpretation, which we
attempted to supplement with a doctrine of biblical inspiration. He argues: 'It is one thing
to describe the formal outlines of the canonical object, over against an interpretative
tradition that has rendered it invisible; it is quite another to assert, as Childs does, the
adequacy and sufficiency of the canon for guidance of the community into truth.' Watson
thinks that Childs' portrayal of the community of faith guided by the canon does not match
reality; among the things which the canon does not tell us are that its truth lies 'not in the
individual text but in the complementarity and balance established by the entire collection';
whether or not we may prefer one text over another; what status is to be given to the
Septuagint; 'how to cope with its apparent contradictions, improbabilities, and other
difficulties'; and whether and how its authority 'is to be co-ordinated with other kinds of
authority.'268
The majority of Protestant orthodox theologians have indeed not, in their doctrinal
assertion of the sufficiency of Scripture, declared these questions to be clearly resolved.
The canon has rarely been declared to be sufficient for 'guidance of the community into the
truth', if by that is meant that a relatively easy and definitive resolution of theological,
interpretive and applicational questions may be read off the surface of the canonical texts.
To find resources for the reconstruction of the sufficiency of Scripture outside Scripture, as
we have done, is therefore both necessary and not a performative denial of the doctrine. We
267 This is not intended as an argument for a 'flattening' literalistic interpretation of Scripture,
particularly of those parts of the Old Testament which, in the course of progressive revelation, do not
have 'literal' authority over believers today. 'Literal', though, is here in scare-quotes because, as
argued earlier in this chapter, the Old Testament itself refers to what for it is an unnamed coming
reality. For present-day believers, obedience to the 'literal' sense of Old Testament food laws, e.g., in
the context of the canon would therefore mean adherence to Christ's warning that it is not what goes
into us that makes us unclean but what comes out of us, (Mark 7.15). Literal sense, which is always
contextually defined, is therefore to be distinguished from literalistic sense, which is not. See
Vanhoozer's comment that 'the literal sense - the sense of the literary act - may, at times, be
indeterminate or open-ended', (Vanhoozer, Is There a Meaning, 313). Nor is it to deny the necessity
of recognising tropes in Scripture; as has long been acknowledged, the 'literal sense' of a text can be
metaphorical, if that is its intended meaning. See, e.g., Beryl Smalley's comment in this regard on the
twelfth-century writer Hugh of St. Victor, (Beryl Smalley, The Study of the Bible in the Middle Ages
3rd ed. rev. [Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1952, 1983], 93), referred to in chapter 2.
268 Watson, Text, Church and World, 13 VI. For a similar observation about the insufficiency of the
canon, see Frances Young's comment on Irenaeus: 'proper performance of scripture for Irenaeus
depends in the end not on canons of interpretation offered by the scriptures themselves ... but rather
on the 'plan of salvation', on what we might call the Christian kerygma, on a framework belonging to
the particular community which designates these books as authoritative, a framework related to these
books but 'extra' to them', (Young, The Art ofPerformance, 60).
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may also treat the particular areas of canonical 'insufficiency' which Watson raises. A
question such as that of the status of the Septuagint will be decided by complex historical
considerations;269 by contrast, Warfield champions Scripture's errorlessness, over the
evidence for its apparent contradictions, on internal exegetical grounds which privilege
Jesus' witness to the nature of Scripture over critical observations about the Bible's
apparent 'phenomena'. Human reason, used not as an absolute philosophical foundation,
but as an instrument, is required to reach the conclusion that Jesus is the centre of Scripture;
it is certainly required to argue that he is the exegetical centre in precisely the wayWarfield
sees him, and to argue exegetically for a balanced complementarity between the texts in
their corporate witness to him. Such a use of reason is also required, along with a
theological hermeneutic, if we are to assess interpretations which relegate the authority of
one text below that of another.270 The Westminster Confession of Faith provides one of the
strongest confessions of the sufficiency of Scripture, while also ascribing this kind of role to
reason.271 The canon of Scripture does not itself explicitly provide a sufficient set of
'canonical' interpretive frameworks, which would decide all historical questions about it,
and especially all questions of biblical interpretation and present-day application.272 It is in
that sense insufficient.
However, the doctrine defended here assumes a realist epistemology, such as that to
which Watson holds, as we have seen, which believes that the content and structure of the
canon of Scripture - as is the case with every speech-act - is sufficiently 'there',
sufficiently real, external to the reader, to resist inappropriate interpretive frameworks, and
to allow discernment of their inappropriateness. That is, the canon, both in its individual
texts and in their determinate inter-relationships, is sufficient to determine a spiral of
constantly revised frameworks which enable ever fuller hearing of its message, that is, ever
fuller knowledge of what the Bible says of the character and actions of God. Although
sufficient to determine this spiral, the canon does not of course enforce it on any and all
readers; for the spiral to be realised, readers must read with care and self-suspicion.273 This
269 This question was referred to briefly above in our treatment of B.S. Childs.
270 Goldingay offers three models for assessing such interpretations, and for inter relating the diversity
of the Bible's material: privileging those biblical texts which offer 'the high points of insight' on a
theme; looking for internal canonical critical principles; simply accepting a diverse unsystematic
witness to a complex reality, (Goldingay, Theological Diversity, 58, 98ff., 184).
271 'All things in Scripture are not alike plain in themselves, nor alike clear unto all; yet those things
which are necessary to be known, believed, and observed for salvation, are so clearly propounded,
and opened in some place of Scripture or other, that not only the learned, but the unlearned, in a due
use of the ordinary means, may attain unto a sufficient understanding of them', (Westminster
Confession of Faith, 1.7, [italics added]).
272 'I suppose that even the whole world would not have room for the books that would be written',
(John 21.25b).
273 Dialogue with Bible-readers from other communities is a crucial part of 'careful reading', and a
vital means for becoming rightly suspicious of one's own prior readings: 'faced with the
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notion of what it is to read has been outlined by N.T. Wright, broadly as an epistemology of
critical realism, and narrowly as a 'hermeneutic of love': 'Each stage of the process [of
reading] becomes a conversation, in which misunderstanding is likely, perhaps even
inevitable, but in which, through patient listening, real understanding (and real access to
external reality) is actually possible and attainable.'274
The material content for these frameworks will necessarily come in part from outside
the Bible and outside the community which wishes to read the Bible; the recognition that
no individual or community can ever exhaustively grasp the God who comes to the world
polyphonically must make Christians open to this reality. However, all interpretive
frameworks, whatever their origin, are to be, and can be, revised by the Scripture whose
reading they enable.
In sum, a principle of 'canonically-limited polyphony' is proposed, which would
establish three necessary conditions, collectively forming a sufficient condition, for the
'naming' of the personal God of revelation. God must be named polyphonically. To name
him in only one way would be to view and know his reality in only one dimension. And
God must be named by a limited polyphony. To name him in limitless ways is not to name
him at all. And to seek to delimit the polyphony by any other criterion than by the canon of
Scripture is to risk naming a God after our own image.275 The formal aspect of the
sufficiency of Scripture, then, the rule of Scripture as its own interpreter, is best viewed as a
vital doctrinal statement of the necessary and sufficient conditions for the 'naming' of God.
Since it is sufficient in this way and for this purpose, Scripture is insufficient to provide
warrant for dogmatism about knowledge. Since no one may ever grasp the full polyphonic
fragmentation of the sociolinguistic community to which the Canon and the canons of interpretation
belong, self-consciousness needs to be fostered about the various interpretive frameworks brought to
the text, inherited as they are from differing group traditions within Christianity, and based partly on
abstraction of intratextual elements, partly on extratextual theological assumptions. Then the Canon
of scripture which we hold in common, and the frameworks we do not, can be integrated through
tough theological thinking and dialogue of a creative kind', (Young, The Art ofPerformance, 62-63).
274 N.T. Wright, The New Testament and the People of God (London: SPCK, 1992), 64. Wright here
acknowledges a debt to Ben F. Meyer's work on 'critical realism' and the New Testament. See also
Vanhoozer: 'hermeneutic rationality is a matter of putting one's interpretations to critical tests, not of
putting them on secure foundations. ... The rationality of an interpretation is essentially a function of
its ability to endure critical enquiry', (Vanhoozer, Is There a Meaning, 301). He argues at length that
the form and content of a speech-act can be known with 'relative adequacy', (Vanhoozer, Is There a
Meaning, 281-366).
275
Metzger summarises recent attempts, especially in continental Europe, to discern 'a canon within
the canon'. He comments that such attempts, along with such historical positions as Luther's qualms
over the epistle of James, always succumb to arbitrariness, because they fail to envisage situations in
which the books proposed as marginal could become of vital significance for the church: 'New
Testament scholars have the responsibility as servants of the Church to investigate, understand, and
elucidate, for the development of the Christian life of believers, the full meaning of every book within
the canon and not only of those which may be most popular in certain circles and at certain times.
Only in such a way will the Church be able to hear the Word of God in all of its breadth and depth',
(Metzger, The Canon ofthe New Testament, 282).
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self-revelation of God at one time, no one ever succeeds in fully nailing God down; (only
idols are susceptible to nailing down; they even require it, sometimes276).277
In that it is God himself who gives himself to us by giving us the semantic means by
which we may name him, the sufficiency of the canon of Scripture can be defined in terms
of Scripture as a speech-act ofGod. Scripture is sufficient for the continued performance of
the illocutionary act which God once performed in the preparation for, in the witness back
to, and in the actuality of, his self-revelation in his appearing in human flesh. ' [Jesus] is, as
it were, encompassed by textuality: preceded by writings that prepare his way before him,
followed by the writings of those who cannot but speak of what they have seen and
heard.'278 This specific web of textuality is sufficient for God to say what he has to say to
humanity about his redemptive act in Jesus Christ.
276 Isa. 41.7.
277 This point is informed by what Vanhoozer calls 'The Christian morality of literary knowledge':
'the claim that there is knowledge is not the same as the claim that one possesses it or that the
possession of such knowledge allows one to impose one's opinions on others. There is always
something more that can be said in an argument', (Vanhoozer, Is There a Meaning, 302).
278 Watson, Text and Truth, 27.
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6. Conclusion
To recap: this thesis has attempted to use conceptual resources found in literary theory,
hermeneutics and the philosophy of language, in order to reconstruct the basis of a
contemporary formulation of the Christian doctrine of the sufficiency of Scripture. It has
been argued that each of the three historical elements of the doctrine may thus be re-
articulated. Scripture may be conceived of as a divine speech-act, identified permanently
with the Word of God. Scripture, as text, is sufficient for that speech-act, bearing
propositional content and conveying lllocutionary force. The Scriptures, as canon, are
sufficient for the continued performance of the illocutionary act which God once performed
in the culmination of the history of redemption in Jesus Christ.
As both reclamation and development of the orthodox Protestant doctrine of Scripture
in general, and the sufficiency of Scripture in particular, this reconstruction is addressed,
first, to orthodox Reformed and Lutheran communities as an implicit warning that the
tradition is poorly served by the mere repetition of old formulations in new situations, and
by ignoring conceptual resources which thought exercised across a breadth of disciplines
brings to light. Although of course it develops the doctrine in conceptual ways which go
beyond anything found explicitly in the writings of, say, Francis Turretin, or even B.B.
Warfield, our reconstruction is not intended to affirm anything which these theologians
would have found deeply objectionable - difficult, of course, as such anachronistic
judgments are to make.
Second, our reconstruction is addressed to theologians who wish to remain broadly
within the orthodox Christian conceptions of God, Christology, pneumatology and
soteriology, but who in various ways are uncomfortable with the sufficiency of Scripture
and its associated doctrines. It is suggested that they may be in danger of sawing off the
branch on which they wish to sit, rejecting the appropriate theological and epistemological
basis for fundamental doctrinal confessions. It has been pointed out along the way that what
is regularly rejected as 'the scholastic doctrine of Scripture' is often a caricature of the view
of Scripture held by post-Reformation theologians. Terms such as 'biblicisf and
'fundamentalist' are sometimes used too lightly, with insufficient appreciation of what a
majority of orthodox theologians, from the seventeenth century through even to Warfield,
have actually said about Scripture, and the purpose to which their doctrinal formulations on
Scripture were generally directed.
In assessing 'conservative' doctrines of Scripture, of course, the empirical features of
some of the churches and communities which defend 'the sufficiency of Scripture' most
vociferously cannot be overlooked. There are no doubt communities of believers, and
writings, which appear guilty of something close to 'bibliolatry', where faith in Scripture is
turned into something different from faith in Christ. In some conservative Christian groups,
most noticeably in North America, short, isolated citations from Scripture undergo genre-
transformation, hammered into the shape of slogans of social and political ideology. In
others, the sufficiency of the (whole) Scripture is proclaimed but not practised, as the
polyphonic play of biblical voices is halted, uncritically privileging only certain theological
themes and behavioural norms as 'true religion', remaining deaf to the other voices and
blind to the other viewpoints which the Bible contains. These powerful realities in parts of
the Christian church provide for many perhaps greater reason to be suspicious of the
doctrine of the sufficiency of Scripture than any theological or philosophical qualm.
However, it does not follow from these practical failings, from these apparent
performative contradictions of it, that the doctrine of the sufficiency of Scripture is
dangerous, useless or unnecessary. The necessity of distinguishing fundamentally between
text and community, illocution and perlocution, has been argued throughout as central to the
confession of scriptural sufficiency. No doctrine pretends to be able to guarantee faithful
Christian practice. (Only in the case of Scripture does the author of a text himself possess
the capacity to bring about the intended perlocutionary effect in his addressees.) The
doctrine of the sufficiency of Scripture legislates precisely for the inevitable dynamic by
which communities of Christian faith drift from faithful living and thinking, domesticating
the voice of God in accordance with their own prior convictions. By its confession of the
doctrine, the church reminds itself of the supplement which its life and word always need,
remembering, in hope of continual restoration, where the redemptive voice of God may
unfailingly be heard.
To make this kind of assertion is inevitably to adopt a certain attitude with regard to the
authority of the Bible, and to take issue with differing attitudes. It is important to stress
again that to assert the sufficiency of Scripture is not to imply that all questions of the
functioning of Scripture in church and theology have been solved. David Kelsey rightly
says that 'a theologian who marshals his proposals under the emblem "Let theology accord
with scripture" does not thereby announce that he has made a methodological decision, but
only that he has taken on an awesome array of methodological problems.'1 The extent of
the proposal of this thesis, from this point of view, is only that Christian theologians should
concern themselves with this 'awesome array of methodological problems', and not some
other awesome array.
Kelsey, in his influential work on the uses of Scripture in recent theology, offers four
questions which he puts to a variety of models by which Scripture has been said to authorise
theological formulations.2 Some of the consequences of our reconstruction may be clarified
1 David H. Kelsey, The Uses ofScripture in Recent Theology (London: SCM, 1975), 111.
2 Kelsey, The Uses ofScripture, 15.
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by answering Kelsey's questions from the perspective of the doctrine of the sufficiency of
Scripture. First, asks Kelsey, 'What aspect(s) of scripture is (are) taken to be authoritative?'
The options he gives include concepts and doctrines, (illustrated from B.B. Warfield), and
history, (illustrated from G.E. Wright).3 Our answer is something like, 'the Elocutionary act
represented by each text in particular, and by the canon as a whole'. This answer, being
broader than any ofKelsey's options, intends to express that in any particular instance of the
authorising of a theological proposal by Scripture it is the scriptural text which is to define
the mode of its authorising function. Kelsey's second question is, 'What is it about this
aspect of scripture that makes it authoritative?' The answer here is two-fold: 'The
Elocutionary act of each scriptural text separately, and of all taken together, is ultimately to
convey Christ; he in turn authorises Scripture.' Third, Kelsey asks, 'What sort of logical
force seems to be ascribed to the scripture to which appeal is made?' Fie suggests some
options here, including the logical force of a descriptive report, injunction or emotive
ejaculation. Again, our answer is broader than any of these options: 'The logical force will
be determined by the genre and Elocutionary force of the scriptural passage in question.'
The fourth question is: 'How is scripture that is cited brought to bear on theological
proposals so as to authorise them?' Kelsey, borrowing a model from Toulmin's analysis of
arguments, points out that Scripture can be brought to bear authoritatively as the source of
the raw data for theology, providing a certain warrant for a proposal, or for a certain backing
for that warrant. The answer is again that Scripture can be used to authorise theological
proposals in each of these ways, in accordance with the nature of the functioning of its
authority established by the answers to the previous questions.
These answers are not at odds with Kelsey's typology of alternatives in prescribing a
diversity of modes of biblical authority, for one of the main arguments of Kelsey's book is
that the concept of 'the authority of Scripture' does not mean only one thing. However, they
are directly counter to Kelsey's work because they appeal to intrinsic features of the text
itself, its genre and Elocutionary force. For Kelsey, by contrast, '[wjhen a theologian says it
["Scripture is authoritative for theology"], he does not so much offer a descriptive claim
about a set of texts and one of its peculiar properties', rather, he commits himself to a
certain kind of activity in the course of which these texts are going to be used in various
ways.'4
Kelsey excludes the possibility of a 'textually realist' approach to the authorising of
theology by Scripture by looking only at particular ways in which particular texts can be
3 Kelsey points out that he is offering a typology of approaches, not of theologians, and suggests that
it is unlikely that any theologian will treat Scripture as authoritative for theology in any single
consistent fashion. Hence the approaches are only illustrated from particular sections of each
theologian's writing, (Kelsey, The Uses ofScripture, 32).
4
Kelsey, The Uses ofScripture, 89.
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construed as having a certain logical force. For a theologian to ascribe a certain logical
force to scripture is a 'policy decision', he says; it has no necessary relationship to any
historical or literary claims about the texts.5 At the beginning of his book, Kelsey says that
description is all he intends to offer; he has no programme to prescribe.6 However, at the
end he proscribes certain kinds of programme with sufficient force that his own opinion of
what theology should do with Scripture becomes clear. It is 'utterly unrealistic', he says, to
expect a doctrine of scripture
to identify the way in which scripture can "control" theology so as to keep it
Christianly apt. ... Surely, Christianly speaking, it would be improper even to
hope for that. For the full discrimen by which theological proposals are finally
to be assessed includes the active presence of God. No "theological position"
would presume to tell us how to use scripture so as to "guarantee" that God will
be present to illumine and correct us. Theological proposals are concerned
with what God is now using scripture to do, and no degree of sophistication
and theological methodology can hope to anticipate that!7
If the 'ways' in which scripture can 'control' theology have been set up as individual
genres, then Kelsey's conclusion here follows. It is improper to reduce the whole of
Scripture to doctrine, to history, to mythic expression, or whatever, and it would be worse
than presumptuous to claim that such a reduction guaranteed the illumining and correcting
presence of God with us. However, to say that there is indeed one such 'way' in which
Scripture should 'control' theology, but that this 'way' is both as unified and as diverse as
the genres and illocutionary forces found in Scripture, is to make a different kind of claim.
It is not that God's presence is 'guaranteed' by this 'way'; that would be a tendentious way
to characterise it. Rather, Christ is conveyed to us by the literary and generic diversity of
Scripture. Whatever 'God is now using scripture to do' he does precisely by means of these
intrinsic features of the text, in the act of bringing about in believers by the Holy Spirit the
perlocutionary effect appropriate to the illocutionary act represented by the text. Thus,
theological proposals which would be faithful to God should seek authorisation precisely by
paying attention to the means (illocutions performed through locutions) by which, in and
through these texts, God bestows his presence (brings about the perlocutionary effect) on
the church. There is then a single 'way in which scripture can "control" theology', but it has
the status not of a single literary genre but of an ethical readerly attitude to the illocutionary
acts by which God conveys Christ to us in Scripture, and stirs up faithful response to him
ifiducia) in us by the action of the Holy Spirit.
It is sometimes said that the basic orientation to the authority of Scripture implied in
this thesis mistakes the nature of the object of faith in Christian faith. Biblical texts are
5 Kelsey, The Uses ofScripture, 111.
6 Kelsey, The Uses ofScripture, 8-9.
7 Kelsey, The Uses ofScripture, 215-16.
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authoritative because certain people - the human authors, such as the apostle Paul, or the
subject of the texts, supremely Christ - are authoritative; Christian faith is directed
towards persons, not a book.8 As a statement of the object of Christian faith this is
incontrovertible. Whenever someone attempts to prove a point by saying, 'The Bible
says...', the suspicion is understandably aroused that the true bases of Christian faith are
being distorted. However, once all uses of language are conceived of as speech-acts, it
becomes questionable whether this kind of invocation of biblical authority is necessarily
problematic in this way. There does not seem to be a significant semantic difference
between saying to someone, 'I trust you', and saying, 'I trust all the promises and assertions
you have addressed to me'. Of course, utterances beginning, 'The Bible says...', may abuse
the Bible by proof-texting; the point is that this need not be the case with the kind of
commitment to biblical authority implied by the sufficiency of Scripture. It is a central
conclusion of this thesis that to trust the God of revelation and to trust Scripture, that is, to
trust the speech-act it represents, can be and ought in practice to be regularly one and the
same action.
It is important to locate the proposals offered in the present work in relation to the
collection of views of the Bible often labelled 'fundamentalist'. First, whereas much
fundamentalism short-circuits the difficulties of biblical interpretation by proof-texting,
textual meaning has been defined here in terms of literary genre; if anything, this is to
increase the complexity of biblical interpretation, at least on certain topics, rather than to
simplify it. Thus, no particular position is being smuggled in on certain contentious issues
of biblical exegesis, such as those concerning gender and sexuality which are currently
exercising large parts of the Western church. Although it has been argued that certain
interpretive methodologies, from proof-texting through to free-playing intertextuality, are
illegitimate, no single interpretive methodology has been proposed as the only right one.
This is not to decide in advance that Scripture does not speak in favour of one side of the
debates on these issues; it is rather to appeal to anyone wishing to argue a point in some
way based on Scripture for greater faithfulness in exegesis to the nature of the texts which
all sides share in common. This is a second way in which the present proposals are not
fundamentalist, for the practice of faithfulness to the nature of Scripture includes the
acknowledgment both that Scripture is God's speech-act and that God speaks
polyphonically, which must lead the biblical interpreter to recognise that no reader ever
fully grasps the content of the texts.
8 E.g. James Barr, Holy Scripture. Canon, Authority, Criticism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983), 48;
John Barton, People of the Book? The Authority of the Bible in Christianity (London: SPCK, 1988),
83.
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The present work is also not properly characterised as 'fundamentalist' for a third
reason - namely, that it has been conducted through discussion with a variety of academic
disciplines, both critiquing them and being informed by them. At the end of chapter 4, a
general point about textual ontology was made, conceiving of texts as speech-acts, and as
sufficient for the performance of an lllocutionary act. This might be thought of as a
'principle of sufficient texts'. Where Leibniz asserted the metaphysical 'principle of
sufficient reason' - 'the nature of things requires, that every event should have beforehand
its proper conditions, requisites, and dispositions, the existence whereofmakes the sufficient
reason of such event'9 - our principle asserts, more modestly, an ontological claim about
the nature of texts in their relationship to the activity and person of the authors who brought
them about.
This raises the question of the relationship between special and general hermeneutics,
which can be asked at various levels of the arguments offered in this thesis. Is the
sufficiency of Scripture a special case of the general 'principle of sufficient texts', or is the
latter inferred from the former? Is the obedience due to God in Scripture a special case of
the ethical responsibility which all readers owe to all authors, or is the latter learned from
the former? Does speech-act theory tell us how to conceive of the Bible, or does the Bible
somehow pick out speech-act theory as an appropriate interpretive framework through
which to think of it? Do we supplement the Bible, or does it supplement us? It may seem
that we have supplemented the Bible, supremely with the conceptualities offered by speech-
act theory; however, this would be to forget the critical-realist epistemology referred to in
the conclusion of chapter 5.10 In the act of reading we inevitably interpret the Bible through
various grids and frameworks; but the Bible, if we are careful readers, will gradually refine
them, so that we are ever more able to hear the Word addressed to us. If we thus
'supplement' the Bible, that is only an initial epistemological gesture by which it may bring
a vital semantic supplement to us, as we become the people being formed in faithful
9 Leibniz, Fifth Letter to Clarke, §18, in The Philosophical Works of Leibniz trans. George Martin
Duncan (New Haven: Tuttle, Morehouse & Taylor, 1890), 258. See also the further definition: 'that
[principle] of the sufficient reason, by which we consider that no fact can be real or existent, no
statement true, unless there be a sufficient reason why it is so and not otherwise, although most often
these reasons cannot be known to us', (Leibniz, 'The Monadology', §32, in The Philosophical Works
ofLeibniz, 222).
10 While adopting conceptualities from a contemporary branch of the philosophy of language, we have
attempted to heed Devitt and Sterelny's warning regarding twentieth-century philosophy of language:
'Attention has focused so heavily on language that the metaphysical issue has tended to disappear; or
to be redefined in linguistic terms; or worst of all, to be confused with linguistic issues. In general,
the philosophy of language has become too big for its boots', (Michael Devitt & Kim Sterelny,
Language and Reality. An Introduction to the Philosophy of Language [Oxford: Basil Blackwell,
1987], 188). Hans Frei and George Lindbeck, along with deconstractive writers, (see chapter 4),
might be cited as examples of writers who have been adversely affected by the attempts of the
philosophy of language to over-reach itself.
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response to the God speaking in it. The proposals of this thesis are therefore offered as a
conceptual framework which, when Scripture is conceived of by means of it and read in
light of it, is offered only for correction by Scripture where it imposes distortions on
Scripture. As an epistemological attitude towards the text, this is no 'special' biblical
hermeneutic.
Epistemologically, then, we only come to know the semantic content of a text by this
process of hermeneutical imposition and faithful listening to the text's resistance to our
reading. Ontologically, we conceive of texts rightly by the conceptual supplementation of
them with the determinate relationships they have with authors, readers and speech
situations. By these conceptual means, a doctrine of the sufficiency of Scripture was
outlined which may not be misunderstood as a doctrine of the self-sufficiency of Scripture.
The various 'logics of supplementarity'11 by which the present work has come to
conceive of textual ontology in general and the Bible in particular are therefore very
different from the 'logic of supplementarity' by which Derrida reads Rousseau's texts.
Speech-act theory introduces a level of description into our conception of language which
Derrida abolishes. Persons can and do impose on the play of signifiers such that they are
able to act on other people and on themselves by the performance of inter-subjective
Elocutionary acts; signifying systems are supplemented by personal agency. Nor is it a
necessary condition of the performance of an Elocutionary act that an articulation of a
complete grammar of the speech-context be possible. Just as between the eschatological
'all' of fully grasping the completeness of the polyphony of biblical meaning and the
nihilistic 'nothing' of having no knowledge of God lies the adequacy of knowing in part, so
between Derrida's deliberately unattainable demand that contexts be distinguished from one
another in every particular and his consequent conclusion that all is context in the same way
and at the same level, n'y a pas de hors-texte,),n lies the actuality of the performance by
subjects of speech-acts.
Thus, the notion of an Elocutionary act does not necessarily presuppose the kind of
absolute presence, the strict distinction between 'outside' and 'inside', 'text' and 'context',
which Derrida undermines.13 We should probably not talk of a text as supplemented by
" This is Jonathan Culler's term, (Jonathan Culler, On Deconstruction. Theory and Criticism After
Structuralism [London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1983], 105).
12 'There is nothing outside of the text'; literally, as the translator inserts in parentheses, 'there is no
outside-text', (Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology trans. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak [Baltimore &
London: John Hopkins Univ. Press, 1976], 158, [original italics removed]).
13 Reflecting on the distinction between grammatical science and dialectics in Plato's writings,
Derrida writes: 'If truth is the presence of the cidos, it must always, on pain of mortal blinding by the
sun's fires, come to terms with relation, nonpresence, and thus nontruth. It then follows that the
absolute precondition for a rigorous difference between grammar and dialectics (or ontology) cannot
in principle be fulfilled', (Jacques Derrida, Dissemination trans. Barbara Johnson [London: Athlone
Press, 1981], 166).
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persons at all, for that may be taken as an act of addition to a previously posited absolute
metaphysical presence - the kind which Derrida deconstructs by his play on the semantic
ambiguity of the word 'supplement'. Instead, to conceive of a text from the first simply
ought to be to conceive of the means of the performance of an inter-subjective act - to
conceive of a text in a certain set of relations.
This, supplemented by Wolterstorff s concept of the 'normative standings' ascribed to
speakers, leads into questions of anthropology which lie beyond the present scope. It may
be, for example, that, just as to conceive of a speech-act is to conceive of persons, so to
conceive of a person is, at least in part, to conceive of the speech-acts by which she acts on
others and by which others act on her. In the introductory chapter, reference was made to
Catherine Pickstock's rehabilitation of pre-Reformation sacramental theology, carried out in
the attempt to escape Derrida's critique of modernist metaphysical presence. She argues
that 'the liturgical subject, although constituted through deferral and supplementation, is
nonetheless a coherent and analogically repeated subject, unlike the subject of modernity
and postmodernity alike.'14 Perhaps precisely the same may be said, given the work of
Austin and Searle, and more recently of Thiselton, Vanhoozer and Wolterstorff, of the
speaking subject. Ronald Hall, in his exposition of Kierkegaard's concepts of spirit and
presence, claims this much, grounding individual human being on a divine 'call' (speech-
act) which calls forth my speech:
In the end, I am able to speak in my own name, and the same for you, that is, I
am able to speak with reflexive integrity, only if I am willing to hear, willing to
be alert to, my unique vocation, my unique calling by my own name to speak in
my own name. ... This call constitutes the transcendental ground ofmy unique
being; it is the condition ofmy freedom; the condition ofmy unique dynamic
historical presence in the world before some other; it is the condition of my
existence as spirit.15
Clarification would of course be required with regard to God as speaker, as Wolterstorff
suggested.16 God can be conceived of as being acted upon, but not externally by the speech-
acts of others; he acquires the responsibilities of a speaker of certain speech-acts through
the internal demands of his own character.
Both Pickstock and Vanhoozer argue that the traditions of Christian theology provide
resources for conceiving of presence, first divine, and consequently human, in ways which
exceed the polarities ofmodernity and post-modernity. Both writers explicitly and critically
14 Catherine Pickstock, After Writing. On the Liturgical Consummation of Philosophy (Oxford:
Blackwell, 1998), xv.
15 Ronald L. Hall, 'Spirit and Presence: A Kierkegaardian Analysis', in ed. Robert L. Perkins,
International Kierkegaard Commentary. Either/Or Part I (Macon, Georgia: Mercer Univ. Press,
1995), 271-85 (285). I am grateful to Myron Penner for calling my attention to Hall's essay.
16 Nicholas Wolterstorff, Divine Discourse. Philosophical Reflections on the Claim that God Speaks
(Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1995), 95-113.
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adopt 'pre-modern' descriptions of divine action, developing them in deliberately 'post¬
modern' ways, respectively in the Mass and in the Word. It may be that the current crises
and opportunities of Western culture and thought, profoundly shaped as they are by
Christian traditions, call for just this close examination of old theological positions widely
thought to be both irrelevant and destructive - understandably so, given the bloody post-
Reformation history of Europe - in order to see beyond myopic contemporary dichotomies.
Questions of Word and sacrament as modes of God's presence perhaps therefore appear
with renewed significance, and distinctively contemporary questions may be raised. For
example: How does the establishing of a divine Word as a foundation relate to the physical
creation, and especially to human bodiliness?17 Can the event of transubstantiation in fact
ground the meaningfulness of language, as Pickstock thinks?18
In locating our particular thesis in a theological context, we have argued throughout that
within systematic theology the doctrine of Scripture is organically related to the doctrine of
God. It assumes as an explanatory background, and itself in turn claims, that God is such
that his act of salvation can in principle have universal efficacy by virtue of its particular
historical outworking; Jesus Christ is now the exalted Lord precisely because on a certain
day in a particular location he did not shun death. God is therefore such that he retains his
full divine identity, indeed, demonstrates the nature of his divine identity, by taking to
himself a certain created specificity, namely the human individual Jesus of Nazareth. Since
this specific act of revelation includes complex propositional content and involves the
taking of an Elocutionary stance, the subsequent communication of this revelatory act
requires an Elocutionary act, performed by means of a locutionary act; it is for the
performance of this that Scripture is sufficient. The doctrine of the sufficiency of Scripture
is an outworking of the economy of God's particular self-definition in the salvific and
revelational acts in history which culminated in his coming into history as Jesus of
Nazareth.
17 See Vanhoozer: 'The text aims at producing real effects on readers: at transforming them into the
image of the Word. It wants not only to be followed, but to be, as it were, incarnated. The end of
interpretation, I submit, is embodiment', (Kevin J. Vanhoozer, Is There a Meaning in This Text? The
Bible, the Reader and the Morality of Literary Knowledge [Leicester: Apollos, 1998], 440). Also
Thiselton: 'Theologically, a hermeneutic of an embodied text... coheres with a theological account of
the role of the community in which their actions and witness give credibility to, and facilitate
understanding of, the word which is spoken and read. The text is more than a "docetic" or
disembodied system of signifiers', (Anthony C. Thiselton, New Horizons in Hermeneutics [London:
HarperCollins, 1992], 75).
18 'The words of Consecration "This is my body" therefore, far from being problematic in their
meaning, are the only words which certainly have meaning, and lend this meaning to all other words.
... The bread/Body amalgam is, as it were, such an extreme case of sign that it is no longer sign, but
that which gives signs to be', (Pickstock, After Writing, 263).
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